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I propose an approach to naturalize semantics that combines the use-theory of meaning with 
teleosemantics. More specifically, I combine Horwich’s claim that the meanings of words are 
engendered  by  the  acceptance  of  basic  sentences  that  govern  their  deployment  with  the 
teleosemantic  model,  developed by Millikan,  Papineau and Neander, according to  which the 
meanings of symbols are related to functions determined by the history of their use and of the 
underlying biological mechanisms responsible for it.
Horwich’s account is general enough to offer plausible explanations of the meanings of 
all kinds of words and provides a plausible explanation of how meanings govern the uses of 
words in inference. But, as Devitt shows, his claim that meanings are law-like regularities in the 
use of words does not make enough room for misuses due to ignorance or error, which may be 
regular. I argue that this  problem can be overcome by adopting a teleonomic account of the 
functions  of  symbols,  which  allows  for  failures  in  performance.  The  teleonomic  account 
characterizes functions as what items are supposed (but may fail) do to, based on their selective 
history. While this is a biological notion, Millikan and Papineau have proposed plausible ways to 
extend it to acquired representations. Available teleosemantic theories are truth-referential and 
are usually regarded as competing with use-theories that are motivated by deflationary views of 
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truth and reference. I argue that we need the basic-acceptance account independently of the fate 
of deflationism and that it can be articulated in truth-referentialist terms. Additionally, I argue 
that we need to combine it with teleosemantics. The resulting basic-acceptance teleosemantics 
claims that some basic sentences containing a word are supposed (but may fail) to govern its 
overall use. This account, unlike Horwich’s, makes plenty of room for words being misused due 
to ignorance or error.
Basic-acceptance semantics applies to symbols that play roles in inferential processes. 
For more basic animal representations that have direct perceptual causes and behavioral effects, I 
propose instead an account that combines Millikan’s effect-based teleosemantics with Neander’s 
cause-based teleosemantics. Millikan’s theory explains meanings in terms of the conditions in 
the world that representations are supposed to covary with in order to have the effects they have 
the function of producing. I argue that this theory has the advantage of making enough room for 
misrepresentation,  due  to  its  output-based  character,  but  can  ascribe  meanings  that  are 
implausible because it ignores the causes of representations. Neander’s theory explains meanings 
in terms of the causes that the perceptual mechanisms are supposed to respond to. I argue that 
this  theory  has  the  advantage  of  ascribing  meanings  that  are  plausible  given  the  perceptual 
capacities of organisms, but  it  does not make enough room for misrepresentation because it 
ignores the effects of representations. According to the hybrid account I propose, the meanings of 
basic representations are determined by what is supposed to cause their tokens in order for them 
to bring about the effects they have the function of producing. I argue that the hybrid account 
makes enough room for misrepresentation while ascribing meanings that are plausible given the 
capacities of the perceptual mechanisms that produce them.
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In this dissertation, I propose a new approach to explain the nature of the meanings of human 
symbols. This approach is intended to cover the meanings of words and the meanings or contents 
of concepts—i.e., linguistic and mental symbols. The core idea is that a proper explanation of the 
nature  of  such  meanings  needs  to  combine  insights  from  Paul  Horwich’s  “use”  theory  of 
meaning with insights from teleosemantic theories such as those proposed by Ruth Millikan, 
David Papineau and Karen Neander.
I borrow from Horwich’s theory the idea that the meanings of words are engendered by 
the acceptance of some basic sentences containing them which play the role of governing their 
use.  Accepting  a  sentence  involves  “regarding it  as  true”  and relying  on it  as  a  premise  in 
practical and theoretical inferences. To put it picturesquely, to accept a sentence is to have it 
stored in the “belief-box”. I borrow from teleosemantic theories the idea that the meanings of 
symbols depend on etiological functions underlying their use or the mechanisms that govern it. 
Etiological functions are the functions that reproduced items have been naturally selected for 
performing. This may seem to constrain teleosemantics to innate representations. But Millikan 
and Papineau have proposed plausible accounts of how the approach can be extended to cover 
the meanings of acquired representations.
Horwich’s theory has two main advantages. The first advantage is that the theory is able 
to account for the meanings of different kinds of word. For example, Horwich proposes that the 
meaning of ‘bachelor’ is  engendered by the acceptance of ‘The bachelors are  the unmarried 
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men’, that the meaning of ‘red’ is constituted by the acceptance of ‘This is red’ in response to the 
perception of red surfaces, and that the meaning of ‘and’ stems from the acceptance of the two-
way argument schema, “p, q // p and q”. In these examples, we have one meaning constituted by 
links to other words, another meaning constituted by direct perceptual links to reality, and yet 
another meaning constituted by a rule of inference. It is worth pointing out that most theories of 
meaning do not have this generality. The classical “description theory”, for example, explains 
meanings in terms of the links of words to other words, which make it plausible only for terms 
like ‘bachelor’ and implausible for terms like ‘red’. The contemporary “indicator” theory, for 
example, explains meanings in terms of the (reliable) causal links of words to reality, which has 
some plausibility for terms like ‘red’, but none for terms like ‘bachelor’.
The second advantage of Horwich’s theory is that it is able to explain how the meanings 
of words govern their use, including their sophisticated roles in inference. The idea is that the use 
of a word in some basic sentences can account for its use in other sentences that result from 
inferential processes where the basic sentences work as premises. For instance, the sentence ‘The 
bachelors are the unmarried men’ can serve as an axiom in the inferential system, so that the use 
of ‘bachelor’ in other sentences can be derived from it. Similarly, stimulus-dependent tokens of 
‘This is red’ can serve as premises for stimulus-independent uses of ‘red’. Many theories—like 
the “indicator” theory just mentioned—rely merely on links between isolated words and reality. 
A problem that often goes unnoticed is that such links cannot govern by themselves the use of 
words in inference or thinking processes. Only sentences can serve as premises in practical and 
theoretical inferences. So only properties related to the role of words in sentences can govern 
their overall deployment and, consequently, constitute their meanings.
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The  two  advantages  of  Horwich’s  theory  just  mentioned  are  lacking  in  available 
teleosemantic theories, which account for meanings based only on direct links between symbols 
and reality and are not articulated in terms of sentence acceptance. But Horwich’s theory has two 
problems pointed out by Michael Devitt. First, it is presented as a “use” theory that is compatible 
with deflationism: the view that reference and truth cannot play any role in the explanation of 
meaning.  (Deflationists  argue  that  the  predicates  ‘is  true’ and  ‘refers’ do  not  stand  for  any 
substantial properties that could play explanatory roles in semantics, because their meanings are 
fully explained by their roles in trivial statements such as the statement that  ‘Snow is white’ is  
true  if  and only  if  snow is  white and  the  statement  that  ‘Socrates’ refers  to  Socrates.)  The 
problem with Horwich’s theory is that it risks collapsing into a form of truth-referentialism that 
is incompatible with deflationism, since it links words to reality in ways that non-deflationary 
theories utilize to explain truth and reference: these are precisely the sorts of links that we would 
expect if truth and reference did play an explanatory role in semantics. I think that a collapse of 
the “use” theory into a form of truth-referentialism is likely, but I am glad to embrace it, since I 
am not committed to deflationism.
The second and more serious problem is that Horwich’s theory, as it stands, is unable to 
regard misuses of words as misuses, because it makes meaning depend on whatever dispositions 
people have to deploy words, but people have dispositions to make mistakes—which the theory 
regrettably is forced to treat as correct uses. For example, if a person has a disposition to accept 
‘This is a dog’ in response to the perception of dogs, coyotes and wolfs, Horwich’s theory has to 
regard all such uses as correct, since they are among the dispositions that fix the meaning of the 
word.  This problem motivates  my proposal to combine Horwich’s basic-sentence acceptance 
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theory with teleosemantics.
Teleosemantic theories have the advantage of overcoming precisely the problem faced by 
Horwich’s theory and many other theories that similarly rely on dispositions. This is because 
teleosemantic  theories  deploy  a  concept  of  function  that  allows  for  characterizations  of 
malfunctioning or  failures  in  the  performance of  a  function—and with  the  added benefit  of 
allowing for  such “normative” characterizations  within  the  confines  of  naturalism.  This  is  a 
notion of function that has its home in biology and is anchored on the selective history of items. 
The heart, for example, has the function of pumping blood (roughly) because hearts have been 
“selected” by Darwinian natural selection to pump blood. A heart that is not pumping blood can 
consequently  be  characterized  as  malfunctioning:  as  not  doing what  it  is  “supposed” to  do. 
Teleosemantic theories deploy this notion of function (very roughly) to explain the misuses of 
symbols as situations where they are not deployed the way they are “supposed” to in order to 
perform their functions.
Teleosemantic  theories  apply  straightforwardly  to  innately-determined representations. 
But  Millikan  and  Papineau  have  offered  reasonable  accounts  of  how  the  approach  can  be 
extended to acquired symbols.  Papineau suggests that  the learning processes involved in the 
acquisition of novel concepts are selective processes. Millikan suggests that novel concepts have 
functions derived from the functions of the innate mechanisms responsible for their acquisition, 
which  have  been  naturally  selected  for  coining  new  concepts.  Regarding  linguistic  words, 
Millikan suggests that they have direct functions because they are reproduced items subject to 
social selection. While these are very bold hypotheses, it is reasonable to expect acquired mental 
and linguistic representations to have etiological functions, since our linguistic and conceptual 
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capacities exhibit a complex “design” that is best explained as the result of natural selection 
and/or analogous selective processes.
The main drawback of available teleosemantic theories is that they do not account for the 
diversity of symbols that Horwich’s theory does, and they do not explain how the meaning of a  
symbol is responsible for governing its overall use in inferential processes. Indeed, Millikan and 
Papineau offer accounts according to which the meanings of concepts and words depend on their 
direct links to reality: they do not provide plausible accounts for the meanings of words like 
‘bachelor’ or ‘and’. Also, their accounts do not explain meanings in terms of sentence acceptance 
properties, so the meanings they ascribe are not able to govern the uses of words in inference. 
Even worse, the links postulated by these theories are not even causal in nature: they merely 
involve  correlations  or  co-variations.  So  they  are  detached  from  the  causal  roles  of 
representations in cognition.
The  situation,  then,  is  the  following:  basic-acceptance  semantics  accounts  for  the 
meanings of different kinds of words and for how meanings govern use, but Horwich’s version is 
unable  to  characterize misuses  as  misuses,  while  teleosemantics  can characterize misuses  as 
misuses, but Millikan’s and Papineau’s versions are able to account neither for the meanings of 
all kinds of words nor for how meanings govern use. To overcome this situation, I propose a 
combination of basic-acceptance semantics with teleosemantics. The resulting “basic-acceptance 
teleosemantics”  promises  to  combine  the  main  virtues  of  each  of  the  approaches  while 
overcoming their main deficiencies.
In a nutshell,  my proposal is that the meanings of words are constituted by the basic 
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sentences that are “supposed” to govern their use. The meaning of ‘bachelor’, for example, is 
likely constituted by the fact that ‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’ is “supposed” to govern 
its use. And the meaning of ‘dog’ likely stems from the fact that accepting ‘This is a dog’ in 
response to the perception of dogs is “supposed” to govern its use. Like Horwich’s theory and 
unlike  standard  teleosemantics,  basic-acceptance  teleosemantics  can  account  for  words  with 
different kinds of meaning and for how meanings are causally responsible for word’s uses. But 
basic-acceptance teleosemantics, unlike Horwich’s theory and like standard teleosemantics, can 
make enough room for misuses. Suppose that a person has a disposition to accept ‘This is a dog’ 
in response to the perception of dogs, coyotes and wolfs. As long as the word has a function 
specifically related to its application only to dogs—e.g., the word proliferated because of uses 
governed by accepting ‘This is a dog’ in response to the perception of dogs—then its applications 
to wolfs and coyotes can be properly characterized as misuses.
In the course of working on these ideas I encountered fundamental questions regarding 
the metaphysical status of meanings and the methodology of semantics. I present my resulting 
reflections in the first two chapters of this dissertation. I argue in Chapter 1 for a naturalized 
semantics, based on the fact that meanings play causal roles in the physical world, and object to 
the view that meanings are abstract entities. The idea that meanings are abstract entities is mainly 
motivated by certain view of attitude ascriptions. Consider ‘Mary believes that it will rain’ and 
‘John said that it will rain’. According to a standard analysis, such ascriptions relate the person to 
an abstract object outside of space and time, which happens to be the same object in the case of  
these  two examples:  the  “proposition”  that  it  will  rain.  Despite  being  popular,  this  view is 
troubling  because  abstract  objects  cannot  play  causal  roles  in  the  physical  world,  yet  the 
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meanings postulated in attitude ascriptions do play such roles. The content of the belief ascribed 
to Mary, for example, may explain why she picks up an umbrella. I argue in Chapter 1 that we 
need a  naturalized  semantics  that  explains  the  nature of  meanings  in  terms of  properties  or 
phenomena that can play causal roles in the physical world. In the process, I defend a view of 
attitude ascriptions suggested by Devitt, which serves as an alternative to the “propositionalist” 
one: the suggestion is that ‘that’-clauses ascribe semantic properties to concrete representation 
tokens by means of synonymy with the sentences embedded in the clauses. For example, the 
ascription to Mary above may be paraphrased as ‘Some belief of Mary has the same meaning as 
‘It  will  rain’.’ Under this  analysis,  attitude ascriptions  quantify over  concrete  utterances  and 
thoughts  and  ascribe  worldly  semantic  properties  to  them.  In  Appendix  2,  I  offer  another 
consideration in favor of this analysis: I argue that it avoids some serious problems faced by the 
alternative non-propositionalist analysis offered by Friederike Moltmann.
In Chapter 2, I discuss what is the task of semantics. While it is not unusual to assume 
that  the  task  is  to  explain  the  truth-conditions  of  sentences  and the referential  properties  of 
words, I argue, following Devitt, that this begs the question against deflationists, who argue that 
truth and reference cannot play any substantial role in semantics. I engage in this chapter on a 
brief  discussion of  the correspondence theory of  truth and deflationism. I  point  out  that  the 
canonical view of the correspondence relation as one of structural resemblance is hopeless, but 
that  a  contemporary  alternative  based on the  logico-syntactic  structure  of  sentences  and the 
referential properties of their words constitutes a promising project. I suggest that the debate 
between deflationism and the correspondence view is likely to be settled by whether we find out 
that we need or not truth and reference to play explanatory roles in semantics. This shows that  
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we cannot  settle  the  debate  before  engaging  in  semantics,  and  that  we  should  not  identify 
meanings in truth-referential terms before attempting to explain their natures. Following Devitt, I 
suggest  that  we should identify meanings  based on the causal roles of linguistic  and mental 
representations.  As  “folk  semanticists”  we  identify  pre-theoretically  meanings  in  attitude 
ascriptions in order to explain the behavior of others and use them as guides to reality. As noted 
above, we can explain Mary’s picking up an umbrella based on her belief that it is raining. Also, 
we can learn that it will rain by ascribing the right meaning to John’s utterance, assuming he is  
reliable. In general, we identify such meanings by the causes and effects of representations. The 
same considerations apply to words and concepts, which also have meanings that we identify by 
their  causal  roles,  by  the  way  they  are  used.  Pre-theoretically  we  regard  meanings  as  the 
properties that explain the uses of words and concepts. Identifying meanings by the causal roles 
of representations has the advantage of being “neutral” between various semantic theories and 
not begging the question against deflationists. It sets a common explanatory target for the various 
theories to compete against each other. But it also establishes a clear requirement for a proper 
semantic theory: it must ascribe meanings that explain the causal roles of representations.
The second part of this dissertation begins in Chapter 3, where I briefly survey available 
semantic  theories,  offer  a  sketch  of  the  combination  of  basic-acceptance  semantics  and 
teleosemantics, and elaborate on the virtues and problems faced by Horwich’s version of basic-
acceptance semantics—along the lines sketched above. In Chapter 4, I briefly present the basic 
ideas  behind  teleosemantics  and  discuss  in  some  detail  the  teleological  notion  of  function, 
arguing that it has crucial advantages over dispositionalist alternatives. In Chapter 5, I discuss 
standard  teleosemantic  theories  in  more  detail,  focusing  on  the  case  of  simple  animal 
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representations that have direct perceptual causes and behavioral effects. My original idea was to 
briefly  survey these theories  before moving on to  discuss  human representations.  But  while 
assessing the views, I came to the conclusion that the main teleosemantic proposals for basic 
representations all had serious drawbacks. I ended up proposing a hybrid account that combines 
Millikan’s  effect-based  teleosemantics  with  Karen  Neander’s  cause-based  teleosemantics. 
Millikan’s theory explains meanings in terms of the conditions in the world that representations 
are  supposed  to  covary  with  in  order  to  bring  about  the  effects  they  have  the  function  of 
producing.  I  argue  that  this  theory  has  the  advantage  of  making  enough  room  for 
misrepresentation,  due  to  its  output-based  character,  but  can  ascribe  meanings  that  are 
implausible because it ignores the causes of representations. Neander’s theory explains meanings 
in terms of the causes that the perceptual mechanisms are supposed to respond to. I argue that 
this  theory  has  the  advantage  of  ascribing  meanings  that  are  plausible  given  the  perceptual 
capacities of organisms, but  it  does not make enough room for misrepresentation because it 
ignores the effects of representations. According to the hybrid account I propose, the meanings of 
basic representations are determined by what is supposed to cause their tokens in order for them 
to bring about the effects they have the function of producing. I argue that the hybrid account 
makes enough room for misrepresentation while ascribing meanings that are plausible given the 
capacities of the perceptual mechanisms that produce them. It  is worth pointing out that my 
argument  for  this  hybrid  account  relies  on  the  methodological  considerations  discussed  in 
Chapter  2.  Finally, in  Chapter  6,  I  discuss  how available  teleosemantic  theories  extend  the 
approach to human representations, but object that Papineau’s and Millikan’s accounts of the 
meanings  of  human  concepts  and  words  have  the  problems  pointed  out  above.  Again,  my 
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objections rely in part on the methodological considerations from Chapter 2. Finally, I argue that 
a  combination  of  basic-acceptance  semantics  with  teleosemantics—along  the  lines  briefly 
sketched above—is able to overcome the problems faced by Horwich’s theory, on one hand, and 
Papineau’s and Millikan’s theories, on the other.
Millikan has resurrected the view of correspondence as structural resemblance I reject in 
Chapter  2.  I  argue  in  Appendix  1  that,  despite  her  talk  of  “picturing”  relations  and 
“isomorphisms”, structural resemblances play no role in her account. This, of course, does not 
protect the account from the serious objections raised above and discussed in more detail  in 
Chapters 5 and 6.
I conclude this introduction with an important terminological warning. I use profusely the 
word ‘property’ throughout this work. However, it must be noted that in Chapter 1, while arguing 
against Platonism, I express sympathy for a form of nominalism. According to nominalism, there 
are no such entities as universals. And talk of “properties” is usually and justifiably understood 
as talk of universals. Some people, however, do not want to “give away” the word ‘property’ to 
realists about universals. Talk of properties may, for instance, be consistent with particularism 
about properties: according to which properties are real but particular, not universal. On the other 
hand, ‘property’ can be taken as a convenient manner of speaking that should be paraphrased 
away  in  an  ultimate  metaphysical  analysis.  I  use  profusely  the  word  because  I  do  find  it 
extremely useful. But I want readers to understand that I expect my use  not to commit me to 
realism about universals. If pressed, I would say that I am using the word merely as a useful but 
figurative manner of speaking.
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Chapter 1:
The Metaphysics of Meaning
1.1 Introduction
There is a commonly held view that threatens any form of a naturalized semantics. Many in the 
field  of  philosophical  semantics  regard  the  contents  of  utterances  and  thoughts  as  abstract  
entities, rather than natural worldly phenomena. The main motivation for this view comes from 
an  analysis  of  attitude  ascriptions.  Instead  of  analyzing  attitude  ascriptions  as  identifying 
phenomena that play causal roles in the physical world, the investigation of attitude ascriptions—
as Michael Devitt points out—is “dominated by philosophers who talk of ‘propositions,’ Platonic 
objects that are separate from the concrete spatio-temporal world of meaningful tokens” (Devitt 
1996: 83). These are the entities that W.V.O. Quine dismisses as “creatures of darkness” (Quine 
1956: 180). The aim of this chapter is to argue against the view that the meanings or contents of 
concrete utterances and thoughts involve any relations to such entities. I will argue that there are 
compelling metaphysical reasons for regarding contents as natural worldly phenomena—to be 
explained by a  naturalized semantics—and rejecting  any appeal  to  propositions  qua abstract 
objects. To defend naturalized semantics from the threat of Platonism, we have to delve into the 
metaphysics of meaning.
One  of  the  main  motivations  for  a  naturalized  semantics  comes  from  Metaphysical  
Naturalism, which in its strongest form is the same doctrine as  physicalism: the view that “all 
entities are physical entities and that the laws they obey are in some way dependent on physical  
laws” (Devitt 2010: 254). Metaphysical Naturalism should be distinguished from the doctrine of 
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Epistemological  Naturalism,  according to  which philosophical  knowledge is  continuous with 
scientific knowledge and does not have the privileged status it was traditionally thought to have. 
Quine defends this doctrine with his rejection of  a priori  knowledge. Since all knowledge is 
empirical,  Quine  argues,  there  is  no  place  for  a  “first  philosophy”  that  investigates  reality 
independently of science:  “it  is  within science itself,  and not in  some prior philosophy, that 
reality is to be identified and described” (Quine 1981a: 21). (See Devitt 2010: 254-255.)
But  there is  a  weaker  metaphysical doctrine that  is  also often regarded as  a  form of 
“Naturalism”:  the  view  that  only  physical  forces  can  act  upon  the  natural  world.  Most 
contemporary philosophers accept that physical events can only have physical causes—since this 
follows from well-established and fundamental  scientific principles like the “conservation of 
energy”. Accepting the causal closure of the physical world, however, leaves room for admitting 
the existence of non-physical entities that do not have any physical effects. (Many contemporary 
dualists about the mental, for example, have retreated to an epiphenomenalist version of dualism 
according to which mental states do not cause intentional behavior.) Some philosophers seek to 
naturalize semantics because they accept this weaker form of naturalism and think that meanings 
do have effects in the physical world,  but they are not physicalists. This is the case of Paul 
Horwich (1998a & 1998b), who offers a naturalistic theory of  meaning, but also supports the 
view that the  propositions expressed by linguistic and mental sentences are abstract objects. I 
will address Horwich’s way of combining propositionalism with naturalized semantics and argue 
that, while there is one interpretation under which the abstract entities he posits are innocuous, 
there is another interpretation under which his view does conflict with the causal closure of the 
physical world. While I sympathize with the stronger naturalist doctrine—physicalism—I will 
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argue that the weaker and widely accepted doctrine—the causal closure of the physical world—is 
enough to rule out abstract objects playing the role of meanings or contents.
I will proceed as follows: I will clarify what propositions are alleged to be (Section 1.2), I  
will criticize the main arguments offered in support of the existence of such entities (Sections 1.3 
& 1.4), and I will argue that meanings must be worldly phenomena, rather than abstract objects,  
in order to play the explanatory roles they ought to play (Section 1.5). Afterwards, I will discuss 
whether there are grounds for naturalizing propositions, rather than rejecting them altogether 
(Section 1.6). And, finally, I will argue against Horwich’s account of propositions qua abstract 
objects—or, more specifically, one interpretation of it—which he combines with a naturalistic 
account of meanings (Section 1.7).
1.2 What are Propositions Alleged to Be?
The way talk of propositions is usually introduced does not seem  ostensibly controversial or 
obscure, but serious complications arise when we consider the ontological commitments such 
talk is often interpreted as having and whether the postulated entities can play the explanatory 
roles they are supposed to play. In this section, I shall discuss what propositions are often alleged 
to be: abstract objects that constitute the contents of utterances and thoughts and that are the 
primary bearers of truth. There are alternative views of the nature of propositions. For example, 
there is the view that propositions are identical to the facts that make sentences and beliefs true, 
the view that they are worldly properties of utterances and thoughts, and the view that they are 
merely  convenient  fictions we talk  about  figuratively  to  formulate  generalizations  about  the 
meaningful utterances and thoughts.  My concern here is  with the view that  propositions  are 
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abstract objects. In the following sections, I will critically assess the main arguments for this 
view and argue that the meanings or contents of utterances and thoughts should not be regarded 
as propositions  qua abstract objects, since meanings play causal-explanatory roles that abstract 
objects cannot play. In this section I will discuss the main features of the view I am opposing.
Propositions are often said to be “what is common to a set of synonymous declarative 
sentences”, so that two sentences “express the same proposition if they have the same meaning” 
(Haack 1978: 76-77). For example, ‘Snow is white’ in English, ‘La nieve es blanca’ in Spanish 
and ‘Schnee ist weiß’ in German have the same meaning, so they are all alleged to express the 
same  proposition—namely,  that  snow  is  white.  A proposition  is  supposed  to  be  something 
different from each of the declarative sentences that expresses it. It is what Alonzo Church calls a 
“proposition in the abstract sense”, which he distinguishes from a “proposition in the traditional  
sense” (Church 1956a: 3). The word ‘proposition’ was traditionally used to refer to a “declarative 
sentence taken together with its meaning” (Church 1956a: 3); but in its contemporary use the 
word refers only to the “content of meaning” of a declarative sentence (Church 1956a: 5) which, 
according to Church, is an “abstract object” (Church 1956b: 26). According to this view, the 
meaning of a declarative sentence  is a proposition  qua abstract object and what is common to 
various synonymous sentences is that they are all related to a single abstract object. A variant of 
the view is that the meaning of synonymous declarative sentences is a property they have in 
virtue of a relation to a proposition qua abstract object.
The claim that propositions are what synonymous declarative sentences have in common 
faces complications in the case of context-sensitive sentences. Presumably when Mary and John 
each say ‘I am hungry’, they are expressing different propositions, even though their utterances 
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have, in a sense, the same meaning.1 So, as David Kaplan argues, a distinction needs to be drawn 
between two  kinds  of  meaning. One kind  is  the  unvarying meaning of  an  expression—e.g., 
utterances of ‘I am hungry’ always mean that the speaker is hungry—which Kaplan calls its 
“character” (Kaplan 1989: 505-507). The other kind is the varying meaning of an expression that 
changes from context to context—e.g., ‘I am hungry’ means that Mary is hungry in one context 
and that John is hungry in another—which Kaplan calls its “content” (Kaplan 1989: 500-505). 
Kaplan convincingly argues that,  while the  character  of an expression depends on linguistic 
conventions,  the  content of  a  particular  utterance of  the expression depends on its  character 
together with the  context of the utterance: “The character of an expression is set by linguistic 
conventions and, in turn, determines the content of the expression in every context” (Kaplan 
1989: 505). For example, the content of Mary’s utterance of ‘I am hungry’ is that Mary is hungry, 
because the character  or  linguistic  convention for  ‘I’ is  that  it  refers  to  the speaker  and the 
speaker in this context of utterance is Mary. Additionally, Kaplan argues that, when uttering a 
sentence, the content of the utterance—rather than its character—is what is said and what has a  
truth-value (Kaplan 1989: 500). So, what is said and what is true or false when Mary utters ‘I am 
hungry’ is that Mary is hungry. Armed with Kaplan’s distinction, proponents of propositions can 
handle context-sensitivity by specifying that two utterances express the same proposition when 
they  have  the  same  content,  rather  than  the  same  character.  Kaplan  himself  identifies 
propositions with the contents of sentence utterances: “The content of a sentence in a given 
context is... a proposition.” (Kaplan 1989: 500). To simplify exposition, I will mostly ignore in 
what  follows  the  complexities  introduced  by  context-sensitivity.  But  Kaplan’s distinction  is 
1 In this case, the utterances are tokens of the same English sentence type. But the same considerations apply to 
tokens of synonymous context-sensitive sentences from different languages. When Carlos says ‘Tengo hambre’ 
in  Spanish,  he  is  presumably  expressing a  different  proposition than  Mary  and  John,  even  though ‘Tengo 
hambre’ is synonymous with ‘I am hungry’.
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important regardless of whether the  contents of declarative sentences are regarded as abstract 
objects or not. I will return to this issue after arguing against the account of propositions  qua 
abstract objects.
Propositions are said to also be the contents of beliefs, identified in reports of the form ‘S 
believes that p’, where the ‘that’-clause contains a sentence expressing the content of the belief. 
Bertrand Russell, for example, said: “The content of a belief, when expressed in words, is the 
same thing...  as  what  in  logic  is  called  a  «proposition»…  «That  all  men are  mortal», «that 
Columbus  discovered  America»...  are  propositions.” (Russell  1921:  240-241).  Russell 
characterized believing as a particular kind of psychological attitude that may be taken towards 
different propositions. Someone may believe that p, that q, that r, etc. Conversely, he pointed out 
that “there are various different attitudes that may be taken towards the same content.” (Russell 
1921: 243). Someone may believe that p, expect that p, remember that p, hope that p, fear that p, 
etc. However, he warned: “These attitudes are not equally ultimate.” (Russell 1921: 244). Since 
Russell’s work, beliefs, desires and intentions have come to be regarded as the most fundamental 
“propositional  attitudes”,  because  intentional  behaviors  are  presumably  caused  by  intentions 
formed as a result of practical inferences from beliefs and desires. While desires and intentions 
have  satisfaction-conditions,  only  beliefs  have  truth-conditions.  I  will  focus  on  beliefs  and 
discuss other psychological attitudes only when relevant.
It is worth pointing out that Russell  rejected the view that propositions are entities that 
exist  separately from concrete  representations when he characterized beliefs  as propositional 
attitudes: he held instead that a meaningful declarative sentence is a “word-proposition”, while a 
contentful mental image is an “image-proposition” (Russell 1921: 241). Notice that what today is 
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regarded as the “Russellian” conception of propositions is the view held by the early Russell 
(1903)—I briefly  discuss  it  below—which he later  rejected.  Russell’s view during this  later 
period was closely related to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s: “the proposition is the propositional sign in 
its projective relation to the world” (Wittgenstein 1922: 3.12). Russell and Wittgenstein reverted 
to the traditional use of the word ‘proposition’.2
Contemporary accounts of propositional attitudes,  however, often adopt the view that 
they are relations between agents and abstract objects. According to this view, what the belief 
that snow is white,  the sentence ‘Snow is white’ and the sentence ‘Schnee ist weiß’ have in 
common is that they are all related to a single abstract object: the proposition that snow is white. 
Regarding a proposition as an abstract object raises difficult metaphysical questions. Stephen 
Schiffer, for example, characterizes the nature of a proposition as follows:
Well:  (i)  it  is  abstract,  in that it  has no spatial  location...  (ii)  It  is  mind- and 
language-independent in  that  it  exists  in  possible  worlds  in  which  there  are 
neither thinkers nor speakers... [It] is also language-independent in that, while it 
may be the content of a sentence of any language, it itself belongs to no language; 
it  is  not  a  linguistic  entity...  [Propositions  are]  abstract,  mind-  and  language-
independent objects... (Schiffer 1992: 506)
Basically, the claim is that propositions are  Platonic objects that exist outside of the physical 
world of space and time and independently of any concrete utterances and thoughts. The main 
source of this view is Gottlob Frege, who argued that the proposition expressed by a sentence has 
2 Locke, for example, said: “The signs we chiefly use are either ideas or words; wherewith we make either mental  
or verbal propositions.” (Essay: Book II, Ch. XXXII, §19). Similarly, Ockham claimed that the parts of “mental 
propositions” are “called concepts” and that “a mental proposition is composed... in the same way as a spoken 
proposition is composed of spoken words” (Summa Logicae: Part I C12).
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only the senses of the words as constituents (Frege 1956: 292), which are “neither things of the 
outer world nor ideas”, but abstract entities that exist in a Platonic “third realm” (Frege 1956:  
302). These Platonic objects are extremely mysterious. Where do they exist, if not in space and 
time? What are they made of? How can we know they exist  if  we cannot access the other-
worldly realm they inhabit? And, more importantly, how can they be the content of concrete 
utterances and thoughts if—given the causal closure of the physical world—they cannot interact 
with them? Since there are no satisfactory answers to these crucial questions—I will focus on the 
last one, which is particularly pressing—there is a very strong case for disregarding propositions 
qua abstract objects as “creatures of darkness”.
Finally, propositions are claimed to be the primary bearers of truth. This specific claim 
has to be distinguished from the claim that propositions are truth-bearers—a broader claim that is 
compatible with a number of differing views about the nature of propositions and their relation to 
declarative sentences and beliefs. The claim that “propositions” are truth-bearers, without further 
qualification, applies equally to “propositions” regarded as  meaningful sentences or contentful  
beliefs and to propositions regarded exclusively as the  meanings or contents that sentences or 
beliefs may have. In contrast, the claim that propositions are the primary truth-bearers is clearly 
committed to the latter of these views. The idea is that particular sentences and beliefs are only 
derivatively true: a belief is true only insofar as it has a true proposition as its content and a 
sentence is true only when it expresses a true proposition. Talk of sentences or beliefs being true 
is considered at best as parasitic. Frege, for example, claimed: “when we call a sentence true we 
really  mean  its  sense  is”  (Frege  1956:  292).  The  view  is  popular  among  contemporary 
philosophers. Some argue even that it is implicit in our ordinary way of talking. Paul Horwich, 
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for example, claims: “Ordinary language suggests that propositional truth is fundamental and 
that the notion of an utterance ‘expressing a true proposition’ and the notion of a belief ‘being 
directed  at  a  true  proposition’ are  understood in  terms of  it.”  (Horwich 1998b:  133).  I  will  
challenge this view and the underlying assumption that ordinary language considerations can 
settle metaphysical controversies.
The particular view on the nature of propositions I oppose—and will argue against in the 
remainder of this chapter—is the one that endorses all of the three following claims:
(1) Propositions are the common meanings of synonymous sentences and beliefs.
(2) Propositions are the primary truth-bearers.
(3) Propositions are mind- and language-independent abstract objects.
Whether  propositions  so conceived really  exist  depends on whether  synonymous declarative 
sentences and the beliefs identified by ‘that’-clauses containing them indeed have something in 
common,  whether  what  they  have  in  common  is  a  legitimate  and  primary  truth-bearer  and 
whether what they have in common is a relation to an abstract entity.
The view that  combines  claims (1),  (2) and (3) should be clearly distinguished from 
alternative views. I will focus for a moment only on sentences to simplify exposition. Consider 
the view according to which propositions are identical to the concrete facts represented by true 
sentences (e.g., Russell 1904). This view rejects (3), should also reject (2)—since it cannot draw 
a distinction between truth-makers and truth-bearers—and endorses a qualified version of (1): 
synonymous true sentences express the same proposition. Another view regards propositions as 
worldly semantic properties shared by synonymous sentences and holds that these properties are 
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the primary truth-bearers (e.g., Armstrong 2004). This view endorses (1) and (2) but rejects (3). 
Finally, there is the view that the primary truth-bearers are meaningful sentence tokens that are 
true or false partly in virtue of their meanings (and partly in virtue of how the world is), where  
such meanings are worldly phenomena (e.g., Devitt 1996). This view rejects (3), endorses (2) 
only if  ‘proposition’ is  used in  its  traditional  sense  and endorses  a  qualified  version  of  (1):  
synonymous sentences have common meanings, but these meanings should not be regarded by 
themselves as propositions, since what is true or false are meaningful tokens.
While it is clear that various sentences and beliefs do have common semantic features 
that are responsible for their  truth or falsity, it  is far  from clear that these common features 
involve abstract entities.3 Consider the various utterances and written inscriptions of ‘Snow is 
white’ in English, of ‘La nieve es blanca’ in Spanish, of ‘Schnee ist weiß’ in German, and the 
various instances of the belief that snow is white in the minds of different people. Surely all these 
concrete sentence and belief tokens have “something” in common: they all  mean  or have the 
content that snow is white. Moreover, these sentence and belief tokens surely are true in virtue of 
their meanings or contents (together with snow being white). Unless we are skeptical about the 
very  notions  of  meaning  or  sameness  of  meaning—i.e.,  synonymy—there  is  no  reason  to 
disregard them as  “creatures  of  darkness”.4 But  why should we regard meanings  as abstract 
entities rather than worldly features of sentence and belief tokens?
3 I will focus mainly on sentence and belief  tokens. Different but synonymous (non-context-sensitive) sentence 
types are said to express the same proposition. In turn, different concrete tokens of the same (non-context-
sensitive)  sentence  type  are  said  to  express  the  same proposition.  The major  contrast  is  between  concrete 
sentence and belief tokens, on one hand, and the alleged abstract objects called “propositions”, on the other.
4 Quine’s  rejection  of  propositions  stems,  in  part,  from  his  skepticism  about  synonymy:  “If  there  were 
propositions, they would induce a certain relation of synonymy or equivalence between sentences themselves: 
those  sentences  would be  equivalent  that  expressed  the  same proposition.  Now my objection  is...  that  the 
appropriate equivalence relation makes no objective sense at the level of sentences.” (Quine 1970: 3) I will  
ignore this skepticism here and assume that a naturalized semantics can account for different sentence and belief  
tokens having the same meaning or content.
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The view that meanings are abstract objects is usually motivated by the metaphysical 
conviction that, when various sentence and belief tokens have the same representational content, 
what is common to them is not just a property but, rather, a relation to a single object: the same 
thing  that is said or believed on many occasions and which has the property of being true or 
false.5 This  postulated  object  is  assumed  to  be  something  different  both  from the  concrete 
sentence  and  belief  tokens  related  to  it  and  from  the  reality  that  would  make  it  true.  A 
proposition, on this view, is an intermediary between linguistic and mental entities, on one side, 
and the represented world, on the other. For example, it is alleged that a token of ‘Snow is white’  
is (derivatively) true because it expresses the proposition that snow is white, which in turn is 
(primarily) true because snow is white.  This contrasts  with the simpler view that a token of 
‘Snow is white’ is true because snow is white, with no additional entity mediating between the 
sentence and the world. The simpler view has the advantages of being more economical—i.e., 
postulating fewer entities—and relying only on things whose reality is already uncontroversial 
(Devitt 1996: 212).
I  end  this  section  with  a  clarification  of  the  notion  that  propositions  are  mind-  and 
language-independent entities. While I am focusing on the version of this view that can be traced 
back to Frege, there is another equally popular version that is not (necessarily) committed to 
propositions qua abstract objects: the so called “Russellian” account of propositions. The early 
Russell  held  that  propositions  do  not  contain  symbols:  “Words all  have  meaning...  they  are 
symbols which stand for something other than themselves. But a proposition... does not itself 
5 The meaning of a sentence or belief token, on this view, may be regarded as an object or as the property of being 
related to an object. However, regarding the meaning as a property is also compatible with it not being a relation 
to an object: “[Whereas] if the meaning of a token is an object then the token obviously has the property of  
being related to that object; it is not the case that if the meaning is a property then that property is obviously a  
relation to some object.” (Devitt 1996: 57).
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contain words: it contains the entities indicated by words” (Russell 1903: 48). On this view, the 
sentence ‘Mary loves John’ has the words ‘Mary’, ‘loves’ and ‘John’ as constituents, while the 
proposition it expresses is a mind- and language-independent entity that only has the referents of 
these words in the world as constituents: Mary, love and John. The early Russell and Frege agree 
that only the  meanings of words are constituents of the proposition expressed by a sentence. 
Their disagreement is about the nature of those meanings. Frege regards senses while the early 
Russell regards referents as the constituents of propositions.
The “Russellian” account of the  parts of a proposition needs also an account of what 
binds them together into a  single entity.  Russell  claimed that “every proposition has a unity 
which renders it distinct from the sum of its constituents” (Russell 1903: 53). In the case of the 
sentence ‘Mary loves John’ the unity is provided by the syntactic arrangement of its words. But 
the proposition  that Mary loves John allegedly contains no words. Russell proposed that what 
provides the unity of such a proposition is that the loving relation “actually relates” Mary and 
John (Russell  1903:  50).  As  Jeffrey  King notices,  on  this  view there  is  “a  collapse  of  true 
propositions into the facts that make them true” (King 2007: 23). Russell for a time embraced the 
collapse and suggested that a proposition is true if and only if it is  identical to a fact (Russell: 
1904). But the collapse creates a serious problem. It entails, as King points out, that “there are no 
false propositions” (King 2007: 23). If it is not a fact that Mary loves John, then there is no unity 
that we can call the “false proposition”  that Mary loves John. This simple point constitutes a 
reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine.
The Russellian account of the parts of propositions may be combined with other accounts 
of the unity of the proposition. It may be claimed the unity is provided by an abstract structure 
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that is not identical to the structure of the fact it represents. This proposal avoids the collapse of 
propositions into facts, but propositions are regarded again as abstract structured entities—even 
if  their  parts  are  concrete.  The case against  propositions  qua abstract  entities I  make below 
applies also to this kind of view. King (2007) proposes a different modification of the Russellian 
view, according to which the unity of a proposition is provided by the syntactic structure of the  
sentence expressing it. This proposal also avoids the collapse of propositions into facts. But it 
clearly departs from the Platonic view I am discussing: King’s “propositions” are not language-
independent.6
Many philosophers,  however,  still  subscribe  to  propositions  qua abstract,  mind-  and 
language-independent objects. In the next two sections I will discuss the main arguments offered 
in support of this view. I will argue that none of them succeeds and that the explanation of the 
common contents of various declarative sentences and beliefs—in virtue of which they are true 
or false—should rely on worldly phenomena rather than relations to alleged abstract objects.
1.3 Propositions and the “One over Many” Argument
One consideration that may be offered in support of regarding the common contents of various 
sentence  and  belief  tokens  as  abstract  objects  relies  on  the  classical  “One  over  Many”  or 
“Universals” problem. In this section, I shall present the problem, discuss how it may be applied 
6 King’s ingenious proposal, however, adopts a “direct reference” view of meaning along the lines proposed by 
Nathan Salmon (1986) and Scott Soames (2002). This view faces well-known problems: it cannot account for  
differences  in  meaning  between—or  in  the  “propositions”  expressed  by—sentences  like  ‘Lois  Lane  loves 
Superman’ and  ‘Lois  Lane  loves  Clark  Kent’.  Frege’s  solution  to  this  problem was  to  regard  “modes  of 
presentation” or senses as part  of the meanings of words (Frege  1948).  Frege problematically regarded the 
senses of names as associated descriptions: a view that has been debunked by Saul Kripke (1982). He also 
regarded the senses of sentences as abstract entities: the target of this chapter. But a broadly Fregean solution  
can be articulated without any of these problematic commitments (see Devitt 2001b & 2012).
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to meanings and argue that it fails to provide support for regarding them as abstract objects.
How can many things have one single feature in common? Multiple objects, for example, 
are red. This mundane situation may seem, as David Armstrong puts it, “profoundly puzzling”:
The  same  property  can  belong  to  different  things...  Apparently,  there  can  be 
something identical in things which are not identical. Things are one at the same 
time as they are many. How is this possible? (Armstrong: 1978: 11)
Plato proposed an uncanny solution to this problem: when many concrete and particular things 
share a common feature, there must be one abstract and universal thing—a “form”—that exists 
independently of any of them but that they all are related to. In the Republic Plato says: “[Take] 
any set of many things you like. For example, there are... many couches and tables... But the 
forms connected to these manufactured items are surely just two, one of a couch and one of a 
table.” (Rep.: 596a-b) Plato says of “all the forms”: “each of them is itself one thing, but because 
they appear all over the place in partnership with actions and bodies, and with one another, each 
of them appears to be many things.” (Rep.: 476a) Needless to say, Plato’s solution seems even 
more puzzling than the problem. According to Plato, if many things are red, it must be because 
they are all related to a single abstract object: redness itself. Similarly, it may be argued, we need 
to explain how numerically different sentence and belief tokens can have a single meaning or 
content in common that is responsible for their truth or falsity, and the Platonic solution is to  
postulate an abstract object that all of these tokens are related to. It is worth addressing this 
instance of the “One over Many” argument, even if it is seldom explicitly made nowadays by 
those who regard propositions as abstract objects. “One over Many” thinking is common and 
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may well have some influence on the view that meanings or propositions are abstract entities. 
Consider, for example, the following passage by George Pitcher:
If one person says “It is raining,” another “Il pleut,” and a third “Es regnet,” a 
correct answer to the question “What did he say?” would in each case be “He said 
that it is raining”—for each would have said the same thing. And it is this element 
which all three utterances have in common—this same thing that is said in all 
three cases—that is the real bearer of truth, not the different sentences which the 
speakers happen to utter. (Pitcher 1964: 5)7
Since different synonymous sentence tokens all say the same thing, the passage suggests, this 
common feature must itself be another  thing that they all are related to and that is the “real” 
truth-bearer.  But this argument, as Richard Kirkham points out, is a “non sequitur” (Kirkham 
1992: 64). It simply does not follow from different utterances saying the same thing that each 
utterance does not say it by itself or that it is not a truth-bearer in its own right: “The [different] 
tokens  say  the  same thing,  but  each  one  says  it  independently. Why could  not  each  of the 
sentence  tokens  be  true  because  of  what  it  says?”  (Kirkham  1992:  64).  The  metaphysical 
principle that  the common features of worldly things must involve a common relation to an 
abstract thing that “really” has that feature is, as Kirkham points out, itself problematic:
Consider the property of being my sister: there are two women in the world who 
possess this property, and it is not something they have in common that “really” 
possesses the property, they each have it. There is not one thing that is my sister, 
7 In fairness, Pitcher seems to be merely presenting here what he takes to be a commonly held consideration,  
since he eventually rejects the view that meanings are Platonic objects (Pitcher 1964: 9).
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there are two. (Kirkham 1992: 65)8
Similarly, when various utterances say the same thing, there is no reason to suppose that what is  
said is another “thing”, in addition to the utterances, that is the “real” truth-bearer. The Platonic 
solution faces serious difficulties (which I discuss later in this section) and is incompatible with a 
naturalized semantics that expects to explain the meanings of utterances in terms phenomena that 
play causal roles in the world.
If we accept that there is a genuine “One over Many” problem, there is an alternative and 
more reasonable solution. Instead of endorsing a Platonic transcendent realism about universals
—the view that “universals exist separated from particulars” (Armstrong: 1978: 140)—we may 
adopt  an  Aristotelian  immanent  realism—which  “admits  universals  but  denies  that  they  are 
transcendent” (Armstrong: 1978: 137)—. Aristotle rejected the view that the common features of 
particular  objects  are  themselves  objects  with  a  separate  existence  and proposed that,  while 
universal  features—or  “forms”—  are  real,  they  only  exist  in particular  objects.  In  the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle says: “in general nothing that is common is substance” since “that which 
is one cannot be in many things at the same time, but that which is common is present in many 
things at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from the individuals” (Met.: Z 
XVI 1040b). According to an immanent realism, redness is a universal but concrete property that 
exists  in—rather than separately from—particular red things, while being a sister  of Richard 
Kirkham is a  worldly property possessed by two particular individuals,  not a single abstract 
8 Kirkham’s reply works well against the kind of Platonism implicit in Pitcher’s passage: one that holds that F-
ness itself must be F. While Plato apparently held this view, a contemporary Platonist may be better off rejecting 
it to avoid the problems associated with it (Armstrong 1978: 71-72). The difficulties I discuss below, however,  
apply to any kind of Platonism.
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entity that they both are related to.9 Similarly, it may be argued, the common semantic properties 
of various sentence and belief  tokens are universal but worldly properties that exist  in these 
tokens.  Such  immanent  realism avoids  abstract  objects  altogether  and  is  compatible  with  a 
naturalized  semantics,  since  worldly  meanings  can play  causal  roles  in  mind  and  language 
(Armstrong 2004: 12-14). However, one may reasonably be skeptical about the need to posit 
universals to begin with. Is there really any  mystery regarding how different tokens have the 
same meaning or how different things can be red?
Those who think that the “One over Many” problem is genuine find mundane situations 
like various things being red deeply puzzling and in need of explanation. Yet, Quine reasonably 
argues that this is a pseudo-problem and no explanation is needed:
One may admit that there are red houses, roses and sunsets, but deny, except as a 
popular and misleading manner of speaking, that they have anything in common... 
That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate 
and irreducible, and it may be held that [the realist about universals] is no better 
off, in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits 
under such names as ‘redness’. (Quine 1961: 10)
Quine’s suggestion is that particular things being red can be taken as a basic fact that needs no 
explanation and, additionally, that positing redness as a universal does not explain anything not 
already accounted for by acknowledging the existence of red things (Quine 1961: 10). His point 
is  that  there  is  nothing  puzzling  to  begin  with  and  the  alleged  explanations  are  idle.  Now, 
suppose that I say ‘My car and my bike have the same property: redness’. Devitt argues that a 
9 Armstrong (1978) offers a contemporary defense of immanent realism which I will discuss later in this section.
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claim like this can be paraphrased into a claim that serves the same purpose but is not committed  
to a universal: I can say instead ‘My car and my bike are both red’, which trivially follows from 
‘My car is red’ and ‘My bike is red’ (Devitt 2010: 14-15). The realist about universals, however, 
is puzzled even about how a single thing can have a property: how can my car be red? But one 
may wonder whether this is really puzzling. The fact that my car is red can be said to merely 
involve  the  existence  of  an  object,  my  car,  that  really  is  red  (Devitt  2010:  16).  A further 
explanation in terms of universal redness seems to be neither required nor informative.
Devitt argues, however, that there are legitimate explanations we may seek for something 
having a property, which are  not  related to the problem of universals: we may wonder what 
caused or what is the purpose of something having certain property, and, in the case of a non-
fundamental property, we may wonder what constitutes something having that property (Devitt 
2010: 16).10 Suppose that we have a satisfying reductive explanation of what constitutes my car 
and my bike being red in terms of the wavelengths of light they reflect and absorb, as well as a 
satisfying causal explanation of why they do reflect certain wavelengths of light and absorb 
others.  The  problem  of  universals  concerns  even  how  objects  can  have  these  fundamental 
physical  properties.  But,  if  it  is  a  pseudo-problem,  no further  explanation  is  required:  “The 
explanation must stop somewhere. What better place to stop than with a fundamental physical 
fact of our world?” (Devitt 2010: 17).
10 Devitt (2010: 13-30) does not use the word ‘property’ in making this point, since he equates—in this context—
positing properties with positing universals.  However, he regards  property talk as an acceptable manner of 
speaking to the extent that we are prepared to paraphrase it in a way that makes no commitment to “properties”  
(i.e., universals). While the transcendent realist regards properties as universal and abstract, the immanent realist 
regards properties as universal  but  concrete.  Alternatively, properties can be regarded as both concrete (not 
abstract) and particular (not universal). [A detailed discussion of particularism about properties can be found in 
Armstrong (1978: 77-87).] To reject universals is not to reject concrete particular properties. I use here and 
elsewhere the word ‘property’ in a metaphysically non-committal way that is compatible with properties being 
universal or particular and with property talk being just a manner of speaking to be paraphrased away when 
addressing ultimate metaphysical questions.
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These considerations can be applied to the question of how different sentence and belief 
tokens can have the same meanings. A token of ‘Il pleut’ and a token of ‘Es regnet’ having the 
same semantic property, it may be argued, is just a matter of both of them meaning that it rains: 
neither transcendent nor immanent universals are required. A naturalized semantics, of course, 
does not regard a token meaning that it  rains as a basic fact, but rather as a fact in need of 
reductive explanation. The legitimate search for such an explanation, however, is not related to 
the  problem of  universals.  Explanations  must  stop somewhere  and no further  explanation  is 
required  once  we  have  a  satisfactory  reductive  explanation  of  what  fundamental  properties 
constitute meanings.
I have argued that there are alternatives to the Platonic solution to the “One over Many” 
problem  for  synonymous  sentence  and  belief  tokens.  One  option  is  an  immanent  realism 
according  to  which  meanings  are  universal  but  worldly  properties  that  exist  in  the  tokens. 
Another  option  is  to  reject  the  “One  over  Many”  as  a  pseudo-problem.  Neither  of  these 
alternatives posits abstract objects to account for the common meanings of synonymous tokens 
and both are compatible with a naturalized semantics. But why should we prefer either of these 
alternatives over Platonism? A compelling reason is that abstract objects can play no causal roles 
in mind and language (Devitt 1996: 210; Armstrong 2004: 12). This consideration undermines 
the Platonic treatment of meanings as abstract objects not only to account for synonymy, but for 
any reason.11 There is also a compelling reason to reject abstract objects specifically as what 
explains how numerically different things can be identical in nature. As Armstrong convincingly 
shows, the appeal to transcendent abstract objects fails because it generates a vicious  relation 
regress: it attempts to explain how things have a property in terms of their relation to an abstract 
11 I will elaborate this point in more detail after addressing other arguments for propositions qua Platonic objects.
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object, but then these things must also have the property of being related to the abstract object, 
which either is different from the first relation—in which case it needs to be explained by yet 
another relation, leading to an infinite regress—or is the same as the first relation—in which case 
the analysis is circular (Armstrong: 1978: 70-71). It follows that positing relations to abstract 
meanings  fails  to  explain  how  various  sentence  and  belief  tokens  can  be  synonymous:  it 
generates a vicious relation regress.
Any attempt to solve the problem of universals that appeals to a relational analysis is 
undermined by a relation regress, since “the relations appealed to by such analyses themselves 
require the same analysis” (Armstrong: 1978: 139). This applies also to  relational  versions of 
immanent realism: if an object having an immanent property is a relation it has to this property, 
then it must also have the immanent property of having this relation, generating a vicious regress  
(Armstrong: 1978: 106-107).12 So, a relational immanent realism about meaning properties fails 
to account for how various tokens can be synonymous: the required relation between the tokens 
and their immanent meaning properties also generates a vicious relation regress.
After convincingly arguing that every other attempt fails,  Armstrong proposes a  non-
relational form of immanent realism, according to which objects  and their  properties have a 
“more  intimate  union”  than  a  mere  relation:  the  properties  of  a  thing,  he  suggests,  are  not 
“separate  constituents  of  the  thing”  (Armstrong:  1978:  107-108).  But  how  can  there  be 
something identical in things which are not identical? If having a property is not a relation and a 
property is not a separate constituent of a thing, how can numerically different things have this 
12 Armstrong (1978) also shows how vicious relational regresses undermine various forms of nominalism that 
attempt to solve the “One over Many” problem avoiding any appeal to universals. The views of Quine (1961) 
and Devitt (2010) just discussed are also versions of nominalism: they reject realism about universals. But there  
is a crucial difference. Quine and Devitt do not attempt to solve the problem but to dissolve it, so their proposal 
is immune to any relational regress objections: they argue that no explanation, relational or not, is required.
31
same property? Armstrong answer is, basically, that this is inexplicable:
Different  particulars  may  be...  identical  in  nature.  Such  identity  in  nature  is 
literally  inexplicable,  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot  be  further  explained...
We simply have to accept that different particulars may have the same property or 
be related by the same relation. (Armstrong: 1978: 109)
A non-relational immanent realism about meaning properties, consequently, would claim that 
various synonymous tokens have a meaning which is universal but inseparable from each of 
them and that their synonymy is an inexplicable fact that we simply have to accept.
Armstrong’s  analysis  shows  that  every  relational  solution  to  the  “One  over  Many” 
problem fails. It seems initially reasonable to expect, then, a non-relational solution—if we take 
the problem to be genuine. Perhaps a non-relational account of properties can be worked out. But 
Armstrong’s own appeal to properties that are inseparable from objects makes inexplicable how 
they can be shared. And this problem may be unavoidable for any non-relational account, just  
like vicious regresses are unavoidable for relational accounts. If the alleged best solution to the 
“profoundly puzzling” fact that different objects can have the same property is itself a mystery, it 
does not seem a genuine solution (Devitt 2010: 18). Rather, it seems that the “One over Many” is 
a pseudo-problem after all (Devitt 2010: 19) and there is no mystery to begin with.
My concern in this section has been whether the “One over Many” problem provides a 
reason for positing propositions  qua abstract objects. Does the fact that  different sentence and 
belief tokens have the same meaning or content require a Platonic account of the metaphysics of 
meaning? I have argued that the “One over Many”  fails to provide support for the claim that 
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meanings are abstract objects. Suppose that the problem is genuine. Then a Platonic solution fails 
because it generates a vicious regress. Perhaps some version of immanent realism can solve the 
problem. But relational versions of immanent realism are undermined by the same problem as 
transcendental realism and Armstrong’s non-relational version does not seem to be a genuine 
solution either, since it leaves unexplained how different things can have the same property. It is  
likely that the problem is  not genuine,  and we simply need no explanation of how different 
tokens can be synonymous. A token of ‘Snow is white’ and a token of ‘La nieve es blanca’ being 
synonymous may merely be a matter of both tokens meaning that snow is white: a fact that 
requires a reductive explanation in terms of more basic meaning constituting facts but no further 
explanation in terms of  universals.  Either  way, the “One over  Many” does  not  undermine a 
naturalized semantics according to which meanings are constituted by worldly properties that 
play  causal  roles  in  mind  and  language.  In  the  next  section,  I  discuss  other  arguments  for 
propositions qua abstract objects that rely on the alleged ontological commitments implicit in our 
ordinary attitude ascriptions.
1.4 Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions
The metaphysical conviction that contents are abstract objects is often defended nowadays on the 
basis of ordinary language considerations. People use expressions like ‘what he said is true’, 
‘what she believes is true’, or even ‘some things he said are true’, which may be interpreted as  
referring to things other than concrete utterances and thoughts or the reality they represent and 
which are the primary bearers of truth. Even ascriptions like ‘Mary believes that the Earth is flat’ 
are said to refer to mind- and language-independent propositions. The way people talk, advocates 
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of propositions  qua abstract  entities claim,  is  ontologically  committed to  the reality  of  such 
things.  Sure enough, people sometimes talk about the “things” that are said or believed. But 
should this way of talking be taken literally? Is such talk actually committed to the existence of 
abstract objects that play the role of intermediaries between utterances, thoughts and the reality 
they represent? And, if  so,  should we regard this  folkloric opinion as correct? These are all 
controversial matters. Perhaps advocates of propositions are misinterpreting ordinary language.13 
Maybe talk about the “things” that are said or believed is just a figurative way of talking about 
the meanings of  concrete utterances and thoughts. Notice that truth is predicated of concrete 
utterances in ordinary language. We may “genuinely say ‘His closing words were very true’ or 
‘The third sentence on page 5 of his speech is quite false’ ” (Austin 1950: 113). Likewise, truth is 
predicated of concrete thoughts.  We may say ‘Her belief is true’,  which refers to a concrete 
psychological state. So why should we regard propositional talk as more fundamental? Maybe 
ordinary language is  simply non-committal  about the ontology of contents and truth-bearers. 
More  importantly, even  if  the  way people  talk  were  clearly  committed  to  propositions  qua 
abstract objects, it would remain to be seen whether these objects really exist, since folkloric 
opinion is not the ultimate guide to reality.
In what follows, I will  present two influential  arguments for propositions specifically 
based on the alleged commitments of attitude ascriptions in ordinary language: the first one is 
based on particular content attributions, while the second is based on general content attributions 
13 Wittgenstein (1953) claims that “intermediaries” between sentences and the world are mere  chimeras  which 
philosophers posit because they misunderstand the workings of ordinary language: “‘A proposition is a queer 
thing!’ Here we have in germ the subliming of our whole account of logic. The tendency to assume a pure 
intermediary between the propositional  signs  and the facts.  Or even to try  to purify, to  sublime,  the signs 
themselves.—For our forms of expression prevent us in all sorts of ways from seeing that nothing out of the 
ordinary is involved, by sending us in pursuit of chimeras.” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 94).
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and their inferential relations to particular attributions. I will argue that there are alternative and 
more plausible accounts of such attributions and that, even if the propositionalist accounts were 
correct about the commitments of attitude ascriptions, it would not follow that propositions exist.
1.4.1 Particular Content Ascriptions
An influential  consideration  offered  for  regarding  contents  as  abstract  objects  relies  on  the 
alleged logical structure of particular content attributions of the form ‘S believes  that p’ or ‘S 
said that p’. It is claimed that these attributions assert a relation between S and the object that p, 
because the ‘that’-clause works as a name or a “referential singular term” (Schiffer 1992: 506). 
Basically, particular content attributions are taken to have the same form as ‘A loves B’, which 
asserts a relation between A and the object B. The logical form of ‘A loves B’ is ‘Lab’, where ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ are names and ‘L’ is a two-place predicate. Analogously, the forms of ‘S believes that p’ 
and ‘S said that p’ are alleged to be ‘Bs<p>’ and ‘Ss<p>’, where the two-place predicates ‘Bxy’ 
and ‘Sxy’ symbolize the believing and saying relations, ‘s’ is the name of the believing or saying 
subject and ‘<p>’ is the name of the proposition: the thing that is believed or said.
However,  there  are  alternative  accounts  of  the  logical  form  of  particular  content 
attributions. A plausible alternative, suggested by Devitt, is that they have the same form as ‘A 
loves  some B’,  which asserts  a relation between A and some object that has the property B 
(Devitt 1996: 56-57). If the ‘that’-clause functions as an “indefinite singular term” instead of a 
referential one, Devitt points out, then what the content attribution asserts is a relation between S 
and some object which has the semantic property specified by ‘that p’—where the object is “a 
token thought” in the case of ‘S believes that p’ and “a token utterance” in the case of ‘S said 
35
that p’ (Devitt 1996: 56). The logical form of ‘A loves some B’ is the existentially quantified 
‘ x(Lax & Bx)∃ ’—something that A loves has the property of being a B—, where ‘B’ functions as 
a predicate.  Similarly, the forms of ‘S believes  that p’ and ‘S said  that p’ can be said to be 
‘ x(Bxs & Px)∃ ’ and ‘ x(Uxs & Px)∃ ’—some belief/utterance of S has the property P—, where the 
one-place predicate ‘Px’ symbolizes the semantic property specified by ‘that p’, the existential 
quantifier ‘ x∃ ’ ranges over sentence and belief tokens, and the two-place predicates ‘Bxy’ and 
‘Uxy’ symbolize the relations “x is a token belief of y” and “x is a token utterance of y”. If we 
additionally grant that the sentence embedded in the ‘that’-clause (the ‘p’ in ‘that p’) specifies a 
semantic  property  by  means  of  synonymy  or  sameness  of  content,  then  what  the  content 
attribution asserts is, more precisely, that some belief or utterance of S has the same content as 
‘p’. The logical forms of ‘S believes that p’ and ‘S said that p’ would then be ‘ x(Bxs & Sx∃ ‘p’)’ 
and ‘ x(Uxs & Sx∃ ‘p’)’—there is something such that it is a token belief/utterance of S and it has 
the same content as the sentence token ‘p’—where the two-place predicate ‘Sxy’ symbolizes the 
sameness of content or synonymy relation and its second place is occupied by a  name for the 
embedded sentence ‘p’ (not for a proposition)  formed by enclosing it within quotation marks. 
There are good reasons to believe that synonymy does play a role in content ascriptions. As 
Devitt points out:
The expression ‘that p’, used to ascribe a putative meaning, seems to ascribe that 
property in virtue of the fact that its content sentence, ‘p’, has the property or one 
very like it.  So there always seems to be an “intimate link” between the two 
properties. However... we can abstract from this link, treating... ‘that  p’ like any 
arbitrary expression for a property. (Devitt 1996: 82)
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Synonymy seems to play a crucial role in the way a ‘that’-clause specifies a meaning. But the 
specified meaning is  not  itself  a  relation between some belief  or  utterance and the sentence 
embedded in the ‘that’-clause. Rather, it is a property that both the belief or utterance and the 
embedded  sentence  have  independently. It  is  important  to  distinguish  the  specification  of  a 
property from a reductive explanation of its nature. For example, I can specify the color of my 
car by pointing out that it has the same color as the Statue of Liberty. The specified color is a  
property that both my car and the Statue have. The reductive explanation of what constitutes my 
car’s color involves neither its relation to the Statue, nor its relation to an abstract object, but 
rather what wavelengths of light are reflected and absorbed by the surface of my car. Similarly, 
the content specified by ‘S believes that p’ is a property that both some belief of S and ‘p’ have. 
But the reductive explanation of what  constitutes  the content of the belief involves neither its 
relation to ‘p’, nor its relation to an abstract object, but rather the fundamental properties that 
explain the causal role of the belief. For example, Nancy’s belief that it will rain plays a causal 
role in explaining why she picks up an umbrella, so an explanation of what underlying properties 
constitute the content of her belief must account for its causing Nancy’s behavior—just as a 
reductive explanation of water as constituted by H2O molecules explains why it boils at 100 
degrees Celsius (at sea level).
Donald Davidson (1968) offers a similar analysis how ‘that’-clauses specify meanings. 
He sympathizes with the idea that ‘Galileo said that the earth moves’ can be paraphrased as 
“Galileo uttered a  sentence  that  meant  in  his  mouth  what  ‘The earth moves’ means now in 
mine”—which asserts “synonymy between utterances” or “samesaying” (Davidson 1968: 140). 
But he prefers not to have the embedded sentence “sealed in quotation marks” because it is then 
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“mentioned and not used” (Davidson 1968: 141). So he proposes a modification according to 
which ‘that’ functions as a “demonstrative singular term” which refers to the used utterance that 
follows it: ‘S said that p.’, he suggests, is equivalent to ‘S said that. P.’ (Davidson 1968: 142). 
Are quotation marks really problematic? Consider the following two non-attitudinal meaning 
reports: (a) ‘La nieve es blanca’ means that snow is white, and (b) ‘La nieve es blanca’ means the 
same as ‘Snow is white’. The mentioned English sentence in (b) serves the same purpose as the 
‘that’-clause  in  (a):  they  both  specify  the  same  meaning.  Just  as  (b)  can  paraphrase  (a),  a 
mentioned sentence can be part of the correct paraphrase of a ‘that’-clause in an attitude report.14 
I will not press this issue further. The crucial point is that synonymy seems to play a role in the  
way ‘that’-clauses specify meanings and that it does not require the postulation of propositions 
qua abstract objects. Some philosophers may be tempted to object that an account of  different 
tokens can have the same meaning requires the postulation of abstract objects, so the proposed 
analysis of particular content attributions does not truly avoid them. But this objection assumes 
an  implausible  Platonic  account  of  synonymy, which  I  have  argued  against  in  the  previous 
section. Additionally, as I argued following Devitt, synonymy only plays the role of specifying a 
semantic property, it is not constitutive of the semantic property.
The proposal that ‘that’-clauses function as indefinite singular terms in particular content 
ascriptions is not only a  plausible  alternative to the proposal that they function as names or 
referential singular terms. There is reason to believe that it is a more plausible account. If ‘that p’ 
14 I am ignoring issues that  may arise from context-sensitivity. Suppose I report:  ‘Mary said that  I  am rich’.  
According to Davidson, I am using the embedded sentence ‘I am reach’. My use of the sentence in this context 
would fix its content: I am talking about  me.  Does the view according to which the embedded sentence is 
mentioned have a problem with context-sensitivity? Perhaps. But a slight modification of the analysis may avoid 
this problem. What I am reporting may be that some utterance of Mary has the same meaning that ‘I am reach’  
would have if I asserted it. I may not be inclined to actually assert it, since I may believe I am not rich.
38
functions as a definite singular term referring to the proposition  that p, we should be able to 
replace it with ‘the proposition that p’, which is a definite singular term referring to the same 
alleged abstract object. In some contexts, there seems to be no problem: ‘Nancy believes that it  
will rain’ may be paraphrased as ‘Nancy believes the proposition that it will rain’. However, the 
substitution  fails  in  other  contexts:  ‘Nancy fears  that  it  will  rain’ cannot  be  paraphrased  as 
‘Nancy fears the proposition that it will rain’. Fearing a proposition obviously is not the same as 
fearing that it will rain. So the propositionalist account faces what Friederike Moltmann calls the 
“Substitution Problem”:  “Even though believe allows for a replacement of a that-clause by the 
proposition that S, many other attitude verbs don’t” (Moltmann 2003: 82). In contrast, I suggest, 
the  proposal  that  ‘that’-clauses  function  as  indefinite  singular  terms  avoids  the  substitution 
problem altogether, since it does not regard them as referring to propositions: ‘Nancy fears that it  
will rain’ should be  not  be paraphrased as ‘Nancy fears  the proposition that it will rain’, but 
rather as (1)  ‘Some fear of Nancy has the same content as ‘It will rain’’ or (2) ‘Some fear of 
Nancy has the content specified by ‘that it will rain’’, which are not problematic. The form of (1) 
is  ‘ x(Fxn  &  Sx∃ ‘r’)’—where  ‘Fxy’  symbolizes  ‘x is  a  fear  of  y’,  ‘n’  names  Nancy,  ‘Sxy’ 
symbolizes ‘x has the same content as y’ and ‘r’—enclosed within quotation marks—stands for 
the sentence ‘It will rain’ (not a proposition): there is something such that it is a fear of Nancy 
and it has the same content as ‘it will rain’. The form of (2) is ‘ x(Fxn & Rx)∃ ’—where ‘R’ is a 
one-place predicate symbolizing the monadic semantic property specified by ‘that it will rain’: 
there is something such that it is a fear of Nancy and it has the content specified by ‘that it will  
rain’. Both (1) and (2) have the same logical forms as the accounts I have offered for belief 
ascriptions. Neither involve any reference to propositions, so the substitution problem does not 
39
arise. While the propositionalist analysis is undermined by the substitution problem, the account 
of ‘that’-clauses as indefinite singular terms provides a uniform and plausible account of content 
attributions involving all attitude verbs that avoids the problem altogether.
A  propositionalist,  however,  may  object  that  regarding  particular  attributions  as 
quantifying over token sentences and beliefs is also compatible with the contents of such tokens 
being specified as abstract objects (or relations to abstract objects).15 The correct paraphrase of 
‘Nancy fears that it will rain’ may be claimed to be (3) ‘Some fear of Nancy has the proposition 
that it will rain as its content’. The form of (3) is ‘ x(Fxn & Cx<r>)∃ ’, where ‘Cxy’ stands for “x 
has y as its content” and ‘<r>’ is a singular term referring to a proposition qua abstract object: 
there is something such that it is a fear of Nancy and its content is the proposition  that it will  
rain. Notice that the form of (3) differs from the form of the non-propositionalist (1) above only 
in  its  second  conjunct.  Basically,  (3)  makes  use  of  an  analysis  like  (1)  and  flips  it  into  a 
propositionalist  one.  While  the  standard propositionalist  analysis  is  undermined  by  the 
substitution problem, this variant seems to avoid it: the paraphrase of ‘Nancy fears that it will 
rain’ as (3) does not seem problematic. On this regard, (1) and (3) seem equally plausible. So the 
substitution problem does not settle the issue of what is ascribed in ordinary attitude ascriptions. 
However, the modified propositionalist analyses has a serious problem. If the content of Nancy’s 
fear is an abstract object, it cannot play a causal role in the explanation why she is constantly 
looking  at  the  sky.  I  will  get  back  to  this  issue.  But  notice  that  attitude  ascriptions  are 
successfully used by ordinary people to explain each other’s behavior. This provides a strong 
reason  for  preferring  a  non-propositionalist  analysis  like  the  one  I  am suggesting  over  any 
propositionalist variant.
15 A similar concern is expressed by Devitt (2006: 143-144).
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1.4.2 General Content Attributions
So far I have focused on isolated  particular  content attributions.  But another influential  and 
seemingly stronger case for regarding contents as abstract objects relies on the logical form of 
general  content attributions and the validity—and presumed soundness—of certain  inferences  
linking them to particular attributions. General content attributions contain phrases of the form 
‘something S said’ or  ‘everything S believes’ which  quantify  over  what  is  said  or  believed. 
Consider the following inference patterns:
(1) S believes that p and R believes that p. So, there is something that both S and R believe.
(2) S believes everything that R says. R says that p. So, S believes that p.16
As Stephen Schiffer and Paul Horwich argue, at  face value the existential quantifier ‘there is 
something’ and the universal quantifier ‘everything’ in the general content attributions seem to 
range over a domain of objects, which would require—for the inferences to be valid—the ‘that’-
clauses in the particular content attributions to function as referential singular terms picking out 
objects in the same domain (Schiffer 1992: 504-506; Horwich 1998b: 86-90). In other words, the 
logical form of (1) seems to be the valid existential generalization ‘Bs<p> & Br<p> // x(Bsx &∃  
Brx)’ and the logical form of (2) seems to be the valid universal instantiation ‘ x(Srx → Bsx) /∀  
Sr<p>  //  Bs<p>’—where  ‘ x∃ ’  and  ‘ x∀ ’  are  standard  objectual  quantifiers  ranging  over 
propositions.17 If the face value interpretation is correct, what the ‘that’-clauses purport to name 
and what the quantifiers purport to range over are propositions. If we  additionally  grant that 
some instances of these valid patterns are sound, it follows that propositions exist. For example, 
16 These are the patterns underlying a couple of the examples offered by Schiffer (1992: 505). Horwich (1998b: 
86-87) offers similar examples.
17 I am following here the standard analysis of particular attributions adopted by Schiffer and Horwich.
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the soundness of ‘Copernicus and Galileo believed that the Earth moves, so there is something 
they both believed’ would establish that the proposition believed by Copernicus and Galileo is a 
real “entity” or object (Horwich 1998b: 90). Nevertheless, there are alternatives to the face value 
interpretation and, even if the face value interpretation of the validity of patterns like (1) and (2) 
were correct, it would remain to be seen whether they have any literally sound instances.
One alternative to the face value interpretation is the proposal that the quantifiers used in 
general content attributions are  substitutional  rather than  objectual  (Schiffer 1987). It may be 
argued, for example, that quantifiers have two distinct uses or meanings in ordinary language: 
one is the standard ontologically committal use, where they function as objectual quantifiers that 
range over entities, while the other is a metaphysically innocent use, where they function as 
substitutional quantifiers that do not range over a “language-independent domain of entities” but 
instead “generalize over the instances” of expressions in the language (Hofweber 2006: 166). An 
example of the first kind of use would be ‘There is something that hit the window’, which clearly 
asserts  that certain object exists. In contrast,  ‘There is something  that both S and R believe’ 
would be, on this view, an example of the second kind of use, asserting that there is some true  
substitution  instance  of  ‘S  and R believe  that  x’ (in  which  ‘x’ is  replaced  by a  declarative 
sentence). Instead of asserting that an object exists, the quantified sentence is equivalent to an 
infinite disjunction of its substitution instances: either S and R believe that p or S and R believe 
that q  or  S and R believe that r, etc. (Hofweber 2006: 167-168). Thus, it may be claimed that 
propositions are “shadows of sentences” rather than objects (Hofweber 2006: 194). Notice that if 
the quantifiers in (1) and (2) are non-objectual, the ‘that’-clauses need not be referential singular 
terms  for  the  inferences  to  be  valid,  since  non-objectual  quantifiers  can  generalize  over  the 
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instances of non-referential expressions.18 ‘That’-clauses may be, as suggested above, indefinite 
singular terms specifying the semantic properties of concrete utterances and thoughts.
Whether there are non-objectual uses of quantifiers in ordinary language is controversial, 
but there is another alternative that relies only on standard quantification. The proposal is that, 
while the quantifiers in general content attributions do purport to range over objects, there are no 
real  objects  in  this  domain,  because  propositions  are  merely  fictional  entities.  What  the 
proponent of this view needs to explain is how a person uttering ‘There is something that both 
Copernicus and Galileo believed’,  quantifying over propositional  objects,  can  convey  a truth 
even when there are no such objects and the sentence is literally false. Notice that, on this view, 
the sentence uttered is as false as ‘There is something that possessed Mary Magdalene’, which 
quantifies  over  demons.  Yet  quantifying  over  propositions,  unlike  quantifying  over  demons, 
seems to be “explanatorily useful, generally successful, and needed” (Devitt 1996: 212-213). Are 
people who engage in propositional talk systematically in error or superstitiously committed to 
non-existing objects if such talk is indeed literally false?
An explanation of how a literally false sentence can be used to convey a truth comes from 
the  very  proponent  of  the  view that  a  sentence  is  ontologically  committed  to  the  objects  it 
quantifies over (Quine 1961: 13-14). Quine suggests that people are not committed to the objects 
18 Consider a singular term ‘t’ related to a predicate ‘F’ in the sentence ‘t is F’. Using objectual quantification to  
infer  ‘something is  F’ from ‘t  is  F’ requires  ‘t’ to  be  referential.  But  any  singular  term in ‘t  is  F’ can be 
generalized into ‘something is F’ using substitutional quantification:  “In the particular quantifier case: ‘F(t)’ 
implies ‘Something is F.’... [It] does not matter what ‘t’ is as long as it is grammatically a singular term. In  
particular, whether or not ‘t’ is a referring expression and whether or not is succeeds in referring, even if it tries,  
is irrelevant...” (Hofweber 2009: 277). So valid inferences like ‘7 is a prime, so something is a prime’, ‘Red is a  
color, so something is a color’ and ‘It is true that snow is white, so something is true’, can be regarded as not 
committed to numbers, properties and propositions being objects—as long as the expressions ‘7’, ‘red’ and ‘that  
snow is  white’ in  the premises  are  non-referential  and the  quantifiers  in  the conclusions are non-objectual 
(Hofweber 2005, 2006 & 2009).
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presupposed by a sentence when they use it as an “avoidable manner of speaking” (Quine 1961: 
13)—that is, when they would be prepared to replace it by a  paraphrase  that serves the same 
purpose but is “innocent of such commitments”, so that “the seemingly presupposed objects may 
justly be said to have been explained away as convenient fictions” (Quine 1961: 103-104). 19 
Basically, a false sentence that quantifies over non-existing objects can convey a truth when it is 
used  as  a  manner  of  speaking which can be paraphrased into  a  true sentence  that  does  not 
quantify over such objects. If propositional talk were an avoidable manner of speaking, people 
who engage in it would not be committed to the existence of propositional objects: they would be 
quantifying  over  convenient  fictions in  literally  false  sentences  that  (sometimes)  serve  the 
purpose  of  conveying  truths—a purpose  that  can  also  be  served by paraphrases  that  do  not 
quantify over propositions but express the same truths literally.
Stephen Yablo elaborates further on how fictional talk can be useful. He proposes that 
figurative  or  metaphorical  uses of language are make-believe games in which the participants 
pretend or imagine that certain fictions are true, not for the game’s own sake, but to “talk about 
game-independent reality”: the fictions serve the purpose of describing features of the real world 
(Yablo  1998:  246).  For  example,  by  pretending  or  imagining  that  Italy  is  a  boot,  we  can 
accurately describe the real location of the town of Crotone using the sentence ‘Crotone is on the 
arch of the Italian boot’ (Yablo 1998: 252-253).20 Yablo proposes that one of the hints that a 
sentence is used metaphorically is its paraphrasability: metaphors are “oftentimes paraphrasable 
19 The original sentence and its paraphrase must “serve the same purpose” but cannot be  synonymous: “if they 
were synonymous, it is hard to see how they could differ in their ontological commitments” (Devitt 2010: 25).
20 Obviously, figurative uses of language can also fail to accurately describe reality (e.g., ‘Crotone is on the heel of 
the  Italian  boot’).  A metaphorical  sentence  conveys  a  truth  only  when  the  fictions  pretended  to  be  true 
successfully track features of the real world: “the reason for the pretence [is] to portray the world as holding up  
its end of the bargain, by being in a condition to make a pretence like that appropriate” (Yablo 1998: 248).
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away with no felt loss of subject matter” (Yablo 1998: 259n).21 The  metaphorical content  of a 
sentence, he suggests, coincides with the  literal content  of its paraphrase: “a paraphrase of  S 
expresses in literal terms what S says metaphorically” (Yablo 1998: 248n).22 If propositional talk 
were figurative rather than literal, people quantifying over propositions would be pretending or 
imagining that these fictional objects exist and thereby describing features of the real world.
A very  plausible  case  can  be  made  that  propositional  talk  should  be  regarded  as  a 
figurative  and  avoidable  manner  of  speaking.  As  Devitt  points  out,  paraphrases  for  general 
content attributions that quantify over propositions are readily available (Devitt 1996: 213). For 
example, (a) and (b) can be paraphrased as (a') and (b'), respectively:
(a) There is something that both Copernicus and Galileo believed.
(a') Some belief of Copernicus had the same content as some belief of Galileo.23
(b) Nancy believes everything Mary says.
(b') When Mary assertively utters any sentence, Nancy forms a belief with the same content.
The paraphrases quantify over sentence or belief tokens, rather than propositions, but they serve 
21 Yablo proposes several other “hints” of metaphoricality and does not take paraphrasability to be a necessary 
condition, since he argues that some metaphors are “representationally essential and so not paraphrasable away” 
(Yablo 1998: 255). Yablo also argues that there is no sharp demarcation between the literal and the metaphorical
—“the boundaries of the literal are about as blurry as they could be, the clear cases on either side enclosing a  
vast  interior  region  of  indeterminacy”  (Yablo  1998:  233)—and,  furthermore,  that  we  may  not  be  able  to 
completely  eliminate  metaphors  from  science—“our  best  theory  may  well  include  metaphorical  sentences 
(whose literal contents are) not meant to be believed” (Yablo 1998: 255). If correct, these radical theses would 
undermine the Quinean program of finding answers to existence questions in the ontological commitments of 
our  best  scientific  theories,  literally  formulated.  This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  these  radical  theses.  The 
Quinean philosopher, however, can go along with Yablo’s characterization of  paraphrasable  figurative talk, 
which offers an interesting elaboration of the Quinean theme that manners of speaking make use of convenient  
fictions.
22 Yablo claims that this explains “rather neatly” how a “paraphrase ‘says the same’ as what it paraphrases”, even 
though the literal meanings of the two sentences do not coincide (Yablo 1998: 248n).
23 This paraphrase is based on one suggested by Devitt (1996: 13).
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the same purposes as the original sentences they paraphrase (Devitt 1996: 213). First, (a') and (b') 
serve the same communicative purposes as (a) and (b). Second, they serve the same explanatory 
purposes. For example, (b') serves the same purpose as (b) in the explanation of Nancy’s picking 
up an umbrella after  hearing Mary utter  ‘It  will  rain’.  Notice that the suggested paraphrases 
assert that pairs of sentence or belief tokens have the same content. This neatly matches the view 
that particular content attributions assert that some sentence or belief token has the same content 
as the sentence embedded in the ‘that’-clause.24 Furthermore, the validity of inferences linking 
general  and  particular  content  ascriptions  is  preserved  by  their  paraphrases.  Consider  the 
following paraphrased instances of patterns (1) and (2):
(i) Some belief of Copernicus and some belief of Galileo had the same content as ‘The Earth 
moves’. So, some belief of Copernicus had the same content as some belief of Galileo.
(ii) When Mary assertively utters any sentence, Nancy forms a belief with the same content. 
Some sentence assertively uttered by Mary has the same content as ‘It will rain’. So, 
some belief of Nancy has the same content as ‘It will rain’.
These inferences are obviously valid because having the same content is an equivalence relation: 
it is symmetric, transitive and reflexive. The valid logical form of these two inferences can be 
represented in standard first-order logic by adding meaning postulates defining the two-place 
predicate ‘Sxy’ (“x has the same content as  y”) as symmetric = ‘ x y(Sxy→Syx)∀ ∀ ’, transitive = 
‘ x y z[(Sxy & Syz) → Sxz]∀ ∀ ∀ ’ and reflexive = ‘ x(Sxx)∀ ’.  A shorter definition of ‘Sxy’ as an 
equivalence relation is that it is Euclidean = ‘ x y z[(Sxy & Sxz) → Syz]∀ ∀ ∀ ’ and reflexive. So the 
24 I already argued in support  of this view. However, if  I  am wrong and either  the standard or the modified  
propositionalist analysis of particular content attributions is right, then particular attributions can also be treated 
as mere manners of speaking (Devitt 1996: 214). The analysis of particular attributions I proposed would then 
offer a literal paraphrase of what is metaphorically conveyed in ordinary language.
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two inferences can be represented, I suggest, as having the following valid forms:
(i) x y z[(Sxy & Sxz) → Syz] & x(Sxx)∀ ∀ ∀ ∀
x y[(Bxc & Sx∃ ∃ ‘e’) & (Byg & Sy‘e’)]
 x y[(Bxc & Byg) & Sxy]∴ ∃ ∃
(ii) x y z[(Sxy & Sxz) → Syz] & x(Sxx)∀ ∀ ∀ ∀
x{Uxm → [ y(Byn & Sxy)]}∀ ∃
x(Uxm & Sx∃ ‘r’)
 x(Bxn & Sx∴ ∃ ‘r’)
Where ‘c’ = ‘Copernicus’, ‘g’= ‘Galileo’, ‘m’ = ‘Mary’, ‘n’ = ‘Nancy’, ‘e’ = the sentence ‘The 
earth moves’,  ‘r’ = the sentence ‘It  will  rain’,  ‘Bxy’ = ‘x is  a  belief  of  y’,  ‘Uxy’ = ‘x is  an 
utterance of y’, ‘Sxy’ = ‘x has the same content as y’, and ‘ x∀ ’ and ‘ x∃ ’ range over sentence and 
belief tokens. Notice that the first premise in both inferences defines ‘Sxy’ as an equivalence 
relation. Both inferences are formally invalid if this premise is omitted.
Alternatively, we can paraphrase the particular content ascriptions in a way that does not 
explicitly assert synonymy or sameness of content:
(i') Some belief of Copernicus and some belief of Galileo had the content specified by ‘that 
the earth moves’. So, some belief of Copernicus had the same content as some belief of 
Galileo.
(ii')When Mary assertively utters any sentence, Nancy forms a belief with the same content. 
Some sentence assertively uttered by Mary has the content specified by ‘that it will rain’. 
So, some belief of Nancy has the content specified by ‘that it will rain’.
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These inferences are also intuitively valid and may be interpreted as having the same logical 
forms as (i) and (ii).  If we interpret instead the specified contents as  monadic properties, the 
inferences  are  also  formally  valid  as  long as  we regard  them as  enthymemes  assuming  the 
obvious premise that two tokens are synonymous (a  dyadic relation) if and only if  whatever  
contents each of them has (their  monadic properties) are the same. Symbolizing this unstated 
premise  requires  substitutional  quantification  (or  the  ontologically  problematic  quantification 
over properties), since it generalizes over (monadic) content properties. But we can represent in 
standard first-order logic instances of the connection between synonymy and particular specified 
contents. So (i') and (ii') can be represented, I suggest, by the following valid forms:
(i') x y[(Ex & Ey) → Sxy]∀ ∀
x y[(Bxc & Ex) & (Byg & Ey)]∃ ∃
 x y[(Bxc & Byg) & Sxy]∴ ∃ ∃
(ii') x y[(Sxy & Rx) → Ry]∀ ∀
x{Uxm → [ y(Byn & Sxy)]}∀ ∃
x(Uxm & Rx)∃
 x(Bxn & Rx)∴ ∃
Where ‘E’ = ‘has the content specified by ‘that the earth moves’’, ‘R’ = ‘has the content specified 
by ‘that it will rain’’, and the rest of the symbols are the same as in (i) and (ii) above. The first 
premises of (i’) and (ii’) assert intuitively obvious connections between synonymy and particular 
specified content properties. Without these added premises, both inferences are formally invalid.
I proposed before a non-propositional analysis of particular content attributions. I have 
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suggested now that general attributions can be treated as figures of speech whose metaphorical 
content does not quantify over propositions and is literally expressed by suitable paraphrases. I 
have also shown that the validity of inference patterns like (1) and (2) can be accounted for by 
combining non-propositionalist accounts of particular and general content attributions.25
1.4.3 Folkloric Opinion and Ontology
From a strictly Quinean point of view, the availability of paraphrases for content ascriptions that 
quantify over propositions does not, by itself, free a person who engages in propositional talk 
from  an  ontological  commitment  to  abstract  objects.  According  to  Quine,  this  depends  on 
whether the person agrees to replace the problematic sentences by their paraphrases in order to 
“free  himself  from  ontological  commitments  of  his  discourse”  (Quine  1961:  103).  It  is  an 
interesting empirical question whether ordinary people would be prepared in general to accept 
the suggested paraphrases. I suspect they would, since the paraphrases clearly serve the same 
purposes  as  what  they  paraphrase.  But  establishing  that  people  are  genuinely  committed  to 
propositions  qua abstract objects perhaps requires more than a rejection of these paraphrases: 
what  would  we conclude  if  they  also  reject  alternative  paraphrases  that  are  more  explicitly 
Platonic, such as ‘There is an abstract object that exists outside of the world of space and time 
and which is a proposition believed by Copernicus and Galileo’? I doubt that ordinary people 
would in general be prepared to accept such explicitly Platonic paraphrases. But, of course, this 
is  an  empirical  matter.  In  any  case,  Quine  points  out  that  ordinary  people’s  ontological 
25 I  also suggested  that  the  quantifiers  in  general  content  ascriptions  may  generalize  over  their  substitutional 
instances  without  ranging  over  propositions.  This  alternative  also  preserves  the  validity  of  the  inferences. 
However, it is controversial whether substitutional quantifiers are used in ordinary language. The fictionalist 
account is simpler, since it relies only on standard first-order logic.
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commitments are often unclear when they talk about “things” beyond well-defined objects: “The 
common man’s ontology  is  vague  and  untidy...  It  takes  in  many  purported  objects  that  are 
vaguely or inadequately defined... [We] cannot even tell in general which of these vague things... 
to count him as assuming.” Quine concludes: “We must recognize... that a fenced ontology is just 
not implicit in ordinary language.” (Quine 1981a: 9) Similarly, Yablo points out that people often 
talk figuratively without being fully conscious of it (Yablo 1998: 246) and, furthermore, that they 
often  “fall  back”  on  the  metaphorical  content  of  areas  of  discourse,  with  “no  conscious 
equivocation”, when they find out that the objects talked about do not exist or are problematic 
(Yablo 1998: 258n). Perhaps people are simply non-committal about the ultimate ontology of 
representational contents.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that people were seriously committed to propositions 
qua  abstract objects: that they preferred explicitly Platonic paraphrases of general attributions 
over the non-propositional paraphrases. This interesting anthropological fact would not establish 
that propositions qua abstract objects exist, just like the real commitment that many people have 
to  immaterial  souls  does  not  establish  that  these  entities  exist.  People  talk  not  only  about 
immaterial  souls,  but  also  about  witches,  ghosts,  gods  and  whatnot.  Non-metaphorical  and 
sincere superstitious talk is ontologically committed to the existence of all sorts of things that 
clearly do not exist and this may also be the case for talk that quantifies over propositions (Devitt 
1996: 212-213). If propositions  are  mere fictions—and this  cannot  be ruled out merely by an 
analysis  of  folkloric  opinion—people  actually  committed  to  them are  in  error. In  that  case, 
instead of adopting a  hermeneutic fictionalism—according to which propositional discourse  is  
used  figuratively—we  should  defend  a  revolutionary  fictionalism—according  to  which 
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propositional discourse ought to  be used only figuratively—.26 The claim would be that people 
ought to accept paraphrases like those suggested above for general content ascriptions. Anyway, 
as I pointed out above, I doubt people are genuinely committed to propositions  qua  abstract 
objects, since they may accept the proposed paraphrases or simply be non-committal; so this is  
only a “worst case scenario” that I have granted for the sake of argument.
In this section, I have presented arguments for propositions qua abstract objects based on 
the alleged ontological commitments of ordinary attitude ascriptions. I have argued that there are 
plausible alternative accounts of such ascriptions that avoid any commitment to abstract objects 
and that, anyway, the issue of whether meanings are abstract objects cannot be settled merely by 
an account of folkloric opinion. In the next section, I will argue that there is a compelling reason 
to reject the view that meanings are abstract objects.
1.5 Against Meanings qua Abstract Objects
In this section, I argue that the meanings of utterances and thoughts are  not  Platonic abstract 
objects. The argument is not based on an analysis of the semantic status quo, on what people do 
ascribe when they ascribe meanings, but rather on what we ought to ascribe in order to explain 
the causal roles of meanings (Devitt  1996: 61-62).  I  do point out,  however, that the general 
success of explanations of behavior in folk-psychology suggests that at least part of what people 
do ascribe is, indeed, what they ought to ascribe. Once meanings qua abstract objects have been 
rejected,  I  suggest,  we  can  either  reject  propositions  altogether—except  as  “convenient 
fictions”—or, perhaps, attempt to naturalize them. Devitt (1996) proposes the former of these 
26 The distinction between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism comes from Stanley (2001).
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alternatives, while Armstrong (2004) suggests the latter. I will discuss in the following section 
whether there is a need for “naturalized propositions” once propositions  qua  abstract objects 
have been rejected.
There  is  a  compelling  metaphysical  reason  to  suppose  that  semantic  properties  of 
sentence and belief tokens we ought to ascribe are natural worldly properties of each of these 
tokens. Abstract objects cannot causally  act upon any concrete things in the world, since “we 
have  fairly  good  scientific  reasons  to  believe  that  Nature,  the  spatio-temporal  system,  is  a 
causally self-enclosed system” (Armstrong: 1978: 129). The causal closure of the physical world 
undermines, for example, the hypotheses that there is a God that acts upon the world or that we 
have  non-physical  souls  that  interact  with  our  bodies.  According  to  such  hypotheses,  some 
physical  events  have  non-physical  causes.  But  that  violates  the  causal  closure  principle. 
Cartesian  substance  dualism  has  been  largely  abandoned  for  this  reason.  But  the  same 
consideration undermines the hypothesis that abstract objects act upon concrete objects: “If the 
case for God and the soul acting upon particulars is weak, it is far weaker in the case of the realm 
of numbers, possible words, propositions and so on.” (Armstrong: 1978: 130).
Those who nowadays postulate the existence of abstract objects often accept that they do 
not causally interact with the spatio-temporal world. However, this raises the question of why 
should we postulate them to begin with:
If any entities outside this realm are postulated, but it is stipulated further that 
they have no manner of causal action upon the particulars in this realm, then there 
is no compelling reason to postulate them. Occam’s razor then enjoins us not to 
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postulate them. (Armstrong: 1978: 130).
Basically, no  explanatory  gain  comes  from the  postulation  of  abstract  objects  and  standard 
simplicity considerations count against postulating explanatorily idle entities.
The same considerations apply to the postulation of propositions qua abstract objects that 
constitute the meanings of sentence and belief  tokens and that are the primary truth-bearers. 
Abstract objects cannot causally interact with concrete—datable and placeable—utterances and 
thoughts,  so  they  cannot  determine  their  semantic  properties.  As Devitt  points  out,  Platonic 
objects “can play no causal role in mind and language”, so “we have the best of reasons for 
thinking that they are not part of mental and linguistic reality.” (Devitt 1996: 210). Armstrong 
rejects the postulation of propositions qua Platonic objects for the same reason:
There are metaphysicians who are prepared to postulate a realm of propositions 
over and above the space-time world. But, presumably, we could not stand in any 
causal or nomic relation to such a realm. And if we cannot stand in such relations 
to propositions it is unclear that such a postulation is of any explanatory value. 
(Armstrong 2004: 12).
That propositions  qua abstract objects cannot act upon the world is rarely disputed nowadays. 
But  the  Platonic  propositionalist  may be  willing  to  accept  that  propositions  do not  causally 
interact with concrete utterances and thoughts, which amounts to acknowledging that they cannot 
play any explanatory role in mind and language. If no explanatory gain comes from postulating 
propositions, however, there is no compelling reason to postulate them in the first place.
Accepting that propositions do not causally interact with utterances and thoughts, while 
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claiming that they constitute their meanings, amounts to regarding meanings as causally inert 
epiphenomena. This is deeply troubling, since we postulate meanings or contents in order to 
explain people’s behavior (Devitt 1996: 57-60).27 Ascribing to Mary a belief that it is raining, a 
belief that using an umbrella can help her not to get wet, and a desire not to get wet, plays a  
crucial role in the explanation of why she picks up an umbrella. Similarly, ascribing to Mary’s 
utterance of ‘It is raining’ the meaning that it is raining plays a crucial role in ascribing to her the 
belief that it is raining, which in turn plays a crucial role in explaining her behavior: why she  
picks up an umbrella. Had the contents of her beliefs, her desire and her utterance been different, 
we would reasonably expect her behavior to vary accordingly.
The causal closure of the physical world provides a compelling reason for regarding the 
semantic properties we ought to ascribe to explain behavior as natural worldly properties, rather 
than relations to abstract objects. Moreover, ordinary people do ascribe contents to explain other 
people’s behavior and their explanations are often successful, which provides evidence that the 
meanings ascribed in folk-psychology do play a causal role in the physical world. In other words, 
there is strong evidence that at least some of what we do ascribe is what we ought to ascribe 
(Devitt 1996: 81). While there is plenty of controversy in the field of naturalized semantics about 
which is the best reductive explanation of what constitutes meanings, it is clear that meanings 
must play a causal role in the psychological explanation of behavior. Consequently, the view that 
meanings are abstract, mind and language independent objects, must be rejected. Does this mean 
that we should reject propositions or that we should attempt to provide a non-Platonic account of 
propositions?
27 As Devitt (1996: 57-60) points out, another crucial purpose for which we ascribe meanings is to learn about the  
world. When a person’s thoughts or utterances are reliable, we can learn about the world by ascribing the right  
meanings or contents to them. It is unclear how this would be possible if meanings were abstract objects.
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In Quinean fashion,  Devitt  prefers  to  avoid  talk  of  propositions  altogether, and talks 
instead of meaningful sentence and belief tokens:
By talking of meaningful tokens, we can avoid talk of propositions. This is an 
advantage  not  simply  because  propositions  are  creatures  of  darkness  but  also 
because talk of propositions... is explanatorily unhelpful. (Devitt 1996: 13)
Devitt  admits  that  propositional  talk  may  be  legitimate  to  the  extent  that  such  talk  can  be 
“paraphrased  away, when  the  ontological  chips  are  down,  into  talk  about  the  properties  of 
concrete  thoughts  and  utterances”  (Devitt  1996:  210).  Although  he  warns  that,  even  then, 
propositional  talk  is  “unnecessary  and  misleading”  (Devitt  1996:  210).  Presumably,  it  is 
unnecessary  because  it  is  an  avoidable  manner  of  speaking and it  is  potentially  misleading 
because there is the risk of taking literally what is only useful as a figure of speech.
Armstrong,  in  contrast,  does  not  want  to  reject  propositions  altogether.  Instead,  he 
proclaims: “as a naturalist, I want to look for a this-worldly account of propositions” (Armstrong 
2004: 12). His proposal is that propositions are indeed the contents of beliefs and the meanings  
of sentences, but that they are properties to be explained by a naturalized semantics, rather than 
Platonic objects: “I would be hoping for a naturalistic theory of content and meaning, and so a 
naturalistic  theory  of...  propositions.”  (Armstrong  2004:  14)  The  difference  between  the 
approaches  of  Armstrong  and  Devitt  may  seem  merely  verbal.  After  all,  they  both  regard 
meanings  as  natural  properties.  Yet,  there  is  a  genuine difference.  Armstrong,  unlike Devitt, 
argues  that  propositions—not  sentence  and  belief  tokens—are  the  primary  truth-bearers. 
(Armstrong 2004: 12). Devitt’s view is best characterized as treating meaningful tokens as the 
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primary  truth-bearers—tokens  that  are  true  or  false  in  virtue  of their  semantic  properties. 
Armstrong even proposes that propositions are  abstractions but, he insists, “not in any other-
worldly sense” (Armstrong 2004: 13). He gives the following reason:
That... content or meaning is an abstraction becomes clear when we notice that 
contents and meanings are types rather than tokens.  Beliefs in different minds 
may have the very same content, numerically different statements may have the 
very same meaning. (Armstrong 2004: 13)
Basically, Armstrong thinks there is a “One over Many” problem for synonymy, so he suggests 
an Aristotelian immanent  realism, according to  which propositions are worldly but universal 
semantic property types that exist in sentence and belief tokens.
The disagreement between Armstrong and Devitt on the nature of meanings/propositions 
stems from their  disagreement  on property  realism.  If there  is  a  genuine  “One over  Many” 
problem for  synonymy, an  immanent  realism about  meaning  is  preferable  to  a  transcendent 
realism. If the “One over Many” is instead a pseudo-problem, there is no reason for regarding 
meanings  as  worldly  but  universal  properties:  we  can  simply  regard  them as  the  particular 
properties of concrete tokens. In the latter case, there is no need for propositions—except as 
“convenient  fictions”  that  we  may  talk  about  figuratively  to  convey  semantic  facts  about 
concrete utterances and thoughts. But is there a need for propositions in the former case? Why 
not just talk about meanings (qua immanent properties)? Armstrong offers the following reason 
for positing  propositions:  “We can certainly apply the truth predicates very widely, but I am 
inclined to think that all other suggested truthbearers besides propositions are called truthbearers 
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on account of their relationship to certain propositions.” (Armstrong 2004: 12). In other words, 
he agrees with the need for “something” that is not only the common meaning of synonymous 
tokens, but also the primary bearer of truth. Such a “thing” is a universal property, rather than an 
abstract object, but plays the same roles the alleged abstract object was expected to play.
I have argued that abstract objects cannot play the causal roles meanings ought to play, so 
meanings  are  not  abstract  objects.  I  pointed  out  that  we  may  then  reject  the  existence  of 
propositions,  following  Devitt,  or  attempt  to  naturalize  them,  following  Armstrong.  But  do 
naturalized meanings play the same roles Platonic propositions where expected to play? Are they 
also the primary truth-bearers? I discuss this topic in the next section.
I  end this  section with a brief clarification regarding the status of abstract  entities in 
general. There is an influential argument that abstract mathematical objects exist because our 
best scientific theories quantify over them. This is known as the “Quine-Putnam indispensability 
argument” (Quine 1961; Putnam 1979). It may be objected that my case against propositions qua 
abstract objects would equally apply to mathematical objects, yet the indispensability argument 
shows that mathematical objects exist—so there must be something wrong with my case. This is 
an extremely difficult issue. However, the objection is far from compelling. First, notice that the 
indispensability argument, while popular, is not the last word on the issue. There is Hartry Field’s 
(1980)  ambitious  though  incomplete  project  of  nominalizing  physics.  According  to  Field, 
numbers are merely useful fictions, reference to which can in principle be eliminated without 
loss  from  our  best  scientific  theories.  But  suppose  that  reference  to  numbers  cannot  be 
eliminated. This alone does not show that they are not fictions. Stephen Yablo (1998) argues that 
abstract entities are fictions even if reference to them cannot be eliminated from science: we may 
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need to learn to live with some in ineliminable metaphors. There is plenty of debate on this issue, 
so it  is  far  from established that  non-fictional  numbers are indispensable.  Second,  and more 
importantly, I have argued that proper paraphrases for propositional talk are readily available. So 
the situation of propositional talk is very different from that of mathematical talk. Even if some 
abstract  entities  such  as  numbers must  be  accepted,  this  provides  no  reason  for  regarding 
propositions as real abstract entities. Finally, numbers in physics do not themselves play causal 
roles. No serious contemporary Platonist about numbers claims that they have physical effects. 
As Mark Balaguer points out: “there are no causally efficacious mathematical objects...  if there 
exist any... then they are causally inert... [since] they exist outside of spacetime...” (Balaguer 
1998: 132). Whatever role reference to numbers has in scientific explanations, it is very different 
from that of reference to electrons and quarks. The fact that numbers are causally inert is what 
makes  Platonism  about  them  a  plausible  position.  But  the  situation  is  very  different  with 
meanings, which clearly have causal roles in the physical world. In contrast with Platonism about 
numbers,  Platonism about  meanings  clashes  with  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  world. 
Consequently, it is simply not a plausible position.
1.6 Naturalized Propositions?
Armstrong attempts to naturalize propositions, regarding them as worldly but universal semantic 
properties that also play the role of being the primary bearers of truth. I shall argue in this section 
that,  even if  Armstrong were right about meanings  being immanent universals,  it  would not 
follow from this alone that they must also be the primary truth-bearers. I will not argue, however, 
that meanings are not the primary truth-bearers. Rather, I will only attempt to clarify what we 
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would need to establish in order to determine whether they are the primary truth-bearers.
It is far from clear that meanings should play the role of primary truth-bearers once we 
have rejected the account of meanings  qua  abstract objects and replaced it with an account of 
meanings as worldly properties—whether universal or not. The semantic properties of sentence 
and belief tokens surely are partly responsible for their truth. A Spanish speaker’s utterance of 
‘La nieve es blanca’ and someone’s belief that snow is white are true because they both mean 
that snow is white—and because snow indeed is white. But it does not follow from this fact 
alone that the real bearers of truth are meanings themselves, rather than meaningful sentence and 
belief tokens—that is to say, concrete utterances and thoughts with their semantic (and syntactic) 
properties.  Meanings or contents,  abstracted  from utterances and thoughts,  may not even be 
legitimate—let alone primary—truth-bearers.28 An analogy may help to clarify this point:
A boat has the property of positive buoyancy—of weighting less than the water it 
displaces—and,  due to this,  it  has the property of floating in water. But what 
floats is the boat, not the property that allows it to float. While other objects also 
float because they are positively buoyant, it does not follow that the property they 
have  in  common  floats.  Positive  buoyancy  does  not  float,  positively  buoyant  
objects float.
28 J.  L.  Austin  argues,  based  on  ordinary  language  considerations,  that  propositions—regarded  as  sentence 
meanings—cannot be truth-bearers: “In philosophy, indeed, ‘proposition’ is sometimes used... for ‘the meaning 
or sense of a sentence or family of sentences’ : but... a proposition in this sense cannot, at any rate, be what we  
say is true or false. For we never say ‘The meaning (or sense) of this sentence (or of these words) is true’: what  
we do say is... that ‘The words taken in this sense, or if we assign to them such and such a meaning, or so 
interpreted or understood,  are true.’ ” (Austin 1950: 113). According to Austin, the primary truth-bearers are 
neither propositions nor sentence types (which he calls simply “sentences”), but rather the datable and placeable 
events he calls “statements”: “A statement is made and its making is a historic event, the utterance by a certain  
speaker or writer of certain words (a sentence)...” (Austin 1950: 113-114). I do not think that ordinary language 
considerations settle  the issue.  Yet,  Austin’s take is  worth mentioning because many authors  take ordinary 
language to be committed to propositions—qua sentence meanings—being the primary truth-bearers.
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Similarly, it may be reasonably argued:
A token of ‘La nieve es blanca’ in Spanish has the property of being true because 
it has the property of meaning that snow is white—and snow indeed is white. But 
what is true is the token, not the property that allows it to be true. While there are 
other sentence and belief tokens that are true also because they mean or have the 
content that snow is white, it does not follow that the semantic property they have 
in  common  is  true.  Meanings  or  contents  are  not  true  or  false,  meaningful  
sentence and belief tokens are true or false.
My point  here  is  not  that  meanings  cannot have  the  property  of  being  true  or  false  simply 
because  they  are  properties.  After  all,  some properties  may themselves  have  properties.  For 
example, the property of being red may have the property of being a color.29 What the analogy 
with positive buoyancy shows, rather, is that an object O having property X in virtue of having 
property Y does not entail that X must be a property of Y itself in order to be a property of O. So, 
truth-values being properties of meanings and, consequently, sentence and belief tokens being 
only derivatively true or false, does not follow merely from meanings being properties in virtue 
of which sentence and belief tokens can be true or false.
To establish that meanings are the primary truth-bearers, we would need to show that the 
relation between meaning and truth is more like the relation between being red and being a color 
29 This is, of course, controversial. Armstrong argues that the truth of statements like ‘Red is a color’ requires  
properties to be real: nominalists who reject properties cannot account for such truths (1978: 58-63). While he  
prefers an account in terms of the universal properties, he points out that a particularist account—according to 
which  “the  properties  of  particulars  are  themselves  particular”  (Armstrong  1978:  59)—does  not  face  this 
problem. ‘Red is a color’ may be analyzed by the particularist as asserting the following: if any particular thing 
has the particular property of being red, then it has the particular property of being colored, and being colored is 
a  second-order  particular property of the first-order  particular property of being red (Armstrong 1978: 61). 
Devitt regards the issue of accounting for the truth of statements like ‘Red is a color’ as a genuine problem, but  
points out that it is different from the “One over Many” problem (2010: 19-20).
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than like  the  relation  between positive  buoyancy  and floating.  While  this  may  be  the  case, 
Armstrong does not provide any explicit reasons to think so. Why should we regard being true as 
a second-order property of first-order meaning properties, rather than as a first-order property of 
meaningful  tokens? Armstrong seems to simply  assume that  meaning properties  are  the real 
bearers of truth. But this begs the question against the reasonable alternative that the primary 
bearers of truth are meaningful sentence and belief tokens.
The only  hint  of why Armstrong takes  meanings  qua immanent  universals  to  be the 
primary truth-bearers can be found on his brief characterization of particular content ascriptions. 
But we are forced to “read between the lines” in lack of an explicit argument. Armstrong says:
Beliefs are essentially beliefs that something is the case. Whatever is believed to 
be the case may then be said to be ‘the intentional object of that belief ’, using this 
as a technical term only. And that is a proposition. (Armstrong 2004: 13)
What follows the ‘that’ in a particular content ascription, Armstrong points out, has the form 
“something is the case”. Surely, then, what follows the ‘that’ can be true or false: it is a bearer of 
truth. But Armstrong additionally claims: “note that what follows the ‘that’... is a proposition” 
(Armstrong 2004: 14). If this claim were true, it would follow that a proposition is a truth-bearer 
in its own right. While Armstrong uses the expression ‘intentional object’ to characterize the 
proposition, he insists this is merely a technical term, so he warns: “I do not want to read too 
much metaphysics into the phrase ‘intentional objects’.” (Armstrong 2004: 13) This warning is 
important, since Armstrong wants to avoid reference to Platonic objects and treat a proposition as 
a universal but worldly semantic property that is “what makes the belief the particular belief that 
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it is” (Armstrong 2004: 13). An argument for naturalized propositions as  primary truth-bearers 
we may “extract” from Armstrong’s brief remarks runs roughly as follows: What follows the 
‘that’ in a content ascription has the form “something is the case” and  is a proposition, so a 
proposition is a bearer of truth; additionally, a proposition  qua  immanent meaning property is 
what makes a belief the particular belief it is, so it follows that it is the primary bearer of truth.
The line of reasoning, if sound, would support the view that being true is a second-order 
property of first-order meaning properties. But the line of reasoning is not sound. The claim that 
the content of a belief makes it the belief it is and the claim that what follows the ‘that’ in a 
‘that’-clause has the form “something is the case” are surely correct and uncontroversial. But 
why should we regard what follows the ‘that’ as a  proposition? Notice that what follows the 
‘that’-clause is  obviously  not a proposition, but an embedded sentence. What Armstrong must 
mean is that what follows the ‘that’ somehow “picks out” a proposition. How can it do so? The 
Platonic  account  provides  an  answer  I  have  argued  against:  the  content  ascription  asserts  a 
relation  to  a  proposition  because  the  ‘that’-clause  refers  to  a  universal  abstract  object.  But 
Armstrong cannot appeal to this answer. Yet, he seems to assume that something similar to the 
Platonist  account  is  correct.  His  characterization  of  a  proposition  as  an  intentional  object is 
revealing, despite his warning about reading “too much metaphysics” into it. The only account 
consistent with Armstrong's own metaphysics is that the ‘that’-clause, instead of referring to a 
transcendent object, “picks out” an immanent property. However, the ‘that’-clause surely picks 
out a semantic property only because the embedded sentence  has  that property. But then the 
‘that’-clause specifies the property by means of synonymy, which is the account I have defended. 
This provides no support for the claim that what  follows  the ‘that’ has a different status from 
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what precedes it. The report ‘Galileo believed that the earth moves’ asserts that Galileo’s belief 
has the same content as the embedded sentence: both tokens have the property and both tokens 
are true in virtue of having this property—and because the Earth does move. So there is no 
support for the claim that what follows the ‘that’ is in any sense primarily true. Granting, for the 
sake of argument, that the meaning shared by what precedes and follows the ‘that’ is a universal 
does not show that the meaning is a primary truth-bearer either, since this is consistent also with 
truth being a first-order property of both meaningful tokens. I conclude that Armstrong’s brief 
characterization  of  content  ascriptions  fails  to  provide support  for  his  claim that  naturalized 
meanings  also  play  the  roles  of  primary  truth-bearers  and  deserve  to  be  regarded  as 
“propositions”.
In this  section,  I  have  argued that  Armstrong provides  no  support  for  his  claim that 
naturalized semantic  properties also play the role of being the primary bearers of truth and, 
consequently, should be regarded as naturalized propositions. I have not argued that meanings 
are not the primary truth-bearers. However, I have argued that to establish that they are requires 
determining that being true is a second-order property of first-order meaning properties. While 
Armstrong does not show that this is the case, it  may be the case. Alternatively, it may be the 
case that the primary truth-bearers are meaningful sentence and belief tokens.
In the next section, I discuss whether postulating propositions  qua abstract objects may 
be consistently combined with a naturalized semantics. A view along these lines is proposed by 
Horwich. Since this view is at odds with my claim that propositions  qua  abstract objects are 
inconsistent  with  a  naturalized  semantics  (and I  borrow some crucial  ideas  from Horwich’s 
theory of meaning for my own proposal), it is important that I clarify and assess the relationship 
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between Horwich’s propositionalism and his semantic naturalism.
1.7 Naturalized Meanings plus Abstract Propositions?
I have argued against the standard account of propositions as abstract objects which constitute 
the meaning or contents of thoughts and utterances and the primary bearers of truth. The main 
consideration against such objects is that they cannot play any causal role in language and mind. 
I have discussed Armstrong’s alternative proposal to naturalize propositions, regarding them as 
natural properties which play the same roles abstract objects were alleged to play. But there is yet 
another alternative to the standard account: propositions may be regarded as abstract objects that 
are the primary truth-bearers, but which do  not play the role of determining the meanings of 
utterances and thoughts. Horwich’s account is precisely of this sort. He proposes a naturalized 
theory of meaning, which he combines with a deflationary theory of truth that applies primarily 
to propositions qua abstract objects. In this section, I attempt to clarify his account of the relation 
between naturalized meanings and propositions. Horwich’s own remarks on this metaphysical 
issue leave room for interpretation. I argue that under one interpretation, Horwich’s account can 
avoid the problems of the standard propositionalist account, while under  another interpretation 
his propositionalism is problematic.
Horwich’s “use” theory of meaning identifies meanings with the properties that account 
for the acceptance of sentences, including linguistic utterances and thoughts (i.e., the tokening of 
mental sentences in the “belief box”), and explains  meanings in terms of some core sentences 
that, he suggests, play a basic role in the causal explanation of why other sentences are accepted 
(Horwich 2005: 28). This account of meaning has good naturalistic credentials and is a crucial 
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component of the approach I am proposing to naturalize semantics. Furthermore, Horwich fully 
accepts the causal closure of the physical world which, he claims, constrains what properties can 
constitute meanings:
[A] person’s utterance of a given sentence on some occasion is surely explained, 
in part, by the meaning he attaches to that sentence; and this can be so (assuming 
the ‘causal autonomy of the physical’) only if [the] meanings of expressions are 
somehow engendered by physical phenomena. (Horwich 2010: 103n)
Horwich makes this unapologetic naturalist remark in the context of rejecting accounts according 
to which meanings are irreducibly normative. He is not specifically invoking the causal closure 
of the physical world to reject accounts of meanings as engendered or constituted by relations to 
abstract objects. Yet, the latter accounts  are also  undermined by this consideration—as I have 
argued—and Horwich’s theory of meaning does not appeal anyway to non-natural properties.
Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth is that truth is not a natural property susceptible of 
a reductive explanation. He argues that the function of our concept of truth is merely to allow us 
to  make  certain  generalizations,  that  the  meaning  of  the  word  ‘true’ is  engendered  by  the 
acceptance  of  the  trivial  equivalence  schema  “<p>  is  true  ↔  p”,  and  that  no  reductive 
explanation  of  the  nature  of  truth  is  possible  or  needed  (Horwich  1998b:  120-146).  The 
equivalence  schema,  Horwich  argues,  applies  primarily  to  propositions  (<p>)  and  only 
derivatively to sentences (‘p’): the truth of the sentence ‘Snow is white’, derives from the truth of 
the proposition it expresses, <Snow is white>, which trivially follows from snow being white 
(Horwich 1998b: 129-135). His main argument for regarding propositions as objects that are the 
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primary truth-bearers is based on ordinary language considerations:
In ordinary language what are said to be true are the things  that we believe and 
that  our  utterances  express—so-called  propositions.  Thus,  on  the  face  of  it, 
propositions exist, some of them… are true, and the correlated truth-like attributes 
of utterances and of acts of believing, asserting, etc. are the complex, derivative 
properties,  ‘u expresses  a  true  proposition’ and  ‘the  object  of  act  x is  a  true 
proposition’. (Horwich, 1998b: 129)
Horwich bases his view that  what is said and what is believed are propositional objects on the 
face  value  interpretation  of  inferences  linking  particular  and  general  content  ascriptions 
(Horwich, 1998b: 86-90). I have already argued against the face value interpretation at length. If 
I am right, it follows that if deflationism about truth turns out to be correct, a version that takes 
sentence tokens as the primary truth-bearers should be favored.30 My concern here is whether 
Horwich’s propositionalism is compatible with his naturalism about meaning and his acceptance 
of the causal closure of the physical world.
The first  point  to  notice  is  that  Horwich distinguishes  propositions—what  is  said  or 
believed—from the meanings of sentence and belief tokens and types identified and explained by 
his  naturalized  semantics:  “Certainly, it  is  vital  to  distinguish  between  (1)  the  meaning  (or 
meanings)  of a sentence type,  (2) the meaning of one of its  tokens,  and (3) the proposition 
expressed by that token.” (Horwich 1998a: 82). The same distinction can be made between the 
meaning of a belief type or token and the proposition believed, since Horwich treats beliefs as 
30 Hartry Field proposes a  sententialist version of deflationism which is similar to Horwich’s but does not posit  
propositions (Field 2001).
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mental sentences (Horwich 2005: 30). Since his reductive account applies directly only to the 
meanings  of  sentences,  this  distinction  seems  to  leave  room  for  treating  the  propositions 
expressed by those sentences as  abstract objects. Indeed, Horwich claims that this is a “small 
and innocuous” step that follows from introducing propositions as follows: if an utterance has the 
same meaning as ‘p’, then it expresses the proposition that  p (Horwich 2010: 33). The claim 
seems to be roughly that the proposition expressed by a sentence token derives from its meaning 
and does not determine its meaning. This claim does not overtly violate the causal closure of the 
physical  world,  as  far  as  meanings  are  concerned.  (It  is  analogous  to  an  epiphenomenalist 
account of the mental, which preserves dualism without violating the laws of nature.)
As far as truth is concerned, the order of Horwich’s account is the opposite: the truth of a 
sentence token derives from the truth of the proposition it expresses. Is this problematic? Does it 
violate  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  world,  since  propositions  are  regarded as  abstract 
objects? Not necessarily. Since truth, according to Horwich, is a trivial property that plays no 
causal-explanatory role, it may be argued that his account of abstract propositional objects as the 
primary truth-bearers is harmless and does not violate the causal closure principle. For example, 
we may explain that Mary succeeded finding a corkscrew because her belief that it was in the 
kitchen drawer—which caused her to go to look for it there—turned out to be true. While truth 
seems to play a crucial role in the explanation of why Mary’s behavior was successful, Horwich 
would insist that the word ‘truth’ is only being used as a “device of generalization” and that we 
can explain the situation without appealing to truth: Mary’s behavior was successful because it 
was partly caused by a token of ‘There is a corkscrew in the kitchen’s drawer’ in her “belief box” 
and there was indeed a corkscrew in the kitchen’s drawer. Horwich would argue that only the 
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meaningful token—which can be explained naturalistically—and the location of the corkscrew—
a physical fact—play a substantial role in the explanation of why Mary acted as she did and 
succeeded.  Horwich’s  contention  is  that  truth  itself  does  not  play  any causal  role  in  the 
explanation; while we may use the word ‘true’ in describing the situation—as I did initially—and 
even to formulate the generalization that true beliefs (often) contribute to successful behavior, we 
only need to apply ‘true’ in accordance with the trivial equivalence schema to do so (Horwich 
1998b: 44-46, 139-141).
Le me summarize what I have said so far in this section. I have argued that Horwich’s 
propositionalism does not  overtly conflict with his naturalistic theory of meaning to the extent 
that  (1)  he  distinguishes  meanings  from  propositions,  (2)  he  does  not regard  the  latter  as 
determining the former, and (3) his deflationary account does not assign any causal role to truth 
in the explanation of why behavior based on true belief  can be successful.  However, I have 
argued previously against his motivation for regarding propositions as the primary truth-bearers: 
his endorsement of the  face value interpretation of attitude ascriptions. I will now discuss in 
more detail Horwich’s distinction between meanings and propositions.
As I pointed out, Horwich claims that positing an abstract propositional object is a “small 
and innocuous” step: when a sentence token is synonymous with ‘p’, it expresses the proposition 
that p (Horwich 2010: 33). This is the way of introducing propositions I discussed above and 
found not to conflict with the causal closure principle. However, the devil is in the details. When 
we take a closer look into Horwich’s distinction between meanings and propositions, we find that 
he makes some remarks  that  may be interpreted as being far  from innocuous.  On occasion, 
Horwich seems to treat propositions as the contents determined by a token’s meaning together 
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with  its  context  of  utterance.  Consider  the  context  of  the  passage  quoted  above,  where  he 
distinguishes the meanings of sentence types and tokens from propositions:
[Speakers] of English know how to use “I am hungry”—they know its unique 
meaning. However, on different occasions it expresses different propositions: I 
used it yesterday to say that I was hungry; whereas John will use it tomorrow to 
say that he is (then) hungry...
Certainly, it is vital to distinguish between (1) the meaning (or meanings) of a 
sentence  type,  (2)  the  meaning  of  one  of  its  tokens,  and  (3)  the  proposition 
expressed by that token. (Horwich 1998a: 82)
Horwich  is  invoking  Kaplan’s  distinction  between  the  character  of  a  sentence  token—the 
unvarying  meaning  it  shares  with  other  tokens  of  the  same  sentence  type  and  which  is 
determined by linguistic conventions—and the content of a sentence token—what is said by the 
token, determined by its character and its  context of utterance—. This passage suggests that 
Horwich may be identifying the  meaning  of the token with its  character and the  proposition  
expressed by the token—what is said—with its content. Does he take the meaning of a sentence 
token to be merely its character? The quoted passage continues as follows:
Moreover, we must acknowledge that the use theory applies primarily to the first 
of these notions, and derivatively to the second (in so far as the meaning of a 
sentence token is simply one of the meanings of the ambiguous sentence type). As 
for the third notion of meaning—the proposition expressed—the use theory does 
not  purport  to  give  a  complete  account  of  it.  However...  the  meaning  of  an 
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utterance  token  is  a  major  determinant  of  which  proposition  is  expressed... 
(Horwich 1998a: 82)
If the meaning of a sentence token is the meaning of the sentence type to which it belongs, as 
Horwich suggests here, then it certainly is merely the token’s character when the sentence is 
context-sensitive.  Of  the  three  notions  he  distinguishes  between,  only  the  third  one—the 
proposition expressed—seems able to accommodate Kaplan’s contents. It would be helpful to 
know  what  Horwich  thinks  about  the  relation  between  the  meaning  of  a  belief—which  he 
expects  his  use  theory  to  explain—and  the  proposition  believed,  since  there  is  no 
character/content  distinction  in  this  case.  But  Horwich’s  remarks  on  the  relation  between 
meanings and propositions are sparse and, as far as I can tell,  he does not address the issue. 
However, his endorsement of the  face value interpretation of attitude reports suggests that he 
identifies the content of a belief with a proposition. What attitude reports ascribe are contents and 
Horwich characterizes them as abstract propositional objects: “the things that we believe and that 
our utterances express—so-called propositions” (Horwich 1998b: 129). Further support for this 
interpretation comes from what Horwich says about the relation between propositions and the 
meanings of non-context-sensitive sentences: “[If we] restrict our attention to context-insensitive 
sentences (such as ‘dogs bark’ and ‘snow is white’)... it is plausible to identify the proposition 
expressed  by  an  utterance  with  the  meaning  of  the  sentence-type  to  which  the  utterance 
belongs...” (Horwich 1998b: 131). All of this textual evidence seems to support the interpretation 
that Horwich does identify propositions and contents. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that 
this is a topic that Horwich has not discussed in much detail. So I am not fully confident that this  
interpretation fully captures his view on the matter. But let me explain why Horwich’s account 
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would be problematic if this interpretation happened to be correct.
Once we combine Horwich’s characterization of propositions as abstract objects with his 
seeming identification of propositions with contents, the result is deeply troubling, rather than 
“innocuous”.  The  problem  is  that  contents,  not  just  characters,  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
explanation of behavior. But, given the causal closure of the physical world—which Horwich 
accepts (Horwich 2010: 103n)—contents qua abstract objects cannot play such roles. Consider 
the following situation: Mary utters ‘I am hungry’ and Nancy responds ‘There is a sandwich in 
the fridge’; then Mary replies ‘Great!’, goes to the kitchen, opens the fridge, grabs the sandwich 
and  proceeds  to  eat  it.  The  explanation  of  Mary’s  doing  what  she  did  relies  on  ascribing 
meanings to the utterances on this exchange, as well as ascribing beliefs and desires to Mary and 
Nancy. We ascribe to Mary’s first utterance the  content  that  she is hungry: a content that we 
ascribe because we know the linguist convention for the use or the word ‘I’—the character of the 
word—and because we know facts about the context of utterance—that Mary is the speaker. 
Based on that ascription, we ascribe a mental state to Mary with that same content. The point is 
that the content  we ascribe to the sentence token and, consequently, to a mental state of Mary, 
does play a causal role in the explanation of why she opens the fridge and eats the sandwich. It 
follows that  contents, as well as  characters, must be natural worldly phenomena that can play 
such  roles.  So  I  conclude  that  if Horwich  identifies  contents  with  propositions,  his 
characterization of them as abstract objects does conflict with the causal closure of the physical 
world and is unable account for the role of contents in the explanation of behavior.
While  Horwich  identifies meanings  as  those  properties  that  explain  what  causes  the 
acceptance of sentences, Devitt argues that Horwich should extend his identification of meanings 
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to include their roles in the explanation of behavior: what sentences cause (Devitt 2011: 197-198 
& 2002: 112). Horwich does provide an account of how mental sentences can cause behavior 
(Horwich 2005:  37-39),  but  he  continues  to  identify  meanings  merely  with  what  causes  the 
acceptance of sentences (Devitt 2011: 198). The broader identification of meanings is not only 
well motivated, but also helps not to overlook the fact the causal closure of the physical world 
constrains what properties can constitute both of the kinds of meaning distinguished by Kaplan, 
since focusing on explanations of behavior shows that the contents we attribute  ought to  play 
causal roles. The fact that folk psychology is generally successful is evidence that the contents 
we do ascribe  to tokens—not just the characters—often are the ones that we ought to ascribe. 
We need a naturalized semantics that explains the nature of characters and contents identified by 
their causal roles.
I have argued that Horwich’s combination of an account of propositions  qua abstract 
objects  with a  naturalized semantics  may either  succeed or fail,  depending on what  specific 
relation  between  propositions  and  meanings  is  intended.  In  so  far  as  Horwich  sharply 
distinguishes meanings from propositions, does not regard propositions as determining meanings 
and offers a deflationary account of propositional truth, his account faces no problems. However, 
if  we  interpret  Horwich  as  identifying  meanings  merely  with  the  characters  of  tokens,  the 
account  is  inadequate.  The  main  problem  stems  from  Horwich’s  seeming  identification  of 
propositions  with Kaplan-style  contents  which,  I  have  argued,  must  also  be  naturalized  and 
should not be regarded as abstract objects. While I see no motivation to posit propositions qua 
abstract objects, there is one way Horwich may avoid the problem. Horwich may regard both the 
characters and contents of sentence and belief tokens as natural properties which play causal 
72
roles  in  the  physical  world  and  posit  abstract  propositions  in  a  truly  “innocuous”  way, 
introducing them as follows: when a sentence or belief token has the same content (in Kaplan’s 
sense) as ‘p’ (a non-context sensitive sentence), it expresses the proposition  that p. This may 
actually be Horwich’s more recent take on the matter, although he does not specify which aspect 
of meaning he intends the “innocuous” introduction of propositions to rely on (see  Horwich 
2010: 33). Yet, given the availability of sententialist versions of deflationism, I see no benefit in 
adopting such a refinement. Finally, Horwich’s main motivation for positing propositions  qua 
abstract objects stems from ordinary language considerations. But if the face value interpretation 
he endorses were right (I have argued it is not), the contents we do ascribe would be abstract 
objects and could not play the causal roles they ought to play. In such a case, we should move on 
from mere ordinary language considerations to considerations about what properties we ought to 
ascribe to explain behavior in a scientifically viable way.
1.8 Conclusion
In  this  chapter,  I  have  discussed  the  view  that  the  meanings  or  contents  of  utterances  and 
thoughts are the abstract objects called “propositions” which constitute the primary truth-bearers: 
what Church calls a “proposition in the abstract sense”. The main reason for addressing such a 
view is that it is inconsistent with a naturalized semantics of the sort I am defending and it is a  
view held by many philosophers. I have argued that the argument for propositions qua abstract 
objects based on the “One over Many” argument fails, since the Platonic “solution” faces an 
insurmountable difficulty: it faces a vicious relation regress. I have argued that the arguments for 
propositions  qua  abstract objects based on the alleged logical form of particular and general 
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content attributions also fail, since there are more plausible accounts of such attributions, which 
treat ascriptions as specifying semantic properties rather than referring to—or quantifying over— 
propositional objects. These non-propositionalist accounts, I showed, can also account for the 
validity of inferences containing particular and general content ascriptions. But I also pointed out 
that, even if the propositionalist accounts were correct about the ontological commitments of 
ordinary ascriptions, this would not prove that propositions exist, since folkloric opinion is  not 
the ultimate guide to reality. The semantic properties we ought to ascribe—and which very likely 
are the ones we often ascribe, given the general success of folk-psychology—are properties that 
play causal roles in the explanation of behavior. This excludes Platonic objects as prospective 
meanings or contents.
We must  either  reject  propositions  altogether  or  look  for  a  naturalistic  account  of 
propositions. I have, however, casted some doubt on the need for naturalized propositions. But 
this  issue depends,  I  argued,  on whether being true is  a second-order property of first-order 
meaning properties. Finally, I have objected to Horwich’s combination of a naturalized semantics 
with an account  of  propositions as abstract  objects—or at  least  one interpretation of it.  The 
“propositional” contents he claims we ascribe in ordinary attributions must play causal roles in 
the physical world, so they cannot be abstract objects.
I conclude that, despite the popularity of propositions qua abstract objects (even among 
some philosophers who want to naturalize meanings!), there are no compelling reasons to believe 
they exist, but there are compelling metaphysical reasons to reject any abstract entities from a 
scientifically viable explanation of the meanings or contents of utterances and thoughts. We need 
a  reductive explanation of what  natural  properties  constitute  the meanings of  utterances  and 
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thoughts: a naturalized semantics.
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Chapter 2:
Truth, Reference and the Task of Semantics
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed a metaphysical issue related to the nature of meanings. In this 
chapter  I  will  discuss  a  “methodological”  issue.  What  is  the task of  semantics? The simple 
answer to this question is that the task is “to say what meanings  are, to explain their  natures” 
(Devitt 2012: 62). Presumably, the various semantic theories on offer are rival accounts of such 
natures.  But  it  is  often  not  clear  whether  they  are  genuine  rivals,  since  they  seem to  have 
different purposes and disagree on what counts as a “meaning”. It is common to assume that the 
goal is to explain the truth-conditions of sentences and thoughts and the references of their parts
—where truth is regarded as some form of correspondence with reality. But deflationists argue 
that truth and reference cannot play a substantial role in semantics. I will argue that no account of 
the nature of truth and reference should be assumed in the definition of the task of semantics, 
since it is likely that the dispute between correspondence and deflationary views will be settled 
by whether  truth  and reference  are  required  to  play  a  substantial  role  in  the  explanation  of 
meaning. Following Devitt (1996), I argue that the task of semantics should be to explain the 
nature of the meanings pre-theoretically identified by the causal roles of representations. This 
definition  of  the  task  has  the  virtue  of  not  assuming  any account  of  the  nature  of  truth  or 
reference and, consequently, of not begging the question against deflationism.
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2.2 The Nature of Truth and Reference
The  status quo in  semantics is  truth-referentialism: the view that  truth and reference play a 
central role in the explanation of meanings. The meanings of sentences are regarded as being 
exhausted by—or consisting mainly of—their truth-conditions, which in turn are regarded as 
being determined by the referential properties of words and the syntactic structure of sentences. 
Similarly, the truth-conditions of thoughts are regarded as being determined by the referential 
properties of the concepts they contain and their structure. Truth-referentialism requires truth to 
be a substantial property. The main substantial account of the nature of truth adopted by truth-
referentialists  is  the  correspondence  theory. And  the  main  alternative  to  the  correspondence 
theory is deflationism, according to which truth is not a substantial property and cannot play an 
explanatory role in the theory of meaning. The deflationary conception of truth motivates some 
kind of “use” theory of meaning in which truth plays no explanatory role. I will briefly discuss 
correspondence and deflationary conceptions and argue that the dispute is likely to be settled by 
whether truth and reference must play an explanatory role in semantics.
The most venerable and popular view about the nature of truth is that it consists in some 
form of correspondence with reality. Various formulations of the view have been proposed. What 
they have in common is a commitment to the claim that truth is a specific kind of  relational 
property: a property that some truth-bearers have because of a relation they bear to reality. The 
various formulations of the view agree on the broad characterization of this relation as one of 
correspondence,  agreement or  conformity.  But  they  disagree  on  whether  it  involves  a 
resemblance or  merely  a  correlation between  truth-bearers  and  reality  (Pitcher  1964:  9-11; 
Kirkham 1992:  Ch.  4.1).  The  various  formulations  also  agree  on  the  objective—mind-  and 
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language-independent—character of the reality that true truth-bearers are related to.  But they 
disagree on whether true truth-bearers correspond to things or to facts (Künne 2003: Ch. 3).
2.2.1 The Canonical Correspondence Theory
What today is regarded as the canonical version of the correspondence view is the claim that a 
truth-bearer is true if and only if it  corresponds to a fact. This idea was advanced in the early 
twentieth century by G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The canonical 
view requires an ontology of facts. Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein argued that facts are entities 
in their own right, existing over and above the things that compose them. The basic idea is that  
facts are structured combinations of objects with properties or relations. For example, the fact 
that a certain tree is an oak allegedly consists of an object, the tree, combined with the property 
of being an oak (Moore 1953: 311), while the fact that Desdemona loves Cassio allegedly is a 
“complex unity” of two objects, Desdemona and Cassio, connected by the loving relation which 
“binds [them] together” in a particular “order” (Russell 1912: 128). The canonical view also 
needs  an  account  of  the  correspondence  relation.  Wittgenstein  (1922)  and  Russell  (1918) 
proposed  that  a  true  sentence  “pictures”  or  “mirrors”  a  fact  in  virtue  of  (1)  the  referential 
relations between its  words and the constituents of the fact,  and (2) a relation of  structural  
resemblance or  isomorphism between the sentence and the fact (Wittgenstein 1922: 2.131 & 
3.21; Russell 1918: 24-25). For example, ‘Socrates is wise’ is true if there is a fact consisting of 
the object and property referred to by the name and predicate, respectively, which has the same 
monadic structure,  Φx, as the sentence. While ‘Napoleon hates Wellington’ is true if there is a 
fact that has the same dyadic form as the sentence, Φxy, and which has Napoleon and Wellington 
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and the hating relation as constituents.
While very influential in its time, the canonical version of correspondence faces serious 
difficulties. As J. L. Austin warned, the idea that portions of reality are  isomorphic to the true 
sentences that represent them seems to commit “the error of reading back into the world the 
features  of  language”  (Austin  1950:  119).  Austin  proposed  that  only  correlations (not 
isomorphisms) between sentences and portions of reality are required for correspondence (Austin 
1950: 115-120). Moreover, it turns out that sentences are not isomorphic to what they represent, 
as Russell himself noticed:
In the phrase “A is to the left of B,” even if we treat “is-to-the-left-of” as one 
word, we have a fact consisting of  three terms with a  triadic relation, not two 
terms with a dyadic relation. The linguistic symbol for a relation is not itself a 
relation, but a term as solid as the other words of the sentence. (Russell 1919: 38)
The fact represented by a true sentence ‘Rab’ allegedly is a unity of two objects, a and b, bound 
by a dyadic relation R. But the sentence is instead a unity of three words, ‘R’, ‘a’ and ‘b’, bound 
by a  triadic  logico-syntactic  relation.  If  there is  such a  thing as  the  fact  that  Rab,  it  is  not 
isomorphic to the sentence ‘Rab’.
Another problem for the canonical view is with the ontology of facts. To begin with, there 
seem to be no facts corresponding to negative, disjunctive or conditional statements (Strawson 
1950: 154-155). Wittgenstein (1922) and Russell (1918) had a solution for this problem, which 
Russell called “logical atomism”: instead of explaining the truth of molecular sentences in terms 
of isomorphisms with logically complex facts, they explained it  in terms of (1) their  logical 
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structure and (2) the truth-values of the atomic sentences they contain: ‘p and  q’ is true if and 
only if ‘p’ is true and ‘q’ is true, ‘p or q’ is true if and only if ‘p’ is true or ‘q’ is true, ‘If p, then q’ 
is true if and only if ‘p’ is false or ‘q’ is true, etc. (Wittgenstein 1922: 5-5.101; Russell 1918: 37-
41). However, this still relied on the mistaken view that atomic sentences are true in virtue of 
isomorphisms. Furthermore, even “atomic” facts are controversial. The idea that combinations of 
objects with properties or relations are sui generis entities assumes realism about universals—a 
controversial doctrine that I questioned in Chapter 1.31 We can accept that Socrates really is wise 
without  regarding  this  as  a  combination  of  Socrates  with  a  universal  wisdom  that  can  be 
instantiated elsewhere. Certainly there is plenty of talk of facts in ordinary language. But it looks 
like  such talk  is  equivalent  to  talk  of  truths.  P. F. Strawson,  for  example,  suggests  that  the  
expressions ‘fact’ and ‘true statement’ have overlapping roles and points out:
There is no nuance, except of style, between ‘That’s true’ and ‘That’s a fact’; nor 
between ‘Is it true that...?’ and ‘Is it a fact that...?’ (Strawson 1950: 136)
Similarly, Quine remarks:
In  ordinary  usage  ‘fact’ often  occurs  where  we  could  without  loss  say  ‘true 
sentence’ or (if it is our way) ‘true proposition’... Now so far as these uses go 
there is no call to posit facts... nor any difficulty in... paraphrasing away the word. 
(Quine 1960: 246-247)
Strawson and Quine do not object to the ordinary uses of the word ‘fact’. Their point is rather 
that such uses are not seriously committed to the existence of anything other than truths.
31 Armstrong (1997) provides a contemporary defense of the existence of atomic facts, regarded as entities that are 
more than the sum of their parts.
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2.2.2 The Contemporary Correspondence Theory
Given  the  serious  problems  faced  by  the  canonical  version  of  the  correspondence  theory, 
contemporary theorists have articulated a version of the view that relies neither on facts nor on 
resemblance  relations.  Instead,  it  relies  on  (1)  an  account  of  truth  in  terms  of  the  logical  
structures of sentences and the referential  properties of their  parts—based on Alfred Tarski’s 
(1956 & 1944) influential work—coupled with (2) a reductive account of reference in terms of 
one or another kind of causal relation between words and objects—a combination which, Hartry 
Field (1972) argued, is necessary to provide a robust account of truth. While the canonical view 
regards  correspondence  as  a  resemblance-to-facts  relation,  the  contemporary  view  treats 
correspondence as a correlation-to-objects relation.
Tarski (1956 & 1944) wanted to offer an account of truth that does justice to the classical  
conception of truth as consisting in some form of correspondence to reality (Tarski 1956: 153 & 
1944:  342-343).  Despite  his  intentions,  however,  his  account  turns  out  to  be  a  form  of 
deflationism (Horwich 2010: 22-24; Devitt 2010:170-173). Tarski showed how the truth of a 
sentence can be explained in terms of its structure and the referential properties of its parts. This 
is the aspect of Tarski’s work that is adopted by the contemporary correspondence theory. I will 
ignore  for  now Tarski’s account  of  reference,  which  is  the  deflationary  part  of  his  account 
discarded by the contemporary correspondence theory.32
Tarski offered his account for fully formalized languages. I will use predicate symbolic 
logic as an illustration. Consider a simple sentence ‘Kr’. Following the procedure proposed by 
Tarski, we can specify the truth-conditions of ‘Kr’ as follows:
32 I will also ignore that Tarski (1956) did not offer an account of truth, but of truth-in-a-(specific)-language.
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‘Kr’ is true ↔ x∃ (‘r’ designates x & ‘K’ applies to x).
In plain English: ‘Kr’ is true if and only if there is an object that the name ‘r’ designates and the 
predicate ‘K’ applies to. Notice that the truth-conditions of the sentence are characterized in 
terms of  its  structure  and the referential  relations—application  and designation—between its 
component words and an object in the world. Sentential structure and referential relations were 
also components of the canonical view. But here “facts” and “structural resemblances” play no 
role. These are correlation-to-objects relations instead of resemblance-to-facts relations. Given 
the difficulties faced by the canonical view discussed above, related to “facts” and “structural 
resemblance”, this is a clear advantage.
Tarski showed that the truth-conditions of an infinite number of sentences can be derived 
from a  finite set  of rules or axioms that can be  recursively applied.  For example,  the truth-
conditions of ‘Kr’ stated above can be derived from applying the general rule:
⌜Fa  is true ↔ x(⌝ ∃ ⌜a  designates x & ⌝ ⌜F  applies to x).⌝
Where ⌜a  can be replaced by any name and ⌝ ⌜F  can be replaced by any one-place predicate. So⌝  
the truth-conditions of  any sentence ⌜Fa  can be obtained. Similarly, the truth-conditions of a⌝  
compound or molecular sentence ‘Kr & Jz’ can be specified by the biconditional:
‘Kr & Jz’ is true ↔ x(‘∃ r’ designates x & ‘K’ applies to x) & x(‘∃ z’ designates x & 
‘J’ applies to x).
Which is  derived from applying the truth-rule  for  ⌜Fa  to  each conjunct  ⌝ after applying the 
general truth-rule for conjunction:
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⌜A & B⌝ is true ↔ (⌜A⌝ is true & ⌜B⌝ is true).
Where  ⌜A⌝ and  ⌜B  can be replaced by any simple or compound sentence (so the rule can be⌝  
applied  recursively  to  complex  sentences  that  contain  indefinitely  many  simple  sentences). 
Notice  that  this  characterization  coincides  with  the  one  offered  by  Wittgenstein  (1922)  and 
Russell  (1918).  What  sets  apart  Tarski  is  his  account  of  “atomic” sentences.  His account  of 
“molecular” sentences is the same.
One of Tarski’s crucial insights is that the “semantic” rules should track and exploit the 
recursive syntactic rules. And the “syntactic” formation rules of predicate logic are finite. So, 
once we have formulated the corresponding finite set of semantic truth-rules that cover all the 
formation rules,  we can characterize the truth-conditions of an infinite number of sentences. 
What  we need is  truth-rules  for:  (1)  sentences  containing  n-place  predicates—⌜Fa ,  ⌝ ⌜Fab ,⌝  
⌜Fabc , etc.—, (2) sentences with quantifiers—⌝ ⌜ x(Fx)∀  and ⌝ ⌜ x(Fx)∃ —and (3) sentences with⌝  
logical operators or connectives — ~⌜ A , ⌝ ⌜A & B , ⌝ ⌜A  B∨ , ⌝ ⌜A → B  and ⌝ ⌜A ↔ B —. Tarski⌝  
showed how this can be done—roughly along the lines of the examples I gave above.
What  is  required to  turn a recursive account  along these lines into a correspondence 
theory of truth is to (1) show how it can be extended to natural languages and (2) complement it 
with an account of the nature of the referential relations between words and objects—a reductive 
account that does not rely on semantic terms, since semantic properties surely are not among the 
fundamental  properties of  the world.  Tarski  himself  offered an account  of  reference in  non-
semantic terms. But Hartry Field (1972) showed that it did not provide a proper reduction (I 
discuss this below) and that it had to be replaced with a naturalistic account of reference in terms 
of one or another kind of casual relation between words and the world. There has been plenty of 
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work on how to naturalize reference in the last decades. The main contenders are theories that 
rely on the historical causes, the reliable causes and the etiological functions of representations, 
respectively. None of these proposals are without problems. Whether some reductive explanation 
of reference in non-semantic terms succeeds or not remains to be seen. Deflationists are skeptical 
because  they  think  that  a  reductive  explanation  of  reference  is  neither  possible  nor  needed 
(Horwich 1998b; Field 1994). But the matter is not settled, and we should keep searching.
The other challenge for the contemporary theory is to extend the recursive account to 
natural  languages.  Tarski  himself  was  skeptical,  because  formulating  the  truth-rules  for  a 
language requires that its structure has been already specified exactly.33 But times changed and 
eventually philosophers and logicians—and later linguists—started to explore how a Tarskian 
account could be applied to natural languages. A crucial inspiration for this optimism was the 
increased understanding of the syntax of natural languages provided by Chomskyan generative 
grammar.  Richard  Montague  declared:  “I  reject  the  contention  that  an  important  theoretical 
difference exists between formal and natural languages” and proposed a Tarski-inspired theory of 
truth for “a formal language that I believe may be reasonably regarded as a fragment of ordinary 
English” (Montague 1974: 188). Similarly, Donald Davidson proclaimed: “a semantic theory of a 
natural language cannot be considered adequate unless it provides an account of the concept of 
truth for that language along the general lines proposed by Tarski for formalized languages” 
(Davidson  1984:  55).  Consider  the  philosophical  practice  of  translating  natural  language 
sentences into quantified predicate logic to reveal their logical form. Plenty of sentences can be 
33 As he  pointed  out:  “At  the  present  time the  only  languages  with  a  specified  structure  are  the  formalized  
languages of various systems of deductive logic, possibly enriched by the introduction of certain non-logical 
terms.” (Tarski 1944: 347). Tarski was also concerned about the syntactic rules of natural languages allowing for 
the formation of paradoxical sentences like the self-referring ‘This sentence is false’, which would make the 
characterizations of truth-conditions inconsistent (Tarski 1956: 157-165 & 1944: 347-349).
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successfully translated. As Davidson points out, this reveals that formal languages already cover 
at  least  some  the  structure  of  natural  languages—for  example,  Frege’s work  on  quantifiers 
reveals the logical roles of some uses of words like ‘all’, ‘every’, ‘some’ and ‘none’ in English 
(Davidson 1984: 29). The remaining challenge is to show that a Tarski-based approach can be 
extended  to those sentences of natural languages that seem to resist formalization. Davidson’s 
analysis  of action sentences and adverbial  modifications is a good example of an attempt to 
reveal the logical form of some problematic sentences, so that a Tarskian account can cover them 
(Davidson 1967 & 1985). Just like with reductive theories of reference, it remains to be seen 
whether this can be accomplished.
2.2.3 Deflationism
According to deflationism, a reductive explanation of truth and reference is neither possible nor 
necessary, because truth and reference are  not substantial properties with an underlying nature 
that could be reductively explained. I will first present the unintentional deflationism of Tarski 
and then the views of some contemporary deflationists.
Tarski suggested that a proper account or “definition” of truth should capture our pre-
theoretical intuitions about what is for a sentence to be true by entailing the proper instances of 
the equivalence schema:
(T) ‘S’ is true ↔ S.
Where the sentence ‘S’ is mentioned on the left hand of the biconditional and used on the right 
hand. The well-known example Tarski (1944) gave of an instance of this schema in English is:
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‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.
Tarski  regarded  each  instance  as  a  “partial  definition”  of  truth,  because  he  though  that  it  
accounted for the truth of a particular sentence. Indeed, Tarski suggested that a mere list of all the 
instances of the schema for a language with a finite number of sentences would provide a proper 
account of truth in that language (Tarski 1956: 188). He moved on to offer his recursive account 
because interesting languages have an infinite number of sentences. But notice that a list-like 
account would not constitute a “correspondence” theory. As Douglas Patterson points out, many 
philosophers—notably Tarski (1944: 342-343)—have held the view that instances of the schema 
“state  correspondences  between  the  sentences  they  mention  and  something  else”  (Patterson 
2003: 421). But instances of the schema do not state relations of correspondence, since they do 
not  state  any  relations  whatsoever:  their  basic  form  is  A  ↔  B,  rather  than  Rab.  Indeed, 
deflationists argue that there is no need to regard the word ‘truth’ as standing for a relational 
property because instances of the equivalence schema are all that is required to account for its  
meaning and utility (Horwich 1998b; Field 1994).
Tarski complemented his recursive account of truth with a non-semantic characterization 
of what is for a name to designate an object and what is for a predicate to apply to an object. 
Notice that  reductive explanations  of reference in terms of one or another kind of causal link 
between symbols and reality (whether reliable, historical or teleological) also are non-semantic. 
But the “non-semantic” characterizations of reference offered by Tarski are not of this sort. In the 
case of ‘K’ and ‘r’, for example, they would be the following:
x∀ (‘K’ applies to x ↔ Kx).
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x∀ (‘r’ designates x ↔ x = r).34
Tarski proposed that a complete list of biconditionals like these,  covering all the non-logical 
symbols of a language, would provide a proper non-semantic characterization of what is for a 
symbol  to  refer  in  that  language.  Sure  enough,  the  right-hand  sides  of  these  biconditionals 
contain no semantic terms. But, as Field pointed out, they do not provide reductive explanations 
of the nature of reference (Field 1972). Field made this point vivid using an analogy with the 
reductive explanation of chemical valence. In the twentieth century, the valence of elements was 
explained in  terms  of  the  underlying  physical  properties  of  their  atoms.  But  suppose  that  a 
chemist in the late nineteenth century offered the following as a “non-chemical” characterization 
of the valence of elements:
An element  e has valence  n if and only if either  e is arsenic and  n is 5, or  e is 
beryllium and n is 2, or …, or e is zinc and n is 2. (See Field 1972: 362-363)
Such a list-like characterization can match all the elements with their correct numerical values. 
The right-hand side of the biconditional contains no chemical terms. Yet it is clear that this list-
like characterization does not provide a reductive explanation of valence (ibid). Indeed, it says 
nothing  substantial  about  the  nature  of  valence.  Similarly,  Tarski’s  list-like  definitions  say 
nothing substantial about the nature of reference. While Field saw this as a serious drawback—
34 Tarski (1956) initially focused on the relation between predicates and the objects they apply to, which he called 
“satisfaction”. He offered the following example of how the application of a one-place predicate can be defined:  
“for every a, ...a satisfies the sentential function ‘x is white’ if and only if a is white” (Tarski 1956: 190). The 
formal languages he originally analyzed did not contain names (Horwich 1998b: 110n). But he did provide an  
account of designation (Tarski 1956: 194n; see Field 2001: 17-18), which he later explicitly included among the 
semantic  features  that  determine  sentential  truth  (Tarski  1944:  345).  Tarski  defined  designation—just  like 
predicate-application—in terms of satisfaction: “a given term designates a given object if this object satisfies the 
sentential  function ‘x is  identical with T’ where ‘T’ stands for the given term” (Tarski 1944: 373n).  So he 
regarded satisfaction as the most fundamental semantic relation that determines sentential truth: “a sentence is  
true if it is satisfied by all objects, and false otherwise” (Tarski 1944: 353).
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and  proposed  that  we  replace  Tarski’s  definitions  with  a  causal  theory  of  reference—he 
eventually  changed  his  mind  and  came  to  think  that  truth  and  reference  indeed  have  no 
underlying nature, but the words ‘true’ and ‘refers’ nonetheless play useful roles. I will briefly 
characterize the views of Horwich and Field, that differ mainly on their takes on truth-bearers.
Deflationists  are  not  always very clear  about  the metaphysics  of  truth and reference, 
although they have plenty to say about the roles of the  words ‘true’ and ‘refers’ (‘applies to’, 
‘designates’, etc.). Consider the following schemata:
‘p’ is true if and only if p.
‘a’ designates and object o if and only if a = o.
‘F’ applies to an object o if and only if o is F.
Deflationists like Field and Horwich argue that the roles of ‘true’, ‘designates’ and ‘applies’ in 
the instances of these schemata are all that is required to account for their meaning and utility, so 
there is no need to regard ‘truth’ and ‘reference’ as standing for relational properties. While Field 
(1994) is a sententialist, Horwich (1998b) is a propositionalist, so his version of the first schema 
is instead: <p> is true if and only if p.
But what is the utility of these words? Deflationists say that they work as devices of 
generalization that allow us to say things that we would not be able (or it would be hard) to say 
without them. You can say, for example, ‘What he said is true’, expressing agreement with a 
statement that you may not be able to put in words. Given the equivalence schema, this sentence 
entails: ‘If he said that grass is green, then grass is green, if he said that Mars is a planet, then 
Mars is a planet, if he said that 2 + 2 = 4, then 2 + 2 = 4, etc.’. Conversely, consider this list of  
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sentences: ‘If grass is green, then we should believe that grass is green; if Mars is a planet, then 
we should believe that Mars is a planet; if 2 + 2 = 4, then we should believe that 2 + 2 = 4; etc.’.  
By deploying the equivalence schema, we can turn the list into the following one: ‘If ‘grass is 
green’ is true, then we should believe that grass is green; if ‘Mars is a planet’ is true, then we 
should believe that Mars is a planet; etcetera’. In turn, this can be generalized into: ‘We should 
believe the truth’ (Horwich 1998b: 105-106).35 This generalization would not be possible without 
the truth predicate.  In virtue of the acceptance of the equivalence schema, we can formulate 
generalizations like this one. Moreover, deflationists argue that the equivalence schema is all that 
is required to account for other uses of the word ‘true’. In Horwich’s words:
The deflationist’s contention… is that whenever we deploy the concept of truth… 
it is playing this role: a device of generalization. Moreover, it doing so requires… 
no more and no less than the equivalence schema. Thus the basis for our use of 
the truth predicate is indeed our acceptance of the instances of that schema… 
(Horwich 1998b: 106)
Horwich indeed claims that the role and meaning of ‘true’ are explained by our acceptance of the 
schema. And similar considerations are offered for ‘designates’ and ‘applies to’ (or ‘is true of’).
But what about the metaphysics of truth? What do deflationists say about the nature of 
truth itself, rather than about the role of ‘true’? This is a more difficult question than it may 
seem, since discussions of deflationism “tend to blur the distinction between the linguistic and 
the metaphysical” (Devitt 2010: 157). What is clear is that, based on their account of the role of 
35 Horwich uses the propositional version of the equivalence schema in his own examples. Given my objections to  
propositions presented in Chapter 1, I prefer Field’s sentential version.
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the truth predicate,  they argue for the negative thesis that it  does  not stand for a substantial 
relational  property. Horwich is  happy to describe truth as  a  “logical”  property—although he 
insists that is has no underlying nature. Presumably he should say that there is no truth property
—or no such thing as truth. So there is no such thing as the nature of truth. Anyway, if the truth 
predicate does not stand for a relational property, then it does seem that there is no place for a 
correspondence theory of truth.
How can we figure out whether we need a correspondence theory or deflationists are 
right and we do not need such a theory? On one hand, the correspondence view of truth is very 
appealing and seems to provide the proper framework for a truth-referential semantics. On the 
other hand, the deflationary view of the role of ‘true’ seems very plausible. But if the equivalence 
schema explains everything about the role of ‘true’, then the term does not stand for a relational 
property of the sort required to play an explanatory role in semantics—although the truth term 
may  serve  in  semantics  as  a  device  of  generalization.  The  main  argument  in  favor  of  the 
correspondence theory and against deflationism is that truth and reference play substantive roles 
in the explanation of meaning (Devitt 2010: 178-181). Deflationists have attempted to address 
this concern by offering so-called “use” theories of meaning where truth and reference do not 
play any explanatory roles (e.g.,  Brandom 1994 & Horwich 1998a). But it remains to be seen 
whether these theories can succeed explaining meaning and, moreover, if in case of succeeding 
they do not appeal to substantive relations between language and the world that may turn out to 
constitute truth and reference. Given this situation, it looks like the debate on the nature of truth 
and reference is very likely to be eventually settled after we have figured out what is the best 
explanation  of  meaning and whether  truth  and reference  play  substantive  roles  in  it  or  not. 
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Consequently, we cannot settle the debate on the nature of truth and reference before engaging in 
the  search  for  a  proper  theory  of  meaning—and we cannot  assume that  the  correspondence 
theory or deflationism is correct before learning more about the nature of meaning.
2.3 Identifying and Explaining Meanings
The task of explaining the nature of any property should rely on a relatively uncontroversial 
identification of the property to be explained. But semantic theories often proceed without such 
an identification or rely on controversial identifications which are simply taken for granted but 
assume a particular account of the nature of meanings, such as the assumption that a theory of 
meaning must explain the truth-conditions of truth-bearers and the referential properties of their 
parts. I shall argue that the task of semantics must be specified on the basis of a non-question-
begging identification of meanings.
As Devitt points out, the task of investigating the nature of meanings is analogous to the 
tasks of investigating the natures of genes (Devitt 2012: 62). Likewise, Horwich suggests that the 
scientific investigation of what constitutes water provides a model for what a semantic theory 
should accomplish: it should account for what properties  constitute meanings (Horwich 2005: 
76-77).  The  suggestion  of  Devitt  and  Horwich  is  that  the  task  of  semantics  is  to  find,  for 
meanings, an account of the sort exemplified by the discoveries that genes are DNA sequences 
and water is H2O. The natures of genes and water—like the nature of meanings—are constituted 
by more fundamental properties.36 But notice that the tasks of explaining the nature of genes and 
36 And the properties that constitute meanings, genes and water in turn are constituted by even more fundamental 
properties. The  chemical  properties of DNA and H2O are explained by their underlying  physical  properties. 
Similarly, whatever properties constitute meanings surely are not directly fundamental physical properties, but 
some properties whose nature needs further explanation.
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water—unlike the task of explaining the nature of meanings—had a clearly defined “subject 
matter”, since genes and water were “identified relatively uncontroversially” before undertaking 
the investigation of their nature (Devitt 2012: 62). Furthermore, the identification of genes and 
water  served  “clear  and  familiar  theoretical  or  practical  purposes”  (Devitt  2012:  62).  The 
characteristic  features  by  which  genes  and  water  were  identified—and  which  made  their 
identification useful for our theoretical or practical purposes—needed explanation: why do genes 
and water have these features? Consequently, investigating their underlying nature was clearly a 
worthwhile task: it was clear (1)  what to explain and (2)  why  the explanation was needed. In 
sum, there was a clear identification of what needed explanation. Similarly, a theory that expects 
to  explain  the underlying nature of meanings must first provide a clear  identification of what 
needs explanation: “[The] first step is semantics is to identify meanings. We can then move on to 
explain the meanings so identified.” (Devitt 2002: 108).
What are these “meanings” we are trying to explain? How should we identify them? And 
why  is  it  worth  seeking  such  explanations?  What  are  the  explanations  needed  for?  The 
methodological question of how meanings should be identified before attempting to explain their 
nature is often overlooked (Devitt 2012: 61-63). But this situation is deeply troubling. On one 
hand, “our ordinary talk of “meanings”... is very vague” (Devitt 2011:197). So the claim that the 
task of semantics is to explain the nature of “meanings” requires further specification. On the 
other  hand,  theorists  often  simply  take  for  granted  certain  views  of  the  tasks  of  semantics, 
without properly motivating them: “It is troubling that much semantic theorizing proceeds with 
inexplicit reliance on apparently  ad hoc  views of the semantic tasks.” (Devitt 2012: 62). The 
problem is that competing theories do not only disagree on what is the best explanation of the 
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nature of meanings, but also on what needs explanation: “It is far from clear what counts as a 
meaning that needs explaining. Indeed, the intractable nature of semantic disputes largely stems 
from differing opinions about what counts.” (Devitt 2012: 62).
Many theorists assume that the task of semantics is to explain what underlying properties 
determine the truth-referential properties of symbols. In other words, they take for granted an 
identification  of  meanings  with  truth-referential  properties  at  the  semantic  level  and  seek  a 
reductive explanation of such properties. But this simply begs the question against deflationary 
views according to which truth and reference have no underlying natures. While properties that 
determine truth and reference may indeed play a role in the explanation of meaning, deflationism 
should not be “ruled out by a definition” of the semantic task (Devitt 1996: 63-64). There is a 
panoply of theoretical  options  and none of them should be either  ruled out  or favored by a 
definition of the semantic task. On one extreme, there are theories according to which a reductive 
explanation of truth and reference is  all that is needed to account of the underlying nature of 
meanings (e.g., Fodor 1987). On the other extreme, there are theories that attempt to reductively 
explain meanings merely in terms of functional-roles which do not substantially determine truth 
and reference  (e.g.,  Harman 1987).  Between these extremes,  there are  theories  according to 
which a reductive explanation of truth and reference is crucial but does not exhaust an account of 
the nature of meanings. One alternative is to regard the very same non-semantic properties that 
determine  truth  and  reference  also as  constituting  Fregean  “modes  of  presentation”  (e.g., 
Peacocke 1992, Devitt 1996, 2001b & 2012).37 Another alternative is to regard the underlying 
37 Horwich points out that the distinction that Frege (1948) draws between sense and reference remains at the 
semantic  level  (Horwich  1998a:  52).  But  just  like  there  are  attempts  to  explain  the  underlying  nature  of 
reference,  there are attempts to explain the underlying nature of  Fregean senses  or  modes of  presentation.  
Peacocke (1992) explains the meanings of concepts in terms of “primitively compelling” functional-roles that 
constitute modes of presentation substantially determining their reference. Similarly, Devitt (1996) naturalizes 
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nature of meanings as composed by two independent factors: a factor that determines truth and 
reference  plus a  functional-role factor that  does not  determine truth and reference (e.g., Block 
1986). All of these proposals are presented as offering accounts of the nature of meanings: they 
are  allegedly engaged  in  the  same  task,  asking  the  same  question  and  offering  different 
competing answers. For this to be genuinely the case, the specification of the task of semantics 
should not beg the question against any of these proposals (Devitt 1996: 64).
How can we decide among all the competing accounts of the nature of meanings? And 
how can we determine that they are genuinely competing explanations of the same phenomena, 
rather than explanations of different aspects of linguistic and mental representations? Consider, 
for  example,  my  thought  that  snow is  white.  It  is  uncontroversial  that  my  thought  has  the 
meaning or content  that snow is white, that it is  true  and that one of the concepts it contains 
refers  to snow. But let us consider what  underlying properties my thought and the concepts it 
contains have. As it turns out, a wide range of theorists agree on what these various properties 
are,  although they disagree on which among them constitute  meanings and on whether they 
substantially engender truth-referential properties. Most theorists agree that my thought and the 
concepts it contains have complex functional-roles in my mind: that they are causally connected 
to various other thoughts and concepts, to various inputs from my perception and outputs to my 
behavior.  Yet,  they  disagree  about  whether  all,  some or  none of  these  roles  constitute  the 
meanings of my thought and my concepts. Additionally, most theorists agree that one of the 
concepts in my thought has links to snow in the distal/external world and, furthermore, that such 
the meanings of non-primitive words covered by a description theory in terms of some of their functional-roles: 
those that constitute the modes of presentation that determine their reference. Interestingly, Devitt (1996, 2001b 
& 2012) suggests that the causal links to reality—whether historical-causal, informational and/or teleological—
that determine the reference of primitive words should also be regarded as constituting modes of presentation: 
these are causal modes rather than descriptive modes.
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links are—at least part of—what constitutes the meaning of the concept. Yet, they disagree about 
whether such links substantially determine the reference of the concept and on whether they 
should be regarded as part of its (non-reference-determining) functional-role. Regarding truth 
and reference:  even deflationists  agree that  representations  do have truth-referential  features, 
although they regard them as trivial  (e.g.,  Horwich 1998b, Field 1994). Regarding modes of 
presentation:  “direct  reference”  theorists  agree  that  there  are  properties  that  substantially 
determine reference, although they do not include them among the components of meaning (e.g., 
Salmon 1986: 70-71, Soames 2002: 19-20; see Devitt 2001b & 2012 for a criticism of this view); 
while deflationists  agree that the meanings of words and concepts determine their  reference, 
although they do not regard such “determination” as substantial (Horwich 1998a: 68-71, 2005: 
79-81).  Finally,  regarding  functional-roles:  every  author  who  is  a  realist  about  mental 
representation—and this includes most authors, except a few behaviorists and eliminativists—
agrees that thoughts and concepts have causal roles in cognition, although some authors deny 
that these roles constitute the meanings of any concepts (Fodor 1987: 71-95). While different 
theorists  agree  that  representations  and  their  parts  have  all these  features—functional-roles, 
connections to reality, etc.—they disagree about which among them constitute their meanings.
Why should we regard meanings as truth-referential properties, including or not modes of 
presentation, as functional-roles or as some combination of these features? Lacking an explicit 
specification of the purposes of semantics, the dispute may seem to be merely about what should 
be honored with the label of “meaning”. William Lycan humorously expresses this concern with 
his “Double Indexical Theory of Meaning”:
MEANING =def Whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to interest me now. 
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(Lycan 1984: 272)
While Lycan’s concern is mainly with theories of linguistic meaning, we can rephrase it to also 
include theories of mental content:
MEANING =def Whatever aspect of linguistic or conceptual activity happens to 
interest me now.
To  be  fair,  the  competing  approaches  in  semantics  often  do  have  theoretically  motivated 
differences. The disputes (or at least some of them) seem to be substantive rather than merely 
verbal.  For  example,  purely  functional-role  theorists  are  not  simply  “more  interested”  in 
functional-roles than on truth and reference. At least some of them are motivated by deflationary 
views according to which truth and reference are trivial features that cannot explain meaning or 
content (e.g., Field 1994).38 In contrast, truth-referential theorists are motivated by the view that 
truth and reference are substantial properties of linguistic and mental representations (e.g., Fodor 
1987).
But  granting  that  the  debate  is  not  merely  verbal  does  not  remove  the  underlying 
problem. As Devitt points out, “to avoid Lycan’s mockery, we must specify a subject matter that 
is  worthy of investigation, we need an explication that is  not ad hoc” (Devitt 1996: 55). We 
cannot determine what theory offers the best account of the nature of meaning without a clear 
specification  of  worthwhile  explanatory  tasks that  are  not  ad  hoc. What  we  need  is  an 
identification  of the  meanings that need explanation which does not presuppose any specific 
38 Others are instead motivated by the idea that content must be “narrow” or “within the head” in order to explain 
behavior. This  is  the  case  of  Ned Block  (1986).  Block does  not adopt  a  deflationary  view that  would be 
incompatible  with  a  truth-referential  semantics.  Instead,  he  combines  a  truth-referential  semantics  with  a 
“narrow” version of functional-role semantics as parts of his two-factor theory of meaning.
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account of their nature. The dispute among various semantic theories will remain hopeless as 
long as we do not have a non-question-begging identification of what needs to be explained and, 
consequently, a measure of what may count as a satisfactory explanation.
In what follows, I shall argue that the investigation of the nature of meaning-properties 
should follow the steps involved in the reductive explanation of any property, starting with an 
uncontroversial  identification  of  the  property and of  the  characteristic  features  by which we 
identify it  before studying its  underlying nature.  In the next section,  I  argue that we should 
identify meanings as the properties that are responsible for the causes and the behavioral effects  
of linguistic and mental representations. Since we need an explanation of these causal roles, 
investigating the nature of the properties responsible for them is a worthy task.
2.3.1 How to Identify Meanings and Investigate their Nature?
In this section, I discuss the methodological issues of how to identify meanings and how such 
identification should inform the investigation of their nature. I shall argue, following Devitt, that 
we should first identify examples of properties that ordinary people recognize as semantic and 
establish what these properties are supposed to do and what are the purposes for which they are 
ascribed. This provides a preliminary target for the investigation of the nature of meanings: the 
investigation should examine the examples of meanings to find out which underlying properties 
constitute meanings and, consequently, are responsible for or explain what meanings do and how 
they serve the  purposes  for which they are ascribed. But it  should be kept in mind that the 
preliminary identifications are in principle defeasible, and we may need to revise them in light of 
the investigation of the nature of meanings. I will proceed as follows: I shall first discuss how the 
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investigation of the nature of any property should proceed and then apply the findings to the 
methodology of semantics.
Consider the general methodological question of how do we determine the nature of any 
property: “How do we tell what is the nature of some property, being an F, that we ascribe?” 
(Devitt 2012: 66). The answer to this question, as Devitt points out, “breaks into two stages”:
First, we must identify some apparently uncontroversial examples of F’s and non-
F’s. Second, we must examine the examples to determine the nature of being an 
F. The second stage is a straightforwardly scientific one. The preliminary first 
stage may not be. It involves using “identification experts” who may be scientists 
but may be just plain folk. (Devitt 2012: 66-67)
Examining the nature of a property is the second stage of the investigation. The first stage is to 
identity clear and apparently uncontroversial instances of the property. The successful scientific 
investigations of the nature of various properties clearly illustrate these two different stages and 
how  they  are  related.  They  provide  us  with  a  good  general  model  for  how  to  proceed  in 
semantics.  I  will  focus  on  the  two  paradigmatic  examples  that  I  mentioned  above:  the 
investigation of the nature of water and genes.
Let us consider the task of explaining the nature of water. The chemical discovery that 
being  a  sample  of  water  is  constituted  by or  reduces  to being  made  of  H2O  molecules 
accomplished this task. In order to accomplish this task, chemists examined samples of water 
that were identified pre-theoretically and uncontroversially—without having an account of their 
underlying chemical composition. Samples of water were identified by characteristic features, 
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like being samples of the colorless liquid that quenches thirst, flows in rivers, freezes at certain 
cold temperatures (0 degrees Celsius) and boils at certain high temperatures (100 degrees Celsius 
at sea level). The task of explaining the nature of water, consequently, had a clear and worthy 
target: what is the nature of the identified samples of water, in virtue of which they have their  
characteristic features? Examining the samples, chemists discovered that they are made of H2O 
molecules.  Based  on  this  discovery,  chemists  were  able  to  explain  why  water  has  its 
characteristic  features.  For  example,  the  physico-chemical  behavior  of  H2O  molecules  at 
different temperatures explains why water freezes and boils at the temperatures it  does. It is 
important to distinguish water’s nature from its causal role. The nature of water is being made of 
H2O molecules. The causal role of water includes, among other things, its behavior as a solid, as 
a liquid or as a gas at  different temperatures.  While  water  was  identified  by  its  causal role, 
chemists did not identify water with its causal role. Rather, they hypothesized that there must be 
some underlying chemical composition that constitutes the nature of water and that explains why 
water has its causal role or characteristic behavior.
Let us consider the task of explaining the nature of genes. In this case, the identification 
of genes relied entirely on a scientific theory. The Mendelian postulation of genes as entities 
playing  causal  roles  in  heredity—the  transmission  of  innate  traits  from  organisms  to  their 
offspring—was well-supported by empirical  evidence.  But  there was an explanatory need to 
account for the nature of these theoretically identified entities. Again, we should not confuse 
what the entities are or their nature with what they do or their causal roles. Mendelian genetics 
discovered that there are some  things  that play certain causal roles in heredity, but it did not 
discover the nature of these things. What are genes made of and how can they play their causal 
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roles in heredity? Molecular genetics provided the needed explanation.  This happened many 
decades after the work of Gregor Mendel, as a result of the discovery by James Watson and 
Francis Crick of the helix-shaped structure of DNA: Molecular genetics discovered that genes 
are made of segments of DNA molecules which are responsible for the transmission of innate  
traits  from organisms to their  offspring.  Molecular  genetics  relied  on Mendelian  genetics  to 
identify what needed explanation (Devitt 1996: 73).
The  way  scientists  discovered  the  natures  of  genes  and  water  illustrate  some  basic 
features of the methodology involved in the investigation of the nature of a non-fundamental 
property—a property that has an  underlying nature. Notice that the account of the  underlying 
nature of a property involves two different levels: the “higher” or “superficial” level where the 
property to be explained is identified and a “lower” or “underlying” level where the nature of the 
property is  explained. Basically, the account of a property’s underlying nature is a  reductive  
explanation. There are philosophical controversies about the character of such explanations. Do 
they  ontologically reduce the higher-level phenomenon to the lower-level phenomenon? And 
how  is  the  gap between  the  levels  bridged  in  the  inference  from  the  explanans  to  the 
explanandum?39 These  are  important  questions  and  they  do  concern  the  metaphysics  and 
methodology of theories of the nature of meaning. However, my current goal is to make some 
general methodological suggestions leaving room for different answers to these deeper questions. 
The  task  of  investigating  the  nature  of  meaning  can  benefit  from  an  elucidation  of  the 
uncontroversial aspects of reductive explanations,  since the debate among different reductive 
accounts  of  meaning  often  proceeds  without  explicitly  attending  to  even  the  most  basic 
methodological matters.
39 See Kim (2005: 93-120) for a detailed discussion of these matters.
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My first methodological suggestion is that the investigation should involve the two stages 
distinguished by Devitt: the examination of the nature of the property should rely on a  prior 
identification of apparently uncontroversial examples of the property. In the case of the property 
of being water, both scientists and ordinary people were able to identify samples of the property. 
No controversial scientific theory was assumed in such identifications. In the case of the property 
of being a gene, in contrast,  Mendelian genetics was assumed. However, Mendelian genetics 
identified genes without having any theory of their underlying nature: this is the specific sense in 
which the prior identification of what needs to be explained should be uncontroversial.40 Since 
the explanation of the nature of the property will take place at a lower-level, the methodological 
suggestion is that we need an apparently uncontroversial identification of the property at the 
higher level before examining its nature at a lower level.
My second methodological suggestion is that an analysis of how examples of a property 
are identified should establish what the property is supposed to do and what are the purposes for 
which  it  is  identified.  Samples  of  water  are  pre-theoretically  identified  by  their  superficial 
characteristics, including their observable behavior: water  does things such as quenching thirst 
when  drunk,  freezing  when  cooled  and boiling  when  heated.  Identifying  water  serves  clear 
theoretical purposes, like predicting its behavior at  different temperatures,  and clear practical 
purposes, like quenching thirst by drinking it, making ice cubes by cooling it or brewing tea by 
heating it. Similarly, Mendelian genetics identifies examples of genes by what they do, by their 
characteristic causal roles in heredity: “the subject matter of investigation is already identified 
40 As James Watson reminds us in his personal account of events that led him and Francis Crick to discover the 
“double helix” structure of DNA, the leading hypothesis until then was that genes were “special types of protein 
molecules” rather than strings of DNA (Watson 1968: 12). Both the DNA theory and the Protein theory were 
compatible with the Mendelian identification of genes.
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relatively uncontroversially... because we already have a fairly good idea of what genes...  do, 
which  is  a  basis  for  identifying  them”  (Devitt  2002:  107).  Identifying  genes  serves  clear 
scientific purposes in explaining and predicting heredity. Diagnosing what a property does or is 
supposed to do and the purposes for which we identify it are intimately linked, since identifying 
a property presumably serves our purposes because of what the property does. Often, elucidating 
the purposes for which we ascribe a property can lead to an elucidation of what the property 
does, of its causal role. An elucidation of what a property does is not an explanation of its nature. 
But it should inform the investigation of such nature.
My third methodological suggestion is that the examination of the underlying nature of 
the identified higher-level property—what Devitt calls the “second stage” of the investigation—
should have as a goal to reveal what lower-level property explains what the identified property 
does—its causal role—and how it serves the purposes for which it is identified. The account of 
the nature of water as composed of H2O molecules explains the characteristic features by which 
water was identified. Similarly, the account of the nature of genes as composed of strings of 
DNA explains the causal roles by which they were identified. These accounts also explain how 
the higher-level identifications serve our purposes: how it comes about that identifying certain 
genes we can predict the transmission of certain innate traits or that identifying samples of water 
we can predict at what temperature they will freeze. That the reductive explanation of a higher-
level property must explain what lower-level property is responsible for its causal role is a basic 
and uncontroversial requirement. Suppose that we discovered a lower-level property of samples 
of water that did not explain why those samples freeze at 0 degrees Celsius, or a lower-level 
property of samples of genes that did not contribute to an explanation of their causal role in 
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heredity. Surely we would have no reason to regard such lower-level properties as constituting 
the natures of water and genes. That a lower-level property explains the causal role of a higher-
level property is crucial evidence in support of the claim that the former constitutes the latter.
It is time to apply these methodological suggestions to the investigation of the nature of 
meanings.  The  first  step  is  to  identify  uncontroversial  samples  of  properties  identified  as 
meanings. The second step is to find out what these identified meanings do—or are supposed to 
do—and what are the purposes for which they are identified. The last step is to look for what 
underlying  non-semantic  properties  constitute  meanings.  A basic  requirement  to  determine 
whether a non-semantic property indeed constitutes a meaning is that it must explain the causal 
role by which and for which the meaning is identified.
My  methodological  suggestions  are  far  from  original.  They  correspond  to  similar 
suggestions  made  by  Devitt  and  Horwich.  Devitt  argues  that  we  need  to  first  identify 
uncontroversial samples of meanings and then investigate their nature (Devitt 1996: 72-81). But 
he also pays attention to the intermediate step I suggested, arguing that we should find out what 
are  the purposes  for  which we ascribe meanings  and that  those purposes  should inform our 
investigation of the nature of meanings (Devitt  1996: 57-62).  Horwich shares this  view. His 
following passage serves well as a summary of what I have said about how semantics should 
proceed:
An underlying property U constitutes a relatively superficial  property S if and 
only if  the co-extensiveness  of  U and S explains  why S is  manifested in  the 
characteristic ways that it  is.  For example,  we judge that ‘being made of H2O 
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molecules’ constitutes  ‘being  a  sample  of  water’ because,  on the  basis  of  the 
assumption that water is made of H2O, we can explain why water is a colorless, 
tasteless liquid that boils at 100º  C. In the same way, in order to identify how 
meaning-properties are constituted, we should look for underlying non-semantic 
properties that can explain the symptoms of those meaning-properties. (Horwich 
2005: 76-77)
It  is  crucial  to  identify  correctly  meaning-properties  and  their  characteristic  features  or 
“symptoms”, since the task of investigating the nature of meanings will largely consist of finding 
out what non-semantic properties can explain such “symptoms”.
How do we identify meanings in the first step of the investigation? Since the competing 
philosophical theories of meaning—including semantic-level analyses—are  not neutral  in the 
required sense,  we cannot simply rely on them in the way that molecular genetics relied on 
Mendelian  genetics.  What  we  need  instead  is  some apparently  uncontroversial  examples  of 
properties that “identification experts” recognize  pre-theoretically as semantic, and we need to 
establish what features of these properties the experts rely on in their identification. In this case, 
like in the case of the identification of water, the relevant identification experts are ordinary 
people. As Devitt points out, ordinary people have the competence “to produce token thoughts 
and  utterances  to  which  the  [meaning]  properties  are  ascribed”  (Devitt  1996:  78).  More 
importantly, ordinary people are competent to ascribe meanings to the utterances and thoughts of 
others. These ascriptions provide the uncontroversial examples we need: “To identify examples 
in the preliminary first stage, we look to ordinary attitude ascriptions” (Devitt 1996: 78). This 
does not mean that philosophers of language must engage in an anthropological or sociological 
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study of folk ascriptions, as interesting as that may be. As Devitt points out, “theorists can count 
themselves among the expert  folk” (Devitt  1996:  78).  Of course,  the theorist  must set  aside 
philosophical  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  meaning.  The  goal  is  to  (1)  find  samples  of 
meanings and (2) analyze what are they supposed to do—what do we ascribe them for qua folk 
semanticists—before (3) proceeding to study their underlying nature.
2.3.2 Identifying Meanings by their Causal Roles
Devitt and Horwich propose a way of identifying meanings that is neutral, in the sense that it 
does not assume any particular account of the nature of meaning. Basically, they suggest that we 
should identify meanings by the  causal roles of representations. While Horwich (1998a, 2005, 
2010) focuses on the  causes  of linguistic and mental representations, Devitt (1996) originally 
focused on their effects.41 But Devitt (2002 & 2011) later suggests that we should focus on both 
aspects of their  causal roles.  In the previous sections I argued that we need a non-question-
begging identification of meanings. I shall argue in this section that we should identify meanings 
as  the  properties  that  we  ordinarily  ascribe  based  on  the  causes  and  behavioral  effects  of 
linguistic and mental representations.  These properties can be recognized pre-theoretically as 
semantic—without  assuming  any  theory  of  meaning—and  we  need  an  explanation  of  their 
nature, so investigating them is a worthy task. Notice that identifying meanings by their causal 
roles is a very different proposal than that of identifying meanings with their causal roles.
The topic of how folk semanticists identify meanings is one I already covered in Chapter 
1, where I analyzed ordinary attitude ascriptions.  I argued, following Devitt,  that we ascribe 
41 Devitt (1997) expanded his identification of meanings to also include the causes of representations.
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contents to the utterances and thoughts by means of ‘that’-clauses that function as indefinite 
singular  terms  that  specify  the  meanings  of  such utterances  and thoughts.  These  ascriptions 
provide us with identified samples of what needs to be explained—and such identifications are 
pre-theoretical in the required sense: they do not assume anything about the underlying nature of 
the identified properties. I also talked in Chapter 1 about one of the main purposes for which we 
ascribe meanings: namely, to explain other people’s behavior. Indeed, Devitt suggests that we 
should focus on the purposes for which the folk make attitude ascriptions using ‘that’-clauses: 
one of them is to explain behavior, but another one is to use other’s thoughts and utterances as 
guides to reality (Devitt 1996: Ch. 2 & 2012: 1.1).
Consider the ascription ‘Nancy fears that it will rain’. Such ascription may play a causal 
role, for example, in the explanation why Nancy is constantly looking at the sky. Or consider the 
ascription ‘Mary believes that it is raining’. It may help us to explain why Mary picks up an 
umbrella before leaving her house. Alternatively, consider the ascription ‘The weather guy said 
that  it  will  rain’.  This  ascription  serves  as  a  guide  to  reality. When  a  person’s thoughts  or 
utterances are reliable, we can learn about the world by ascribing the right meanings or contents 
to them. Notice that we typically ascribe meanings to thoughts and utterances based on what we 
take to be the causes of such tokens, which in turn helps to explain their effects. For example, if 
we witness that John runs away after seeing a dog, we may ascribe to him the thought that the 
dog is dangerous. The content we ascribe is identified both by its presumed causes and effects.
It  is  important  to  recall  two  points  I  made  in  Chapter  1.  One  is  that  our  ordinary 
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ascriptions of content to explain other people’s behavior are often successful. Now we can add 
that our ascriptions of content to other’s utterances and thoughts to learn about reality are also 
often successful. This  success provides very good evidence that the meanings ascribed in folk-
psychology are real phenomena that play causal roles in the physical world. This means that we 
are overall correct in our pre-theoretical identifications of meanings and that investigating the 
underlying nature of such meanings is a worthwhile task. Also, it is worth insisting here that the 
meanings thereby identified must be natural phenomena, since otherwise they could not play the 
causal roles they do play. As I argued before, what is required is a naturalized semantics.
It is worth considering for a moment the case of attributions of content to non-human 
languages. Cognitive ethologists attribute “referential” languages to bees, prairie dogs, monkeys, 
chickens, etc., because of their  causal role of conveying information about the world from one 
organism to another. The attributions also play a causal role in the ethologists’ explanation of 
animal behavior. Let us consider a couple of examples. Cognitive ethologists have discovered 
that  vervet  monkeys  use  three  distinct  vocalizations  to  warn  their  peers  of  the  presence  of 
leopards, eagles and snakes, respectively (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). They have learned this 
because each of these alarm calls is paradigmatically caused by the presence of the relevant 
predator and the calls trigger three different kinds of avoidance behavior that are appropriate to 
avoid  being  hunted  by  that  particular  kind  of  predator. Similarly, chickens  use  two  distinct 
vocalizations to warn of the presence of aerial predators and land predators (Evans and Marler 
1995). Again, each vocalization is paradigmatically caused by the presence of one or the other 
kind of predator and triggers an avoidance behavior in the audience that is appropriate to the 
particular kind of predator being announced. In these cases of non-human languages we clearly 
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see what sorts  of causes and effects  are relevant  to the identification of meanings.  Both the 
“typical” causes and effects of utterances are very directly connected in these simple languages 
to the purposes for which meanings are ascribed to them. The utterances serve the purpose of 
guiding conspecifics  away from predators  and the meanings  ascribed by scientists  serve the 
purpose of explaining the animals’ behavior.
I end with a short note on the meanings of words and concepts. By focusing on ‘that’-
clauses in the case of ascriptions to humans, I have played attention to the meanings of complete 
utterances and thoughts. But as folk semanticists we also ascribe meanings to the words and 
concepts that compose them. The meanings of words and concepts are usually identified within 
‘that’-clauses. If I ascribe to Mary the belief that it will rain, I am ascribing to her a concept with 
the same meaning as the word ‘rain’ in the embedded sentence in the ‘that’-clause. Similarly, if I 
report ‘John said that it will rain’, I am likely ascribing to one of the words uttered by John the 
same meaning as the word ‘rain’—even if John spoke in German and my report serves as a 
translation. The meanings of words have to be abstracted away from the meanings of sentences 
where they appear. But in the end the meanings of words are also pretheoretically identified by 
their causal roles. As Horwich points out: “[We] recognize pretheoretically… that what people 
say is due, in part, to what they mean. I assent to ‘That’s red’, when I do, partly because of what I 
mean by the word ‘red’.” (Horwich 1998a: 47). Also: “[The] symptom of a word’s meaning is its 
overall  use,  principally,  the  collection  of  sentences  containing  it  that  are  accepted  and  the 
circumstances under which this is done.” (Horwich 2005: 77). Horwich’s very reasonable point 
here is that we identify the meanings of words by the way they are used and, more specifically, 
as what  is  causally responsible  for such use.  So a crucial  explanatory target for a theory of 
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meaning is to explain in non-semantic terms what properties are indeed causally responsible for 
the use of words.42
Notice that the identifications here proposed regarding what meanings it is the task of 
semantics to explain are theoretically neutral. They do not beg the question for or against truth-
referential approaches, whether directly referential or “Fregean”, functional-role approaches, etc. 
Any existing or new approach is free to attempt to explain the underlying nature of the identified 
meanings.  The  virtue  of  these  identifications  is  that  they  provide  a  non-question-begging 
definition of what is it the task of semantics to explain.
2.4 Conclusion
I have argued that neither a correspondence nor a deflationary view of the nature of truth should 
be assumed in the definition of the task of semantics, largely because it is an open question 
which of these views will end up succeeding. Moreover, the dispute is likely to be resolved based 
on whether substantial truth and referential relations turn out to be required to explain the nature 
of meaning. In general,  I  argued that we need a pre-theoretical identification of meanings.  I 
suggested that we should identify meanings by the causal roles of utterances and thoughts, and 
that such identification specifies the  task of semantics. Finally, I argued that the ‘that’-clauses 
deployed in ordinary attitude ascriptions in order to explain the behavior of others and in order to 
learn about reality provide the needed identifications.
42 As I argued before, following Devitt (2011: 197-198 & 2002: 112), Horwich should expand his identification of 





In the first part of this dissertation, Chapters 1 and 2, I focused on fundamental metaphysical and 
methodological issues related to the nature of meanings and the task of semantics. I argued that  
meanings  are  phenomena  that  play  causal  roles  in  the  physical  world  and  that  we  need  a 
naturalistic explanation of their underlying natures. I also argued that the task of semantics is to 
explain specifically the meanings pre-theoretically identified by the causal roles of linguistic and 
mental representations. A proper theory of the meanings of words should account for what non-
semantic properties are responsible for their overall uses.
The main aim of the second part of this dissertation, from Chapter 3 to Chapter 6, is to 
explore  what  sort  of  naturalistic  theory  promises  to  explain  what  non-semantic  properties 
constitute  meanings.  My main  focus  is  on  the  meanings  of  human  words  and  their  mental 
counterparts. I will propose a combination of (1) a “use” theory along the lines of Horwich’s 
theory of meaning with (2) a teleological account of the functions of symbols. In this chapter I 
briefly review the range of available theories of meaning, briefly sketch the combination that I 
will propose and focus on motivating a “use” theory along the lines of Horwich’s theory. But I 
also point out the problems faced by the theory. In a nutshell, the main advantages are that it  
promises to explain properly the overall uses of human words/concepts, including their complex 
roles in inferential processes, and also that it can account for the variety of meanings that human 
words  like  ‘red’,  ‘bachelor’  and  ‘or’  exhibit.  One  problem  with  the  theory  is  that  it  risks 
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collapsing  into  a  form of  truth-referentialism  in  spite  of  being  presented  as  a  match  for  a 
deflationary view of reference and truth. But this problem does not concern me in particular, 
since I am happy to embrace such a collapse. I argue that in such a case we would anyway need a 
truth-referential version of the theory. A more serious problem is that Horwich’s theory is unable 
to account for misuses of words due to ignorance or error. It is this problem that motivates the 
search for a teleological component that I undertake in the following chapters.
3.2 The Place of Meaning in the World
What is the place of meaning in the world? In virtue of what do our linguistic utterances and 
thoughts have the meanings they have? The nature of meaning is one of the most fundamental 
issues at the core of both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. As Jerry Fodor 
puts it: “It appears increasingly that the main joint business of the philosophy of language and 
the philosophy of mind is the problem of representation itself: the metaphysical question of the 
place of meaning in the world order.” (1987, p. xi)
The debate on the nature of meaning involves multiple dimensions. One of the many 
questions that a theory of meaning has to answer is what is the relation between the meanings of  
linguistic utterances and thoughts. Some theories of meaning have been originally proposed in 
the philosophy of language and their primary targets are the meanings of words and sentences in 
natural  languages  (e.g.,  Frege  1948  and  Kripke  1980).  Others  have  been  proposed  in  the 
philosophy of  mind and their  primary  targets  are  the  meanings  or  contents  of  thoughts  and 
concepts  (e.g.,  Fodor 1987 and Block 1986).  Others simply treat  language and thought as a 
seamless whole, assuming that we use the same words to think and to communicate and that their 
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meanings do not depend primarily on one of these uses (e.g., Sellars 1954 and Brandom 1994).
It is clear that the meanings of linguistic utterances and the meanings of at least some 
thoughts are intimately related. After all, one of the primary uses of language—likely the primary 
use—is to express thought. As Fodor, Bever and Garrett point out: “there is much to be said for 
the old-fashioned view that speech expresses thought, and very little to be said against it” (Fodor, 
Bever, and Garrett 1974: 375). Someone can express the belief that the weather in New York is 
horrible by uttering ‘the weather in New York is horrible’ or a number of sentences in other 
languages with the same meaning. All these sentences and the belief they express have the same 
meaning or  representational  content.  Additionally, the  meanings  or  contents  of  many  of our 
concepts—probably most of them—come from the meanings of words. Most of us can think 
about genes because we have heard of them: the content of our concept comes from the meaning 
of the word. However, this does not entail that linguistic meaning has the ultimate explanatory 
priority over mental content. After all, some people must have originally thought about genes to 
coin the word ‘gene’, which was then passed along from speaker to speaker until we acquired 
our concept from it (Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 152; Devitt 1996: 157-158).
How are linguistic and mental meanings related? Many authors think that the meanings 
of linguistic utterances depend on  conventions  (Lewis 2002) that  ultimately  link them to the 
meanings of thoughts (Grice 1989). Given the obvious conventional character of the words of 
natural language, together with the consideration in favor of the ultimate priority of thought just 
mentioned, I think that this account must be heading in the right direction—although there is 
room for filling in more details about the nature of the conventions involved in language. I also  
support the promising though controversial hypothesis that thoughts take place in an internal 
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language  of  thought  (Harman  1973;  Fodor  1975).  A  very  plausible  explanation  of  the 
productivity and systematicity of mental states like beliefs and desires is that they have sentence-
like  structure  (Fodor  1987:  147-154).  More  importantly, the  language of  thought  hypothesis 
offers the best available account of the mental processes involved in thinking, which it explains 
as computational operations performed over syntactically structured inner representations (Fodor 
1987: 143-147).  Devitt  reasonably argues that  the later consideration is  more decisive,  since 
other  kinds  of  structures—e.g,  map-like  structures—may  also  be  productive  and  systematic 
(Devitt 1996: 154-156).
If these views are correct, as many theorists of meaning expect today, part of what we 
need to do in order to find the place of meaning in the world is to explain the nature of the 
relevant conventions linking the words used in natural languages to their mental counterparts, but 
the most fundamental task is to explain the sources and nature of the meanings of words in the  
language of thought. I will later elaborate an account of how the meanings of linguistic words 
depend on the meanings of mental words. While I endorse the Gricean view about the priority of 
thought, I will not adopt the particular mechanism he proposes to account for the literal meanings 
of  words.  Following  Millikan  (2005),  my  account  of  linguist  conventions  will  depart  from 
Lewis’  in  being  historical  and  teleological—involving  the  historical  purposes  of  linguistic 
conventions. For the moment, however, I will simply talk about “words”, including their uses in 
thought and communication. We need an account of the meanings of words independently of 
what  account  of  the  relation  between  the  semantic  properties  of  mental  and  linguistic 
representations  turns  out  to  be  true.  Treating  language  and  thought  initially  as  a  “seamless 
whole” will simplify the discussion of other dimensions of the debate.43
43 Millikan (2005: 84) complains that some authors treat  language and thought as a “seamless whole”.  I  will  
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In virtue of what do words mean what they do? While a number of theories have been 
proposed to answer this fundamental question, there is no agreement in sight. The purpose of the 
second part of this dissertation is to propose a new answer to the question. My proposal borrows 
components from already existing theories. Mainly, I combine the core component of Horwich’s 
(1998a) use-theory of meaning—namely, that the meanings of words depend on their  roles in 
some sentences—with the core component of teleosemantics (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1984)—
namely, that the meanings of words depend on their historical functions or purposes. The novelty 
of my approach comes from this particular combination of components, which has not been 
proposed before but, I shall argue, promises to overcome some of the most serious shortcomings 
of available theories of meaning, including those I borrow components from. In a nutshell, my 
proposal is that words mean what they do in virtue of their roles in some sentences that have the 
historical function of governing their use.
Before articulating and defending my own proposal,  I  shall  briefly  mention the main 
competing theories in the debate on the nature of meaning. My focus in the reminder of this 
chapter will be on the virtues and problems faced by Horwich’s “use” theory.
3.3 The Range of Available Theories
There is a panoply of theories attempting to explain why words mean what they do. According to 
the  description  theory (Frege 1948; Russell 1905), the meanings of words depend on  links to  
other  words in  descriptions  that  determine  their  reference.44 This  theory  has  plausibility  for 
words like ‘bachelor’, but is essentially incomplete: the reference of ‘bachelor’ may depend on 
instead treat thought as ultimately more fundamental, as stated above.
44 Searle (1958) modified the theory to rely instead on clusters of descriptions.
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that  of  ‘unmarried  men’,  but  what  determines  the  reference  on  ‘unmarried’  and  ‘men’? 
According to another family of theories, the meanings of words depend instead on links to the  
external  world that  determine their  reference:  indicator  theories (Dretske 1981;  Fodor 1987) 
claim that the relevant links involve the reliable causes of words, other theories (Kripke 1980; 
Devitt 1981) rely on their causal-history, while teleosemantic theories (Millikan 1984; Papineau 
1984) rely on their historical functions—which they explain in terms of natural selection or an 
analogous evolutionary process. The three kinds of theories in this family are typically atomistic, 
including  only links  to  reality  and excluding any links  to  other  words  among the links  that 
determine meaning.45 The description theory can be characterized instead as molecularist, since it 
includes some links to other words.
According to yet another family of theories (Block 1986; Harman 1982: Brandom 1994; 
Horwich  1998a),  the  meanings  of  words  depend  on  connections  to  inputs  from perception, 
outputs to behavior and roles in inference that determine their uses or functional-roles.46 (What I 
am calling  “functional”  roles  are  often  called  “conceptual”  or  “inferential”  roles.  As  Devitt 
(1996) points out, talk of “functional” roles is preferable because the latter two encourage the 
overlooking  of  links  to  inputs  and  outputs.)  Functional-role  or  “use”  theories  are  typically 
holistic, including all the inferential, perceptual and behavioral connections of words among the 
links that determine their meanings (Block 1986; Harman 1982; Brandom 1994). In contrast, 
Horwich (1998a) claims that the meanings of words depend  only on their functional-roles in 
some sentences, which may link a word either to the world, to some other words or to rules of 
45 An exception is Papineau (1984; 1987), who includes all the functional links of words in their meanings.
46 The view has its origins in the work of Wittgenstein (1953) and Sellars (1954).
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inference. This functional-role theory is molecularist rather than holistic.47
The mainstream approach in semantics is truth-referentialist: the view is that meanings 
depend  on  properties  that  determine  the  references  of  words  which,  together  with  syntactic 
structure, determine the  truth-conditions  of sentences containing them. Frege (1948) proposed 
that the meanings of words include their references and their senses or “modes of presentation”: 
the  associated  descriptions  that  determine  their  references.  Based  on  this  distinction,  Frege 
offered a neat account of how co-referring words can differ in meaning: different senses can 
determine the same reference. Most theories relying on causal links to the external world regard 
meanings  instead as  exhausted  by their  referential  properties,  so co-referential  words cannot 
differ in meaning. Devitt (2001b), however, expands the Fregean notion of  senses to include 
causal  modes or reference constituted by links to the world. This allows him to offer a neat 
Fregean account of how co-referring words can differ in meaning, even when their meanings 
depend on links to the world rather than on associated descriptions.
In  contrast  with  this  truth-referential  tradition,  most  functional-role  or  “use”  theories 
claim that the functional-roles involved in meaning do not determine reference. Some theorists 
(e.g., Block 1986) propose that meanings are composed of two factors: a purely internal and non-
reference-determining functional-role factor and a separate  referential factor  involving links to 
the external  world.  Other  theorists  reject  altogether  the referential  factor, since they endorse 
deflationary views (Field 1994; Horwich 1998b) according to which truth and reference are not 
substantive  properties  and,  consequently,  cannot  play  an  explanatory  role  in  the  theory  of 
meaning. Use-theories that endorse deflationism (Harman 1987; Horwich 1998a; Brandom 1994) 
47 Peacocke (1992) proposes a similar theory based on the primitively compelling functional-roles of concepts.
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include  links  to  the  world  in  their  accounts:  their  functional-roles  are  not  purely  internal. 
However, they claim that these external links do not determine reference. A less common—but 
promising—proposal is that some of the functional-roles of words do determine their reference: 
Devitt (1996) argues that the meanings of some words—those covered by a description theory—
include some functional-roles that determine their reference, while Peacocke (1992) argues that 
the  referential  properties  of  all  concepts  are  determined  by  their  primitively  compelling 
functional-roles.
Whether  the  meanings  of  words  depend  on  functional-roles  and  whether  these  roles 
determine reference are two different questions. The expressions “functional-role semantics” and 
“use-theory”  are  often  used  to  characterize  non-referential  theories  or  at  least  theories  that 
include  a  non-reference-determining  factor.  But  this  common  usage  obscures  the  fact  that 
functional-roles may substantially determine reference.48 In what follows, I will depart from this 
common usage and I will not assume that functional-roles do not determine reference.
I end this brief survey presenting another fundamental dimension on which theories of 
meaning diverge.  Most  of  the  theories  mentioned above are  in  the  business  of  naturalizing 
semantics: explaining meaning in terms of properties that words have in the natural world, such 
as  the  reliable  causes  (e.g.,  Fodor  1987),  the  historical  causes  (e.g.,  Devitt  1981),  the 
evolutionary functions (e.g., Millikan 1984) or the causal/functional-roles (e.g., Harman 1982) of 
their physical tokens. However, other theories abandon naturalism, claiming that the meanings of 
words depend on  norms prescribing how they ought to be used that cannot be reduced to any 
48 The common usage is also inconsistent. Most authors that adopt it consider, for example, Peacocke (1992) as a  
functional-role theory of the content of concepts, despite its substantial account of reference determination.
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aggregate of natural facts (Kripke 1982).49 Brandom’s (1994) inferentialism—a use theory based 
on irreducible normativity—is the most developed version of this non-naturalist approach.
The panoply of theories offered to explain meaning shows that this is a very difficult 
enterprise. I shall argue that many of the current proposals  contain at least a kernel of truth, 
providing some important insight into the nature of meaning, but that every single one of them is 
undermined by one or another serious problem. Each proposal combines a set of claims. While 
some claims of a proposal may contain important insights, other claims of the same proposal 
may be problematic. To make progress, we need a new approach that combines the insightful 
claims of different theories while discarding the problematic ones. I will soon discuss some of 
the main insights and problems.
I have presented in this section a brief map of the territory: the vast range of available 
accounts of why words mean what they do. In the next section, I will clarify what are the two 
main components that my own proposal combines to answer this question. Afterwards, I will 
argue for each of the components and articulate how I propose to combine them.
3.4 A New Approach to Explain Meaning
The new approach I propose to explain why words mean what they do combines elements from 
functional-role  semantics  and  teleosemantics.  This  combination,  I  shall  argue,  provides  a 
framework to incorporate the insights of further theories. The basic idea is that words mean what 
they do in virtue of the  core functional-roles they are “supposed” to have in order to perform 
their historical functions: the functions that account for why the words exist and have been kept 
49 Kripke’s (1982) influential work does not endorse this view. He presents it as a reading of Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
discussion about rule-following.
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in circulation. These core functional-roles have the historical function of governing word usage.
The  functional-role  component  of  my  approach  comes  specifically  from  Horwich’s 
(1998a; 2005) use-theory of meaning, according to which the meanings of words depend on their 
core functional-roles: their roles in some basic sentences that users (speakers / thinkers) accept 
or regard as true. Horwich argues that these basic sentences govern the uses of words (2005: 37-
42) and vary in kind for different words, connecting them either to the external world, to other 
words or to rules of inference (2005: 48-49). I borrow this set of central claims from Horwich’s 
use-theory. I shall call this set of claims “basic-acceptance semantics”.
Horwich’s use-theory, however, includes other commitments—beyond basic-acceptance 
semantics—that I do not borrow or endorse. Horwich (1998b) is one of the leading advocates of 
deflationism, so his  use-theory is  committed to the claim that meanings do not substantially 
determine reference. But Devitt (2002) points out that his use-theory risks collapsing into truth-
referentialism, since it includes causal connections between words and the world that are among 
the candidates to naturalize reference. I shall remain  agnostic  about deflationism, since basic-
acceptance—given its links to the world—may indeed determine reference. Devitt (2002; 2011) 
also shows that Horwich’s use-theory cannot tell apart misuses—due to ignorance and error—
from the correct uses of words. This problem, I shall argue, stems from Horwich’s commitment 
to  semantic  dispositionalism:  the  view  that  meanings  depend  on  causal  dispositions  or 
regularities underlying word usage. I shall  reject any form of dispositionalism, since it cannot 
account for the difference between the correct and incorrect uses of words (Kripke 1982). My 
approach  basically  replaces Horwich’s  dispositionalism  with  the  historical  account  of  the 
functions of symbols proposed by teleosemantics.
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The teleosemantic component of my approach is the core claim shared by all available50 
and  possible  teleosemantic  theories;  namely, that  the  meanings  of  symbols  depend  on their 
historical functions, which are determined by the selective history underlying their use and/or the 
mechanisms responsible for it. These are functions that explain why symbols exist. The selective 
processes may take place at the genetic level or at the level of learning and cultural inheritance. 
A combination of these levels is needed to account for the meanings of all words and concepts.  
Teleosemanticists argue that symbols need not perform their functions reliably or regularly. They 
need  only  perform  them  often  enough  to  be  kept  in  circulation  (Millikan  1984). 
Teleosemanticists also argue that a theory of meaning based on historical functions can explain 
why some uses are correct, while others incorrect: the correct ones are those where symbols 
perform their historical functions (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1984; Neander 1995). Any theory of 
meaning committed to these central  claims is  a version of teleo-semantics,  since it  adopts a 
teleological  or  teleonomic  account  of  functions—based  on  selective  history—to  explain  the 
semantic properties (i.e., the meanings) of symbols. My approach is committed to these central 
claims, so it is a version of teleosemantics—even though it combines them with basic acceptance 
semantics.
Available  teleosemantic  theories,  however, typically  share  further  commitments  that  I 
will  not  endorse.  The currently available  versions  of  teleosemantics claim that  the historical 
functions of  all symbols involve links to the external world. But this is plausible neither for 
words whose meanings are likely to involve only links to other words (Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 
156-157) nor for the terms of logic and mathematics (Horwich 1998a: 53). I shall argue that the 
50 Millikan (1984), Papineau (1984), Neander (1991), Jacob (1997) and Price (2001). Godfrey-Smith (1991) offers 
a similar account restricted to the most primitive kinds of representation.
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historical functions of words involve instead their roles in basic sentences that link them either to 
the external world, to other words or to rules of inference. Also, available teleosemantic theories 
are committed to the historical functions of words substantially determining their reference. I 
accept  this  is  very  likely  to  be  true.  But  I  shall  remain  agnostic  about  deflationism  and, 
consequently, open to the possibility that the historical functions of words may not substantially 
determine their reference.51 The goal is to explain the underlying nature of the meanings pre-
theoretically identified by the causal roles of words. If the non-semantic properties that end up 
explaining meanings turn out to provide a proper reductive explanation of truth and reference, as 
I think it is likely, truth-referentialism will be vindicated. But I think plenty of progress can be 
made before fully settling that issue.
A combination  of  basic-acceptance  semantics  and  teleosemantics,  I  shall  argue,  can 
simultaneously  overcome  some  of  the  most  serious  problems  of  available  theories  while 
incorporating  their  valuable  insights.  In  particular,  the  combination  can  overcome  the 
shortcomings that  Horwich’s theory  and available  teleosemantic  theories  have  on their  own. 
Horwich’s theory, I shall argue, cannot tell apart the misuses from the correct uses of words; but 
the combination I propose can do so, since its teleosemantic component is tailored to explain 
why some uses are correct. Standard teleosemantic theories, I shall argue, cannot account for 
words  whose meanings  depend on links  to  other  words  or  to  rules  of  inference and cannot 
explain how the meanings of words govern their complex inferential uses in cognition; but the 
51 Millikan (1993: 231-235) argues that a teleosemantic theory must involve substantive (i.e.,  correspondence) 
reference and truth, since the historical functions of symbols relate them to  real  distal events in the external 
world. While her argument rules out a verificationist notion of truth as warranted assertability, which threatens 
realism about the external world, it does not rule out a  deflationary  notion. As Devitt (2010: 34-35) shows, 
deflationism is fully compatible with realism. If what teleosemantics needs to work is realism, nothing more 
than deflationary truth is required.
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combination I propose can do so, since its basic-acceptance component is tailored to explain how 
the meanings of all kinds of words govern their various uses. I will not argue that my approach 
answers all the questions a theory of meaning must answer. Some questions will remain open—
notably, whether the features that explain meaning substantially determine reference. But I shall 
argue that they can be answered within the framework provided by my approach.
In this section, I have presented the two components I propose to combine into a new 
approach to explain the nature of meaning: the core claims of Horwich’s use-theory—i.e., basic 
acceptance  semantics—and  the  core  claims  of  teleosemantics.  I  have  also  mentioned  which 
aspects of Horwich’s theory and standard teleosemantics I either propose to reject or remain 
neutral about. In what follows, I will argue that a theory of meaning does need to include each of 
the two components I am combining and reject the problematic aspects of the theories these 
components come from. I will also argue that the fate of deflationism is still undecided, so we 
should  remain  initially  neutral  about  it.  Finally, I  will  elaborate  on  how to  combine  basic-
acceptance semantics and teleosemantics. I shall start by motivating basic-acceptance semantics.
3.5 Why Basic-Acceptance Semantics?
The claim that the meanings of words depend on their roles in some sentences that govern their 
use is the central claim of Horwich’s use-theory. I will first elaborate on his theory and the main 
arguments  for  it.  Then I  will  discuss the main problems faced by the theory. Based on this  
assessment, I shall argue that an account of meaning should adopt basic-acceptance semantics, 
reject semantic dispositionalism and remain initially neutral about deflationism.
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3.5.1 Horwich’s Use-Theory of Meaning
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the prevailing view is that truth and reference play a substantial role  
in the explanation of meaning. A challenge to this truth-referentialism comes from deflationary 
views according to which truth and reference are not properties with an underlying nature and, 
accordingly, cannot play a metaphysically substantial or significant role in explanations of any 
kind, including explanations of why words mean what they do. I pointed out that deflationists 
(Field 1994; Horwich 1998b) base their view on a plausible account of the role of the truth term. 
Whether their account of the nature of truth is equally plausible is controversial (Devitt 2001a). 
Nevertheless,  if deflationism is true, we need an alternative approach to explain the nature of 
meaning. And the best—perhaps only—alternative seems to be the “use theory” or functional-
role semantics, since the uses or roles of words in language and thought—which depend on their 
connections to other words, inputs from perception and outputs to behavior—presumably do not 
substantially determine their reference.52 Horwich (1998b) provides one of the most elaborate 
and influential  defenses  of  the  deflationary  theory  of  truth  and reference.  His  use-theory  of 
meaning (Horwich 1998a & 2005) is intended to be compatible with—and largely motivated by
—deflationism.53
Horwich’s use-theory of meaning (UTM) sides with naturalist versions of functional-role 
semantics (FRS),  which understand functional-roles in terms of  causal  connections of words 
(e.g., Block 1986 & 1987; Harman 1968 & 1982), and against non-naturalist versions that offer 
52 As I pointed out in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3, and in this chapter, Section 3.3, this may turn out to be a wrong  
assumption. But notice that two-factor versions of functional-role semantics endorse this assumption but reject 
deflationism. Their case relies on the need of a functional-role factor in psychological explanation (Block 1986 
& 1987). Deflationary versions of functional-role semantics (Harman 1987; Horwich 1998a) typically make a 
similar case about psychological explanation: their theories are not exclusively motivated by deflationism.
53 Other  theorists  that  combine  a  “use  theory”  with  deflationism include  Brandom (1994),  Field  (1994)  and 
Harman (1974, 1982 & 1987).
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irreducibly normative accounts of meaning (e.g., Brandom 1994 & 2000).54 The aim of UTM is 
to offer a reductive account of meaning constitution in terms of non-semantic and non-normative 
facts. Unlike other versions of FRS, however, UTM does not identify the meaning of a symbol 
with its overall use or functional-role. Rather, UTM identifies the meaning of a word with what 
explains its overall use. So UTM regards merely as the explanandum what most versions of FRS 
conceive as the explanans. What makes UTM a version of FRS is that its explanans is a subset of 
“explanatory fundamental” uses or functional-roles: UTM claims that the meaning of a word is 
constituted  by  the  basic  sentence  acceptance  property  that  explains  its  overall  deployment. 
Horwich (2005: 28) offers the following “short crude statement” of UTM:
The meaning of a word, w, is engendered by the non-semantic feature of w that 
explains w’s overall deployment. And this will be an acceptance-property of the 
following form:—‘that such-and-such w-sentences are regularly accepted in such-
and-such circumstances’ is the idealized law governing w’s use (by the relevant 
‘experts’, given certain meanings attached to various other words).55
UTM characterizes the use of a word in terms of its presence in sentences that are regarded as 
true or accepted, including not only uttered sentences, but also sentences deployed in thought—
i.e., sentences in the speaker’s “belief-box”.56 According to UTM, the totality of accepted w-
sentences (sentences containing the word w) can be explained by a small subset of accepted w-
sentences. This hypothesis appeals to “a familiar inferential model” to explain the overall use of 
54 As Brandom (1994, p. 625) characterizes his own view: “the story is one in which it is norms all the way down”.
55 A minor typographical mistake has been corrected in this quotation.
56 Indeed, UTM treats uniformly the use of expressions in speech and in the language of thought (Horwich 2005: 
31).  Basically UTM treats  language and thought  as  a  “seamless  whole”.  Devitt  (2002) suggests  that  UTM 
should give instead priority to the mental. I will follow Devitt’s suggestion when I combine basic-acceptance 
semantics with teleosemantics.
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words (Horwich 2005: 43). The idea is that the acceptance of most w-sentences deployed in 
speech and in theoretical and practical reasoning can be explained as the result of inferences 
from other w-sentences; but there must be some w-sentences that (1) serve as the inferential 
basis for other w-sentences but (2) cannot themselves be inferentially derived from previous w-
sentences. According to UTM, the acceptance of these core w-sentences is  explanatorily basic  
and  constitutes  the  meaning  of  w  because  it  accounts  for  the  acceptance  of  all  other  w-
sentences.57
One of the main advantages of UTM over other versions of FRS comes precisely from 
not identifying meanings with overall uses. A serious problem with FRS is that it seems to lead to 
semantic  holism, since  the  functional  roles  of  a  symbol  include  the  totality  of  its 
causal/inferential connections. Although proponents of FRS usually endorse this result (Block 
1995; Harman 1993), semantic holism is extremely implausible (Fodor and Lepore 1992; Devitt 
1993 & 1996). As Fodor puts it, “Meaning Holism really is a crazy doctrine” (Fodor 1987: 60). 
Semantic holism entails that the meaning of a word in a user’s idiolect changes whenever the 
user  accepts  new sentences  or  rejects  old  sentences  containing  the  word.  This  leads  to  the 
radically absurd consequence that a word in a user’s idiolect cannot mean the same over time and 
that no two users can ever mean the same, given the obvious discrepancies between people’s 
webs of beliefs. UTM, however, is a non-holistic version of FRS, since it only regards some core 
uses as meaning constitutive. If the meaning of ‘bachelor’ stems from the user’s acceptance of 
‘Bachelors are unmarried men’, it will not change when user comes to accept a new sentence,  
such as ‘Bachelors are unhappy’.
57 The various w-sentences contain other words, not just w, so their acceptance is not explained merely in terms of  
the core w-sentences, but rather by the core sentences governing each of these words.
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Another virtue of UTM is that it is a non-solipsistic version of FRS. A persistent worry 
about FRS is that it seems to be a purely internalist doctrine, since it relies on the roles of words  
within  the  cognitive  system.  But  compelling  arguments  for  physical  externalism  show  that 
meanings must involve relations between words the external world (Putnam 1975; Kripke 1980). 
Two-factor theories attempt to avoid this problem by adding a referential factor that connects 
words to the world to the solipsistic—purely internal—functional-role factor that plays a role in 
the user’s psychology (Block 1986). However, they face serious problems that stem from their 
postulation of two  separate  factors. One problem is that they do not offer an account of what 
coordinates  the separate factors (Fodor 1987: 82-83). To put it bluntly, nothing in the theory 
prevents a word from having, for example, the functional role of ‘cat’ and referential connections 
dogs. Another problem is that the external factor plays no role in the psychological explanation 
of behavior. This is deeply troubling, since the explanation of behavior must account for how we 
deal with the world (Harman 1988 & 1999: 235-243). In contrast with two-factor theories, UTM 
makes room for externalism by including connections to  the external  world among the core 
functional-roles of words. These are wide functional roles that reach out into the world instead of 
narrow ones encapsulated in the head. The basic acceptance-property governing the use of ‘cat’, 
for example, may involve accepting ‘This is a cat’ in the presence of cats. Accordingly, this wide 
functional role explains the various uses of ‘cat’, in theoretical and practical reasoning leading to 
intentional behavior, in terms of the links to cats—in the world—of sentences that govern these 
inferential processes. The connections to the world and the psychological roles of the word are 
fully  coordinated  into  a  single  factor,  so  the  external  link  plays  a  substantial  role  in  the 
explanation of behavior. Harman (1987) also proposes a wide or non-solipsistic version of FRS. 
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But his theory is hopelessly holistic.
By being non-solipsistic and non-holistic, UTM has clear advantages over other versions 
of FRS. If we need a functional-role or use-theory, UTM is the best candidate.58 But why should 
we favor UTM over non-use-theoretical alternatives? One reason may be deflationism about 
reference and truth.  If  deflationism is  right,  we need a  use-theory  and the arguments  above 
suggest that we should favor a basic-acceptance account—e.g., UTM—over other use-theories. 
However, Horwich does not base his case for a use-theory exclusively on deflationism—which is 
good because the argument  based on deflationism is  not too strong, given the risk of UTM 
collapsing into a form of truth-referentialism (see Section 3.6.1). He also argues that UTM has 
two crucial advantages over non-use-theoretical alternatives: its  generality  and its  explanatory  
power (1998a: 53). In what follows, I will present these two arguments and argue that together 
they show that we need an acceptance-based account of meaning independently of the fate of 
deflationism. In other words, that we need an acceptance-based account even if the meanings of 
words  turn  out  to  substantially  determine  their  references.  I  start  with  Horwich’s generality 
consideration.
3.5.2 The Generality of a Basic-Acceptance Account
The meanings of different words vary considerably, so theories that are plausible for some terms 
usually are  not  plausible  for  others.  UTM, in contrast,  can account  for all  classes of  terms.  
Horwich (2005: 26-27) gives the following examples of the meaning constitutive properties we 
may expect to find according to his use-theory:
58 In fairness,  Peacocke’s (1992) theory of concepts is  also non-solipsistic and non-holistic.  Indeed, it  is very  
similar to UTM in crucial respects.
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“bachelor” ’s meaning is engendered by the fact that its basic regularity of use is 
our acceptance of the sentence, “The bachelors are the unmarried men.”
“red” ‘s meaning stems from the fact that its law of use is a propensity to accept 
“That is red” in response to the sort of visual experience normally provoked by 
observing a clearly red surface.
The meaning of  “water”  is  constituted  by  the  fact  that  the  law explaining  its 
overall use is that we accept, “x is water ↔ x has the underlying nature of the 
stuff in our seas, rivers, lakes and rain.”
“neutrino” means what  it  does in virtue of our unsupported acceptance of the 
conditional,  “ øT(ø)   T(neutrino)”,  where  “T(neutrino)”  is  a  formulation  of∃ ⇒  
neutrino theory.
“and” means what it  does because the fundamental regularity in its use is our 
acceptance of the two-way argument schema, “p, q // p and q”.
Notice the variety of meaning constituting properties allowed for by UTM. The meaning of 
‘bachelor’ is accounted for by its association with other words. The meaning of ‘red’ is causally 
related to red surfaces. The meaning of ‘neutrino’ is determined by its role within a theory. And 
the meaning of ‘and’ is determined by an argument schema or rule of inference. The shape taken 
by these different basic acceptance properties accommodates insights from description theories 
(‘bachelor’), indicator or causal theories (‘red’), traditional FRS (‘neutrino’) and even solipsistic 
FRS (‘and’). The  generality  of UTM cannot be matched by any of these other theories. The 
description theory is plausible for terms like ‘bachelor’, but cannot account for terms like ‘red’,  
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‘horse’ and ‘water’. Causal theories are plausible for terms such as ‘red’, ‘horse’ and ‘water’, but 
implausible for terms like ‘bachelor’ and ‘neutrino’. And purely internalist versions of FRS give 
plausible accounts  only  of logical terms like ‘and’.  None of these theories provide a unified 
reductive account of the meaning constituting properties of all words (Horwich 1998a: 53).
Due  to  its  generality,  a  basic-acceptance  semantics—such  as  UTM—has  a  crucial 
advantage over almost every other theory offered to explain why words mean what they do. 
There is, however, an alternative to UTM that can accommodate different kinds of meaning. As 
Michael Devitt (2002: 113-114) points out:
The alternative  is  a  “moderate”  truth  referentialism along the  following lines. 
“Primitives” get their meanings from referential relations explained by some sort 
of direct causal link to reality, an informational, teleological, or historical-causal 
link,  or some combination of these;  proper  names and natural kind words are 
likely  primitives.  Other  words  get  their  meanings  from  referential  relations 
explained by their “definitional” links; the words are inferentially associated with 
others that determine their reference; they are covered by “description” theories of 
reference; ‘bachelor’ is a likely example.
Devitt’s moderate  truth-referentialism incorporates the insights of different theories that regard 
meanings as constituted by reference-determining properties.59 So the approach is diametrically 
opposed to Horwich’s UTM, which is committed to deflationism and does not regard meaning 
constituting properties  as  reference-determining.  Notice that  by making room for  description 
theories,  informational  theories,  teleological  theories  and historical-causal  theories,  moderate 
59 Devitt (1996) and Devitt & Sterelny (1999) argue for this moderate view.
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truth-referentialism offers a plausible account of the meanings of different kinds word, unlike 
any of these particular theories taken by itself.
Moderate truth-referentialism explains the meanings of primitive words in terms of direct 
links to reality and the meanings of non-primitive words in terms of  indirect  links to reality 
provided by connections to other words. However, even this moderate approach does not seem 
particularly well-suited to explain the meanings of the terms of logic and mathematics (e.g., 
‘and’ or ‘plus’), which appear to be related to their roles in inference rather than to any direct or 
indirect link to the external world (Field 1977; Harman 1987).60 An acceptance-based theory, like 
UTM,  is  even  more  general  than  moderate  truth-referentialism,  allowing  the  meanings  of 
different words to depend on basic sentences that link them either to the world, to other words or 
to rules of inference. The links to rules of inference are crucial to account for the meanings of the 
terms of logic and mathematics.  But moderate  truth-referentialism only includes links to the 
world and to other words. So UTM has an advantage even over moderate truth-referentialism. As 
Devitt (2002: 117) acknowledges: “I do think that the use theory has an advantage over its rivals 
in the handling of the terms of logic and mathematics”. Fodor (1994: 110) makes a similar point:
I'm inclined to think that maybe there is no objection to the idea that “+”, “and”, 
“all” and the like have the meanings they do because they play a certain causal 
role  in  the  mental  lives  of  their  users.  This  would,  of  course,  be  to  accept  a 
distinction  in  kind  between  the  logical  and  the  nonlogical  vocabularies.  (The 
semantics for the former would be a kind of ‘use’ theory, whereas the semantics 
60 Field (1977) gives an inferential account of the meanings of logical terms.  Similarly, Harman (1987) argues that 
the meanings of logical and mathematical words depends mostly on their roles in inference: given his semantic 
holism, he claims that links to perception also play some role.
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for the latter would depend on nomic, specifically mind-world, relations.)
It may seem surprising that Fodor accepts a use-theory for logical vocabulary, since he is one of 
the fiercest opponents of use-theories in general—at least for non-logical words (Fodor 1987: 71-
84). However, Fodor’s account of meaning—for non-logical words—is far from moderate. On 
the contrary, he  proposes  a  radical  atomism,  according to  which the meanings  of  all—non-
logical—words depend  exclusively  on their  links to the world (Fodor 1987 & 1994).  Both a 
basic-acceptance semantics (like UTM) and Devitt’s moderate truth-referentialism have a clear 
advantage on this regard.
A general theory of meaning has to account for all words, presumably explaining what is 
the common property in virtue of which they all have meanings. While a basic-acceptance theory 
has  a  clear  advantage  over  all  of  its  rivals  on  this  regard,  I  suggest  that  a  modification  of  
moderate  truth-referentialism can also achieve the required generality: it can treat logical words 
as auxiliaries whose meanings also depend on properties that contribute to the truth-conditions 
of sentences, explained in terms of the links of logical words to rules of inference. Moderate 
truth-referentialism can hold the following:
The  meanings  of  all words  depend  on  properties  that  determine  the  truth-
conditions  of  sentences:  primitive words  get  their  meanings  from links  to  the 
world that  determine  their  references,  non-primitive  words  get  their  meanings 
from links to  other words  that determine their references, and logical words get 
their meanings from links to rules of inference that determine their contributions 
to the truth-conditions of sentences.
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I conclude that the generality consideration favors a basic-acceptance theory like UTM over the 
vast majority  of rival theories  of meaning,  but  a moderate truth-referentialism—expanded to 
include links to rules of inference—matches the basic-acceptance theory in generality. While 
generality alone does not favor a basic-acceptance theory over a moderate truth-referentialism, 
generality is a crucial desideratum. A plausible unified reductive account of meaning will have 
to be along the lines of theories like basic-acceptance semantics (e.g., UTM) or an expanded 
moderate truth-referentialism, which can accommodate all kinds of words.
In the next section, I present the second consideration offered by Horwich in favor of 
UTM. I shall argue that this consideration does favor a basic-acceptance approach over all of its 
rivals. Still,  I  shall  argue that a moderate truth-referentialism can again match a deflationary 
basic-acceptance approach if expanded further to include basic-acceptance. The resulting version 
of moderate truth-referentialism is, of course, not a rival to basic-acceptance semantics, because 
it includes basic acceptance, but it is a rival to UTM. After arguing for the core claims of UTM—
i.e.,  basic-acceptance  semantics—, I  shall  discuss  the  main  problems faced by UTM. These 
problems do not stem form basic-acceptance semantics per se, but from UTM’s commitments to 
deflationism and dispositionalism.
3.5.3 The Explanatory Power of a Basic-Acceptance Account
The  feature  of  a  basic-acceptance  semantics—like  UTM—that  truly  favors  it  over  non-
acceptance-based rivals is its  explanatory power. Basic-acceptance semantics offers a plausible 
explanation of how meanings can govern use, since it can appeal to the inferential model to 
explain  how the total  use of  a  word is  derived from a fundamental  acceptance property. In 
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contrast, Horwich (1998a: 47) argues, theories according to which the meanings of words do not  
depend on the acceptance of some sentences containing them cannot explain how these meanings 
govern the use of words in theoretical and practical inference:
One of the properties of meaning that we recognize pretheoretically is that what 
people say is due, in part, to what they mean. [...] And this explanatory feature of 
meaning  is  immediately  accounted  for  by  the  use  theory.  For  the  central 
component of that theory is that the property which constitutes a word’s having 
the  meaning  it  does  is  that  its  use  is  governed  by  a  certain  explanatorily 
fundamental acceptance property. And it is indeed quite clear [...] how the total 
use of a word might be derived, in light of circumstantial factors, from a basic 
‘law’ of use—whereas it is relatively unclear how any other sort of property of a 
word [...] would constrain its overall use.
Let me unfold the points Horwich makes in this passage step by step.
Pretheoretically, the meaning of a word seems to be what governs its use, since people 
use words according to what meanings they attach to them. (Notice that this crucial point is in 
tune with the identification of meanings and the definition of the task of semantics I defended in 
Chapter 2.) If someone utters ‘Bachelors are unhappy’ or has a token of this sentence in his 
“belief  box”,  this  is  surely  due  in  part  to  what  the  word  ‘bachelor’  means  (1998a:  47). 
Additionally, a  central  theoretical  motivation for  attributing meanings and,  consequently, for 
articulating semantic theories is precisely our need to explain people’s behavior, which includes 
their linguistic behavior (Devitt 1996 & 2002). So a  fundamental desideratum for a theory of 
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meaning is that it must explain how people use words. (This again follows for the methodological 
considerations discussed in Chapter 2.)
Before I  elaborate  on how a basic-acceptance account (e.g.,  UTM) can explain word 
deployment, let me point out that standard use theories face a serious circularity problem if they 
attempt to explain word usage in terms of meaning, since they claim that meaning is  use. Use 
theories that identify meanings with the overall use of words seem to have things upside down: 
they attempt to explain meaning in terms of use, when what we need instead is to explain use in 
terms of meaning. Basic-acceptance semantics (e.g., UTM), however, only claims that some core 
uses  determine  meaning:  it  does  not  identify  the  meaning  of  a  word  with  its  overall  use. 
Furthermore,  UTM claims that the core use of a word—i.e.,  its  basic acceptance property—
explains its overall use. So UTM is different from other use theories in not having things upside 
down. The explanatory power of this use theory is precisely given by the fact that it offers a  
plausible explanation of how meanings can govern use.
Horwich  claims  that  the  total  use  of  a  word  derives  from a  fundamental  acceptance 
property (Horwich 1998a: 47). How does it derive? The explanation appeals to the inferential 
model,  which  is  the  only  working  model  of  thinking  we  have:  “no  other  model  has  been 
suggested for how we might explain what needs to be explained.” (Horwich 2005: 44). Given the 
deployment of rules of inference, the acceptance of some w-sentences—sentences containing a 
word w—can bring about the acceptance of other w-sentences, so some uses of a word can be 
derived from—and consequently explained by—others. While most uses of a word are surely the 
result of inferences from other w-sentences, these causal/inferential chain must start somewhere. 
There must be a core set of accepted w-sentences that serve as the inferential basis for other w-
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sentences61 but  are  not  themselves  inferentially  derived  from other  w-sentences.  These  core 
sentences govern the overall use of the word because they function as fundamental premises or 
“axioms” in the system of inferences containing the word. But if this is the case, these core 
sentences must be—at least part of—what the meaning of the words depends on, since they play 
a substantial causal role in the explanation the word’s overall use. As long as our theoretical 
motivations to attribute meanings are related to the need to explain the overall deployment of 
words, basic-acceptance semantics offers indeed a plausible account of the nature of meaning.
Notice that basic-acceptance semantics can also explain how mental content governs non-
linguistic behavior, since the fundamental acceptance properties of a word can as well govern 
behavior  through  practical  inference.  Basic-acceptance  semantics—e.g.,  UTM—exploits  the 
inferential model without identifying meaning with overall inferential roles, so it preserves the 
pre-theoretical intuition that  meaning determines  use.  Also,  it  relies on the inferential  model 
without restricting meanings to inferential roles, since fundamental acceptance properties can 
link the meanings of words to the external world. The various uses of ‘cat’ in inferences leading 
to intentional behavior, for example, may be explained by the acceptance of ‘This is a cat’ in the 
presence of cats. Links to the world play a crucial role in the explanation of the use of many 
words and the intentional behavior resulting from practical inferences containing them.
Horwich claims that “it is relatively unclear how any other sort of property of a word [...] 
would constrain its overall use” (Horwich 1998a: 47). In other words, he claims that a basic-
acceptance approach offers the best explanation.  I take it that non-use-theoretical approaches 
must anyway incorporate a use theory to explain the use of logical and mathematical words (see 
61 Together with other factors, such as the meanings of other words in those derived w-sentences, inputs from 
perception, etc.
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Section 3.5.2). So I will focus on words whose meaning plausibly depends on links to some other 
words or to the world. The description theory plausibly claims that the meaning of ‘bachelor’ 
depends  on  its  association  with  ‘unmarried  man’.  Indicator,  causal-historical  and  (standard) 
teleosemantic theories plausibly claim that the meaning of ‘cat’ depends on its  links to cats. 
Basic-acceptance semantics (e.g., UTM) includes these very same links to explain the meanings 
of ‘bachelor’ and ‘cat’, respectively. The crucial difference is that the above mentioned theories
—or a moderate truth-referentialism that combines them—do not articulate these links as part of 
basic-acceptance properties. Can the links explain by themselves the overall use of these words, 
independently of the words having the links while embedded in some basic sentences? Arguably 
not. Most uses of these words in theoretical and practical inferences—in thinking—must result 
from previous  sentences  containing  them,  since  only  sentences  can  function  as  premises  in 
inferences. I take this to be rather uncontroversial.62 Those who endorse non-acceptance-based 
theories can go along with this and claim that the word simply preserves its meaning in these 
inferential  processes.  But  the  widely  accepted  inferential  model  of  thinking  does  impose  a 
constraint  in  what  properties  can  conceivably  govern  the  use  of  words—and,  consequently, 
explain  their  meanings—,  since  when  we  get  to  the  original  uses  of  the  words  in  the 
causal/inferential chain, they must also be uses in sentences for the very same reason:  isolated  
words cannot function as premises. The acceptance of ‘Bachelors are unmarried men’ associates 
‘bachelor’  with  ‘unmarried  men’,  as  the  description  theory  plausibly  suggests,  but  it  also 
explains how the association can govern the use of the word in other sentences containing it. The 
acceptance of ‘This is a cat’ in the presence of cats links ‘cat’ specifically to cats in the external  
world, as indicator, causal-historical and teleosemantic theories plausibly suggest, but it also can 
62 At least for anyone who accepts the language of thought hypothesis and a “computational” theory of the mind.
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serve as a premise in inferences containing ‘cat’, thereby governing other stimulus-independent 
uses of the word. So links to other words and to the world can indeed govern a word’s overall 
use, provided they are links the word has when embedded in some sentences containing it.
While UTM incorporates causal connections to the world in its account of the meaning of 
some  words,  Horwich  denies  that  they  thereby  determine  the  reference  of  such  words. 
Interestingly, however, Horwich (2005:  44)  points  out  that  a non-deflationary version of the 
basic-acceptance approach  can  be articulated,  by postulating basic-acceptance properties  that 
substantially determine the referential properties of words. Given the generality consideration, a 
plausible  non-deflationary version of  basic-acceptance semantics  should be combined with a 
moderate  truth-referentialism. Such a version of a basic-acceptance semantics would have the 
following shape:
i. Primitive words get their meanings from the acceptance of basic sentences with links to 
the world that determine their references and govern their use (e.g., the acceptance of 
‘This is a cat’ in the presence of cats determines the reference of ‘cat’ and governs its 
use).
i. Non-primitive words get their meanings from the acceptance of basic sentences that link 
them  to  other  words  that  determine  their  references  and  govern  their  use  (e.g.,  the 
acceptance of ‘Bachelors are unmarried men’ determines the reference of ‘bachelor’ and 
governs its use).
ii. Logical words get their meanings from the acceptance of basic sentences that link them to 
truth-preserving inference rules and govern their use (i.e., the acceptance of the schema 
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‘p, q // p and q’ determines the truth-conditional meaning of ‘and’ and governs its use).63
This version of moderate truth-referentialism  clearly  matches  Horwich’s deflationary UTM in 
explanatory power. But arguably it does so thanks to incorporating basic-acceptance semantics.
The moral we should draw is that the “explanatory power” consideration strongly favors 
a  basic-acceptance  account  of  meaning  over  all of  its  non-acceptance-based  rivals.  If 
deflationism  turns  out  to  be  right,  we  need  a  deflationary  basis-acceptance  account.64 If 
deflationism turns out to be wrong, we need a  moderately truth-referentialist basic-acceptance 
semantics.  Basic-acceptance  semantics  is  strongly  motivated  independently  of  the  fate  of  
deflationism.
In Section 3.5.1, I presented Horwich’s UTM and argued that it has crucial advantages 
over other versions of FRS. In Section 3.5.2, I argued that basic-acceptance semantics—the core 
set of claims of UTM—has a crucial advantage over  almost  every other theory of meaning in 
terms of generality, except an expanded moderate truth-referentialism that includes links to rules 
of inference for logical words. Basic-acceptance semantics and moderate truth-referentialism are 
the only plausible candidates for a general theory that accounts for the meanings of all words. In 
this section, 3.5.3, I argued that basic-acceptance semantics has a crucial advantage over every 
other theory of meaning in terms of explanatory power: the meanings of words must depend on 
basic-sentences containing them in order to govern their use. I also argued that this argument is 
independent of deflationism, so that it does not favor a deflationary basic-acceptance semantics
—like Horwich’s UTM—over a moderately truth-referentialist basic-acceptance semantics.
63 This sketch is inspired on one offered by Horwich (2005: 44-45).
64 At least if we do not want to “abandon meaning altogether” (Devitt 2002: 106).
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I have so far abstracted away from the problems faced by Horwich’s UTM and focused 
on the virtues and insights of a basic-acceptance semantics. However, Horwich’s UTM does face 
some serious challenges. I shall discuss these challenges in the following sections. Based on my 
assessment, I shall argue that basic-acceptance semantics must be combined with teleosemantics 
and that the result may turn out to be deflationary or moderately truth-referentialist.
3.6 Problems with Horwich’s Use-Theory
While basic-acceptance semantics is strongly motivated by its generality and explanatory power, 
Horwich’s UTM faces two main problems pointed out by Devitt (2002 & 2011): (1) UTM risks 
collapsing into truth-referentialism, and (2) UTM is undermined by problems of ignorance and 
error. I shall argue that neither of these problems stems from basic-acceptance semantics. The 
first problem arises from UTM’s commitment to deflationism. Given the risk of a collapse, I 
shall argue that basic-acceptance semantics should remain agnostic or neutral about deflationism 
until we determine whether it effectively collapses or not into a form of truth-referentialism. The 
second problem arises from UTM’s commitment to a dispositionalist account of the functions of 
words. I shall argue that UTM is indeed undermined by this problem and that basic-acceptance 
semantics must be combined with a different account of the functions of words in order to offer a 
plausible explanation of why words mean what they do.
Before discussing the main problems faced by UTM, let me make a brief point about 
Horwich’s take on the relation between the meanings of linguistic and mental representations. 
Horwich treats language and thought as a “seamless whole”. As far as he is concerned, his theory 
is about the words used by people both to think and to communicate with each other. As he puts 
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it: “I favour a  uniform account, which will deal in the same way with both overt and mental 
terms” (Horwich 2005: 31). In a critical assessment of UTM, however, Devitt reasonably argues 
that  UTM  should  give  instead  priority to  the  mental.  Devitt’s  main  point  is  that  UTM’s 
“linguistic theory which seeks to identify and then explain the meanings of linguistic words 
depends on the prior identification and explanation of the meanings of mental words”, and that 
this is a consequence of UTM’s “reliance on  accepting a sentence” (Devitt 2002: 109). Recall 
that,  for  Horwich,  accepting  a  sentence  involves  regarding it  as  true  and relying  on it  as  a 
premise in inferences, which includes not only asserted sentences, but also sentences deployed in 
thought—i.e., sentences in the speaker’s “belief-box”. The point is that “accepting a sentence” is 
fundamentally a psychological notion. Inferences take place in the mind. In order to rely on a 
sentence as a premise in theoretical and practical inferences, the sentence must be tokened in 
though—i.e., stored in the “belief-box”. This alone should suffice to show that UTM should give 
priority to the mental.
Suppose  that  Mary  believes  that  bachelors  are  unhappy  and  utters  ‘Bachelors  are 
unhappy’. What explains Mary’s linguistic behavior? The best explanation we have—I am not 
sure there even is another plausible one—is the standard one based on Mary’s thoughts: she 
believes that bachelors are unhappy, she wants to communicate her belief, therefore she utters a 
sentence that has the same meaning as her belief according to the linguistic conventions of her 
community (Devitt 2002: 110). This sort of explanation is based on our old and very successful 
folk-psychology. The idea behind it is reflected in the saying that language expresses thought 
(Devitt 2002: 111). It should be obvious that there is a lot to say in favor of this view and almost 
nothing to say against it. But the view in effect assigns explanatory priority to the mental. Let us 
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consider now Horwich’s explanation of the overall use of a word in terms of basic-acceptance. 
To follow the same example, UTM would explain Mary’s uses of ‘bachelor’ in her utterance and 
belief by her acceptance of ‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’. Should a proper version of 
UTM deal “in the same way with both overt and mental terms”? The first point to notice is that 
the basic sentence will have to be tokened in the “belief-box” in order to govern inferences with 
the word by serving as a premise. The second point to notice is that, given the explanation of 
Mary’s utterance, the basic sentence will only cause the utterance by first causing the belief. 
UTM can indeed explain both overt and mental uses, but the explanations are not symmetrical: it  
can explain the overt use by explaining the mental one. So I conclude that UTM indeed should 
give priority to the mental. Of course, for many explanatory purposes it is convenient to ignore 
the complex relations between language and thought treating them simply as a “seamless whole”. 
But the point remains that in an ultimate analysis thought takes priority.
3.6.1 Risk of Collapse
Devitt points out that both UTM and a moderate truth-referentialism account for the meanings of 
non-primitives  such as  ‘bachelor’ in  terms of  their  associations  with other  words.  For  these 
terms, Devitt argues, the only difference between the two competing theories is in their accounts 
of the nature of reference: “truth referentialism is committed to a substantial reference relation, 
the use theory, to deflationary reference” (Devitt  2002: 114). Therefore,  relevant evidence in 
favor of one theory of meaning over the other has to be found elsewhere: in their accounts of the 
meanings of primitives.
Moderate  truth  referentialism  explains  the  meanings  of  primitives  in  terms  of  their 
141
reference determining causal  relations to  reality. The use theory has to choose between also 
explaining the meanings of these words in terms of their causal relations to reality or explaining 
them instead in purely intra-linguistic terms. As Devitt points out, well-known arguments for 
externalism count against the second alternative (Devitt 2002: 115). A use theory that follows 
this path is an  extremely implausible theory of meaning. To be plausible, the use theory must 
explain the meanings of primitives in terms of their causal relations to reality. But then, Devitt 
argues, the theory faces the following challenge:
[It] needs to distinguish itself from truth referentialism. Truth referentialism holds 
that  these  meaning-constituting  causal  links  explain  reference.  The use theory 
needs  to  say  why  they  don’t  (because  the  use  theory  holds  that  reference  is 
deflationary and not open to this sort of explanation). (Devitt 2002: 114-115)
It is important to notice that this challenge is faced specifically by Horwich’s deflationary UTM, 
rather than by basic-acceptance semantics in general. As I argued above (Section 3.5.3), basic-
acceptance semantics is motivated independently of deflationism—and may even take a truth-
referntialist form—so its fate does not go hand in hand with the fate of deflationism.
How can UTM explain why all of these causal links are not reference determining ones? 
Horwich may claim that the causal links only determine meaning and that ascriptions of referents 
to these words are derived trivially from the application of the deflationary reference schema 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3). But the problem is that deflationism entails that reference cannot 
play any explanatory role in meaning. Why should we expect the meanings of primitives to be 
constituted  exactly  by  the  same  causal  links  that  truth  referentialism  regards  as  reference 
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determining if reference does not play any explanatory role in the account? Truth referentialism 
has good reasons to hold that we need these causal links: we need them to explain reference.
In his reply to Devitt, Horwich makes two points. I already presented the first point above 
(Section  3.5.3):  Horwich  suggests  that  a  non-deflationary  version  of  the  basic-acceptance 
approach  can  be  articulated,  by  postulating  basic-acceptance  properties  that  substantially 
determine  the  referential  properties  of  words  (Horwich  2005:  44).  This  of  course  does  not 
prevent UTM from collapsing into truth-referentialism. Horwich’s point is merely that  if there 
were a collapse, it would not undermine basic-acceptance semantics  per se. Horwich’s second 
point is intended to defend  specifically his deflationary UTM. He argues that we should not 
expect basic-acceptance semantics to take the shape required by moderate truth referentialism, 
since  the  plausibility  of  deflationism shows that  there  is  no  reason to  assume that  meaning 
properties must constitute the “is true of” relation (Horwich 2005: 45). While Horwich agrees 
that some words may turn out to have relational acceptance properties, he insists that the use 
theory does not require it:
[The use theory]  leaves room for ‘physical’ externalism, insofar as it  does not 
preclude  the  possibility  that  the  conditions  of  acceptance  involved  in  certain 
meaning-constituting properties will include aspects of the environment. But it is 
not  committed to externalism, insofar as it allows that the best explanations of 
overall use may turn out never to call for that kind of basic acceptance property. 
(Horwich 2005: 49n.)
Devitt warned that if UTM treats the meanings of primitives as determined by causal relations to 
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reality, it risks collapsing into truth referentialism. Horwich replies that UTM is not committed to 
externalism and UTM’s explanations may turn out to never involve causal links to reality. If this 
happened to be the case, UTM would certainly not collapse. However, a purely internalist UTM 
would not only avoid a collapse: it would also be undermined by the powerful arguments for 
externalism, as Devitt originally warned (Devitt 2002: 115). So the sensible conclusion to draw 
is that UTM indeed risks collapsing into a form of truth-referentialism.
Given similar  worries,  Field suggests  that  we should  merely adopt  a  methodological  
deflationism in the theory of meaning: “a methodological policy, which if pursued could lead to 
the discovery that deflationism in the original sense (‘metaphysical deflationism’) is workable or 
could lead to the discovery that inflationism is inevitable” (Field 2001: 119). We should leave 
open the possibility that a fully satisfactory version of basic-acceptance semantics may turn out 
to be one that complies with the requirements of a moderate truth-referentialism—along the lines 
I sketched above (Section 3.5.3). I have to confess that, unlike Horwich, I am inclined to believe 
that this is a likely outcome.
3.6.2 Problems of Ignorance and Error
Another  issue pointed out  by Devitt  (2002 & 2011) is  that  UTM faces serious  problems of 
ignorance  and  error.  These  problems,  I  will  argue,  stem  from  UTM’s  commitment  to 
dispositionalism, not from basic-acceptance semantics itself.
Horwich relies  on a  dispositionalist  model  of  inference to  explain  the  overall  use of 
words, on one hand, and the nature of basic acceptance properties, on the other. Accordingly, 
Horwich regards the overall use of words as a certain kind of regularity, and the core uses that 
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constitute  their  meanings  as  an  “explanatory  basic  regularity”.  The  meaning  constituting 
properties of words are, according to Horwich, the  laws  that govern their use. These laws are 
articulated as basic acceptance properties which, in turn, are dispositions or tendencies to accept 
certain sentences in certain conditions. Certain sentences have to be regularly accepted in certain 
conditions  in  order  to  constitute  an  explanatory  basic  use.  Even  Horwich’s  account  of  the 
division of linguistic labor is purely dispositionalist. A speaker qualifies as sharing the public 
meaning of a word, even when he is too ignorant or makes too many mistakes, as long as he is 
disposed to defer to the experts in the use of that word in his linguistic community.
Horwich’s  dispositionalist  accounts  of  fundamental  acceptance  properties  and  of  the 
division of linguistic labor face serious problems of ignorance and error. As Kripke (1982) has 
shown, any dispositionalist theory of meaning will fail to properly characterize incorrect uses as 
incorrect, because speakers/thinkers often have dispositions to make mistakes and often lack the 
right dispositions. A purely dispositionalist theory does not have the resources to exclude the 
dispositions  to  make  mistakes  from  being  meaning  constitutive.  So  it  is  no  surprise  that 
Horwich’s use theory, as it stands, fails to offer a plausible account of meaning. I will argue that 
Horwich’s  dispositionalist  account  of  fundamental  acceptance  properties  indeed  leads  to  a 
serious disjunction problem when applied to relational meanings. On one hand, Horwich claims 
that  the  problem of  error  is  a  pseudo-problem.  But  I  will  reply  that  this  position  leads  to 
implausible  attributions  of  meaning.  On  the  other  hand,  Horwich  offers  an  account  of  the 
division of linguistic labor that anyway may help to overcome the problem. But I will argue that 
the problem persists for mental words that are not part of a public language and that the proposed 
solution even fails for words that are indeed words of a public language since, as Devitt (2002) 
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shows, Horwich’s theory of linguistic  deference is  itself  undermined by serious problems of 
ignorance and error.
Let us suppose that UTM’s hypothesis for the meaning of ‘horse’ is that it constituted by 
our basic tendency to accept ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of horses. However, surely we have  
a tendency to accept ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of not only horses, but also muddy zebras,  
the odd cow, etc. But then this is the actual law of use of ‘horse’, with the result that applying 
‘horse’ to muddy zebras, the odd cow, etc., does not constitute a misuse of the word. Horwich, 
however, claims that the meaning constituting laws of use are idealized laws. So his theory does 
make  some room for error. If a speaker has a tendency to only  occasionally  accept ‘This is a 
horse’ in the presence of muddy zebras and odd cows, but a regular tendency to accept it in the 
presence  of  horses,  then  the  use  theory  can  characterize  his  misuses  as  misuses:  simplicity 
considerations will determine that the relevant idealized law is only the one that involves horses.
However, idealized laws of use will successfully abstract away from errors only when 
most actual uses of the word are correct. The dispositionalist use theory still requires meaning 
constituting sentences to be regularly accepted. But this makes too little room for error. The 
problem is that errors may often be more frequent than the use theory allows. In these cases,  
UTM will attribute the wrong meaning to the word. In the ‘horse’ example, it will attribute a 
disjunctive meaning-constituting relational property to speakers that fail more often than they 
succeed in identifying real horses. Or consider Putnam’s (1975) ‘beech’ and ‘elm’ example. In 
this case, plain ignorance of how to apply the terms (rather than error committed during their 
application) may lead to consistent misapplication of the words by many speakers who share 
Putnam’s inability to distinguish beeches from elms.
146
Horwich argues that the problem of error is a pseudo-problem. I will get back to this 
below. But he also offers an account of the division of linguistic labor that is intended to make 
room for people misusing words without changing their meanings:
In order for an individual member of the community to mean a certain thing by a 
given word, it is not necessary that he himself uses it precisely in accordance with 
the regularity that fixes the meaning of the word type. What is needed is, first, that 
there are acknowledged experts in the deployment of the term—experts whose 
usage  is  determined  by  some  such  regularity;  second,  that  the  individual  is 
disposed  to  defer  to  the  experts—i.e.  to  accept  correction  by  them;  and 
consequently, third, that his use of the term conforms to that regularity at least to 
some extent. In these circumstances, even when the speaker’s use of a word is 
fundamentally abnormal, we none the less attribute the normal meaning to him; 
and that normal meaning is constituted by the regularity that explains the overall 
use of the word by those ‘specialists’ to whom the rest of us are prepared to defer. 
(Horwich 1998a: 86)
There are two things to be said against this. In the first place, the proposed solution only is  
available for abnormal uses of words with a public usage. So the problem of error persists for 
words that are not part of a public language—e.g., mental words coined by an individual thinker 
or written words coined for someone’s private use. In the second place, even for words with a 
public usage,  the solution relies on the  disposition of  users to defer to experts.  The original 
problem  of  error  was  related  to  the  theory’s  dispositionalist  account  of  basic  acceptance 
properties.  But,  as  Devitt  (2002)  demonstrates,  a  dispositionalist  account  of  the  division  of 
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linguistic labor is doomed to face analogous problems.
I  will  elaborate  the  first  problem  with  a  simple  thought  experiment.  Suppose  that 
Robinson Crusoe, alone on his island, coins a new word to name a small long-eared species of 
rodent he has encountered. When speaking to himself and writing in his diary he calls these 
creatures ‘gavagais’.  One day he manages to construct  a precarious boat to  escape from his 
solitary  confinement.  In  sailing  out  to  sea,  however,  he  finds  himself  in  a  storm  that 
unfortunately brings him to another uninhabited island. On this new island, Robinson Crusoe 
finds a small mammal that looks exactly like a gavagai, so he thinks these creatures are gavagais  
and the new entries on his diary also allude to these creatures as gavagais. However, unknown to 
him, the creatures on the new island are not really gavagais. They are not even rodents, but 
marsupials that have evolved into a very similar shape to that of gavagais because of their similar 
ecological niches.
In a case like this, how can the use theory explain error and misrepresentation? It cannot 
appeal to semantic deference, since this is a word coined by a solitary speaker. Robinson Crusoe 
is the only “expert” in the use of the term. The use theory cannot avoid the conclusion that the 
meaning of  Robinson Crusoe’s ‘gavagai’ is  constituted by his  tendency to accept  ‘This  is  a 
gavagai’ in the presence of either gavagais or their marsupial lookalikes. But surely Robinson 
Crusoe is misrepresenting the small marsupials as being gavagais. Since the misrepresentation is 
systematic, the use theory cannot abstract away from it appealing to the ideal law of use for the 
word.  Since  the  word  is  not  a  word  of  a  public  language,  the  use  theory  cannot  appeal  to 
semantic deference to account for the proper meaning of the word.  The conclusion is  that a 
dispositional characterization of basic acceptance properties fails to provide a plausible account 
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of meaning.
The second problem with Horwich’s proposed solution is that his dispositionalist account 
of semantic deference faces itself  serious problems of error. Recall  that Horwich’s theory of 
deference imposes three requirements for a speaker who uses a word abnormally to qualify as 
using the word with its public meaning: first, there must be experts on the use of the word; 
second, the speaker must be disposed to defer to the experts; third, the speaker use must conform 
to the public use to some extent. As Devitt (2002) points out, these requirements can hardly be 
met:
Consider proper names.  To meet  Horwich’s second requirement,  the user of a 
name has  to  acknowledge her  ignorance  and hence  be  prepared  to  defer. But 
surely many ignorant users of a name do not acknowledge their ignorance. On 
Horwich’s theory these users will not be using the name with the same meaning as 
the deferrers and the experts. My guess is that most users of most names will be in 
that category. Next, the requirement demands that each deferrer identify experts to 
defer to. How? They cannot be identified simply as experts on the meaning of the 
name, on pain of circularity. It is surely unlikely that most deferrers will be able to 
manage the required identification [...]. Finally, Horwich’s first requirement is that 
there  be  acknowledged  experts.  But  surely  the  ignorant  will  often  defer  to 
someone that they think is an expert who in fact is not. In sum, people will often 
not defer where they should; they will often try to defer but fail; they will often 
refer to a nonexpert. (Devitt 2002: 118-119)
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The account of deference fails for exactly the same reasons as the account of basic acceptance 
properties. People often have dispositions to make mistakes (error) and often lack the required 
dispositions  (ignorance).  In  the  case  of  deference,  as  Devitt  points  out,  people  may  have 
dispositions to make mistakes in whom to defer to, in when to defer, and people may lack the  
disposition  to  defer  to  anyone  whatsoever.  Again,  these  failures  may  often  be  regular,  so 
appealing to regularities or laws of usage does not solve the problem.
Horwich has developed an ingenious reply to the objection that UTM cannot overcome 
the problem of error. In a nutshell, he argues that the “problem of error” is a pseudo-problem that 
results  from  an  unwarranted  inflationism  about  truth  and  reference.  Given  inflationary 
assumptions, he claims, we wrongly expect to be able to “read off” the referent of a word from 
its meaning constitutive property. But deflationism frees us from the requirement that a meaning 
constitutive  property  should  substantially  determine  the  reference  of  a  word.  According  to 
deflationism, the reference of a word is instead trivially determined. So, Horwich concludes, 
there is no need to impose on the theory of meaning any substantial requirements related to how 
the  correct  reference of a word is determined by its meaning. (See Horwich 1998a: 65-71 & 
2005: 63-84.)
I  have  two points  to  make  against  Horwich’s attempt  to  disregard  the  problem as  a 
pseudo-problem.  First,  it  seems  to  me  that  Horwich’s  “dissolution”  fails  because  it  would 
undermine his own reasonable hypotheses about words’ meanings. Consider the hypothesis that 
the meaning of horse is engendered by the acceptance of ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of  
horses. This is similar to many of the reasonable hypotheses offered by Horwich himself. But in 
order to really embrace the view that there is no problem of error, rather than just flirt with the 
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idea, Horwich must be willing to bite the bullet and say that the meaning of ‘horse’ is engendered 
by the acceptance of ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of horse-looking things; so that the word 
would be correctly used when applied to muddy zebras or odd cows.
The second problem I find with Horwich’s alleged dissolution of the problem of error is 
that I do not think that the problem is merely a truth-referentialist one. While the problem has 
often been articulated in truth-referentialist terms, the underlying problem with dispositionalism 
is  deeper  and occurs  even  outside  of  the  theory  of  meaning.  As  teleological  theorists  have 
pointed out, a dispositionalist theory of biological function is in quite an analogous situation to a 
dispositionalist  theory  of  meaning (I  elaborate  more on this  on Chapter  4).  The function  of 
sperm, for instance, seems to be to fertilize eggs. However, most sperm never performs this 
function. And similar problems arise for the functions of biological organs, innate behaviors, 
acquired  behaviors,  etc.  Biological  devices  often  have  dispositions  to  malfunction  and  even 
malfunction regularly. So a purely dispositionalist/regularist account of functions is unable to 
characterize malfunctioning as malfunctioning.
The problems of malfunctioning with dispositionalist theories of biological function are 
clearly not based on any inflationary assumptions. But they will also arise for a functionalism 
about  content  that  adopts  a  similar  dispositionalist  account  of  the  functions  of  symbols. 
Consequently, I think that deflationism does not truly remove the underlying problem. Even a 
deflationary UTM should give a proper account of malfunctioning in the deployment of words 
and concepts. But as long as UTM is committed to pure dispositionalism, it is not clear how it 
can offer such an account.
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There is a use-theorist  that does take seriously the problem of dispositionalism being 
unable to underscore a proper distinction between correct and incorrect uses. Robert Brandom 
(1994 & 2000) argues for a form of use theory that he calls “inferentialism” and that, notably, is 
based on  norms  rather than  dispositions or  regularities of use. Brandom’s elaborate theory is 
non-naturalist, since it relies on irreducible normativity. This alone makes it unattractive, given 
the arguments for a naturalized semantics I have given in Chapter 1. But notice that someone 
with different views on that issue may suggest that Horwich should similarly adopt a norm-based 
account of use. Meanings would be engendered according to such a theory by basic norms of 
acceptance, instead of basic acceptance regularities. The meaning of ‘horse’, it could be said, is 
engendered by a norm like: You ought to accept ‘This is a horse’ in the presence of horses.
The alternative solution, which I suggested earlier, is to combine basic-acceptance with a 
teleological account of the functions of symbols. This combination allows the basic-acceptance 
approach  to  make  plenty  of  room for  ignorance  and error  while  remaining within  the  sane 
confines of naturalism. The meaning of ‘horse’, for example, may be said to be engendered by 
the  fact  that  the  acceptance  of  ‘This  is  s  horse’ in  response  to  the  perception  of  horses  is  
supposed to govern its use, while the meaning of ‘cardiologist’ may be said to be constituted by 
the fact that its use is supposed to be governed by the acceptance of ‘Cardiologists are doctors 
specialized heart diseases’—where the relevant “supposed” is not a prescriptive one, but the kind 
of “supposed” involved in the natural fact that kidneys are supposed to filter blood. This requires 
the  notion  of  “function”  that  applies  to  biological  organs  to  be  “normative”  in  this  non-
prescriptive sense and representations  (including acquired  ones)  to  have  these same sorts  of 
functions. I will discuss these issues in the following chapters.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have briefly surveyed the range of available theories of meaning, suggested an 
approach  that  combines  Horwich’s  basic-acceptance  semantics  with  teleosemantics,  and 
elaborated  on  the  virtues  and  problems  of  UTM:  Horwich’s  version  of  basic-acceptance 
semantics. I argued that the generality and mainly the explanatory power of basic-acceptance 
semantics  favors  it  over  other  alternatives,  although  I  pointed  out  that  a  basic-acceptance 
semantics with these advantageous features can take a truth-referentialist form. I also argued, 
following Devitt, that UTM risks collapsing into truth-referentialism and fails to give a proper 
account of relational meanings, because it is undermined by serious problems of ignorance and 
error. I  have suggested that  the risk of collapse into truth-referentialism does not  undermine 
basic-acceptance semantics. If basic-acceptance semantics fails to give a plausible account of 
meaning given the problems of ignorance and error of UTM, then we either have to reevaluate 
the inference to the best explanation based on the explanatory power consideration or somehow 
fix the theory to avoid the problems of ignorance and error. Since I think that the explanatory 
power  consideration  favors  the  use  theory  over  any  theory  not  based  on  basic  sentence 
acceptance properties, I will explore the second alternative: to fix the use theory to avoid the 
problems of ignorance and error. Overcoming the problems of ignorance and error is the main 
virtue of the combination of basic-acceptance and teleosemantics. In the next chapter, I will 





In Chapter 3, I  argued in favor of a basic-acceptance account of meaning, but objected that 
Horwich’s articulation of such an account is undermined by serious problems of ignorance and 
error. My aim is to propose a teleological or teleonomic version of basic-acceptance semantics 
which promises to overcome such problems. There are various already existing “teleosemantic” 
theories that rely on teleology to offer accounts of meaning that avoid falling prey of problems of 
ignorance and error. The approach I will  be proposing departs in crucial  ways from existing 
theories, but also borrows elements from them. Some available teleosemantic theories are quite 
complex and the model of functions they rely on requires some inspection before delving into 
how it can illuminate the nature of meaning. In this chapter, I will briefly discuss the nature of 
teleosemantic theories and discuss in some detail the etiological account of functions that such 
theories rely on. I will argue that the main advantage of the etiological account is that it accounts 
for the “normative” character  of functions  within a fully  naturalistic  framework. This  is  the 
feature that makes etiological functions particularly attractive to semantics.
4.2 What is Teleosemantics?
The core feature of teleosemantic theories is the following: they rely on a teleological account of 
functions to explain the nature of meanings. But most of the available versions of teleosemantics 
share another feature: they rely on direct links to reality to explain the references and/or truth-
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conditions of representations.  In this section, I briefly present these points, which I discuss in 
more detail afterwards. I suggest that the only defining feature of teleosemantics is the first one. 
A theory of meaning can be teleosemantic even if it does not have the second feature.
The first common feature of available versions of teleosemantics is that they all attempt 
to explain the nature of meanings in terms of what symbols or representations are supposed to do 
or  what  is  their  purpose given the  history  of  their  use  and/or  the  history  of  the  underlying 
mechanisms responsible for their use. What they propose, first and foremost, is that the meaning 
or content of a symbol or representation depends on its etiological functions: the functions that 
explain why the symbol or representation exists. Since the historical functions of an item explain 
why the item exists in terms of its  purposes, of what the item is  for, the etiological account is 
often called “teleological”. This account of functions has its roots in biology and the philosophy 
of biology. A kidney, for example, has the function of filtering blood. A teleological account 
proposes that filtering blood is a purpose of kidneys (among others, such a producing certain 
hormones) because they have been naturally selected for doing this. One of the main virtues of 
this account is that it makes room for malfunctioning. A failing kidney can be said to have the 
function of filtering blood even if it is not currently performing it properly or at all, because the  
explanation  of  why it  exists  relies  on how having kidneys benefited  ancestor  creatures—by 
filtering  waste  and excess  fluids  out  of  their  blood—aiding their  survival  and reproduction, 
which  resulted  in  the  inheritance  of  the  trait  by  their  descendants.  Notice  that  while 
“malfunctioning”  or  “failing”  to  perform  a  function  are,  in  a  qualified  sense,  “normative” 
notions, the etiological explanation is fully naturalistic. I discuss etiological functions in more 
detail in the following sections of this chapter.
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A teleosemantic theory basically makes use of the etiological explanation of functions to 
account  for  the  meanings  of  symbols  or  representations.  If  symbols  or  representations  are 
supposed to be used in certain ways because they have etiological functions, then their misuses 
can be accounted for in fully naturalistic terms. If we strictly follow the biological account which 
relies on Darwinian natural selection operating over hereditary traits,  a teleosemantic account 
may seem to be available only for innate symbols or representations. Some teleosemanticists do 
limit the scope of teleosemantics to a subset of symbols or representations that are innate or the 
result of purely innate mechanisms (Sterelny 1990 & Neander 1999). But other teleosemanticists 
have argued that the account can be extended to cover also symbols or representations that are 
the result of learning (Millikan 1984, Papineau 1984 & Dretske 1988) and even to the words of 
natural  languages  which  are  transmitted  culturally  rather  than by  biological  reproduction 
(Millikan  1984).  Whether  the  scope  of  a  teleosemantic  theory  is  limited  or  not  to  innately 
determined symbols or representations, what makes it a version of “teleosemantics” is that it 
relies  on  an  etiological  account  of  the  functions  of  symbols  to  explain  the  nature  of  their 
meanings. This is the defining feature of teleosemantics.
The second common feature of most available versions of teleosemantics is that they 
resort to teleology specifically in order  to explain the contents of representations in terms of 
direct links to reality that determine their references and/or truth-conditions.65 Like indicator or 
informational  theories,  causal-historical  theories  and  description  theories  of  reference—but 
unlike  many  “use”  or  functional-role  theories  of  meaning—all  available  versions  of 
65 In the case of words and concepts, the direct links are alleged to determine their references—which in turn 
contribute to the truth-conditions (or satisfaction-conditions) of sentences and thoughts containing them. In the 
case  of  simple  and  non-compositional  representations—such  as  those  generated  by  frog’s  bug-detectors 
(discussed in Chapter 5)—a teleosemantic theory is best characterized as providing direct links that determine 
truth-conditions.
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teleosemantics are truth-referential. Indeed, teleosemantic theorists tend to simply identify the 
contents  of  representations  with  their  references  and/or  truth-conditions.  Like  indicator  and 
causal-historical theories, most available versions of teleosemantics rely on direct links to reality 
to  explain  representational  content.  The  links  are  direct in  contrast  to  the  indirect links  of 
description theories of reference—according to which the link between a symbol and reality is 
mediated by its links to other symbols (e.g., ‘bachelor’ is indirectly linked to bachelors through 
its direct links to ‘unmarried’ and ‘man’). In sum, available teleosemantic theories belong to the 
large set of truth-referential theories of meaning and, within this set, to the sub-set of theories 
that rely on direct links to the world. The crucial motivation for resorting to teleology in order to 
explain the nature of these direct links can be appreciated by comparing teleosemantic theories 
with indicator or informational theories—since the former are tailored to avoid one of the most 
serious problems faced by the latter.
According to indicator or informational  theories (Stampe 1977, Dretske 1981 & Fodor 
1987), the references and/or truth-conditions  of symbols or representations are determined by 
their reliable causal links to reality. A mental token of ‘horse’, for example, is said to indicate or 
carry information about the presence of a horse because tokens of that type are reliably caused by 
the presence of horses. Indicator theories have the virtue of being fully naturalistic. But they are 
undermined  by serious  problems of  misrepresentation.  Due to  ignorance  or  error, tokens  of 
‘horse’ are  sometimes  caused  by  zebras  or  distant  cows,  for  example.  The  problem is  that 
indicator  theories  do  not  have  the  resources  to  characterize  these  instances  as  genuine 
misrepresentations. Since ‘horse’ is reliably caused by horses, zebras and other horse-looking 
things, the pure indicator theory unfortunately entails that ‘horse’ refers to horses, zebras and 
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other horse-looking things.
Available teleosemantic theories attempt to overcome the problem of misrepresentation 
by relying  on a  teleological  characterization  of  the  direct  links  between representations  and 
reality.  A simple option combines indication with teleology, claiming that a representation  R 
stands for X if and only if it has the etiological function of indicating X (Dretske 1988). A related 
informational alternative holds that R stands for X if and only if the mechanism that produces it 
has the etiological function of responding to X (Neander 2013). These versions of teleosemantics 
may be regarded as teleological variants of indicator or informational theories. They rely on 
etiological  functions  to  isolate  the  proper  causes of  representations—what  conditions  in  the 
world  they  are  supposed to  be  caused by—and are  able  to  characterize  tokens  that  are  not 
properly caused as misrepresentations. A representation may have the function of indicating or 
being tokened in response to exclusively X even if it fails to be reliably caused only by X. Other 
versions of teleosemantics depart further from indicator or informational theories, focusing on 
the effects rather than the causes of representations. They claim that a representation R stands for 
X if and only if it is supposed to be tokened in the presence of X—or when X obtains—in order to 
bring about the beneficial effects it has the function of producing (Millikan 1984 & Papineau 
1984). Notice that what matters here is that R is tokened in the right circumstances, regardless of 
what causes such tokens. The circumstances may be the right ones even when R is not caused by 
what it represents. These versions of teleosemantics rely on etiological functions to isolate under 
what  conditions  in  the  world  representations  are  supposed to  be  tokened—and  are  able  to 
characterize tokens that are not tokened in the proper conditions as misrepresentations. I will 
propose a hybrid between these two approaches. The hybrid account claims that a representation 
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R stands for  X if  and only if  it  is  supposed to  be  caused by  X  in  order  to  bring about  the 
beneficial  effects it has the etiological function of producing. I will argue that this combination 
overcomes some problems faced by teleosemantic theories exclusively based on either the causes 
or the effects of representations. I discuss these various teleosemantic approaches in Chapter 5.
All of these teleosemantic theories attempt to explain truth-referential content in terms of 
direct links between representations and reality. However, this common feature is not a defining 
characteristic  of  the  teleosemantic  approach  itself.  In  principle,  the  etiological  account  of 
functions  can  be  exploited  to  articulate  teleosemantic  variants  of  other  kinds  of  theories  of 
meaning. Consider a moderate truth-referentialism, according to which the meanings of primitive 
words/concepts depend on their reference-determining links to reality and the meanings of non-
primitive words/concepts depend on their reference-determining links to other words/concepts 
(Devitt  1996).  The place for teleosemantics within such an approach, it  may be assumed, is 
among the candidate theories for the meanings only of primitives, while a description theory is 
expected to account for the meanings of non-primitives. However, a description theory can also 
be articulated in teleological terms—basically, characterizing the reference-determining links to 
other words/concepts of a non-primitive as those it  is  supposed to have in order to  be used 
properly.66 Furthermore, I will suggest that teleology can be used to articulate a teleosemantic 
version of a “use”, functional-role or conceptual-role theory. More specifically, I will argue that a 
basic-acceptance  semantics  that  relies  on  an  etiological  account  of  functions  promises  to 
overcome  the  serious  problems  of  misrepresentation  faced  by  Horwich’s  basic-acceptance 
66 Papineau (1987: 78-80 & 93) indeed offers a teleosemantic description theory for non-observational concepts, 
which supplements his (direct-links based) teleosemantic theory for observational concepts. The version of the 
description theory  he  adopts,  however,  is  not  the  most  plausible  one  (see  Devitt  1991:  431-432).  But  the 
problems do not specifically stem from its teleosemantic character. I will get back to this in Chapter 6.
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theory. I discuss these matters and propose a combination of basic-acceptance semantics with 
teleosemantics in Chapter 6.
Before  delving  into  the  functions  of  symbols  or  representations,  discussing  different 
teleosemantic approaches and articulating a teleosemantic version of basic-acceptance semantics, 
I will discuss in more detail the etiological account of biological functions that serves as the basis 
for teleosemantics. While the etiological account of functions discussed below can and has been 
applied  beyond  the  realm of  the  strictly  biological—for  example,  to  the  realm  of  “cultural 
evolution”—its  application  to  strictly  biological  phenomena  is  largely  responsible  for  its 
naturalistic credentials which, in turn, are responsible for much of the philosophical interest in 
applying  it  beyond  the  strictly  biological.  The  focus  of  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  on 
biological functions.
4.3 The Etiological Account of Biological Functions
The etiological account of biological functions is usually called “teleological” because it ascribes 
“purposes” to biological items. But this must be qualified, since it departs in crucial ways from 
traditional forms of teleological thinking. In the Aristotelian tradition, purposes or goals were 
understood as “final causes”—roughly, the counterpart of X being the efficient cause of Y would 
be Y being the final cause of X—which were postulated not only to explain why seeds grow into 
plants, but also why stones fall to the ground. The etiological account of functions does not rely 
on  this  rightly  discredited  notion  of  “final  causes”.  Another  traditional  form of  teleological 
thinking—which is still alive in folkloric opinion—relates the purposes of biological items to 
their  alleged  “design”  by  an  intelligent,  supernatural,  creator.  This  view  is  at  odds  with  a 
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naturalistic view of the world. In contrast,  the contemporary form of teleological explanation 
offers a naturalistic account of the “purposes” of biological items that relies on the brute, blind, 
and ultimately physical forces governing biological evolution.
While the etiological account is the mainstream view about the nature of functions in the 
philosophy of biology, it is not the only naturalist account available. Its main alternative is the 
account of functions in terms of the causal roles played by items within the larger systems to 
which they belong. The etiological and the causal-role accounts of functions are often regarded 
as rivals. But they both may be appropriate as accounts of different phenomena. However, in the 
case of specifically biological functions the etiological account has a clear advantage over the 
causal-role account: it explains how things can have a function even when they fail to perform it. 
I contrast the etiological and the causal-role accounts of functions in Section 4.7 of this chapter.
Eyes are for seeing, hands are for grabbing, wings are for flying, ears are for hearing, and 
so forth. The purpose of hearts is to pump blood, the purpose of kidneys is to filter blood, the 
purpose of calluses is to protect skin from friction, and so forth. In some sense of the words ‘for’ 
and  ‘purpose’  these  are  all  uncontroversial  claims.  But  the  characterization  of  biological 
functions in these teleological terms has to be taken with a grain of salt. Ordinary people often 
describe  functions  teleologically, but  they  also  often  think  of  such  functions  as  intended or 
deliberate purposes: the kinds of purposes conferred to artifacts by their intelligent designers and 
users, which biological items would also have if they were the products of intelligent design. The 
question is how can a naturalistically respectable “teleological” account of functions be offered 
for biological items, since scientific biology has shown that they are the result of non-intelligent 
forces. As Peter Godfrey-Smith points out:
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Teleology has been a huge topic in the philosophy of biology; here I mean the 
status of our tendency to treat biological activities in terms of purposes, goals, and 
proper  functions.  It  is  usually  assumed  that  the  intentions  of  an  intelligent 
designer or user of an object can be the basis for teleological description in a 
straightforward way. The problem is whether and how these terms can be used in 
the absence of this overt role for intelligence. (Godfrey-Smith 2009: 12)
Let us consider for a moment the functions of artifacts. Pens, for example, are for writing. That is 
their purpose because they have been intentionally designed for it. Now consider a stone used as 
a paperweight. If it was polished to be comfortable to handle and painted over to be aesthetically  
appealing,  it  has been intentionally  designed to be a paperweight and a  piece of decoration. 
Alternatively, the stone may have been chosen or “selected” by someone because it was already 
smooth and simply used as a paperweight without modifying it. It anyway has the function of a  
paperweight—i.e., preventing paper from being blown away by wind—because of the use it has 
been deliberately selected for and is being put to. However, stones qua stones have no purposes. 
It would be a serious mistake to ascribe purposes to them, “projecting” into the world the kinds 
of purposes that humans deliberately confer to artifacts. Unlike stones, however, wings, eyes, 
hearts  and  kidneys  do  have  “purposes”—in  some  sense  of  the  word—independently of  the 
“intentions of an intelligent designer or user” (to use Godfrey-Smith’s phrase). How can this be?
The contemporary account of teleology in the philosophy of biology regards evolution by 
natural selection as the ultimate source of “purposiveness”. Charles Darwin discovered in the 
19th  century  that  the  complex  phenotypical  traits  of  organisms  are  the  result  of  a  process 
involving inheritance, modification and differential survival and reproduction. Organisms inherit 
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characteristics from their ancestors, but they are not perfect copies or reproductions, since there 
are  occasional  random  mutations.  These  modifications  sometimes  increase  or  decrease  a 
creature’s chances of surviving before it reproduces. Consequently, favorable modifications tend 
to be maintained in—and unfavorable modifications tend to be filtered out from—populations of 
reproducing organisms over time. As Darwin pointed out, the process is analogous to that of the 
artificial selection of traits made by human breeders of domesticated animals and plants. The 
difference is that the natural history of organisms involves no deliberate selection whatsoever. 
Nonetheless, some variations are favored and others are filtered out as a matter of brute fact. This 
is what Darwin called “natural selection”. Intelligence plays no role in the process, but the results 
of the process often look as if they had been deliberately designed. We may say that biological 
traits  are  “designed”  by  natural  selection,  as  long  as  we keep  in  mind  that  this  manner  of 
speaking, while useful in some contexts, is either merely figurative or has a technical meaning 
that departs from the ordinary usage of ‘design’.
The process of evolution by natural selection explains how organisms and their traits 
descend from common single-celled ancestors which did not have most of those traits. It explains 
why creatures have eyes, hearts, kidneys, wings, hands, and so forth. The standard evolutionary 
explanation is gradualist. Eyes are complex structures which are the result of cumulative small 
changes—each of which was favorable—starting with simple mutations that made some skin 
cells light-sensitive. There may also be non-gradual changes or “saltations”. But notice that the 
selective process does not stop working once an organ has “fully” evolved. Even if the eyes of 
many  species  have  not  changed  in  millions  of  years,  their  maintenance  in  the  reproducing 
population still requires explanation. Random mutations keep occurring and traits that are not 
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continuously favored by natural selection tend to turn into vestigial traits and disappear over 
time.  This  means  that  the  maintenance  over  time  and  the  current  existence  of  a  complex 
functional trait in a population requires an explanation in terms of natural selection even if that 
particular trait originally was the result of a non-gradual change.
Darwin lacked an adequate theory of inheritance. But his contemporary Gregor Mendel 
discovered a crucial piece of the puzzle: there are units—now called “genes”—that are discretely 
transmitted  from  parent  organisms  to  their  offspring  and  which  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
inheritance  of  phenotypical  characteristics.  Almost  a  century  later,  Francis  Crick  and James 
Watson  discovered  the  structure  of  the  DNA molecules  stored  in  cell’s  chromosomes.  This 
helped to establish that genes are strings of DNA—instead of some kind of protein molecule, as 
many  expected  at  the  time  (Watson  1968:  12).  The  synthesis  of  evolutionary  theory  with 
Mendelian genetics and eventually with molecular genetics has proven to be extremely fruitful. 
Genetics not only contributes to the explanation of the underlying mechanisms involved in the 
inheritance  of  phenotypical  traits.  It  also  contributes  to  the  explanation  of  the  phenotypical 
variations  required  for  evolution to  take place.  At  least  some of  such variations  result  from 
random mutations in strings of DNA. Molecular genetics also provides crucial evidence of the 
common descent of existing organisms and their links in the tree of life. It must be mentioned, 
however, that relatively recent research shows that genes are not the  only factors involved in 
heredity, so treating them as the single “unit of inheritance” is an oversimplification. Organisms 
also  inherit  plenty  of  traits  in  non-genetic  ways,  ranging from the  epigenetic  inheritance  of 
cellular structures and molecular machinery (other than DNA) to the “cultural” inheritance of 
behaviors that occurs even in simple organisms that are able to learn from their parents.67
67 See Sterelny and Griffiths (1999: Ch. 5) for a discussion of non-genetic forms of inheritance.
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A controversy in  the field of evolutionary biology that  is  particularly relevant  to  the 
philosophy of biology involves the “units  of selection”.  Classical Darwinism regards natural 
selection as operating mainly at the level of  individual organisms, regarded as the entities that 
inherit traits and may succeed or fail to survive and reproduce.  But some theorists—such as 
George Williams (1966) and Richard Dawkins (1976)—propose that genes are the real units of 
selection in biology. According to this view, the evolutionary process selects those genes that 
have  favorable  phenotypical  “expressions”—instead  of  those  organisms  that  have  favorable 
traits. Genes are regarded as the main beneficiaries of the process. Other theorists propose that 
natural selection operates at multiple levels. Richard Lewontin (1970), for example, suggests that 
natural selection acts on  any entities that display heredity, variation and differential fitness— 
whether  they  happen  to  be  genes,  organisms,  populations  or  even  species.  The  etiological 
account of functions discussed below works regardless of which of these views on the units of 
selection turns out to be correct. While the way some versions are formulated does seem to make 
assumptions about the units of selection, such assumptions can be easily avoided. As long as a 
biological trait is the result of a selection process, the trait can have an etiological function. The 
idea that selection processes also operate at the level of learning processes (discussed in Chapter 
6) does assume a sort of multi-level view. However, it is worth noticing that even Dawkins—the 
most vehement advocate of the gene-centered view—is open about natural selection operating on 
more  than  one  level.  Indeed,  he  is  known  for  proposing  that  there  are  units  of  cultural 
inheritance, that he baptized as “memes”, which are also units of selection.
The idea  behind the  contemporary  teleological  account  is  that  the  process  of  natural 
selection not  only explains  why biological  items exist,  but also  what are their  functions.  An 
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influential  philosophical  defense  of  the  account  was  offered  by  Larry  Wright  (1973).  I  will  
briefly discuss his proposal before presenting the main current formulations of the view.
4.4 Wright’s Defense of Teleology
Wright suggested that the questions “What is the function of X?” and “Why do C’s have X?” are 
both requests for “functional explanations” and that the answers to them are the  same (Wright 
1973: 155). For example, the basic common answer to “What is the function of the heart?” and 
“Why do humans have a heart?” is “To pump blood” (Wright 1973: 155). Of course, a more 
complete answer to the second question requires an evolutionary explanation: hearts have been 
naturally selected in order to pump blood. This is precisely what Wright proposed (Wright 1973: 
162-164).  According  to  this  account,  a  function  depends  on  causal  history or  etiology: 
“functional  explanations...  concern  how  the  thing  with  the  function  got  there...  they  are 
etiological, which is to say «causal»...” (Wright 1973: 156). More specifically, what matters are 
the  effects of having  X’s for ancestors—which Wright called “consequences”. We have hearts 
because the  hearts  of  our  ancestors  pumped  blood,  which  contributed  to  their  survival  and 
reproduction: “the consequences... must be invoked to explain why  X is there” (Wright 1973: 
162). Notice that this account does not rely on an Aristotelian view of teleology in terms of “final 
causes”. There is nothing that may raise questions about “backward” causation in it. There is 
only the “forward” or “efficient” causation involved in selective history. The effects of X can turn 
into causes for X existing now precisely because they are past effects. This non-vicious circle is 
made possible by the reproduction of traits. Nonetheless, the etiological account may be said to 
make legitimate the teleological characterization of functions. According to Wright, his analysis 
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“shows what it is about functions that is teleological... [it] provides an etiological rationale for 
the functional «in order to»...” (Wright 1973: 162). So talk of hearts existing in order to pump 
blood turns out to be correct if ‘in order to’ is understood etiologically.
Contemporary advocates of the etiological account often follow Wright in making use of 
explicitly teleological language to characterize functions: the function of an item is said to be its 
“purpose” or what it is “supposed” to do, which is a result of evolutionary “design”. The account  
of functions itself is called “teleological”. However, the intended meanings of these words is 
strictly etiological:
A thin form of teleological description can be grounded in a Darwinian view. For 
example, the Darwinian can say that the function of a body part is the thing it 
does that has led to its being favored by natural selection. In that thin sense, the 
function is what that structure is ‘‘supposed’’ to do. This is a very deflationary 
sense of ‘‘supposed to.’’ (Godfrey-Smith 2009: 13)
In fact, since the etiological account of functions is at odds with traditional teleological views, 
some biologists prefer to use the word ‘teleonomy’ instead of ‘teleology’ in order to talk about 
“those parts of traditional teleological thinking that can be given a foundation in the operation of 
natural  selection”  (Godfrey-Smith  1996:  16).  While  the  etiological  account  of  functions  is 
sometimes called “teleonomic” in philosophical contexts, it is more often called “teleological”. 
But  the  difference  is  merely  terminological.  I  will  here  use  ‘teleology’ and  ‘teleonomy’ as 
equivalent terms and I will use words like ‘purpose’, ‘supposed’, ‘in order to’ and ‘design’ in 
their “thin”, strictly teleonomic or etiological, sense.
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Let  me  make  another  brief  terminological  remark.  Current  teleologists  often  call 
functions “proper functions”. This is a technical term.68 The qualifier ‘proper’ is often intended to 
distinguish  the  teleological  notion  of  function  from  other  ones,  such  as  the  causal-role  or 
dispositional one. While this usage is widespread, it also invites misinterpretation, since ‘proper’ 
contrasts with ‘improper’, yet it is unclear what an “improper function” would be. I will simply 
use the word ‘function’ or the longer ‘etiological function’ or ‘historical function’ when context 
may  require  disambiguation.  The  qualifiers  ‘etiological’ and  ‘historical’  contrast  with  ‘non-
etiological’ and ‘ahistorical’, which properly apply to alternative notions of function. The word 
‘proper’ is best used to qualify  performances of a function. An item may be said to perform 
properly or improperly its function. Notice how odd it would sound to say that an item performs 
properly its proper function.
While some aspects of Wright’s analysis have been rejected by later teleologists, the core 
etiological point of the proposal as I described it above remains the same. But Wright actually 
did more than define functions etiologically. He suggested that the two conditions for Z to be the 
function of X are: “(a) X is there because it does Z” and “(b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s 
being there” (Wright 1973: 161). While the first condition is clearly intended to be historical—
although it should be rephrased as ‘X is there because  past X’s did Z’—the second condition 
requires X to presently do Z. However, suppose that an organism has a kidney that does not work. 
The kidney is there because the kidneys of ancestors of the organism filtered blood. It is there in  
order to filter blood. Yet this particular kidney does not filter blood. Wright argued, correctly, 
that in such a case there is still a functional explanation of  X being there, so  X does have the 
function of doing Z; but he also claimed that this “departs from the paradigms in a systematic but 
68 The term was coined originally by Millikan (1984). But has since been used by many other authors.
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intelligible way” and that the word ‘function’ should be italicized “to make its use plausible and 
appropriate” in cases where an X fails to do Z (Wright 1973: 167). This is because in such cases 
the second condition he proposed for having a function is not met.
Current teleological accounts of functions draw a very different conclusion than Wright 
did: biological items that fail to perform their functions have these functions in the exact same 
way as those that succeed in performing them. Current versions rely  merely on an etiological 
condition. The two main formulations of the current teleological account are those offered by 
Karen Neander (1991 & 1995) and Ruth Millikan (1984 & 1993). I will present their accounts 
and discuss  along the  way some qualifications  proposed by Paul  Griffiths  (1993)  and Peter 
Godfrey-Smith (1994).
4.5 Neander’s Proposal
According to Neander, biological functions are “effects for which traits were selected by natural 
selection” (Neander 1991: 174). She offers the following more detailed definition:
It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (0) to do that which items 
of  X’s type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of  0’s ancestors, and which 
caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by 
natural selection. (Neander 1991: 174)
Neander is interested specifically in the biological notion of function. But she suggests that the 
broader definition of function that applies also to non-biological items such as artifacts also relies 
on  selection (Neander 1991: 175). This matches Wright’s claim that the functions of artifacts 
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result  from  “conscious  consequence-selection”,  while  those  of  biology  result  from  natural 
selection (Wright 1973: 163-164). Neander follows Wright in arguing that what is peculiar to 
biological  functions  is  that  they  are  determined  by  natural selection.  But  notice  that  her 
definition—unlike Wright’s—does not even mention what items presently do. In fact, Neander 
explicitly  denies that the functions of biological traits are defined by anything other than their 
evolutionary history:
[For] a trait to have a proper function is not for it presently to have any actual 
causal  role...  or  disposition.  Instead,  a  trait  has  a  proper  function  if  there  is 
something that it is supposed to do. According to my etiological theory, a trait is 
supposed to  do whatever  it  was  selected for  by natural  selection...  Functional 
norms seem to be determined by a history of selection... (Neander 1991: 183)
The basic idea is that biological functions are not what items do, but what they are supposed to  
do given  their  selective  history.  The  main  advantage  of  this  view—which  accounts  for  its 
popularity in the philosophy of biology—is that it is able to account for malfunctioning: “It is the 
function of kidneys... to filter wastes from blood because that is what kidneys did in ancestral 
organisms that caused them to be favored by natural selection... and this fact remains true even if 
renal failure becomes universal” (Neander 1991: 183).
A failing kidney is malfunctioning or failing to perform its function. But this requires it to 
have the function of filtering blood. Otherwise, it would not be failing to perform it. If X’s having 
the function to  do  Z requires in  any way that  X actually  does  Z,  then there is  no room for 
characterizing X as malfunctioning when it does not do Z. What this shows, Neander points out, 
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is that the notion of a biological function is a “normative notion” and that “a normative notion is  
not ahistorical” (Neander 1991: 168). The sense in which functions are “normative” obviously is 
not the strong prescriptive sense: kidneys do not have an “obligation” or “duty” to filter blood. 
Rather, it is a weaker teleonomic sense: kidneys are “supposed” to filter blood because kidneys 
were naturally selected for filtering blood—so if they fail to filter blood, they fail to do what 
explains what they were selected for. But having a biological function must be “normative” in 
this “thin” sense, since otherwise malfunctioning would not be even possible. Neander’s main 
argument for the etiological account of biological functions is that only a historical account can 
be “normative” in the required sense and properly characterize malfunctioning.
Neander  sometimes  characterizes  natural  selection  as  proportionally  increasing the 
distribution of genes and their phenotypic expressions in a population (Neander 1991: 174). But 
Griffiths warns that proportional increase should  not be a requirement. Populations often have 
various competing traits, some of which have a reduced number in the population, which anyway 
are there due to natural selection; so Griffiths argues that the function of a trait is simply what it  
has  been  selected  for,  independently  of  any  proportional  increase  (Griffiths  1993:  414).  Of 
course, many traits do proportionally increase due to natural selection. Griffiths qualification is 
simply that this should not be built into the etiological account of functions. Griffiths proposes 
the following definition of biological function:
Where  i is a trait of systems of type  S, a proper function of  i in  S’s is  F iff a 
selective explanation of the current non-zero proportion of S’s with i must cite F 
as a component in the fitness conferred by i. (Griffiths 1993: 415)
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Notice that this definition explicitly requires selection to account only for the current existence of 
a trait, regardless of how many members of a population have the trait. Another difference with 
Neander’s definition is that Griffiths’ “leaves implicit various points about the gene/phenotype 
relation” (Griffiths 1993: 415). This is an advantage given that there is debate in biology about 
the precise details of such relation (Griffiths 1993: 416). Neander’s formulation seems to assume 
the  controversial  view  that  genes  are  the  single  units  of  selection.  But  this  unnecessary 
commitment is easily avoided. In any case, Griffiths intends his definition to apply exclusively to 
biological functions. The only kind of selection he has in mind is natural selection.
4.6 Millikan’s Proposal
Millikan offers a more ambitious etiological account of functions that is even more general than 
Griffiths’ variant and is intended to apply not only to innately determined functions, but also to 
the functions of any items that result from the interaction between the innate mechanisms of an 
organism and its environment, as well as functions of items such as cultural artifacts and words 
of human natural languages which, Millikan argues, have selective histories even though they are 
not histories of natural selection operating over innate traits. In this section, I will focus on how 
her account applies to biological functions.
Millikan distinguishes  between what  she  calls  “direct  proper  functions”  and “derived 
proper functions” (Millikan 1984: Ch. 1 & 2)—which I will simply call “direct” and “derived” 
functions. Her account of direct functions basically matches Neander’s and Griffiths’ accounts 
when applied to biological items. Although she introduces some interesting qualifications, the 
idea roughly is that an item’s function is determined by its selective history. Her account of 
172
derived  functions,  in  contrast,  goes  beyond:  it  allows  for  the  ascription  of  functions  to  the 
products of selected mechanisms—products that have not been selected themselves, although 
they are the result of selected items which have the direct function of producing them.
I  will  first  present  Millikan’s account  of  direct  functions  and  then  elaborate  on  her 
account of derived functions. An item A has a direct function to perform F, Millikan suggests, if 
and only if:
A originated as a “reproduction” (to give one example, as a copy, or a copy of a 
copy) of some prior item or items that, due in part to possession of the properties 
reproduced, have actually performed F in the past, and A exists because (causally 
historically because) of this or these performances. (Millikan 1993: 13)
Notice that Millikan does not explicitly mention natural selection or even selection of any kind 
here. Nonetheless, her definition of function clearly captures the basic features of the etiological 
account and is intended to rely precisely on selective processes. First, the direct function of an 
item depends on the causal history that explains why the item exists. As Millikan points out, her 
account “looks to the history of an item to determine its function rather than to the item’s present 
properties  or  dispositions.”  (Millikan  1993:  13).  This  is  intended  to  provide  an  account  of 
functions that allows for things being able to have them even when they fail to perform them. 
Second,  the  relevant  causal  history  is  one  that  involves  the  reproduction  of  items—where 
reproduction  is  understood as  a  physical  process  that  generates  similar  copies  of  the  items. 
Consider a series of similar items, I1, I2, I3,... In, were each successive item is a reproduction or 
copy  of  the  previous  one.  According  to  Millikan,  the  members  of  this  series  form  a 
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“reproductively established family” (Millikan 1984: 18-25). The links between the members of 
such a family are  causal, so two items do not belong to the same family merely because of 
resembling each other. Of course, two items can be members of the same family because they 
have a common ancestor: the causal links of reproduction typically produce family trees.
Millikan’s proposal is that an item A has performing F as a direct function when (1) A is a 
member of a reproductively established family, (2) some ancestors of  A in the family actually 
performed  F and (3)  A exists  because of  this.  If  A is  a  biological trait,  the causal-historical 
explanation  of  why  it  exists  in  virtue  of  its  ancestors  performing  F is  provided  by natural 
selection: performing F contributed to the ancestors’ survival and reproduction, so the trait that 
allowed the ancestors to perform F was passed on to their descendants in the family.
What kinds of items are members of a reproductively established family? Genes are a 
clear example. Each token gene is literally a copy or reproduction of ancestor genes of the same 
type. The function of a token gene is to do whatever the ancestors in its lineage did that explains 
why the lineage has survived and, consequently, why the token gene exists.  But what about 
phenotypic  traits  such as  organs  and innate  behaviors?  Neither  of  them are  direct  copies  of 
previous  organs  or  innate  behaviors.  Millikan  draws  a  distinction  between  “first-order”  and 
“higher-order” reproductively established families to clarify this issue (Millikan 1984: 23-25). 
Genes belong to first-order families, while organs and innate behaviors belong to higher-order 
families, since they are only reproduced via the reproduction of genes. For example: “although 
my heart is not a copy of my parents’ hearts, it was produced... in accordance with the proper 
functions of certain of my genes which were directly copied from my parents’ genes” (Millikan 
1984: 25). This means that hearts do belong to reproductively  established families—they are 
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reproduced items—and that their function is to do what their (higher-order) ancestors did which 
explains why they exist (the full explanation, of course, has to include the selection of genes). 
The same considerations apply to innate behaviors such as sneezing. The functions of organs and 
innate  behaviors  are  direct  functions:  “the  sorts  of  purposes  that  we  ordinarily  attribute  to 
biological devices such as hearts and inherited behaviors are direct proper functions, granted that 
our guesses about the evolutionary histories of these devices are correct—our guesses about their 
«reasons for survival»” (Millikan 1984: 28).69
As formulated, the account attributes functions to reproduced items that exist because 
they  have  been  historically  selected  to  perform  certain  tasks.  But  without  some  further 
qualification, this account seems to have a problem with vestigial items. The same may be said 
of Neander’s account. Consider the vestigial eyes of mole rats. Mole rats live underground and 
are blind. But they still have vestigial eyes, although completely covered by a layer of skin. Now 
consider the malformed eyes of an individual blind rabbit. The explanation of why the eyes of a 
mole rat and the blind rabbit exist involves the evolutionary history of their ancestors, whose 
eyes were selected for seeing. In the case of the blind rabbit, the etiological account explains why 
the eyes are failing to do what they are supposed to. That is the main virtue of the account over 
non-historical ones. But the account seems to wrongly imply that the eyes of the mole rat are also 
failing to do what they are supposed to. The solution to this problem relies on the fact that natural 
selection  is  not  only  responsible  for  the  formation  of  a  trait,  but  also  for  its  maintenance. 
Millikan does point out that “the  main business of natural selection is steady maintenance of 
69 Millikan’s account of higher-order  reproductively established families does seem to be effective in including 
phenotypical traits. But notice that her discussion seems to assume a gene-centered view of natural selection. 
Why not treat hearts as reproduced or inherited items on their own right? Why should genes be regarded as the  
first-order reproduced items?
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useful traits against new intruders in the gene pool” (Millikan 1989: 173). However, this feature 
is not part of her definition of direct functions. Godfrey-Smith argues that the historically recent 
maintenance of a trait by natural selection is “important enough to make this a constitutive part  
of the concept of function” (Godfrey-Smith 1994: 356). He proposes a “modern history” account 
according to which biological functions are “dispositions or effects a trait has which explain the 
recent  maintenance  of  the  trait  under  natural  selection”  (Godfrey-Smith  1994:  356).  This 
qualification allows the etiological account to distinguish vestigial from non-vestigial traits. The 
eyes of the mole rat—unlike those of the blind rabbit—have not been recently maintained by 
natural selection for seeing, so they do no have a function that they are failing to perform.
Millikan argues that items can have functions even if they have not been selected: these 
are not direct functions but  derived  functions. An item A has a  derived function to perform F, 
Millikan suggests, if and only if:
A originated as the product of some prior device that, given its circumstances, had 
performance  of  F as  a  proper  function  and  that,  under  those  circumstances, 
normally  causes  F to  be  performed  by  means of  producing  an  item  like  A. 
(Millikan 1993: 13-14)
Millikan’s account of derived functions is intended to illuminate how things that are “new under 
the sun”, which do not have a selective history of their own, can nonetheless sometimes have 
biological functions (Millikan 1984: 45). The functions of these items are derived from the direct  
functions of mechanisms that have been selected precisely for producing them. The account of 
derived functions is also etiological, since it is firmly grounded on selective history.
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Millikan  uses  the  example  of  chameleons’  camouflage  to  illustrate  the  need  for  an 
etiological account of derived functions (Millikan 1984: Ch. 2). Chameleons have mechanisms 
that allow them to rearrange the pigment patterns of their skin. Some species—such as Smith’s 
dwarf chameleon—use their ability to change color as camouflage: they change their color so 
that  it  matches  the  color  of  their  background,  making  them less  visible  to  predators.  Now 
suppose that a chameleon sits on a surface with a color pattern that none of its ancestors has ever 
encountered before.  Presumably, the resulting color  pattern of the chameleon is  supposed to 
match the color of the surface it is sitting on, thereby making it less vulnerable to predators. But 
an orthodox etiological account apparently cannot account for this. This particular background 
pattern has not been encountered before, so there cannot be any selective history determining 
specifically that the pigment pattern of the chameleon’s skin is  supposed to match it. Godfrey-
Smith explains the problem by distinguishing between innate mechanisms or structures and the 
states that they produce:
It is one thing to say that a mechanism has a biological function, and another to 
say that a particular state of this mechanism has a function... Structural features... 
are products of an evolutionary history, a history of heritable variation in fitness. 
But states... are not the right sort of things to have such a history... A state may or 
may not profit an organism, but its nature is not the product of the success of 
previous  states  of  the  same type,  and has  no  propensity  to  lead  to  the  future 
survival and proliferation of the type. (Godfrey-Smith 1989: 542)
It  seems  that  the  states  produced  by  innate  mechanisms  cannot  have  etiological functions. 
However, some states produced by some innate mechanisms prima facie seem to have purposes. 
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Presumably, the entirely new pigment pattern of the chameleon has the  purpose of making the 
chameleon less visible to predators by making it blend with its surroundings. The phenomenon 
of camouflage is widespread in the animal kingdom. Animals often have color patterns that make 
them less visible to predators or prey. When such a color pattern is fixed—as it is in most cases—
the orthodox etiological account has no problem explaining why the pattern has a function: it is a 
phenotypical trait that has been naturally selected for camouflage purposes. Yet, the  non-fixed 
and  variable color  patterns  of  some species  of  chameleon,  octopus  and cuttlefish  also  have 
camouflage purposes, which must be somehow the result of the evolutionary history of these 
species.
Millikan’s account of derived functions  expands the etiological account to explain how 
the products of innate mechanisms can indeed have functions. Even if the entirely new color 
pattern of a chameleon cannot itself have been specifically selected, the mechanisms responsible 
for the pigment rearrangement have been naturally selected for producing variable color patterns 
to match variable backgrounds. Protecting the chameleon from predators by making it blend with 
its current background is a direct function of the mechanisms. This function is performed by 
means of producing states of a certain general type: skin color patterns that match the color 
patterns of the background. The state of the chameleon sitting on a background not encountered 
before by its ancestors is precisely of this general type. The evolutionary explanation of why the 
mechanisms exist explains why the new pattern of skin color exists. It also explains its function: 
the  purpose of the pattern is to make the chameleon less visible. While the state has not been 
selected for  performing this  function,  it  nonetheless  has  a  function  that  is  derived from the 
selected or direct function of the mechanism that produces it (Millikan 1984: 39-45).
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Millikan’s account of derived functions has a crucial application in the explanation of the 
functions  of  non-innate  states  and  behaviors  that  are  the  combined  result  of  the  innate 
mechanisms of an individual organism and its interaction with its environment.  Consider the 
following case: “If a rat becomes ill within a few hours after eating a specific food, it will later 
shun all  foods  that  taste  the  same.  For  example,  if  the  rat  eats  soap and soon becomes  ill, 
thereafter it will refuse to eat soap.” (Millikan 1993: 224). The mechanism responsible for this 
behavior is innate.  It  was selected because it  sometimes made ancestor rats  avoid poisonous 
foods. The mechanism has the direct function of preventing poisoning. However, the specific 
flavors avoided by an individual rat will depend on the rats’ experience: the rat learns to avoid 
them after becoming ill. This learning is the result of the interaction between a  specific innate 
mechanism and the rat’s experience.  The rat  cannot  learn,  for  example,  to  avoid  foods that 
“merely look the same or that are found in the same place as the food eaten prior to illness”  
(Millikan 1993: 224-225). The learned behavior has not been itself naturally selected, yet it is the 
product of a naturally selected innate mechanism “designed” to enable the rat to learn to avoid 
eating certain foods. The learned or acquired behavior and the inner states in the rat’s nervous 
system responsible for it have a function or purpose. When a rat has learned to avoid eating soap-
tasting substances, its behavior and the inner states that cause this behavior have the function of 
preventing poisoning. Yet neither the behavior nor the inner state has a history of selection of its 
own.  Millikan’s  account  of  derived  functions  provides  a  compelling  explanation  how  such 
learned or acquired states and behaviors can have etiologically grounded functions. They have 
functions derived from the direct functions of the learning mechanisms that exist in order to 
produce them in response to variable environmental circumstances (Millikan 1993: 225-228).
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4.7 Biological Functions and Causal Roles
The claim that  functions  are  determined by history may be initially  counterintuitive.  Let  us 
consider two cases presented by Neander as alleged counterexamples to the etiological account 
of functions. The first is the case of William Harvey’s discovery of the function of the heart two 
centuries before Darwin’s discovery of the process of natural selection. Since Harvey had no 
historical notion of the origins of hearts, it may be argued that the function he discovered cannot 
be etiological (Neander 1991: 189). The second is a thought experiment: suppose that lions came 
to exist instantly a few minutes ago by a purely accidental arrangement of molecules. The organs 
of “instant lions” cannot have etiological functions, since they do not have any selective history, 
but  it  looks like they have functions  nonetheless (Neander  1991:  189).  The advocate of  the 
etiological analysis has compelling replies to these alleged counterexamples. But let us explore 
for a  moment the alternative view. What could be the ahistorical functions  of the organs of 
instant lions and the function discovered by Harvey if it were not a historical function?
The main ahistorical naturalistic alternative to the etiological account is the view that 
functions  are  defined  by  the  causal  roles  that  items  play  within  larger  systems.  The  chief 
proponent of the view is Robert Cummins, who argues that the function of an item is its causal 
contribution  to  some overall  capacity  of  the  system of  which  it  is  a  part.  He  proposes  the 
following definition:
x functions as a ф in s (or: the function of x in s is to ф) relative to an analytical 
account  A of  s’s capacity  to  ψ just  in  case  x is  capable  of  ф-ing in  s and  A 
appropriately and adequately accounts for s’s capacity to ψ by, in part, appealing 
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to the capacity of x to ф in s. (Cummins 1975: 762)
Cummins idea is that an overall capacity of a complex system is explained by decomposing the 
system into its various parts, showing what each of these parts does and how the combination of 
the contributions of each of the parts accounts for how the system as a whole is able to have the 
analyzed  capacity.  Cummins  calls  this  kind  of  explanation  “functional  analysis”.  A  clear 
illustration of functional analysis, he suggests, is provided by the schematic diagrams used in 
electronics:  “Since  each  symbol  represents  any  physical  object  whatever  having  a  certain 
capacity, a  schematic  diagram of  a  complex device  constitutes  an  analysis  of  the  electronic 
capacities of the device as a whole into the capacities of its components.” (Cummins 1975: 760). 
Here is a simple example: the function of each of the diodes in a circuit that turns alternate 
current (AC) into direct current (DC) is to allow the flow of electricity in only one direction, 
while  the  function  of  the  capacitor  is  to  smooth  the  peeks  of  voltage  that  result  from the 
rectification performed by the diodes (the diodes only make one of the outputs always positive 
and the other always negative, but they do not remove the cyclical variations in voltage); the 
overall capacity of the circuit is explained by the causal contributions made by each of these 
components and how they are arranged.
According to  Cummins,  the  explanation  of  the functions  of  biological  organs  is  also 
provided by a functional analysis: “It is appropriate to say that the heart functions as a pump 
against  the background of an analysis  of the circulatory system’s capacity  to transport  food, 
oxygen, wastes, and so on, which appeals to the fact that the heart  is capable of pumping.” 
(Cummins 1975: 762). In this example, the overall capacity to be analyzed is the circulatory 
system’s capacity to circulate blood and thereby transport nutrients, oxygen, waste, hormones, 
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etc.,  to and from cells  throughout the body. It  is  simply undeniable that this  capacity of the 
circulatory system is the result of the interlocking capacities of its parts and that the specific 
contribution of  the  heart  is  that  it  works  as  a  pump in the system.  An analysis  of  how the 
circulatory system works  (when it  works  properly)  must  surely have the basic  features  of  a 
Cummins-style functional analysis. Consequently, it has to be acknowledged that the idea that 
functions are causal roles played within a system has some initial plausibility.
Let us consider the two alleged counterexamples to the etiological account presented by 
Neander: Harvey’s discovery of the function of the heart and “instant lions”. It may be argued 
that  the  function  discovered  by  Harvey  was  merely  a  causal-role  function—since  he  knew 
nothing of evolutionary history—and that this illustrates what kind of functional explanation is 
really employed in physiology. This is a rather weak argument. But many philosophers who are 
skeptical about the etiological account seem to share the intuitions that support it. Similarly, it 
may be argued that the organs of instant lions have causal-role functions. A functional analysis 
will reveal that their kidneys have the function of filtering blood, their hearts have the function of 
pumping blood, and so forth. The etiological account cannot attribute functions to instant lions, 
but the causal-role account does not have this limitation. Indeed, the functions ascribed by the 
causal-role  account  to  instant  lions  are  the  same it  ascribes  to  real  lions.  These points  give 
reasons to  favor  the  causal-role  account  over  the etiological  account  to  those who have the 
intuitions that Harvey discovered all about the function of the heart and that the organs of instant 
lions  really  would  have  the  same biological  functions  as  those  of  real  lions.  What  can  the 
advocate of the etiological account reply?
The first point to notice is that the advocate of the etiological account can and should 
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accept that Harvey did discover the contributions of the heart (when it is functioning properly) to 
the circulatory system and that the causal-roles of the organs of instant lions would indeed be 
those ascribed by a Cummins-style functional analysis if such creatures suddenly came to exist. 
The second point to notice is that the causal-roles of organs do play a crucial explanatory role in 
the etiological account as well,  although with an important qualification. The causal-roles of 
properly  working hearts  within  the  circulatory  systems  of  ancestors,  for  example,  are  what 
explain why their descendants have hearts. The hearts of present day creatures  are there only 
because the hearts of past creatures pumped blood and contributed to the circulation of nutrients, 
oxygen and waste, which thereby contributed to their survival and reproduction, leading to the 
genes for hearts being passed on to their descendants. The etiological account does not require a 
heart to presently pump blood in order to have the function of pumping blood. This is the main 
disagreement between etiological and purely causal-role accounts. But a causal-role analysis is 
anyway already part of the etiological account of what has been selected by natural selection.
The crucial debate is not whether causal-roles matter, but whether the purely causal-role 
account  is  the  proper  account  of  biological  functions.  Cummins  explicitly  denies  that  the 
evolutionary history of an organ defines its function and argues that the function of an organ 
depends on its current dispositions:
[If] the function of something in a system s is to pump, then it must be capable of 
pumping in s. Thus... to attribute a function to something is, in part, to attribute a 
disposition to it. If the function of x in s to ф, then x has a disposition to ф in s. 
(Cummins 1975: 757-758).
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If the kidneys of an instant lion have the disposition to filter blood and thereby contribute to the 
capacities of its circulatory and urinary systems, this is their biological function according to 
Cummins.  This  would  be an  advantage  over  the  etiological  account  if the  intuition  that  the 
kidneys of instant lions have the biological function of filtering blood  were correct. However, 
that intuition is highly suspicious and, more importantly, the causal-role account has a major 
drawback that outstrips any advantages it may seem to have over the etiological account.
By requiring an item to actually have a causal role or disposition in order to have a 
function, the causal-role account cannot explain what would it be for the item to malfunction or 
fail to perform its function. Consider a real lion—i.e., not an “instant lion”—with a non-working 
kidney that does not have a disposition to filter blood. Surely the kidney is malfunctioning. But 
according to the causal-role analysis this kidney does  not have the function to filter blood to 
begin with,  since it  has no such disposition.  I  take it  that  most advocates of the causal-role 
analysis of functions accept that evolutionary history explains why real lions have kidneys. What 
they deny is that this is what defines the function of kidneys. Regarding Harvey’s discovery, they 
may want to say that what Harvey discovered is the function of the heart, while Darwin merely 
discovered the historical  origins of the heart.  However, by denying that evolutionary history 
defines  the functions  of organs  and other  biological  traits,  the causal-role  account  is  simply 
unable to characterize them as malfunctioning or failing to perform their functions, as Neander 
(1991 & 1995), Millikan (1993 & 1999) and others have emphasized.
How can the etiological account handle the alleged counterexamples? Regarding “instant 
lions”, the etiological account must claim that their organs do not have functions of the sort that  
allow for ascriptions of malfunctioning. When a real lion’s kidneys do not filter blood properly 
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or at all, they are failing or malfunctioning because they have been selected for filtering blood. 
When an instant lion’s kidneys do not filter blood, they are not malfunctioning, since they are not 
supposed to filter blood to begin with. Surely we should say, when they do filter blood, that they 
have  this  causal-role.  This  is  true  of  both  real  and instant  lions.  But  the  purely  causal-role 
account is wrong to characterize the functions of the organs of real lions in the same way as 
those of the organs of instant lions. As Neander points out, “theories which imply that instant 
lions... would have proper [biological] functions do not capture the distinction between what an 
item does  and  what  it  is  supposed  to  do...”  (Neander  1991:  180).  Consequently, “wayward 
intuitions about instant lions might have to be revised in the light of the fact that biology has and 
needs a  notion of a  «proper function» that  is  normative” (Neander 1991: 180).  There is  the 
intuition some people have that the organs of instant lions would have the same functions as 
those of real lions. But there is also the strong intuition that things that have functions in some 
sense have “purposes”: that they are “supposed” to perform their functions but may “fail” to do 
so. The dilemma is that an account of the nature of functions cannot be consistent with both 
intuitions. The only way out of the dilemma that preserves the second intuition is to revise the 
first  one.  While  the  traditional  teleological  intuition  was  associated  with  notions  that  are 
incompatible with naturalism, the etiological account is not. So a firm commitment to naturalism 
does not provide any reason to favor a causal-role account over an etiological one.
Regarding Harvey’s discovery, what the etiologist must say is that he indeed discovered 
what hearts do when they function properly—which, unknown to him, turned out to be also what 
hearts have been naturally selected for doing. That Harvey did not know about natural selection 
is irrelevant to the issue of the nature of biological functions (Neander 1991: 175-176; Millikan 
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1993: 15). Just like Mendel discovered genes without having a clue about their underlying nature 
as strings of DNA, Harvey discovered the function of the heart without having a clue about its 
underlying etiological nature. The intuition that what he discovered was merely a causal-role 
function is simply wrong. The etiological functions of items are first identified by the causal-
roles of normal well-functioning samples. As Neander points out, this is how physiology works: 
“The  primary  physiological  analysis  necessarily  abstracts  away  from  maladaptive 
environments...  and  the  infinite  possible  pathways  of  pathology...  by  describing  what  the 
components  do  when  they  are  functioning  properly.”  (Neander  1995:  117-118).  Harvey 
abstracted away from failing hearts and thereby described how hearts work when functioning 
properly.  That  hearts  are  supposed to  pump  blood,  however,  can  only  follow  from  some 
teleological or teleonomic account  of biological functions.  Harvey himself  was a teleologist, 
likely of the theological kind (Neander 1991: 176). So he likely thought he had discovered what 
hearts are supposed to do given their intelligent design. If this is the case, then we have to say 
that he was wrong about the source of natural teleology. The heart is indeed supposed to pump 
blood, but this is because it has been naturally selected to do so.
4.8 Conclusion
The etiological account relies on the selective history that accounts for the existence of trait in 
order  to  explain  its  function.  The  crucial  advantage  of  this  account  over  dispositionalist 
alternatives is that it offers a fully naturalistic account of what an item is  supposed to do and 
what  counts  as  malfunctioning or  failing to  perform its  function.  It  is  this  feature that  is  of 
interest to semantics. Teleosemantic theories promise to explain the nature of meanings in a way 
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that  offers  a  naturalistic  solution  to  problems  of  misrepresentation.  I  will  discuss  the  main 





The  etiological  account  of  functions  discussed  in  Chapter  4  has  the  crucial  advantage  over 
dispositionalist  alternatives  of  offering  a  fully  naturalistic  account  of  malfunctioning. 
Teleosemantic theories exploit this feature to offer a fully naturalistic account of the “normative” 
character of meanings. If symbols or representations have etiological functions that determine 
how they are supposed to be used, then they can be said to have meanings that are independent 
of their current uses. When a representation or symbol is not deployed the way that accounts for 
its existence, such deployment can be characterized as a misuse. In this chapter I will discuss in 
depth  the  main  teleosemantic  approaches,  including  those  that  focus  on  the  effects  of 
representations to explain their meanings, and those that focus on their causes. I will argue that 
each of these approaches has insights but also drawbacks and that a hybrid account that explains 
meanings in terms of both the inputs and outputs of representations is needed. I will start with a 
discussion  of  indicator  or  informational  theories  of  meaning  and  the  problem  of 
misrepresentation they face—which is a major motivation for favoring a teleosemantic account.
5.2 Indicator or Informational Semantics
According to indicator or informational semantics, the meanings of symbols or representations 
are basically their  referential  properties,  which are determined by their  direct causal links to 
reality. More specifically, the relevant links are alleged to involve reliable causation. A symbol 
188
or representation is claimed to refer to what reliably causes tokens of it. Consider the reliable 
causal correlation between smoke and fire or between the rings of a tree and its age. Smoke and 
tree rings can be said to “carry natural information about” or “indicate” the presence of fire and 
the age of trees, respectively, because of the law-like correlations involved. Similarly, a token 
representation is said to indicate or carry natural information about the presence of those things 
which its type is  lawfully or nomically linked to. This is  a very demanding requirement for 
indicating  or  carrying  information.  Dretske,  for  example,  proposes:  “A signal  r carries  the 
information that  s is  F = The conditional probability of  s’s being  F, given  r... is 1” (Dretske 
1981: 65). Suppose that r is a perceptually induced mental state that represents that something is 
a horse—say, the word ‘horse’ in an agent’s language of thought. Dretske’s requirement entails 
that  an  actual  horse  must  always be  present  when  ‘horse’  is  tokened  for  ‘horse’  to  carry 
information about or indicate specifically horses.
An obvious problem is that the indicator theory, even if it worked, would only apply to 
perceptually induced representations: what about the stimulus-independent tokens of ‘horse’? 
The indicator theory is at best incomplete and needs to be complemented with an account of how 
the meanings of stimulus-independent tokens derive from the meanings of stimulus-dependent 
tokens (Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 157). Another problem is that the indicator theory only applies 
to symbol or representation types that have  direct links to reality: what about words like the 
‘bachelor’—and their mental counterparts—whose meanings depend on those of other words? 
This is a problem of scope: the theory does not have the generality required to provide us with a 
theory of meaning that covers all kinds of word (Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 156). These problems 
may be solved by restricting the indicator theory to a theory of stimulus-dependent meaning and 
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combining it with other theories that provide the missing explanations. However, the indicator 
theory faces a serious problem that undermines its account of stimulus-dependent meanings. As 
Godfrey-Smith points out: “informational semantics has been hounded by a problem with error... 
and no other problem has hounded the theory so persistently” (Godfrey-Smith 1989: 533-534). 
Stimulus-dependent tokens of ‘horse’ are not only caused by horses, but also by a number of 
horse-looking things, such as distant cows or muddy zebras. A token of ‘horse’ caused by a 
muddy zebra is being misused: this is a clear case of misrepresentation. But the word ‘horse’ is  
causally linked to all of these things, so the indicator theory wrongly entails that it must mean 
“horse or distant cow or muddy zebra or...”. The indicator theory cannot characterize misuses as 
misuses: it must characterize tokens of ‘horse’ caused by muddy zebras as correct uses of the 
word. As Godfrey-Smith points out, the problem is the following:
[Any] environmental state that can cause a representation token is included in the 
class of environmental states informationally linked to that representation type. 
Anything that can cause you to think ‘Horse!’ contributes to the content of that 
representation type,  and as  a  result  error  is  impossible.  (Godfrey-Smith 1989: 
537)
Fodor attempts to overcome the problem by invoking an alleged “asymmetric dependence” of 
incorrect uses on correct uses: “the fact that cows cause one to say ‘horse’ depends on the fact 
that horses do; but the fact that horses cause one to say ‘horse’ does not depend on the fact that 
[cows] do” (Fodor 1987:  108).  The basic  idea is  that the meaning fixing law-like regularity 
underlying the use of a symbol is exclusively the one that is  not asymmetrically dependent on 
other regularities. Fodor thinks that this simple proposal shows why ‘horse’ applies correctly to 
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horses and not muddy zebras. While ingenious, however, this suggestion does not truly avoid the 
problem. Why should we suppose that the most basic regularity is  precisely the one linking 
‘horse’ with horses? It seems rather that the most basic regularity is the one linking ‘horse’ with 
horse-looking things, of which actual horses, distant cows and muddy zebras are all instances 
(Godfrey-Smith 1989: 539-540; Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 159-160).
The indicator theory, while initially attractive, does not have the resources to make room 
for misrepresentation. The problem arises due to the  dispositionalist character of the theory:  x 
being reliably caused by y is an actual disposition governing occurrences of x. As Saul Kripke 
argues,  dispositionalist  theories  of  meaning  constitution  cannot  properly  account  for 
misrepresentation, since the users of representations often have dispositions to make mistakes 
while using them and often lack the dispositions to correctly deploy them (Kripke 1982: 28-35). 
A theory that reduces meanings to the actual regularities or dispositions underlying the uses of 
representations cannot avoid the problem of error. As I argued in Chapter 3, this is the case for 
Horwich’s account  of  the  meanings  of  words  in  terms of  law-like  regularities  involving the 
acceptance of basic sentences containing them. This is also the case for the indicator account of 
the meanings of representations in terms of their reliable causes.
Notice the affinity between the indicator theory and the causal-role account of functions 
discussed  above.  They  are  both  dispositionalist  and  have  analogous  problems:  one  cannot 
account  for  misrepresenting  and  the  other  cannot  account  for  malfunctioning.  Indeed,  the 
indicator theory may be regarded as adopting the causal-role account of functions and identifying 
meanings with a part of those functions. The causal-role of a representation in a cognitive system 
includes not only its causes, but also its effects—which are crucial in the explanation of the 
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contribution of the representation to the systems’ overall capacities. Clearly, the indicator theory 
does  not  identify  meanings  with  the  complete causal-roles  of  representations.  However,  the 
indicator  theory  does  identify  meanings  with  the  (distally  characterized)  causes  of 
representations, which are part of their causal-roles: the part that allegedly fixes their meanings 
or contents.  When seen this  way, the indicator  theory’s problem of  error  turns  out  to  be an 
instance  of  the  broader  problem of  malfunctioning  that  undermines  causal-role  accounts  of 
functions. On the other hand, the etiological account of functions is tailored to make room for 
malfunctioning  and  it  is  precisely  an  alternative  to  dispositionalism.  This  suggests  that  the 
problem  of  error  that  undermines  the  indicator  theory  may  be  overcome  by  adopting  an 
etiological account of functions.
5.3 Teleosemantics and Indication
The simplest  teleosemantic  proposal  is  to  combine indication  with an etiological  account  of 
functions. Dretske (1988), for example, modifies his previous indicator theory precisely in this 
way. According to his amended version, “the meaning or representational content of an element 
is  what  it  has the function of  indicating rather  than what  it  actually  succeeds in  indicating” 
(Dretske 1988: 151). The idea is that the meaning of an item depends on what it is supposed to 
indicate—in the teleological sense of “supposed”. This combination of teleology an indication is 
meant to allow for indication relations fixing the meanings of representations while making room 
for representations sometimes failing to indicate. I will discuss this form of teleosemantics and 
the problems it faces before exploring other versions of teleosemantics that depart further from 
the indicator theory.
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Dretske  offers  a  historical  explanation  of  why the  function  of  a  representation  is  to 
indicate  something.  His  explanation  takes  into  account  both  the  causes  and  the  effects  of 
representations. The crucial effects of representations, he reasonably argues, are their behavioral 
effects. Representations allow organisms to behave in ways that are appropriate responses to 
their surroundings. According to Dretske, representations are able to do this because they are 
able to carry information about those surroundings. The causal relation between a representation 
C and the behavior M it elicits, Dretske argues, must be explained by the meaning of C which in 
turn, he argues, “will have to be explained by the fact that  C indicates, or has the function of 
indicating, how things stand elsewhere in the world” (Dretske 1988: 84). But why is the function 
of C to indicate something? Dretske argues that C has this function because of what it has been 
recruited to do: “Once C is recruited as a cause of M—and recruited as a cause of M because of  
what it indicates about F—C acquires, thereby, the function of indicating F.” (Dretske 1988: 84). 
Whether “indicating”—in Dretske’s sense—can indeed be a function is something I will discuss 
after presenting the view in more detail.
Dretske’s account of recruitment is historical. A simple example is provided by artifacts. 
Consider a thermostat that turns on the heating in a room when the temperature drops. Here M is 
the heating turning on,  C is  the state  of the thermostat  that  causes  M,  and  F is  the drop in 
temperature that causes C. The function of C is to indicate  F, Dretske suggests, because it has 
been recruited for this job: the system has been intentionally designed for F to reliably cause C 
and C to reliably cause M (Dretske 1988: 86-89). But how can we extend this kind of account 
beyond the case of intentional design?
Consider the hair triggers used by the Venus flytrap (a carnivorous plant) to detect that an 
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insect has landed on it. When an insect touches twice any of the hair triggers in a leaf within a 
short  time  interval,  the  plant  snaps  together  the  two  halves  of  the  leaf,  trapping  the  insect 
between them (when successful). Dretske comments on this example:
[Here]  leaf  movement  (M)  is  caused by an  internal  state  (C)  that  signals  the 
occurrence  of  a  particular  kind  of  movement,  the  kind  of  movement  that  is 
normally produced by some digestible prey. And there is every reason to think 
that this internal trigger was  selected for its job because of what it  indicated... 
(Dretske 1988: 90; emphasis added)
Dretske suggests that  the same kind of the explanation applies  whenever  a  representation is 
innately linked to an instinctive behavior. For example, when noctuid moths detect the high-
frequency sounds  normally produced by echolocating bats approaching to prey on them, they 
swerve away. Moths’ bat-detectors (C) were selected for triggering the avoidance behavior (M), 
Dretske argues, because they normally indicated that bats were approaching (F) (Dretske 1988: 
91). Dretske’s suggestion is that whenever the instinctive behaviors of an organism are innately 
triggered by perceptual mechanisms or states, natural selection is responsible for recruiting such 
mechanisms or states as indicators:  “What the theory of evolution has to tell  us about these 
cases...  is that...  M is produced by an indicator of  F because such an arrangement confers a 
competitive advantage on its possessor.” (Dretske 1988: 92).70 Once an item has been recruited 
for this job by natural selection, Dretske argues, it has the biological function of indicating:
If we suppose that, through selection, an internal indicator acquired (over many 
70 Dretske does not discuss the distinction between mechanisms and states. So it is not entirely clear what is his 
precise account of what is selected. See Godfrey-Smith (1989) for a critical discussion of this issue.
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generations) a biological function, the function to indicate something about the 
animal’s surroundings, then we can say that this internal structure represents (or 
misrepresents, as the case may be) external affairs. (Dretske 1988: 94)
If indicating is a teleonomic function, then items that have this function can fail to perform it. As 
Dretske points out, an indicator may represent or misrepresent. However, Dretske’s account does 
not make enough room for misrepresentation in spite of its reliance on teleology. I will get back 
to this in a moment.
What  about  acquired  representations?  When  a  representation  is  acquired  rather  than 
innate, Dretske argues, its recruitment as an indicator is done instead by the learning process. In 
operant conditioning, he proposes, reinforcement recruits indicators as causes of behavior: “By 
the timely reinforcement of certain output—by rewarding this output  when, and generally  only 
when,  it  occurs in certain conditions—internal indicators of these conditions are recruited as 
causes of this output.” (Dretske 1988: 98). Consider a pigeon that learns in a lab to get food by 
pecking on a screen if and only if pictures of trucks are displayed (Dretske 1988: 153). Here the 
learned behavior  would be pecking on truck pictures and the indicator  recruited would be a 
detector of truck pictures. Or consider the following example: when a blue jay becomes ill after 
eating a monarch butterfly, it avoids eating monarch butterflies again (Dretske 1988: 111). Here 
the learned behavior would be refusing to eat monarch butterflies and the indicator recruited 
would be a detector of monarch butterflies.71 Notice the analogy between such a learning process 
71 Operant conditioning is a general kind of learning: it does not have a specific target, which makes it particularly 
plastic. The case of the pigeon is paradigmatic. But perhaps the blue jay learns not to eat monarch butterflies  
because it has instead a specialized innate mechanism. In that case, the function of the learned behavior and the 
representation that causes it would be best characterized as a derived function. In any case, there are various 
forms of learning and surely something along the lines of operant conditioning has a place among them. Also, 
notice that the complex mechanisms responsible for operant conditioning must themselves be the result of the 
evolutionary history of organisms that have them. So the functions of responses to stimuli learned in this way 
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and the natural selection of innate perceptual representations. In both cases, some perceptual 
representation C is recruited to detect some F in the surroundings and cause some behavior M. In 
both cases, the recruitment happens because of the benefits of the effects of responding in certain 
ways to certain stimuli. Dretske indeed suggests that the learning process may itself be regarded 
as  selection process:  “Learning...  is  a  way  of  shaping  a  structure’s  causal  properties  in 
accordance with its indicator properties.  C is, so to speak,  selected as a cause of M because of 
what it indicates about F.” (Dretske 1988: 101).
The  three  kinds  of  historical  process  discussed  by  Dretske  (artificial  design,  natural 
selection and learning) are alleged to recruit items to have the function of indicating conditions in 
the world—a function that items may fail to perform. What kind of account of misrepresentation 
is  available  to  this  approach? If  the thermostat  breaks and gets  stuck in  C even though the 
temperature has not dropped, we can say that C is supposed to indicate F—if this is what it was 
recruited for—but that it is failing to do so. Consider the Venus flytrap. If its hair triggers have 
been naturally selected for indicating that an insect has landed, they would be failing to indicate 
what they are supposed to when they are triggered by a botanist touching them twice with a stick. 
The same may be said of indicators selected by learning processes. The blue jay’s detector of 
monarch butterflies would be failing to indicate what it is supposed to when triggered by a fake 
monarch placed by a researcher.
Unlike the standard indicator theory, the combination of indication and teleology does 
make room for misrepresentation. The idea is that if item C was selected for indicating F because 
it did indicate F during its recruitment, then it is failing to do what it is supposed to when it does 
can also be characterized as at least being partly derived from the direct functions of innate mechanisms.
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not  indicate  F  after  its  recruitment.  Sometimes  misrepresentation  may  happen  because  the 
mechanism itself is or becomes internally defective, like in the case of the thermostat stuck in C 
or a moth that is born unable to detect bats. But the interesting cases are those where the internal  
mechanisms are not defective and the misrepresentation occurs because “the world is deceptive” 
(Godfrey-Smith 1989: 546). In such cases, the teleological version of the indicator theory can 
claim that the conditions in the world that cause the misrepresentation are abnormal, since they 
differ from the conditions under which the indicator was recruited. The teleological component is 
intended  to  offer  a  naturalistically  respectable  characterization  of  the  distinction  between 
“normally and abnormally caused representation tokens” (Godfrey-Smith 1989: 546). When the 
Venus flytrap’s detectors are triggered by insects or the blue jay’s detectors are triggered by 
monarch butterflies, we may say that the detectors are operating under normal conditions. When 
the  same  detectors  are  triggered  instead  by  researchers,  the  detectors  are  still  supposed to 
indicate insects and monarch butterflies, respectively, but they fail to do so because they are 
operating under abnormal conditions.
What does the teleological version of the indicator theory regard specifically as a normal 
condition?  An  etiologically  characterized  normal  condition  must  be  a  condition  that  obtains 
during  selection.  But  this  leaves  room  for  more  than  one  teleonomic  account  of  normal 
conditions. As we will  see in the next section,  Millikan offers a very different account than 
Dretske’s. According to Godfrey-Smith’s interpretation, the teleological version of the indicator 
theory  relies  on  the  “ecologically normal”  environment  were  the  indicator  evolved  or  was 
selected  (Godfrey-Smith  1989:  546).  And  this  is  indeed  what  Dretske  proposes.  His  idea 
becomes  clear  in  his  discussion  of  cases  where  misrepresentation  occurs  because  of  the 
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abnormality of the circumstances. Here is a revealing (albeit long) passage:
In many cases of biological interest, a sign—some internal indicator on which an 
animal relies to locate and identify, say, food—will... be a reliable indicator only 
in the animal’s natural habitat or in conditions that approximate that habitat. Flies, 
for instance, when given a choice between nutritionally worthless sugar fructose 
and  some  nutritive  substance  like  sorbitrol,  will  invariably  choose  the 
nutritionally  worthless  substance  and  starve  to  death.  Surprising?  Not  really. 
Under  natural conditions...  the  substances  that  stimulate  the  receptors  are 
nutritional.  Under  natural  conditions,  in  a  fly’s normal  habitat,  then,  receptor 
activity  indicates  a  nutritional  substance.  Furthermore,  the correlation between 
receptor activity and nutritional value of its activator is no accident... Flies would 
not have developed (or maintained without modification) such a receptor system 
in environments where such a correlation did not exist. (Dretske 1988: 57-58)
According to Dretske, what a detector is supposed to indicate is what it actually indicates in the 
natural habitat or environment where the detector was recruited. The fly’s detector is supposed to 
indicate a nutritional substance because this is what it has been naturally selected for indicating 
and still indicates in  ecologically normal conditions. When the detector misrepresents, Dretske 
suggests, it is because the conditions are ecologically abnormal. Notice also that Dretske is still 
thinking of indication in terms of reliable causation or correlation: a detector has the function of 
indicating X because it is (or at least was) a reliable indicator of X in the environment where it 
was recruited or selected.72 Recall that the inability of the original indicator theory to make room 
72 Here is another passage where Dretske clearly makes these points:
Put  a  frog  in  a  laboratory  where  carefully  produced  shadows  simulate  edible  bugs.  In  these 
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for misrepresentation resulted from its requirement of reliable correlation. Dretske’s teleological 
modification no longer requires that a representation is reliably correlated to what it represents 
under  all conditions.  Nevertheless,  the  modification  still  requires  reliable  correlation  in 
ecologically normal conditions.
Dretske’s  teleological  version  of  the  indicator  theory  does  make  some  room  for 
misrepresentation, but it is not enough. The problem is that misrepresentation can occur more 
frequently than correct representation even in ecologically normal conditions, as Godfrey-Smith 
(1989 & 1992) points out. Consider the following example: “many birds have a hair-trigger flight 
response  to  dark fluttering  shapes  that  could be predators” (Godfrey-Smith  1989:  547).  The 
benefit of the flight response comes from helping birds to escape predators. This is why the 
predator-detectors have been favored by natural selection.  Ancestor birds managed to escape 
predators  by  responding  in  this  way  and  the  trait  was  inherited  by  their  descendants.  The 
perception that triggers this response is clearly supposed to represent predators, even when it 
fails to do so. But we should distinguish two kinds of misrepresentation. On one hand, a bird’s 
predator-detector may fail to be activated when a predator is actually present. On the other hand, 
a bird’s predator-detector may be activated when no predator is actually present. The first case is 
a “false negative”, while the second one is a “false positive” (Godfrey-Smith 1992: 299). It is 
safer for birds to have predator-detectors that generate many false alarms than detectors that 
unnatural circumstances the frog’s neural detectors—those that have, for good reason, been called 
«bug detectors»—will no longer indicate the presence or the location of bugs... If we suppose...  
that it is the function of the frog’s neural detectors to indicate the presence of edible bugs, then, in  
the laboratory, shadows are misrepresented  as edible bugs...  Occasionally, when an edible bug 
flies by, the frog will correctly represent it as an edible bug, but this is dumb luck... The frog has...  
no reliable representation. (Dretske 1988: 68-69)
Again, what a detector is supposed to detect is determined by what it indicates in ecologically normal conditions
—and misrepresentation can occur in abnormal conditions. But here Dretske clarifies that correct representation  
can also occur in abnormal conditions—even though it is not reliable in such conditions. The assumption again  
is that representation would be reliable in ecologically normal conditions.
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sometimes fail to be triggered when a predator is actually menacing. As Godfrey-Smith points 
out,  whenever  the  benefit  of  avoiding  false  negatives  outweighs  the  cost  of  avoiding  false 
positives, natural selection will favor detecting mechanisms that produce representations that are 
not reliably correlated to what they are supposed to represent—namely, mechanisms that produce 
many  false  positives  (Godfrey-Smith  1992:  302-303  &  1989:  547-548).  Dretske’s  account 
ascribes the wrong meanings to the representations produced by such mechanisms. The activated 
state of a bird’s predator-detector is reliably correlated to dark fluttering things in ecologically 
normal circumstances, but presumably it represents predators.
The same problem arises in the case of representations selected by learning processes. 
Consider the case of the blue jay that learns to avoid eating monarch butterflies again after 
becoming ill. When the blue jay avoids eating a fake monarch placed by a researcher, this can be 
reasonably  characterized as  an  ecologically  abnormal situation.  However, there  are  naturally 
occurring butterflies, such as viceroy butterflies, that mimic the appearance of monarchs. Viceroy 
butterflies are part of the normal ecosystem of blue jays. As Dretske himself points out, blue jays 
actually avoid eating viceroys after learning that monarchs are poisonous (Dretske 1988: 111). 
What the blue jay’s detector is reliably correlated to—what it indicates—in ecologically normal 
circumstances is monarchs  or viceroys. Indeed, Dretske claims that, in this case, the detector 
represents “monarch-like butterflies” (Dretske 1988: 111). However, the purpose of the detector 
is specifically to help the blue jay to avoid indigestion by not eating monarchs. The avoidance of 
viceroys results from blue jays mistaking them for monarchs—i.e., false positives. But Dretske’s 
theory cannot characterize such false positives as misrepresentations. The problem arises even 
for detection systems that are produced by intelligent design.  A house alarm system may be 
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triggered not only by burglars but also by insects or rodents. But it may be better to have an 
alarm system that produces false positives than one that may fail to detect burglars. The system 
may be purposefully chosen despite its known unreliability: perhaps it is less expensive than a 
more reliable one. The detectors are reliably correlated in normal conditions to the presence of 
moving objects in the house. What they are supposed to represent is the presence of burglars.
Another objection that has been raised against Dretske’s combination of indication and 
teleology is that indicating cannot be an etiological function. Talking about the combination of 
teleonomy  with  informational  semantics,  Godfrey-Smith  warns:  “A  thing  cannot  have  the 
function to have come from somewhere, to have certain normal antecedents. A thing’s function is 
always something that it does; a function is always something like a  power.” (Godfrey-Smith 
1989: 542). Similarly, Millikan claims that “it cannot be the function of a state to have  been 
produced in response to something” (Millikan 1993: 85). If we think of indication in terms of 
reliable causation, the objection then can be simply expressed as follows:  R cannot have the 
function of indicating X because R indicating X involves R being caused reliably by X, while a 
function is a selected  effect. If we are talking about the mechanism that produces  R, the same 
consideration applies: the mechanism can indeed have the function of producing R, but it cannot 
have the function of being caused by X to produce R. This objection works against Dretske’s way 
of combining indication with teleology—where indication is simply identified as the function of 
a representation. Neander (2013) proposes an updated combination of causal or informational 
semantics  with  teleonomy—which  I  discuss  in  Section  4.5.  In  reply  to  the  objection  that 
functions  are  selected  effects,  she  suggests  that  functions  can  sometimes  include  causes  in 
addition to effects. A causal version of teleosemantics, however, does not need to identify what is 
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supposed to cause a representation with its function. I will propose in Section 4.6 a causal variant 
of teleosemantics that is compatible with the standard account of functions as selected effects.
Let me recapitulate. According to Dretske’s teleological version of the indicator theory, 
the activated state of a detector represents what it is supposed to indicate. This means—given his 
account of “normal” conditions—that the state represents whatever it  indicates or is reliably  
correlated to  in  ecologically  normal  circumstances.  The problem is  that  this  does  not  make 
enough room for misrepresentation. In particular, the account cannot characterize false positives 
as misrepresentations when they occur frequently in a creature’s natural habitat. Additionally, 
Dretske’s way of combining indication with teleology has the problem of being at odds with the 
etiological account of functions as selected effects. Despite these problems, I think that the idea 
of  appealing  to  teleonomy in  order  to  draw a  distinction  between normally  and abnormally 
caused representation tokens is a crucial insight which is on the right track.
Other  teleosemantic  theories—even  those  that  are  causal  or  informational—differ 
considerably  from  Dretske’s.  The  orthodox  teleosemantic  approach—originally  proposed  by 
Millikan (1984) and Papineau (1984)—does not only reject the requirement of reliable causation 
under ecologically normal conditions, but also the requirement that tokens of representations 
must be caused by what they represent. An alternative approach—proposed by Neander (1995)—
rejects only the requirement of reliable causation under ecologically normal conditions, but still 
attempts to explain the meanings of representations  in terms of teleonomically characterized 
causal links to reality. The orthodox approach relates the meanings or contents of representations 
instead to the effects they are supposed to have. The general motivation for this is that, under an 
etiological account, functions are selected effects. Papineau (1984) proposes a teleosemantics 
202
that focuses primarily on the contents of the complex mental representations involved in human 
belief-desire psychology. Millikan (1984) proposes a teleosemantics that starts with an account 
of the most basic forms of non-human representation, which she extends to cover the mental and 
linguistic  representations  used  by  human  beings.  I  will  discuss  these  applications  of 
teleosemantics to sophisticated human representations in Chapter 6—where I borrow ideas from 
Papineau and Millikan, but I argue that a proper teleosemantics for human representations should 
be articulated in terms of basic sentence acceptance. In the following sections of this chapter, I 
will  examine  Millikan’s  account  of  the  content  of  basic  representations  (Section  5.4)  and 
Neander’s alternative (Section 5.5). Afterwards, I will propose a hybrid account that combines 
some insights from these two approaches (Section 5.6). The hybrid account is intended to apply 
to  basic  perceptual  representations,  not  the  complex  human  representations  covered  by  the 
acceptance-based teleosemantics proposed in Chapter 6.
5.4 Consumer-Based Teleosemantics
Millikan  draws  a  distinction  between  the  mechanisms  that  produce representations  and  the 
mechanisms that consume or use representations, and suggests that the latter are responsible for 
something being a representation and having a specific meaning or content: “What we need to 
look at is the consumer part, at what it is to use a thing as a representation. Indeed, a good look at 
the consumer part... ought to be all that is needed to determine not only representational status 
but representational content.” (Millikan 1993: 88). In this section I will examine the core features 
of Millikan’s consumer-based teleosemantics, focusing on basic non-human representations. I 
will argue that her account has the advantage of making ample room for misrepresentation but is 
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susceptible to a serious objection because it disregards the causes of representations as irrelevant 
to their content.
Let  me  illustrate  Millikan’s  distinction  between  producers  and  consumers  of 
representations  with  a  couple  of  simple  examples.  In  the  case  of  inner representations,  the 
producers  and  consumers  are  located  within  a  single  organism.  For  example,  the  moth’s 
perceptual mechanisms responsible for tokening a representation when a bat is approaching are 
the producers, while the mechanisms responsible for triggering the bat-avoidance behavior when 
the representation is tokened are the consumers. In the case of  outer representations used for 
communication, the producers and consumers are located in different organisms. When a beaver 
perceives danger, for example, it makes a loud sound by slapping the water with its tail as it 
dives for safety. The splashing sound causes other beavers in the colony to also dive under water 
for safety. Here the producers of the alarm signal are the mechanisms that cause the original 
beaver to slap its tail, while the consumers are the mechanisms that cause the other beavers to 
hide when hearing the sound. The consumers are the mechanisms responsible for representations 
having the behavioral effects they are supposed to have.
Why should we focus on the consumer mechanisms in order to explain representational 
status  and  representational  content?  The  explanatory  role  of  consumers  in  determining 
representational status becomes clear when we consider cases like the following:
The devices in me that produce calluses are supposed to vary their  placement 
according  to  where  the  friction  is,  but  calluses  are  not  representations.  The 
pigment arrangers in the skin of a chameleon, the function of which is to vary the 
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chameleon’s color with what it sits on, are not representation producers. (Millikan 
1993: 85)
As Millikan points out, “not every device whose job description includes producing items that 
vary  with  the  world  is  a  representation  producer”  (Millikan  1993:  85).  The  mechanisms 
responsible  for  calluses  and  chameleons’  camouflage  colors,  just  like  the  mechanisms 
responsible for moths detecting bats and beavers slapping their tails, produce items that covary 
with conditions in the external world. Yet calluses and chameleons’ camouflage colors are not 
representations. What sets apart the inner states produced by moths’ bat-detectors and the tail 
splashes of beavers from calluses and chameleons’ camouflage colors is that they are  used as 
representations by  consumer mechanisms: such mechanisms modulate  behavior in accordance 
with the conditions in the world that representations are supposed to covary with. Notice that the 
benefit of  having  representations  comes  precisely  from  their  behavioral  effects.  While  the 
producer and consuming mechanisms must have evolved to work in coordination with each other
—i.e.,  they  must  be  co-adapted—the  function  of  the  producers  must  be  to  provide  what 
consumers need to perform their functions (Millikan 1993: 88).
What the consumers need is representations to be tokened whenever certain conditions in 
the  world  obtain.  The  function  of  the  consumer  mechanisms  that  trigger  the  moth’s  bat-
avoidance behavior, for example, is to prevent moths from being captured by bats. That is what 
these mechanisms have been selected for. What they need to perform this function is that the 
representations they consume are tokened specifically when bats are approaching. Millikan calls 
this the “normal condition” for the performance of the consumers’ function. Her consumer-based 
teleosemantics does not  identify meanings with the teleonomic functions of representations or 
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their  consumers,  but with the  relations between representations and the world that  obtain in 
“normal  conditions”—namely,  the  relations  that  the  consumers  need  to  obtain  in  order  to 
successfully perform their teleonomic functions:
Note that the proposal is not that the content of the representation rests on the 
function of the representation or of the consumer, on what these do... The content 
hangs  only  on  there  being  a  certain  condition  that  would  be  normal for 
performance of the consumer’s functions, namely, that a certain correspondence 
relation hold between sign and world, whatever those functions may happen to be. 
(Millikan 1993: 89)
Millikan’s talk  of  “normal  conditions”  differs  from common usage.  She  does  not  mean  the 
conditions that obtain on average or that are ecologically normal. Instead, Millikan clarifies, her 
term ‘normal’ should be understood “normatively, historically, and relative to specific function” 
(Millikan 1993: 86). What is “normal” in this sense is what has historically happened during the 
proper performance  of  a  function.  Whatever  happened  when  an  item failed  to  perform  its 
function is not “normal” in this sense, even if the item failed to perform its function more often 
than  it  succeeded.  Millikan  uses  the  term  ‘normal’  in  this  normative-historical  sense  to 
characterize  the  etiological  explanation of  the  performance  of  a  function,  as  well  as  the 
conditions that must be invoked in such an explanation:
A “normal explanation” explains the performance of a particular function, telling 
how it was (typically) historically performed on those (perhaps rare) occasions 
when it was properly performed. Normal explanations do not tell, say, why it has 
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been common for a function to be performed; they are not statistical explanations. 
They  cover  only  past  times  of  actual  performance...  A  “normal  condition  for 
performance  of  a  function” is  a  condition,  the  presence  of  which  must  be 
mentioned in giving a full normal explanation for performance of that function... 
It follows that “normal conditions” must not be read as having anything to do with 
what is typical or average... (Millikan 1993: 86-87)
In order to avoid confusion with the common usage of the word ‘normal’, I will use instead the 
uppercased word ‘Normal’ to talk about this normative-historical notion, as Millikan does herself 
in  some  of  her  writings  (e.g.,  Millikan  1984).  Consider  again  beavers’ alarm  signals.  The 
function of the consumers of these representations is to protect beavers from danger. The Normal 
explanation of how this function was historically performed, when it was performed properly, 
must  mention  that  perception  of  the  signal  made  beavers  instinctively  dive  under  water  (a 
complete explanation of this will include an account of how the relevant mechanisms worked). 
The Normal explanation must  also mention that a crucial Normal condition for the consumers 
performing properly their function was that the representations were tokened when there was 
actual danger, since only on those occasions diving under water  was a  beneficial  behavioral 
response to the representation. In evolutionary terms, the cooperating producer and consumer 
mechanisms of beaver tail-splashes were favored by natural selection because occasionally they 
actually helped to protect beavers from danger. Since the crucial condition that must obtain in the 
world for the consumers of beaver tail-splashes to perform their function is that there is danger, it 
follows—according to Millikan—that tail-splashes mean danger:
The splash means danger, because only when it corresponds to danger does the 
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instinctive  response  to  the  splash  on  the  part  of  the  interpreter  beavers,  the 
consumers, serve a purpose. If there is no danger present, the interpreter beavers 
interrupt their activities uselessly. Hence, that the splash corresponds to danger is 
a normal condition for proper functioning of the interpreter beavers' instinctive 
reaction to the splash. (Millikan 1993: 90)
Like  the  standard  indicator  theory,  Millikan’s  teleosemantics  explains  the  meaning  of  a 
representation in terms of its direct links to what it represents. Like Dretske’s teleological version 
of the indicator theory, it explains more specifically what a representation is supposed—but may 
fail—to represent in terms of an etiological account of what it is supposed to covary with, be 
correlated to, or correspond to in the world. But Millikan’s consumer-based teleosemantics does 
not place any requirement of reliability under ecologically normal conditions on the production 
of a representation. Consequently, it can make ample room for misrepresentation. Suppose, as it 
is likely, that the majority of beaver tail-splashes turn out to be false positives—produced when 
there is no real danger around. This does not impact at all what the tail-splashes are supposed to 
represent according to Millikan’s account. As long as the trait has been selected and maintained 
in the population because it aided the survival of beavers by making them dive under water for  
safety when there was danger—and even if this happened only on rare occasions—the splashes 
will  mean danger. When there is no real danger around, a tail-splash is  a misrepresentation. 
Millikan’s teleosemantics can account for most tail-splashes in ecologically normal conditions 
being misrepresentations. Notice that, for many biological devices, successful performance of 
their functions is something that rarely occurs but explains why the devices exist. Most sperm 
cells, for example, do not succeed in fertilizing egg cells. Nonetheless, this is precisely what they 
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have been selected for doing (Millikan 1984: 4). That an item may fail to perform its function 
more often than succeeding is not peculiar to representations.
Another  advantage  of  Millikan’s  consumer-based  teleosemantics  is  that  it  offers  a 
plausible account of how representations can represent  distal affairs rather than the  proximal 
stimuli involved in their deployment. Consider male hoverflies, which wait for females to mate 
with by hovering in a single place for long periods of time. When they perceive a female, they 
instantly dart towards it. This behavior conforms to a very precise rule that specifies the angle of  
the chasing flight in relation to the vector angular velocity of the target’s image moving across 
the  hoverfly’s retina  (Collett  and Land 1978).  Since  this  rule  specifies  how the  hoverfly  is 
supposed  to  react  to  a  proximal  stimulus,  rather  than  a  distal  object,  Millikan  calls  it  the 
“proximal hoverfly rule” (Millikan 1993: 218-219). As Millikan points out, while it is unlikely 
that the hoverfly “calculates over any inner representation of this rule in order to follow it”, it  
still has a “genetically determined mechanism of a kind that has historically proliferated in part 
because it was responsible for producing conformity to the proximal hoverfly rule, hence for 
getting male and female hoverflies together” (Millikan 1993: 219).73 Given the selective history 
of these mechanisms, they are  supposed to conform to the proximal  hoverfly rule.  Why not 
regard  the  representations  consumed  by  these  mechanisms  then  as  representations  of  the 
proximal stimuli—i.e., images—rather than of distal female hoverflies? Images produced by all 
sorts of distal objects, such as midges or distant birds, trigger the chasing behavior in conformity 
73 Following Devitt, we can say that this is a structure rule “governing the outputs of a competence”, rather than a 
processing rule “governing the exercise of the competence” (Devitt 2006: 18). Whether a rule is a structure rule  
or a processing rule depends on whether the rule governs the exercise of the competence: whether “following 
the rule” involves “calculating over its representation”. This distinction should not be conflated with the one 
between proximal and distal rules. As I point out below, the crucial rule governing the hoverfly’s behavior is one 
that relates the hoverfly to distal affairs. This is a distal structure rule.
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to the rule more often than actual female hoverflies (Collett and Land 1978). Yet the mechanisms 
seem to be working in accordance with their evolutionary “design”, rather than malfunctioning, 
whenever they follow the proximal rule. Millikan argues that the representations consumed by 
these  mechanisms  are  nevertheless  representations  of  distal  female  hoverflies,  because  the 
mechanisms are also supposed to make the male hoverfly follow the crucial rule: “If you see a 
female,  catch  it.”—which  she  calls  the  “distal  hoverfly  rule”  (Millikan  1993:  222).  The 
etiological explanation of why the mechanisms exist relies on the occasional past conformity of 
the  behavior  they  produce  to  the  distal  rule,  since  “it  was  only  when  ancestor  hoverflies 
conformed to the distal hoverfly rule that they  became ancestors” (Millikan 1993: 223). The 
proximal rule alone cannot explain why the mechanisms exist. What the mechanisms needed to 
perform  the  function  that  explains  why  they  were  selected  is  that  the  representations  they 
consumed  covaried  with  actual  female  hoverflies.  That  is  why  the  representations  are 
representations of distal female hoverflies rather than of proximal images. But what is the role of  
conformity  to  the  proximal  rule  which,  Millikan  acknowledges,  the  mechanisms  are  also 
supposed to  follow? Millikan  suggests  that  “conformity  to  the  proximal  rule  is  a  means  to 
conformity to the distal rule” or, in other words, “the mechanism that has historically accounted 
for...  ancestor  hoverflies’  successes  at  conformity  to  the  distal  hoverfly  rule  begins  with 
conformity to  the proximal  rule” (Millikan 1993:  222-223).  The idea is  that  the function of 
conforming to a proximal rule is  part of the Normal explanation of how the mechanism that 
consumes an inner representation properly performs a function that involves conformity to a 
distal rule. Whenever an inner representation is supposed to be used in conformity with certain 
proximal rule in order to—or as a means to—be used in conformity with certain distal rule, what 
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it  represents  is  what  it  must  be  related  to  in  the  external  world  for  its  use  to  succeed  in 
conforming to the distal rule.
Millikan’s teleosemantics  defines  representational  content  in  terms  of  the  historically 
Normal conditions for the proper performance of the functions of representation consumers. This 
allows the approach to make ample room for error by not imposing any reliability requirement 
on  the  production  of  representations—not  even  under  ecologically  normal  circumstances. 
Millikan goes a step further, arguing that her account does not even require representations to be 
caused by  what  they  represent.  She  offers  the  following  example—originally  discussed  by 
Dretske  (1984)—to  clarify  this  point.  There  is  “a  certain  species  of  Northern  Hemisphere 
[anaerobic]  bacteria  which  orient  themselves  away from toxic  oxygen-rich  surface  water  by 
attending to their magnetosomes, tiny inner magnets, which pull toward the magnetic north pole, 
hence pull down” (Millikan 1993: 92-93). The function of the consumers of the representation 
produced by the magnetosomes is to guide the bacteria towards safe oxygen-free water—this is 
the  beneficial  effect  that  they  were  selected  for. While  the  Normal  explanation  of  how the 
function is performed will mention magnetosomes pulling towards the magnetic north pole and 
bacteria swimming in that direction, the crucial Normal condition for the consumers to perform 
properly their function is that the magnetosomes pull towards oxygen-free water. According to 
Millikan, then, what the magnetosomes represent is “the direction of oxygen-free water”, even 
though this “is not... a factor in  causing the direction of pull of the magnetosome” (Millikan 
1993: 92-93). The “Normal mechanisms” (Millikan 2004a: 76-79) by which producers perform 
their functions—i.e., the mechanisms invoked in a Normal explanation of these performances—
may often rely on causal links between representations and what they represent. But, according 
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to  Millikan,  this  is  not  a  requirement  and  anyway  does  not  determine  the  meanings  of 
representations:  what  matters  is  that the  producers  Normally  token  representations  that  are 
correlated  to  what  they  represent,  not  how they  manage  to  do  so.  This  is  a  strong  and 
controversial claim that can be reasonably contested.
An influential objection against Millikan’s teleosemantics shows that her view that the 
causes of representations are  irrelevant to  their  content  is  problematic.  Paul Pietroski  (1992) 
proposes  a  thought  experiment  involving  two  imaginary  animal  species:  kimus  and  snorfs. 
Kimus live in a valley where snorfs, their main predators, hunt during the day. Kimus are utterly 
unable to recognize snorfs, but they have evolved both a mechanism that detects red things and 
the instinctive behavior of moving towards them, which makes kimus climb a nearby hill every 
morning, attracted by “something red on the hilltop”—a trait that has been favored by natural 
selection because climbing the hill has helped kimus to avoid being hunted by snorfs (Pietroski 
1992: 273). According to Millikan’s theory, the activated state of the detectors represents snorf-
free areas, since the behavior produced by its consumers was beneficial only because it led kimus 
to such areas. But Pietroski argues that this content ascription is unacceptable. He points out that 
we ascribe “intentionality” (i.e., aboutness) or representational content to mental states in order 
to explain behavior: “For what are intentional states, if not those states that figure in (correct)  
intentional explanations?” (Pietroski 1992: 276). While a relation to snorfs is a crucial part of the 
evolutionary or selection explanation of why kimus have the trait, Pietroski argues, it is not part 
of a plausible intentional explanation of kimu-behavior (Pietroski 1992: 274-276).
It does seem counter-intuitive to claim that kimus climb the hill because they represent it 
as snorf-free. The content ascribed by Millikan’s theory seems to conflict in this case with the 
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one we would ordinarily ascribe—based on the perceptual causes and behavioral effects of the 
representation (see Chapter 2)—and likely also with what a  scientific intentional psychology 
would ascribe. This is because, as Pietroski points out, kimus cannot “discriminate snorfs from 
non-snorfs” (Pietroski 1992: 276) and their representations are tokened “in the absence of  any 
causal interaction” with snorfs (Pietroski 1992: 277). Pietroski acknowledges that the correct 
theory of content may turn out to be “somewhat revisionary of our common-sense practice of 
providing intentional explanations”, but he warns that Millikan’s theory is “radically revisionary” 
and that she does not provide any “independent motivation”—apart from her own theory—to 
support such revision and to regard the evolutionary relation between kimus’ states and snorfs as 
constitutive of the states’ content (Pietroski 1992: 277). Notice that this last concern of Pietroski 
is in tune with the methodological point I made in Chapter 2—following Devitt (1996)—about 
the task of semantics: we need an independent and uncontroversial identification of the meanings 
that need explanation. Otherwise, it is unclear what would count as a successful explanation and 
whether  allegedly  competing  semantic  theories  are  actually  attempting  to  explain  the  same 
phenomena. I will get back to this methodological issue in Section 4.6.
Millikan agrees that her theory implies that kimus represent snorf-free areas, but rejects 
the intuition that this is problematic. She points out that certain desert tortoises find their food 
(edible  vegetation)  by its  green color, which is  merely correlated to,  and not caused by, the 
nutritional  characteristics  that  make  it  food—characteristics  that  tortoises  are  unable  to 
discriminate (Millikan 2000: 236). Millikan’s reply is that, according to Pietroski’s criteria, the 
representations that tortoises use as guides to find food cannot be representations of where there 
is food. If we accept that tortoises have representations of where there is food, Millikan argues, 
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we should revise the intuition that supports Pietroski’s objection.
It is not clear that the tortoises case can settle the issue in favor of Millikan’s view, since 
these representations can be beneficial because they direct tortoises to take in nutrients without 
being representations about the nutritious characteristics of what tortoises eat. Perhaps they are 
representations of “tortoise food”—in the sense of “what tortoises eat” rather than of “what is 
nutritious for tortoises”—or perhaps they are simply representations of green stuff. I prefer the 
former option because it fits well with the eating behavior guided by the states and because the 
latter option would imply that a tortoise eating a green plastic bag—left behind in the desert by a 
hiker—would  not  be  misguided  by  a  false  positive.  There  is  nothing  peculiar  about  a 
representation of “food” in the proposed sense. To put it metaphorically, the representation can 
tell the tortoise something like “this is what you can eat” rather than “this is nutritious”. It is  
doubtful that animal representations of food represent it qua nutritious stuff.
Another important point is that there would be no causal interaction between tortoises’ 
representations and what they represent only under Millikan’s assumption that they represent 
food  qua nutritious stuff.  If  we take the tortoises’ states  to  represent  green stuff,  the causal 
connection  is  clear. But  there  is  also  a  causal  connection  if  we take  the  states  to  represent 
“tortoise food”. In the sense suggested above, “tortoise food” is green (even though its nutrients 
are not green and are not responsible for its color). So, the presence of “tortoise food” causes the 
tokening of tortoises’ representations—because it is green. In contrast, neither snorfs nor their 
absence are causally involved in the tokening of kimus’ representations.74 Millikan is counting on 
74 There is considerable philosophical debate about what is the nature and what are the relata of causal relations. 
Perhaps under some views it is conceivable that snorf-free areas cause kimus’ states. But the view of causation 
that Millikan relies on in her reply to Pietroski is not one of them. Millikan relies on the notion that A can cause 
B because A is F rather than because A is G—even if A is both F and G. My reply simply points out that in such 
a case A still causes B.
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her readers agreeing that tortoises have perceptual states that represent food but are not caused 
by food. But the sense of ‘food’ in which we can correctly say that tortoises represent food is not 
necessarily the same as that in which we can correctly say that tortoises’ representational states 
are not caused by food.
Another  reply  to  Pietroski  offered  by  Millikan  relies  on  rejecting  altogether  the 
assumption that creatures can only have representations of what they are able to  discriminate. 
Millikan complains that “a creature can perfectly well have a representation of Xs without being 
able to discriminate Xs from Ys” (Millikan 2000: 237). This reply has an important kernel of 
truth,  but  I  do not  think  that  it  suffices  to  undermine  Pietroski’s objection.  What  is  true  in 
Millikan’s claim  is  that  the  strong  discrimination  view it  opposes  is  very  problematic.  The 
problematic view is that a creature cannot have a perceptual representation of Xs if it is not able 
to discriminate Xs from some (perhaps many) non-Xs. Such a view does not make enough room 
for  misrepresentation.  False  positives  occur  precisely  because  of  the  limited  discriminatory 
capacities of the perceptual mechanisms involved. However, the problematic view should not be 
confused with the reasonable view that a creature cannot have a perceptual representation of Xs 
if it is not able to discriminate Xs from any non-Xs whatsoever. Now consider Pietroski’s claim 
that kimus cannot represent snorfs because they cannot discriminate snorfs from non-snorfs. If 
the claim is based on kimus not being able to discriminate snorfs from some non-snorfs, then the 
view is implausible because it does not make room for false positives. Pietroski does talk about 
kimus not being able to “reliably discriminate” snorfs from non-snorfs (Pietroski 1992: 276), but 
his  argument  does  not  depend  on  this.  Much  more  relevant  is  the  fact  that  kimus  cannot 
discriminate  snorfs  from  any non-snorfs  whatsoever.  So  Millikan’s  fair  point  against  an 
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unreasonably strong discrimination view does not defend her theory from Pietroski’s objection. 
The  content  ascription  of  Millikan’s theory  in  the  kimus  case  violates  even  a  minimal  and 
seemingly reasonable discrimination requirement.
Millikan’s focus on the role of representation consumers allows her to offer an account 
that makes plenty of room for misrepresentation. But her account is susceptible to Pietroski’s 
objection because it disregards the role of representation producers as irrelevant to content. It 
should be noticed that Millikan (1984) originally emphasized equally the functions of consumers 
and producers and that she has later returned to a more balanced focus, insisting that consumers 
and producers have been “designed” or selected for  cooperating with each other:  “What the 
consumer  does  helps  the  producer,  and  what  the  producer  does  helps  the  consumer...  The 
presence of each is  part  of the normal mechanism by which the other fulfills  its  functions.” 
(Millikan 2004a: 79). Beyond these matters of emphasis, Millikan has not changed her mind 
about the irrelevance of the causes of representations. Her motivation seems to rely on her view 
that functions are a matter of effects: “Taking the... example of the firing of a fly detector in a 
frog’s eye, it couldn’t be a function of that firing to have been caused by a fly.” (Millikan 2004a:  
68). In contrast, Neander has proposed that perceptual states represent what the mechanisms that 
produce them have the function of  detecting or  responding to, when analyzed at the lowest or 
most “mechanical” teleo-functional level (Neander 1995: 129-136). Neander’s view is that the 
mechanism involved in a representation’s production—in  how the representation is  caused—is 
what  is  relevant  to  the representation’s content.  Unlike Dretske’s teleological  version of  the 
indicator  theory,  Neander’s  teleosemantics  does  not  depend  on  what  typically  causes 
representations  in  ecologically  normal  conditions.  Unlike  Millikan’s  teleosemantics,  it  does 
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explain meaning in terms of causation.
5.5 Producer-Based Teleosemantics
Neander points out that biological traits have a hierarchical array of functions and argues that, in 
the case of systems that  produce representations, the lowest-level functions—involving causal 
links  between  representations  and  what  they  represent—are  the  ones  that  determine 
representational content. In this section, I will examine the core features of Neander’s producer-
based teleosemantics and argue that it  has the advantage not being susceptible to Pietroski’s 
objection,  due to the role it  assigns to the causes of representations,  but also that it  has the 
disadvantage  of  not  making enough  room for  misrepresentation,  due  to  its  treatment of  the 
effects of representations as irrelevant to their content.
Biological traits typically have various effects. Let us start with a non-representational 
example: “Suppose a trait  in an antelope population altered the structure of the hemoglobin, 
which caused higher oxygen uptake, which allowed the antelope to survive at higher ground to 
which they were forced to retreat. Suppose also that, as a result, this trait was selected.” (Neander 
1995:  114-115).  Which  among  all  of  these  effects  of  the  trait  is  its  etiological  function? 
According to Neander they all are, because the explanation of why the trait exists must mention 
them all.  As Neander points out, however, the various functions are not independent of each 
other, since the trait (1) contributed to gene replication by (2) allowing the antelope to survive at 
higher ground by (3) increasing oxygen uptake  by (4) altering the structure of the hemoglobin 
(Neander 1995: 114-115). The various functions are hierarchically related, each of them being 
performed by means of the performance of the function in the following “lower” level—where 
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the lower level specifies the underlying mechanism responsible for how the higher-level function 
is performed and the higher level specifies the  purpose for which the lower-level function is 
performed (Neander 1995: 116). While  all the levels describe functions of the trait,  Neander 
argues that the lowest level describes the function that is specific to the trait, since the trait itself 
is malfunctioning only if it fails to perform this function (Neander 1995: 119-120). A failure in 
the  increase  of  oxygen  uptake  may  occur  in  a  certain  antelope  because  its  lungs  are 
malfunctioning, even if the structure of hemoglobin has been properly altered (Papineau 1998: 
4). But the trait in question is itself malfunctioning if it fails to properly alter the structure of 
hemoglobin.  So,  according to Neander’s account,  altering the structure of hemoglobin is  the 
specific function of the trait.
Neander applies these considerations to the functions of traits involved in the production 
of representations. Consider the magnetosomes which are part of the phenotypes of the anaerobic 
bacteria discussed above. What are their  functions? What did the magnetosomes of ancestral 
bacteria  did  that  explains  why they exist  today? The magnetosomes (1)  contributed to  gene 
replication by (2) helping bacteria to survive by (3) guiding bacteria towards oxygen-free water 
by (4) aligning themselves with the magnetic north pole. According to Neander, all of these are 
functions  of  the  magnetosomes,  but  only  the  last  one  is  their  specific  function,  since  the 
performance  of  higher-level  functions—e.g.,  guiding  bacteria  towards  oxygen-free  water—
depends on the magnetosomes’ “collaboration with other components” (Neander 1995: 118). The 
other components would include, most crucially, the consumers of the representation.
Now consider the case of frogs, which respond to the visual perception of their prey by 
darting their sticky tongues to capture and eat it. Their prey includes insects, spiders, worms and 
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all sorts of living animals small enough to fit into their mouths. Frogs respond in this way not 
only to their prey, but also to any small and dark thing moving in front of them. According to 
Millikan’s teleosemantics, the frog’s perceptions represent frog food, since it was only when the 
representations of ancestor frogs corresponded to edible things that their consumers performed 
the  functions  that  explain  why  both  the  consumers  and  their  cooperating  producers  where 
favored by natural selection. But according to Neander’s teleosemantics, the frog’s perceptions 
represent instead small and dark moving things, because detecting such things is the lowest-level 
and  specific  function  of  the  perceptual  mechanism involved:  “it  is  by detecting  small  dark 
moving things that the frog detects frog-food” (Neander 1995: 130). Suppose that a frog snaps at 
a small and dark leaf carried by the wind. According to Neander, the detectors are not themselves 
malfunctioning in this case, even though they are failing to perform the higher-level function of 
detecting frog food. The detectors have not been “designed” to tell apart prey from small and 
dark  moving  leaves.  In  this  case  there  is  no  misrepresentation according  to  Neander’s 
teleosemantics  (Neander 1995: 129). This is a potentially problematic feature of the account. I 
will I get back to this later in this section.
A crucial virtue of Neander’s theory, she argues, is that it ascribes contents which are 
related to  the cognitive capacities  of the representation-producing mechanisms—to how they 
work when they function properly: “Low Teleology [i.e., Neander’s theory] has something to say 
about the criteria by which a cognitive system identifies that which it represents, and how it  
represents it, whereas High Teleology [e.g.,  Millikan’s theory] has nothing to say about this” 
(Neander  1995:  134).  Recall  that  in  Millikan’s theory  what  matters  regarding  the  producer 
mechanisms  is  merely  that they  token  representations  when  the  Normal  conditions  for  the 
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performance of the consumers’ functions obtain—and not  how the producer mechanisms are 
supposed  and  able  to  do  it.  Because  of  this,  Millikan’s  theory  regards  the  causes  of 
representations  and  the  discriminatory  capacities  of  perceptual  mechanisms  as  irrelevant  to 
representational content. But this is precisely why her theory can sometimes ascribe implausible 
contents. As Pietroski’s kimus’ case illustrates, it can ascribe perceptual representations about 
things that the perceptual mechanisms are causally insensitive to and unable to discriminate from 
anything  else.  Pietroski  suggests  that  his  objection  undermines  teleosemantics  in  general 
(Pietroski 1992: 278). But Neander points out that this is not the case, since the objection applies 
only to the “High Church” variety (Neander 1995: 127). Indeed, Neander’s teleosemantics does 
not ascribe counter-intuitive contents in the kimus case. The kimus’ trait did evolve because it 
helped kimus to survive  by avoiding snorfs. While this is a crucial  biological function of the 
kimus’ trait, it is not the function that determines the content of kimus’ representation, according 
to Neander’s theory. What the perceptual mechanism is designed to causally respond to or detect 
is specifically red stimuli. So the resulting perceptual states represent red things, not snorf-free 
areas. This indeed is an advantage of Neander’s account over Millikan’s.
Neander’s analysis of the relation between the higher-level and lower-level functions of 
traits  is  illuminating.  Her  teleosemantic  account—which  focuses  on  the  functions  of  the 
mechanisms  that  produce  representations—has  the  advantage  of  ascribing  contents  that  are 
related to the capacities of such mechanisms. But there are some important questions or concerns 
that  may be  raised  about  her  account.  Does  it  truly  respect  the  requirement  that  etiological 
functions must be selected effects? Does it actually allow for the representation of distal affairs? 
And does it make enough room for  misrepresentation? I will address each of these questions, 
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starting with the first one. Regarding this issue, Papineau objects:
Neander  has  taken  insufficient  note  of  Millikan’s  point  that  representational 
content hinges on how the representation is used, not on what causes it. In her 
general discussion of teleology, Neander focuses, quite rightly, on the  effects of 
biological  traits.  But  as  soon  as  she  turns  to  representation  she  shifts  to  the 
question of what is  supposed to  cause the frog’s state (what it  is  supposed to 
detect). (Papineau 1998: 7)
Neander’s account is committed to the view that the content of a representation is whatever is 
supposed to  cause it—which,  in  Papineau’s view,  is  at  odds with the etiological  account  of 
functions as selected effects. This is similar to the objection raised by Godfrey-Smith (1989) and 
Millikan (1993) against  earlier  attempts to articulate an indicator or informational version of 
teleosemantics, including Dretske’s: an item cannot have the function of being caused by—or 
being produced in response to—something (see Section 4.3). Neander replies that while it is true 
that functions must involve effects—since this is what is required for natural selection to occur—
they can also involve causes: “Biological mechanisms are selected for their causal roles, which 
can include dispositions to  respond to specific types of causes.”  (Neander 2013: 24).  Going 
against teleosemantic orthodoxy, Neander suggests that sensory systems have response functions: 
functions  to  produce  states  in  response  to  certain  input  conditions—where  ‘response’  is 
understood in “purely causal” terms (Neander 2013: 23). Her proposal is that a sensory state 
indeed represents what its producer mechanism has the function of causally responding to, given 
its evolutionary “design”.
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Neander’s proposal  that  sensory  systems  have  response  functions  has  some intuitive 
appeal.  Nonetheless,  the  proposal  is  indeed at  odds with  the standard  etiological  account  of 
functions as selected effects—which Neander (1991) herself helped to articulate (see Section 
3.5).  It  is  no  surprise  that  Millikan  disagrees.  She  objects  that  a  sensory  system cannot  be 
selected for producing states in response to certain causal inputs—since this cannot be a selected 
effect—and proposes that the causal relations that Neander has in mind are instead part of  the 
Normal  explanation  of  how sensory  systems  often  are  supposed  to  work  to  perform  their 
functions  (Millikan  2013a:  37-40).  The  idea  here  is  that  a  sensory  system may  be  selected 
because it produced states that were caused by certain causal inputs, but this is not what it has 
been selected  for doing: it is not its purpose or function. Millikan’s suggestion is that we can 
account for the explanatory role of the relevant causal relations—when a sensory system relies 
on  them  to  perform  its  function—without  abandoning  the  standard  etiological  account  of 
functions as selected effects. But let us consider an example that Neander provides to support her 
view that items can have response functions:
Now think about those biological functions that depend on natural selection. One 
type of mechanism might secrete melatonin in response to the dimming of light, 
while another type of mechanism might secrete melatonin in response to light 
brightening and a third more or less randomly. Since melatonin makes us sleepy, 
the first mechanism might be more adaptive in creatures like us who have poor 
night vision. So the first type of mechanism might be selected in preference to the 
second and third because the first differs in its input cause, in what triggers its 
production of melatonin. (Neander 2013: 24)
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It sounds initially reasonable to claim that the selected mechanism in this example was selected 
for secreting melatonin in response to the dimming of light. Such a function would be a selected 
disposition or causal role, rather than merely a selected effect. There is no doubt that there is an 
important difference between the three mechanisms in this example and that the difference is 
responsible for one of them being favored by natural selection. The way Neander describes it, the 
difference  is  merely  about  input  causes,  since  the  three  mechanisms  have  the  same  effect: 
secreting melatonin. However, the standard account of functions as selected effects can handle 
this case without problems. The effects of the three mechanisms can be described differently: 
secreting melatonin at night, during the day or randomly. So there is no problem omitting the 
cause  in  the  characterization  of  the  function of  the  selected  mechanism.  The  cause  can  be 
accommodated  instead  as  part  of  the  Normal  explanation  of  how the  selected  mechanism 
manages  to  secret  melatonin  at  night:  the  mechanism  performs  this  function  by  causally 
responding to the dimming of light.
It looks like the selected effects view can account for the phenomena that may intuitively 
seem to have response functions. We should remain open-minded, but the selected effects view is 
the standard etiological account of functions—the  status quo—so we would need compelling 
reasons  to  abandon  it  and  adopt  Neander’s  revisionary  proposal.  Furthermore,  the  selected 
effects view presumably has an advantage in those cases that may seem to involve response 
functions. Suppose that the mechanism discussed by Neander happens to secret melatonin certain 
night by accident—i.e., not in response to the dimming of light. There is a sense in which the 
mechanism did perform its function, albeit accidentally. As Millikan points out: “functions are 
sometimes performed yet  performed abNormally” (Millikan 2013a:  40).  The selected effects 
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view has no problem characterizing this situation as I did. The function of secreting melatonin at  
night was performed, but abNormally because the dimming of light is what Normally causes the 
secretion—i.e., what is supposed to cause it. The response function view, however, is unable to 
characterize  the  situation  this  way:  the  function  of  secreting  melatonin  in  response  to  the 
dimming of light was simply  not performed. So this view has a problem allowing for alleged 
response  functions  to  be  performed  accidentally.  While  I  am  skeptical  about  the  need  for 
response functions, I am not skeptical about Neander’s view that the content of a representation 
depends on what is supposed to cause it. I will get back to this in the next section.
Moving on to another issue, Millikan has also objected that Neander’s teleosemantics 
treats  all  representations  as  representations  of  proximal  stimuli  (Millikan  2000:  231).  But 
Neander has recently offered her own solution to the distality problem. Her proposal is that a 
representation  R refers to something distal  D rather than something proximal  P (when  P is an 
intermediary link in the causal chain between D and R) if and only if the sensory system has the 
etiological function of producing tokens of R in response to D by means of producing tokens of 
R in response to  P (Neander 2013: 34). Notice that this suggestion is analogous to Millikan’s 
solution to the distality problem, but articulated in terms of response functions. In both cases, a 
relation between a representation and proximal stimuli is regarded merely as a means to perform 
a  function  involving  a  relation  between  the  representation  and  something  distal.  However, 
Neander’s  solution  seems  to  be  incompatible  with  her  own  claim  that  the  content  of  a 
representation is determined by the lowest-level mechanical function of the system that produces 
it. Consider Neander’s claim that the frog’s perceptual states represent small and dark moving 
things, rather than prey or frog food. With her new solution to the distality problem, she is able to 
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argue that the frog’s states represent distal things, since they are the products of sensory systems 
that  have  (1)  the  function  of  responding  to  distal small  and  dark  moving  things,  which  is 
performed by means of performing (2) the function of responding to  proximal small and dark 
moving images. But if we must accept that a higher-level function determines content in order to 
solve the problem of distality, why not regard this higher-level function as the one performed 
when the  frog  darts  its  tongue towards  its  prey or  food?  Neander’s solution  to  the  distality 
problem requires abandoning her “lowest level of analysis” account of representational content. 
So that analysis can no longer provide a reason for favoring her claim that frogs’ perceptions 
represent small and dark moving things rather prey or food.
In fairness, Neander can still appeal to the fact that the frog does not have the capacity to 
distinguish its prey from other small and dark moving things, even when its visual systems are 
working properly: the perceptual systems are not themselves malfunctioning when the frog darts 
its tongue towards a moving leaf. But this brings us to the remaining question I raised about  
Neander’s teleosemantics: can it make enough room for misrepresentation? Neander’s causal or 
informational teleosemantics, unlike Dretske’s combination of indication and teleology, does not 
depend on reliable causation or correlation under ecologically normal circumstances. Yet her 
account faces similar problems. Presumably the representation that causes the frog to dart its 
tongue towards a moving leaf is a  false positive—just like the beaver’s tail splash produced in 
the  absence  of  danger  or  the  bird’s  representation  of  predators  tokened  in  the  absence  of 
predators. For frogs, the  benefit of not missing actual prey outweighs the cost of darting their 
tongues towards non-edible targets, so natural selection has favored a perceptual mechanism that 
cannot discriminate between actual prey and a number of other things, but is quite effective at 
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allowing frogs to catch their prey, which is its purpose. According to Neander’s teleosemantics, 
however,  the  frog’s  representation  triggered  by  a  small  and  dark  moving  leaf  is  a  true 
representation instead of a false positive: “I suggest that the frog doesn’t misrepresent as long as 
its  representation...  is  caused by something appropriately small,  dark and moving” (Neander 
1995: 129). The leaf example is mine, but Neander remarks that according to her theory a frog 
responding to a “bee bee” (a small metallic projectile shot by an air gun) is not misrepresenting 
(Neander 1995: 131).
I  should  clarify  that  Neander’s  teleosemantics  does  make  some room  for 
misrepresentation. The frog does misrepresent when it responds to “anything which reflects onto 
its retina a pattern that falls outside of the specified parameters” of size, shade and movement—
which can happen, she points out, if the frog is sick, neurologically damaged or has a congenital 
defect (Neander 1995: 131). Neander’s account makes room for misrepresentation in cases where 
the perceptual mechanism fails to perform its function because it  malfunctions. The problem, 
however, is that misrepresentation often occurs when the mechanism fails because “the world is 
deceptive”—to use Godfrey-Smith’s expression. As Millikan reasonably argues against Neander 
(2013), there can be  misrepresentation without  malfunctioning:  this occurs when the Normal 
condition in the external world required for the representation producer to perform its function 
does not obtain (Millikan 2013a: 40). Neander’s teleosemantics does not make room for this kind 
of misrepresentation and this is a serious drawback. Given the limited discriminatory capacities 
of male hoverfly mate-detectors, of beaver danger-detectors, of bird and moth predator-detectors
—just to mention some other examples discussed above—it turns out that the states produced by 
these  devices  do  not  represent  mates,  danger  or  predators,  according  to  Neander’s 
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teleosemantics, despite their guiding mating, hiding and avoidance behavior.
Dretske’s  original  attempt  to  combine  informational  semantics  with  teleology  was 
intended to make room for misrepresentation. It was a nice try. But it did not make enough room. 
Neander’s updated attempt has virtues that I have pointed out. However, it shares with Dretske’s 
attempt the problem of not making enough room for misrepresentation. Perhaps it makes even 
less room, since Dretske does not take such a restrictive approach regarding the discriminatory 
capacities of creatures. Frogs, he says, represent bugs (Dretske 1988: 68). And I already quoted 
him claiming that flies represent nutritional substances by means of detecting their sweet flavor
—because in their natural habitat “the [sweet tasting] substances that stimulate the receptors are 
nutritional” (Dretske 1988: 58). Under Neander’s account, these receptors would only represent 
sweet substances—and Millikan seems to agree that a  causal theory would be forced to adopt 
such a restrictive view of causal connections. Perhaps Dretske is mistaken to claim that flies 
represent  nutritional  substances  as  such.  Still,  the  representations  do  tell  flies  to  eat  these 
substances—not just that they are sweet. So a more plausible content ascription may be that they 
represent edible stuff or “food”—in the sense of something to get a hold of and eat, rather than 
something nutritious. In the analogous case of carnivorous hunters or predators, we have a better 
word for this: ‘prey’.
Back to Dretske, it is worth mentioning that—even in his early version of the indicator 
theory—he  allows  for  more  complex  informational  groundings  than  Neander.  Notice  that 
Neander does not limit herself to simple causal links: R can represent X even when they are not 
directly connected by a single causal link, but rather by a chain of causal links: this is what her 
solution to the distality problem is meant to allow for. But Dretske allows for other variants of 
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what we may call “causal groundings”. Suppose, for example, that something X causes both Y 
and  Z, but  Y and  Z are not causally linked otherwise. In this case, Dretske proposes,  Y and  Z 
carry information about each other due to their common cause (Dretske 1981: 38-39). It follows 
that  a  perceptual  system can manage to  indicate  Z by detecting  Y even if  it  is  not  causally 
sensitive to Z itself. If these more complex forms of causal grounding do work, then it may be 
the case that flies do have representations of nutritious stuff. The presence of nutrients and of 
sweet tasting molecules in a fruit, for example, surely are connected by a common and complex 
causal process. The same would apply to the green color and nutrients of the edible vegetation 
that  tortoises  eat—recall  Millikan’s reply to  Pietroski.  These are  complicated matters,  but  it 
certainly looks like adopting a restrictive view of causal connections is not the only reasonable 
option for  a  naturalized semantics.  It  should be noticed,  however, that  Dretske goes beyond 
“causally grounded” informational relations. His definition of indication relies on the conditional  
probability of X happening if a representation R is tokened (Dretske 1981: 65). Such correlations 
may often be the result of causal connections, which can be found in most of Dretske’s examples, 
just like in most of Millikan’s. But they are not strictly required. That is why Dretske suggests 
that the magnetosomes of northern anaerobic bacteria  may represent oxygen-free water, even 
though there is no causal connection between the magnetic north they detect and oxygen-free 
water (Dretske 1986: 26).75 On this issue Dretske and Millikan coincide. But this sort of view 
leads to the problem highlighted by Pietroski’s though experiment.
75 Dretske argues that it is indeterminate whether the magnetosomes represent the magnetic north or oxygen-free 
water (Dretske 1986: 28-32). The lack of a causal connection in one of the two alternatives does not motivate 
him to prefer the other.
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5.6 A Hybrid Account
Neander’s  producer-based  teleosemantics  avoids  Pietroski’s  objection  because  it  does  relate 
content to the cognitive capacities of the mechanisms that produce representations, but cannot 
characterize many false positives as genuine misrepresentations: those that occur because “the 
world is deceptive” rather than because of internal malfunctioning. Millikan’s consumer-based 
teleosemantics can properly characterize such false positives as misrepresentations because it 
relates content to the Normal conditions for the performance of the functions of the mechanisms 
that  consume  representations—i.e.,  that  guide  behavior  based  on  them—but  cannot  avoid 
Pietroski’s objection. In this section I will propose a hybrid account that relates content to the 
roles of both producers and consumers of representations. The hybrid account promises to make 
ample room for misrepresentation while making plausible ascriptions of content that take into 
account  what  the  perceptual  mechanisms  of  a  creature  do  causally  interact  with—thereby 
avoiding Pietroski’s objection.76 While the hybrid account makes ascriptions that are in tune with 
Pietroski’s plausible intuitions, it should be noticed that my case for the approach rests mainly on 
methodological considerations about what phenomena it is the task of semantics to explain.
The hybrid account is meant to apply primarily to “basic representations” that are caused 
by perceptual mechanisms and directly guide behavior:  representations of the kind that have 
been the focus of this chapter. The approach also has an application for the simplest perceptual 
representations  of  cognitively  complex  creatures  such  as  human  beings.  But  those 
76 My hybrid account may look similar at first sight to Nicholas Shea’s suggestion that Millikan’s teleosemantics 
should be supplemented with an input condition (Shea 2007). Shea adds an input condition to Millikan’s output-
based account. I agree that we need a teleosemantics that takes into account both inputs and outputs. But the 
hybrid account I am proposing differs in a crucial respect from Shea’s: while his input condition involves mere 
informational correlations between representations and what they represent, my hybrid account relies on causal  
links—like Neander’s. Since Shea’s input condition is not causal (Shea 2007: 16), his proposal shares problems 
with Millikan’s. In the kimus’ case, it also entails that their states represent snorf-free areas.
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representations differ in crucial ways from what I am treating here as basic representations, since 
they typically do not directly govern behavior and their consumers are likely to include a variety 
of mechanisms, including those that token more complex representations such as thoughts and 
concepts. I will focus here on “basic representations”. My proposal in a nutshell is the following:
Hybrid Producer-Consumer Teleosemantics: The content of a basic representation 
is  determined  by  what  is  supposed  to  cause  tokens  of  it—what  its  producer 
mechanisms are supposed to respond to—in order for its consumer mechanisms to 
perform their function in accordance with a Normal explanation.
Like Neander’s account, the hybrid account relates the content of a basic representation to what 
is supposed to cause it: the links involve connections to things that the perceptual system of a 
creature  does  causally  interact  with.  Like  Millikan’s account,  the  hybrid account  relates  the 
content of a basic representation only to those links to reality that the representation tokens have 
on those occasions when the consumers succeed performing the functions that they have been 
selected  for.  These  functions  are  selected  effects,  as  conceived  by  the  standard  etiological 
account of functions. In the case of basic representations, the functions are to produce behaviors 
that are appropriate to—and vary accordingly with—the creatures’ circumstances.
I pointed out in the last section that I agree with Neander’s view that the content of a 
basic representation depends on what is supposed to cause it, but I explained why I am skeptical 
about  the  need  for  response  functions.  How  can  we  get  the  “normative”  notion  of  being 
“supposed to be caused” by something without identifying this as a function of a mechanism? 
Millikan’s  distinction  between  what  is  part  of  a  function  and  what  is  part  of  the  Normal 
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explanation of how the function is performed provides the answer. It allows us to extend the 
“normativity”  conferred  by  the  teleonomic  account  of  functions  to  the  mechanisms  and 
conditions involved in their performance. Kidneys are  supposed to filter blood because this is 
their function. They are also  supposed to be connected in certain ways to the circulatory and 
renal systems. But this is not something they do, not an effect that they have been selected for. 
Instead, it is a Normal condition for their managing to filter blood in the way that historically 
accounts for their existence. The same applies to the causes of perceptual representations under 
Millikan’s analysis: such representations are  supposed to be caused by certain distal events in 
order for their producers and consumers to perform their functions. Millikan, of course, thinks 
that such causal relations are not relevant to the representations’ contents. But notice that what 
Millikan  does  identify  as  the  contents  of  representations—namely,  certain  crucial  Normal 
conditions for the performance of the consumer’s functions—are not part of a function either, but 
of a Normal explanation. The fact that causes are not a part of the functions of the producers or 
consumers of representations does not rule them out as candidates for content determination in a 
teleosemantic theory.
What kinds of content ascriptions are provided by the hybrid account? I will discuss the 
cases of frogs and kimus below. Let me start with other two examples. According to the hybrid 
account, the states produced by  male hoverfly mate-detectors and by moth predator-detectors 
represent  mates  (i.e.,  female  hoverflies)  and  predators  (i.e.,  bats),  respectively,  since the 
consumers of the representations perform Normally their behavior-governing function of guiding 
these creatures  to  mate  or  avoid predators  when the representations  are  caused by mates  or 
predators. The states are  supposed to be caused by mates and predators, respectively, so they 
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misrepresent when triggered by things that are not mates or predators. Notice that the content 
ascriptions are plausible given the roles of these representations in the lives of hoverflies and 
moths. Also, the approach makes plenty of room for misrepresentation. In these examples, the 
content ascriptions are similar to those provided by Millikan’s theory, but the hybrid account 
relies on causal connections between representations and reality rather than on mere correlations.
An interesting point made by Pietroski is that Millikan’s teleosemantics looks appealing 
because there are cases where the contents it ascribes coincide with those ascribed by a plausible 
intentional  explanation  of  behavior:  “selection  explanations  and  intentional  explanations 
sometimes make reference to the same properties; and this is probably what makes teleological 
accounts of content like Millikan’s look so plausible” (Pietroski 1992: 278). For example, he 
points  out,  the  plausible  intentional  explanation  of  frogs’  tongue-darting  behavior  and  the 
evolutionary explanation of why frogs have such a trait both make reference to bugs (Pietroski 
1992:  278).  Pietroski’s  kimus  case  is  meant  to  show  that  intentional  and  evolutionary 
explanations  do  not  always  coincide.  This  happens  when the  crucial  Normal  condition  that 
Millikan would regard as determining the content of a representation does not coincide with what 
causes the representation: “The kimu example is designed to be just like that of the frog, with 
one exception: Whereas bugs at least sometimes cause neural firings in frogs, snorfs never cause 
[neural firings] in kimus.” (Pietroski 1992: 274). As Pietroski figured out, when the causes and 
the crucial Normal conditions associated with a representation come apart, Millikan’s ascriptions 
of content look considerably less plausible. While Pietroski takes his objection to apply to any 
teleosemantic theory, the situation is different for causal versions of teleosemantics. Presumably, 
a causal version can ascribe contents that are plausible by Pietroski’s standards. As discussed 
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above, Neander’s teleosemantics does ascribe to kimus the content that Pietroski argues to be the 
plausible one. However, the ascriptions of Neander’s teleosemantics do not always coincide with 
what Pietroski regards as plausible ascriptions. In the frog’s case, for example, Pietroski thinks 
that the ascription that best explains the tongue-darting behavior is that the frog represents bugs. 
This is closer to Millikan’s ascription than Neander’s. So neither Millikan’s theory nor Neander’s 
delivers content ascriptions that consistently match the ascriptions which, according to Pietroski, 
would  be  part  of  a  plausible  intentional  explanation  of  behavior.  The  hybrid  teleosemantic 
approach I am proposing, in contrast, does deliver ascriptions that are more consistently in tune 
with Pietroski’s plausible ascriptions and, I dare say, with the ordinary and scientific ascriptions 
made to successfully explain animal behavior that is governed by representational states.
In the imaginary kimus case, the hybrid account entails that kimus represent red things, 
since red things are the cause of the representations in those occasions where the consumers 
managed to perform their function—mainly guiding the kimus up the hill, which was indeed 
beneficial because kimus avoided snorfs by going to the hilltop. The causal part of the hybrid 
account ensures that—unlike what happens with Millikan’s theory—the contents ascribed are 
properly related to creatures’ perceptual capacities. In the frog’s case, the hybrid account entails 
that the representations are about prey or frog food, since the presence of prey or frog food was 
causally  responsible  for  the  tokening  of  the  representation  in  those  occasions  where  the 
consumers succeeded in performing their function of making frogs catch and eat their prey. The 
consumer part of the approach ensures that—unlike what happens with Neander’s theory—the 
contents  ascribed  are  properly  related  to  creatures’ behavioral  repertoires.  Unlike  Millikan’s 
consumer-based and Neander’s producer-based account,  the hybrid account  ascribes contents 
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that are in tune in both cases with what Pietroski argues to be plausible ascriptions, based on 
ordinary non-teleosemantic standards. I do think that this is an advantage of the hybrid account, 
because the contents suggested as plausible by Pietroski are indeed the ones we would ascribe 
based on the causal  roles  of representations—that  is,  on their  causes and behavioral  effects. 
While these ascriptions are in principle subject to revision, the identifications of meanings they 
provide  are  overall  likely  to  be  correct  because—as  I  argued in  Chapter  2—we are  largely 
successful explaining behavior based on them.
While I agree with Pietroski’s take on what would count as plausible ascriptions, my case 
for the hybrid account does not  rely merely on Pietroski’s  intuitions.  Instead,  it  is  based on 
methodological considerations about what phenomena it is the task of semantics to explain. As I 
pointed  out  in  Chapter  2,  following  Devitt  (1996),  we  need  a relatively  uncontroversial 
identification of meanings in order to define a common explanatory goal for semantic theories. It 
is troubling that the disagreements between semantic theories are not just about what is the best 
explanation of  the nature of meanings,  but  also about  what  counts  as a  meaning that  needs 
explanation (Devitt 2012: 62). Given this situation, it is hard to establish that different theories 
are  genuinely  competing  with  each  other  to  explain  the  same  phenomena.  Consider  the 
disagreement  between  Millikan  and  Neander  regarding  frog’s representations.  Their  theories 
disagree  about  what  non-semantic  phenomena  are  responsible  for  the  content  of  these 
representations; but they also disagree about what is the content to be explained: whether frogs 
represent  frog food or  small and dark moving things. Why should we regard their theories as 
competing with each other? We need a common and theory-neutral identification of what needs 
explanation to regard them as rivals.77 Furthermore, it is problematic that the identification of the 
77 Otherwise,  it  may  look  like  Millikan  and  Neander  are  simply  interested  in  different  aspects  of  frogs’ 
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putative content (the explanandum) seems to depend exclusively on the very theories that offer 
the explanation of its nature (the explanans).
Perhaps the main point made by Pietroski in his objection to Millikan is that we need a 
theory-independent identification of contents in order to be able to judge whether Millikan’s 
theory  succeeds  or  fails  at  explaining  them (Pietroski  1992:  277).  I  argued  in  Chapter  2, 
following Devitt (1996), that folk and scientific content ascriptions based on representations’ 
causal roles provide the needed independent identifications. This happens to be also the sort of 
theory-independent ascription that Pietroski has in mind. As his discussion makes clear, he takes 
proper content ascriptions to be those that contribute to the explanation of behavior and take into 
consideration the causes of representations. He also regards discriminatory capacities as relevant 
to (perceptual) content. I made a distinction above (see Section 5.4) between a reasonable and a 
problematic discrimination requirement: the problematic one is that  a creature cannot have a 
perceptual representation of Xs if it is not able to discriminate Xs from some non-Xs—which 
does not make room for false positives—while the reasonable one is that a creature cannot have a 
perceptual representation of Xs if it is not able to discriminate Xs from any non-Xs.
Consider the kimus case. It is reasonable to conjecture that this case looks  prima facie 
like a counter-example to Millikan’s theory precisely because our ordinary standards for content 
ascriptions would rule against kimus having representations of snorfs or snorf-free areas. Based 
on the behavior of kimus and the stimuli that causes it we would likely ascribe to them instead  
representations of—and an attraction towards—red things. Cognitive ethologists or comparative 
representational  activity,  which  they  are  honoring with  the  label  of  “meaning”.  Recall  Lycan’s  humorous 
“Double Indexical” theory of  meaning—“MEANING =def Whatever aspect  of linguistic  activity happens to 
interest me now” (Lycan 1984: 272)—which we could paraphrase more broadly here as follows: “MEANING 
=def Whatever aspect of representational activity happens to interest me now”.
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psychologists studying kimus’ behavior would do the same. The discovery that kimus’ fondness 
for red things evolved because the nearby red-looking hilltop happened to be snorf-free is not 
likely to prompt a revision of this  ascription.  Since kimus’ cannot discriminate a snorf from 
anything else and their perceptual systems are not causally sensitive to snorfs or their absence, 
the best explanation of kimus’ behavior remains the one in terms of perception of—and fondness 
for—red things.
Now let us consider the frog’s case. Neander complains that it has been an assumption in 
the philosophical debate that the frog’s state represents “frog food or fly or some such thing” and 
that it misrepresents when triggered by a bee bee (Neander 1995: 131). But this hypothesis is 
based on ascriptions made after witnessing frogs’ hunting/feeding behavior and the stimuli that 
causes it—ascriptions that provide a very plausible explanation of frogs’ behavior. Our ordinary 
ascriptions are not perfect. People tend to ascribe more complex and fine-grained contents than 
animals’ representations are likely to have. Some people may think that frogs can represent flies 
qua flies, crickets qua crickets, etc. Also, some people may ascribe beliefs and desires to frogs: 
“It  thinks there is  a fly passing by and wants to  eat it”.  But  even such anthropomorphizing 
ascriptions often seem to contain a grain of truth. In any case, misconceptions can be easily  
corrected by studying further frogs’ behavior: we can go scientific. Consider the revolutionary 
research on frogs’ vision by Jerry Lettvin and his  colleagues.  Lettvin  et  al. (1959) start  the 
presentation of their discoveries with some crucial observations about frogs’ behavior:
A frog hunts on land by vision. He escapes enemies mainly by seeing them... The 
frog does not seem to see… the detail of stationary parts of the world around him. 
He will starve to death surrounded by food if it is not moving. He will leap to 
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capture any object the size of an insect or worm, providing it moves like one. He 
can be fooled easily… by any moving small object. (Lettvin et al. 1959: 1940)
After exposing frogs to various stimuli—fooling them in various ways—and measuring with 
electrodes  the  responses  in  their  nervous  systems,  they  discovered  that  frogs  have  different 
feature detectors—i.e., neurons that respond to specific stimuli such as moving edges or the net 
dimming of light. The most interesting ones were “convexity detectors”:
We have been tempted... to call the convexity detectors “bug perceivers.” Such a 
fiber... responds best when a dark object, smaller than a receptive field, enters that 
field, stops, and moves about intermittently thereafter... Could one better describe 
a system for detecting an accessible bug? (Lettvin et al. 1959: 1951)
Lettvin et al. realize that these neurons play the role of bug detectors, even though they cannot 
discriminate bugs from some other things—i.e., small and dark moving things.78 This is because 
of the role of the detectors in the explanation of frogs’ behavior: “the purpose of a frog’s vision is 
to get him food and allow him to evade predators” (Lettvin et al. 1959: 1950). Regarding them 
merely as detectors of small and dark moving things would not make room for characterizing the 
frog as being “fooled” in the lab when engaging in hunting behavior towards a metal pellet.
The fact that the ascriptions entailed by the hybrid account are in tune with ordinary and 
scientific ascriptions provides evidence in favor of the approach: independent evidence that the 
phenomena explained are indeed  meanings.  I  have focused on the role  of ascriptions in  the 
explanation of behavior, which is one of their main purposes (Devitt 1996). But ascriptions also 
78 Notice that this is consistent with the reasonable discrimination requirement, but not with the problematic one, 
which would not allow for a characterization of the neurons as bug detectors.
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serve the purpose of informing us about reality (Devitt 1996). In the case of scientific ascriptions  
of meaning to the representations used in non-human languages, the main purpose is that of 
explaining  how animal  utterances  serve  as  guides  to  reality  to  their  intraspecific  audiences 
(Devitt 2013: Sec. 3). Consider the cases I discussed of vervet monkeys and domestic chickens 
(see Chapter 2). Vervets use three distinct vocalizations to warn of the presence of leopards, 
eagles and snakes (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). Chickens use two distinct vocalizations to warn 
of the presence of aerial predators and land predators (Evans and Marler 1995). Each vocalization 
triggers  an  avoidance  behavior  in  the  audience  that  is  appropriate  to  the  particular  kind  of 
predator being announced. What these alarm calls represent, according to the hybrid account, are 
the specific kind of predators that cause their utterance when the consumers in the audience 
manage to perform Normally their avoidance behavior functions. When a chicken or a young 
vervet makes an aerial or eagle call in response to a non-predatory bird—as they often do—this 
is a misrepresentation because the running-for-cover behavior it triggers does not perform the 
function of protecting from an aerial predator, at least not Normally (it may on occasion do it 
abNormally, when the alarm is triggered by a non-predator but a yet unseen aerial predator is  
also approaching). In cases of animal communication, the hybrid account also makes ascriptions 
that are in tune with those made by scientists studying what “information” animals communicate 
to their conspecifics.
The hybrid account looks at what the consumers of representations need to perform their 
functions in order to determine which among all the causes that the producers respond to are the 
ones  that  they  are  supposed  to  respond  to.  By  relying  on  the  actual  causal  interactions  of 
perceptual mechanisms, the approach avoids ascribing implausible contents. By relying on the 
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functions of the consumers to separate Normal from abNormal causes, the approach is able to 
make plenty of room for misrepresentation.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the core motivation for teleosemantics and the main teleosemantic 
approaches.  On one hand, I argued that a consumer- or output-based approach makes ample 
room for misrepresentation but can ascribe implausible contents given the cognitive capacities of 
the perceptual mechanisms involved. On the other hand, I argued that a producer- or input-based 
approach has the advantage of explaining content in terms of what perceptual mechanisms can 
causally interact with, but has the drawback of not making enough room for misrepresentation. I 
proposed a hybrid producer-consumer approach that promises to make ascriptions that take into 
account  the  capacities  of  perceptual  mechanisms  while  also  making  enough  room  for 
misrepresentation. The focus of this chapter has been mainly on basic representations. In the next 
chapter I discuss how teleosemantics has been extended to complex human representations and I 
argue that a proper teleosemantics for such representations should be articulated in terms of basic 
sentence  acceptance.  The resulting  account  combines  insights  from Horwich’s use-theory  of 





In Chapter 5, I argued that a hybrid producer-consumer teleosemantics ascribes the right contents 
to  representations—taking  into  account  the  capacities  of  the  (perceptual)  mechanisms  that 
produce them,  while also making enough room for misrepresentation. The proposal is that the 
content of a representation is determined by its Normal cause: what is supposed to cause tokens 
in order for them to produce the effects they have the function of bringing about. The focus in 
Chapter 5 was on the contents of the most basic representations, which are the least controversial 
candidates for a teleosemantic account, since the existence of the mechanisms that produce and 
consume them is surely explained by natural selection operating over innate traits. But how can a 
teleosemantic approach be extended to cover also the meanings of the sophisticated mental and 
linguistic representations used by human beings? I suggested in Chapter 3 that a combination of 
basic-acceptance semantics with a teleonomic account of the functions of words and concepts 
can overcome the problems of ignorance and error that undermine Horwich’s dispositionalist 
version. In this chapter, I will elaborate on what sets apart human representations and what are 
the challenges for a teleosemantic account of their contents, I will then discuss available attempts 
by Papineau and Millikan  to  offer  a  teleosemantics  for  human representations  and critically 
assess them. Finally, I will discuss how a basic-acceptance teleosemantics can be articulated and 
what advantages does it have over standard teleosemantic accounts and over Horwich’s theory.
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6.2 Etiological Functions and Human Representations
The  sophisticated mental and linguistic representations that humans use for thinking and for 
communicating with each other differ in a number of ways from the  basic representations I 
discussed in Chapter 5. Notice that plenty of non-human representations also differ from such 
basic  representations  in  at  least  some  of  these  ways  and  it  is  likely  that  some  human 
representations are basic. But let us focus on the stark contrast between sophisticated human 
representations—which I will simply call “human representations”—and basic representations:
i. Many human representations are acquired rather than innate. Unlike beaver tail-splashes 
and the inner states produced by moth’s bat-detectors, which are directly the result of 
genetic selection, all the linguistic symbols that humans use to communicate with each 
other are the result of linguistic conventions and many—perhaps most—of the mental 
symbols  that  humans  use  for  thinking  are  the  result  of  learning.  Humans  coin  new 
concepts as a result of their interactions with the environment and thought processes, as 
well as new words to communicate thoughts involving these new concepts, but they also 
acquire concepts from learning the conventional meanings of words in their linguistic 
communities. So there is a complex interrelation between human language and thought.
ii. Human representations are  compositional. Beaver tail-splashes and the states produced 
by  moth’s  bat-detectors  are  not  combinations  of  simpler  representations  and  do  not 
combine  into  more  complex  ones.  Human  sentences  and  thoughts,  in  contrast,  are 
combinations  of words and concepts,  respectively, and their  meanings  depend on the 
meanings of these parts and the ways they are combined. The recursively applicable rules 
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of syntax explain the productivity and systematicity of human language: how a finite 
stock of words can be combined into innumerable sentences and how the words of some 
sentences  can  be  recombined  into  other  sentences.  The  hypothesis  that  thoughts  are 
syntactically structured combinations of concepts offers a very plausible explanation of 
the analogous productivity and systematicity of human thought (Fodor 1987: 147-154).
iii. Most  inner  human  representations  only  have  behavioral  effects  when combined  with  
other representations. The activated inner states of moth’s bat-detectors automatically 
make moths engage in bat-avoidance behavior without the mediation or collaboration of 
other  inner  representations.  Human  concepts  can  only  have  behavioral  effects  when 
combined into thoughts. But most human thoughts do not have behavioral effects on their 
own either: beliefs and desires only cause behaviors when suitably combined with each 
other to produce decisions to act—e.g., neither the belief that there is food in the fridge 
nor the desire to get food will independently make someone open the fridge to get food.
iv. Human  thoughts—as  well  as  the  sentences  used  to  express  them—are  inferentially 
linked. The inferential processes involved in theoretical and practical reasoning connect 
beliefs  and  desires  to  produce  new  beliefs  and  desires  and,  eventually,  to  produce 
decisions to act. The inferential links between thoughts parallel those between sentences. 
Just like ‘Dolphins are warm blooded’ can be inferred from ‘Dolphins are mammals’ and 
‘All mammals are warm blooded’, someone can come to believe that Dolphins are warm 
blooded because of believing that they are mammals and that all mammals are warm 
blooded. Since our best explanation of inferential links relies on syntactic structure, the 
account of inferential processes as computational operations performed over syntactically 
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structured inner representations arguably offers the best explanation of  thinking  (Fodor 
1987:  143-147).  While  some non-syntactic  structures—such  as  map-like  structures—
could in principle account for the productivity and systematicity of thought, it is unclear 
how could they account for thinking processes (Devitt 1996: 154-156).
v. Human words as well as concepts have different kinds of meanings. Beaver tail-splashes 
and the activated states of month’s bat-detectors have meanings determined by direct 
links to reality. While many human words and, more fundamentally, the concepts they 
express also have meanings determined by direct links to reality (e.g., ‘tiger’), it is very 
plausibly the case that others have meanings determined by links to other words/concepts 
(e.g.,  ‘bachelor’)  and yet  others  have meanings determined by their  links to  rules  of 
inference (e.g., ‘and’).
vi. The overall deployment of concepts—and, consequently, of the words used to express 
them—is partly a function of inferential processes. While the activated states of moth’s 
bat-detectors are directly produced by perceptual mechanisms, many tokens of human 
concepts are produced instead by inferential mechanisms that token thoughts containing 
them as a result  of other thoughts containing them—even when the causal-inferential 
chain may begin, for concepts linked to reality, with tokens produced by perception.
Teleosemantics can offer a plausible account of the meanings of basic representations which are 
innate, non-compositional, directly connected to perceptual causes and behavioral effects and, 
consequently, directly linked to what they represent. But an ambitious teleosemantic theory that 
expects to explain the nature of the meanings of mental and linguistic human representations 
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must: (1) offer an account of how acquired representations which do not have a history of genetic 
selection  can  have  etiological  functions,  (2)  offer  an  account  of  the  meanings  of 
thoughts/sentences based on an account of the meanings of concepts/words and how they are 
combined, (3) offer and account of the different functions of beliefs and desires and (4) offer an 
account of the explanatory role of inference in the performance of the functions of beliefs and 
desires. Additionally, as I argued in Chapter 3, a proper theory of meaning must (5) offer an 
account of how the meanings of various concepts and words are related either to their links to 
reality, their links to other concepts and words or their links to rules of inference, and also (6) 
explain how the meanings of linguistic and mental words (i.e., concepts) govern their overall use 
in inference. I will argue that none of the available versions of teleosemantics properly satisfies 
requirements (5) and (6), but that a teleosemantic theory articulated in terms of basic sentence 
acceptance—a “basic-acceptance teleosemantics”—can do so. Recall that I argued in Chapter 3 
that we need a basic-acceptance semantics precisely in order to account for the variety of kinds  
of meaning and, more importantly, for how meanings govern the uses of words. But I also argued 
that Horwich’s dispositionalist version is undermined by problems of ignorance and error. Basic-
acceptance teleosemantics is  meant to overcome this  problem by virtue of being based on a 
teleonomic account of how words are supposed to be used—instead of a dispositionalist account 
of how they are regularly used.
Before  elaborating  on  my  proposal,  I  will  discuss  the  teleosemantic  theories  that 
Papineau and Millikan offer to explain the meanings of human representations. Their accounts 
attempt  to  satisfy  requirements  (1)  to  (4).  Among  these,  (1)  is  the  crucial  requirement.  An 
ambitious teleosemantic theory can borrow available (non-teleonomic) accounts of belief-desire 
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psychology, inference  and compositionality—giving a  teleonomic  twist  to  them—as long  as 
human representations and/or the mechanisms responsible for their deployment have etiological 
functions.  The  most  pressing  question  is  how  acquired human  representations  and/or  the 
mechanisms  responsible  for  their  use  can  have  etiological  functions.  The  version  of 
teleosemantics  I  will  propose  is  new  in  regarding  basic  acceptance  as  crucial  to  meaning 
determination. But it will borrow plenty from the work of Papineau and Millikan, particularly 
regarding how acquired representations can have etiological functions.
How can acquired representations have etiological functions? One option, proposed by 
Papineau,  is  to  regard  the  learning  processes  responsible  for  the  acquisition  of  new mental 
representations  as  selective processes  (Papineau  1984:  557).  Another  option,  proposed  by 
Millikan,  is  to  regard  acquired  mental  representations  as  having functions  derived from the 
functions of the innate mechanisms responsible for their acquisition and deployment (Millikan 
1984: 41-43). Regarding linguistic representations, Millikan suggests that they have etiological 
functions  because  they  are  socio-culturally  reproduced  items  with  their  own  histories  of 
selection.  I  will  start  discussing  mental  representations.  If  Papineau  is  right,  acquired 
representations  have  direct functions.  This  allows  for  a  fairly  straightforward  application  of 
teleosemantics to human mental representations. I will first elaborate on Papineau’s account of 
mental content. Afterwards I will contrast it with Millikan’s alternative—and elaborate on her 
teleosemantic account of linguistic meaning. It is worth pointing out that despite differences in 
their earlier work, the views of Millikan and Papineau have to a large extent converged over the 
years.  This  includes  their  views  of  what  are  the  sources  of  teleonomy  for  acquired 
representations, which happen to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
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6.3 Papineau on Human Mental Representations
Papineau offers accounts of the contents of human beliefs, desires and the concepts that compose 
them, which are based on the functions these representations have been allegedly selected for 
performing—whether they are innate or acquired. In this section, I will elaborate on his proposal.
Papineau  expects  his  teleosemantic  account  to  cover  both  innate  and  acquired 
representations, since he conceives the acquisition of new representations as a selective process 
that is analogous to the intergenerational selection of innate traits: “Natural selection takes place 
in  learning  as  well  as  in  intergenerational  evolution  (though  then  it  is  natural  selection  of 
cognitive components rather than genes).” (Papineau 1984: 557). Dretske’s (1988) suggestion 
that the recruitment of representations by operant conditioning may be regarded as a form of 
selection is a variant of the same general idea (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). The idea that learning 
processes  are  selective  has  an  important  precedent  in  twentieth-century  psychology.  The 
influential psychologist B. F. Skinner insisted on the similarity between operant conditioning and 
natural selection:
In  both  operant  conditioning  and  the  evolutionary  selection  of  behavioral 
characteristics, consequences alter  future probability. Reflexes and other innate 
patterns of behavior evolve because they increase the chances of survival of the 
species.  Operants  grow  strong  because  they  are  followed  by  important 
consequences in the life of the individual. (Skinner 1953: 90)
Skinner’s claim is that both innate and learned behaviors are shaped by their  effects. While the 
phylogenetic  shaping  of  behavior  takes  long  periods  of  time,  working  only  across  multiple 
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generations, the ontogenetic shaping of behavior due to operant conditioning takes place in short 
periods of time, during the life of individuals. Skinner suggested that both processes “change the 
organism so that it adjusts to its environment in the sense of behaving in it more effectively... 
Successful responses are  selected in both cases, and the result is  adaptation” (Skinner  1966: 
1211-1212; emphasis added). The idea is that learning is a fast-paced selective process that, just 
like  its  slower  phylogenetic  counterpart,  produces  adaptive  behaviors.  Furthermore,  Skinner 
pointed out that both the phylogeny and the ontogeny of behavior “seem to «build purpose into» 
an organism” so that  “an ongoing system acts  as if it  had a  purpose” (Skinner  1966:  1211; 
emphasis added). Notice that Skinner here is getting very close to suggesting that the products of  
operant conditioning, just like those of natural selection, have teleonomic functions or purposes. 
He seems to be warning—just like those biologists that cautiously distinguish teleonomy from 
classical  teleology—that  the  sense  in  which  the  products  of  selection  can  be  said  to  have 
“purposes” is not the robust sense of in which intentionally designed items have purposes.
Skinner’s selectionist view of operant conditioning is very plausible—since the analogies 
between operant conditioning and natural selection are striking—and it constitutes an important 
precedent  of  the  selectionist  views  of  learning  proposed  by  Papineau  and  Dretske.79 But 
Skinner’s selectionist  view is  entangled  with  two problematic  features  of  his  thought.  First, 
Skinner was a radical behaviorist who disregarded inner or mental phenomena as irrelevant to 
the explanation of behavior. Second, he expected conditioning to explain the ontogeny of  all 
acquired behaviors, from the simplest to the most sophisticated ones. This model turned out to be 
inadequate  and  has  been  largely  replaced  by  a  cognitivist  model  in  which  inner  structures, 
79 See Hull, Langman and Glenn (2001) for a detailed discussion of the analogies between operant conditioning 
and natural selection—as well as a general characterization of  selection that applies to biological evolution, 
operant behavior and the workings of the immune system.
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processes and representations play crucial explanatory roles. One of the triggers of this cognitive 
revolution was, incidentally, the criticism by Noam Chomsky (1959) of Skinner’s attempt to 
explain  the  acquisition of  human verbal  behavior  in  terms of  reinforcement  (Skinner  1957). 
Operant conditioning is now considered just one among many forms of learning—not well suited 
to  explain  verbal  or  other  sophisticated  behaviors—and  it  is  often  itself  taken  to  involve 
cognitive components.  Dretske’s suggestion that learning may be regarded as selecting  inner 
representations,  for  example,  resurrects  Skinner’s  selective  account  while  disregarding  his 
behaviorism. However, Dretske only presents the idea as a tentative suggestion, when talking 
specifically about representations acquired by means of operant learning (Dretske 1988: 101), 
and  refrains  from  fully  endorsing  a  selective  account  of  the  functions  of  all  acquired 
representations.80 Papineau, in contrast, is confident that the kinds of learning involved in the 
acquisition  of  all  inner  representations—including  human  beliefs,  desires  and  concepts—are 
function-conferring selective processes. He offers the following hypothetical illustration of how 
this may come about in the case of beliefs:
Suppose our individual psychological developments throw up new possible belief 
types, new ways of responding mentally to circumstances, at random, analogously 
to  the way that  our  genetic  history throws up mutations  at  random.  Then we 
would expect such new dispositions to become ‘fixed’ just in case belief tokens 
give rise to advantageous (that is psychologically rewarding) actions, analogously 
to  the  way  that  genetic  mutations  become  fixed  just  in  case  they  have 
80 Dretske prefers to talk about the “recruitment” of innate and acquired representations. He is only committed to  
the recruitment of innate representations being a selective process. But he does not elaborate much on how the 
recruitment of both innate and acquired representations is a function-conferring process. Godfrey-Smith argues 
that this “leaves a gap in [Dretske’s] theory” that should be filled in by a selective account which “can apply 
equally to genetic and learning-theoretic cases” (Godfrey-Smith 1992: 291).
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advantageous (offspring-producing) results. (Papineau 1987: 66)
Papineau  does  not  articulate  a  detailed  account  of  how  human  beings  actually  acquire 
representations—which is something better left for scientific psychology to figure out. But he 
warns that the link between sophisticated representations and behaviors in human belief-desire 
psychology is not fixed merely by conditioning which, he points out, is a “relatively primitive 
method of generating actions” (Papineau 1993: 79-80). Nonetheless, he expects the acquisition 
of  the  relevant  representations  to  have—just  like  operant  conditioning—crucial  features  in 
common with genetic selection. This is a very interesting idea. It is very plausible that some 
inner representations are acquired by means of some selective process. It is doubtful, however, 
that the analogy with genetic selection can be properly extended from operant conditioning to the 
kinds of learning involved in the acquisition of all novel representations. But the account can be 
combined  with  the  account  Millikan  offers  (see Section  6.4)  in  order  to  provide  a  solid 
teleonomic account of the acquisition of human mental representations. I will elaborate on how 
Papineau makes use of this  idea to offer a teleosemantic account that applies equally to the 
meanings of innate and acquired human representations.
Papineau offers teleonomic accounts of the contents of beliefs, desires and the concepts 
that compose them. Regarding beliefs, his suggestion is the following:
The disposition to form a given type of belief is explained by the fact that that 
belief has typically arisen in certain circumstances, and in those circumstances the 
actions  that  it  has  directed  have  been  selectively  advantageous.  The  typical 
circumstances in question are the belief’s truth conditions. (Papineau 1984: 557)
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Since Papineau regards learning as a selective process, this  account is supposed to cover all 
beliefs. The idea is that a belief (whether acquired or innate) has been selected because it has had 
beneficial behavioral effects (either for the individual or for its ancestors) when tokened under 
specific  conditions.  Given its  selective history, the belief  is  supposed to  be tokened in such 
conditions,  which  are  what  it  represents—its  truth-conditional  content.  This  account  has  the 
virtue  of  making  room  for  misrepresentation:  belief  tokens  are  false  when  they  occur  in 
“untypical”  circumstances  that  differ  from  those  under  which  those  types  of  tokens  where 
selected (Papineau 1984: 558). Suppose that I have acquired a disposition to token certain belief 
because past  tokens of  this  belief  had  beneficial  behavioral  effects  specifically  when it  was 
raining—such as helping me stay dry by making me seek cover or pick up an umbrella. My 
belief is consequently supposed to be co-present with the occurrence of rain and it is false when 
tokened in the absence of rain.
Notice that Papineau’s account is somewhat similar to Millikan’s account of the content 
of basic innate representations—although extended to cover acquired representations: in both 
cases the content is the condition that the representation, given its selective history, is supposed 
to  covary  with.  (A crucial  difference  is  that  Papineau  relies  on  “typical”  conditions,  while 
Millikan relies on “Normal” conditions—and the difference is not merely terminological, since 
he does regard such conditions as those that were average during the selection period. This leads 
to a problem that I will point out in the next section.)
Beliefs, however, differ from basic representations not only because they are often not 
innate, but also because they only cause actions when combined with desires. My belief that it is 
raining will only make me pick up an umbrella or seek cover if I want to stay dry. Also, the 
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contents of beliefs and desires depend on the contents of concepts that compose them and the 
way they are combined. The content of the belief that elephants swim depends on the content of 
the  concepts  expressed  by  ‘elephants’  and  ‘swim’—and  presumably  on  its  predicational 
structure. Papineau attempts to accommodate these complexities by offering teleonomic accounts 
of the content desires, of the content concepts and of how the different pieces of the puzzle fit 
together.
The “biological purpose” of desires, Papineau proposes, is to cause behaviors that bring 
about conditions which meet the varying needs of the organism. He offers the following account 
of their content:
[The] satisfaction condition for a given desire is that characteristic result of the 
actions it directs which has been selectively advantageous, and the production of 
which therefore explains the disposition to form that desire. (Papineau 1984: 562)
The  idea  is  that  a  desire  has  been  selected  because  the  behaviors  prompted  by  its  tokens 
produced certain beneficial effects. Given its selective history, the desire is supposed to produce 
such effects, to bring about certain conditions in the world, which are what it represents—its 
satisfaction conditions. Again, Papineau intends this account to cover innately determined and 
acquired states. The explanation of why I have an innate disposition to desire to eat (whenever I 
need nutrition) involves intergenerational natural selection: my ancestors benefited from having 
inner states that made them get food into their stomachs. According to Papineau, the acquisition 
of novel desires is also a selective process (Papineau 1984: 563). The explanation of why I have 
a desire to drink coffee in the morning, for example, may be that drinking coffee in the morning 
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has been psychologically rewarding in the past, so a disposition to token the desire has been 
selected for producing this behavior.
In Papineau’s account, desires and beliefs are both selected because of their behavioral 
effects, but their contents depend on different aspects of their roles. The contents of desires are 
the conditions they are supposed to produce, while the contents of beliefs are the conditions they 
are supposed to be co-present with. Notice that desires “fluctuate… in response to environmental 
circumstances”—e.g., the desire to eat is supposed to be triggered when the level of blood sugar 
is low—yet they do not represent such circumstances (Papineau 1984: 564). Conversely, beliefs 
are supposed to direct behavior, but they do not represent their behavioral effects. How are the 
contents of desires and beliefs related to their etiological functions or purposes in Papineau’s 
account? In the case of desires, the answer is simple: their contents are the conditions they have 
the  purpose  of  bringing  about.  Regarding  beliefs,  Papineau’s initial  suggestion  is  that  their 
purpose is “to be present when certain states of affairs obtain” (Papineau 1984: 559). So their 
contents  would  be  the  conditions  they  have  the  purpose  of  being  co-present  with.  But  this 
characterization  of  the  purpose  of  beliefs  is  problematic.  Etiological  functions  are  selected 
effects. Being co-present with certain states of affairs is not even an  effect of beliefs. A later 
suggestion of Papineau is that the purpose of beliefs is “to produce whichever results will fulfil  
the purposes of the desires they are acting in concert  with… to generate actions which will 
produce desired results in such-and-such conditions” (Papineau 1998: 8). This second suggestion 
is preferable. Directing behavior to satisfy the desires they are combined with is an  effect that 
beliefs  could  be  selected  for producing  (including  acquired  beliefs,  if  Papineau’s  selective 
account of learning were right). In order to explain their contents in terms of co-presence, then, 
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we should not say that beliefs have the purpose of being co-present with certain states of affairs, 
but rather that beliefs perform their  function of contributing to the satisfaction of desires by 
being co-present with certain states of affairs, which are what they represent.
Papineau refines his characterization of the contents of beliefs, taking into account their 
collaboration  with  desires:  “we  should  count  as  the  truth  conditions  of  beliefs  not  simply 
circumstances in which the resulting actions have advantageous effects, but rather circumstances 
in which those actions lead to the satisfaction of desires” (Papineau 1984: 564-65). Consider, for 
example, my disposition to form the belief that the artifact I am perceiving is my television’s 
remote control. According to Papineau’s account, the explanation of why this belief has been 
selected is that its tokens have led in “typical circumstances” to the satisfaction of the desires 
they were combined with. The “typical circumstances” were specifically those in which I was 
perceiving  my  television’s  remote  control,  so  those  circumstances  are  the  belief’s  truth 
conditions. Once the truth conditions of the belief have been fixed by its selective history, tokens 
will still cause similar behaviors when combined with similar desires, but they may be false and, 
consequently, fail  to  perform their  function.  When combined with  the  desire  to  turn  on the 
television, the belief will make me press the artifact’s power button. When combined with the 
desire to turn off the sound of the television, it will make me press the artifact’s mute button. 
Such behaviors may succeed or fail to satisfy the relevant desires depending on whether the 
belief is tokened in “typical” or “untypical” circumstances—e.g., when I mistake my stereo’s 
remote control for my television’s, I fail to turn on the television when pressing the artifact’s 
power button. Basically, Papineau explains the current success or failure of an already selected 
belief in performing its function in terms of its truth or falsity and the truth conditions of the 
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belief in terms of its past success in contributing to the satisfaction of desires. (Papineau further 
characterizes truth conditions of a belief as those that guarantee the success of actions based on 
them. This is another problematic feature that I will briefly discuss in the next section.)
A belief will produce different behaviors in combination with different desires. Beliefs do 
not have specific behavioral effects of their own—however, they do have specific circumstances 
under which they are supposed to be tokened. Similarly, a desire will produce different behaviors 
in combination with different beliefs. My desire to eat may make me open my fridge or go to the 
grocery  store,  depending on what  beliefs  it  is  combined with.  But  Papineau’s account  does 
require some specific effect of all successful behaviors directed by a desire to be its satisfaction 
condition, since this is the condition the desire has the purpose of bringing about. So he suggests 
that the content of the desire is the effect it is  always supposed to produce, regardless of what 
beliefs it is combined with (Papineau 1998: 12). Whether it makes me open my fridge or go the 
grocery store, my desire to eat has the purpose of getting food into my stomach. Still, in order to 
direct behaviors that fulfill their purposes, desires must be combined with  appropriate beliefs: 
beliefs that are true and relevant to their satisfaction. Papineau suggests that part of the purpose 
of the “inferential mechanism” in the “human decision-making system” is to generate true beliefs 
about means to satisfy desires—out of true background beliefs—and that, consequently, there is 
an  interdependence between  the  purposes  of  beliefs,  desires  and  the  inferential  mechanism 
(Papineau 1993: 76-77). The inferential mechanism, he proposes, has been selected for making 
valid inferences: “Habits of thought which correspond to... deductively valid steps will tend to be 
preserved by natural selection” (Papineau 1987: 77). The advantage of this etiological account is 
that it is able to explain why the mechanism is  supposed to produce certain conclusions rather 
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than others. While “humans often draw invalid conclusions”, Papineau points out, this “doesn’t 
show that validity isn’t the inferential mechanism’s purpose, any more than heart failures show 
that blood circulation isn’t the heart’s purpose” (Papineau 1993: 77). Notice that a non-historical 
account of the function of the inferential mechanism in terms of its current dispositions—of the 
sort that a Cummins-style functional analysis would provide—cannot explain inferential error for 
the same reason that it  cannot explain why a failing heart  is malfunctioning (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.7).
Papineau’s  discussion  of  the  inferential  mechanism focuses  on  deductive  inferences, 
including those that have beliefs about means to satisfy desires as conclusions. But a full account 
should  be  extended  in  two  ways.  First,  it  should  cover  inductive  and  abductive  theoretical 
inferences—which also play important roles in how human beings form new beliefs out of old 
ones. Second, it should cover practical inferences that have beliefs and desires as premises and 
intentions  or  decisions  to  act  as  conclusions—which are  crucial  to  explain  how beliefs  and 
desires are combined to direct behavior. Consider my belief that drinking the liquid in my glass 
will quench my thirst. This seems to be the kind of belief about means that Papineau has in mind. 
I may have inferred it from my beliefs that lemonade quenches thirst and that the liquid in my 
glass is lemonade. But the belief will not make me drink the liquid unless it is combined with my 
desire to quench my thirst to produce a decision to act. This form of practical inference provides 
a  clear  example  of  the  interdependence between  the  purposes  of  beliefs,  desires  and  the 
inferential mechanism. Also, it is in tune with Papineau’s claims that beliefs and desires cannot 
have behavioral effects on their own and that the inferential mechanism is part of the decision-
making system. Once the etiological account has been extended to cover these other forms of 
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inference, however, the claim that validity is the purpose of the inferential mechanism must also 
be revised. Good inductive and abductive inferences are not valid. Intentions or decisions to act 
have satisfaction-conditions rather than truth-conditions, so a good practical inference cannot be 
characterized as truth-preserving. What the etiological account must say is that the purpose of the 
inferential mechanism (or mechanisms) is to produce conclusions that are well-supported by the 
premises—thereby  producing  (1)  beliefs  that  are  guaranteed  or  likely  to  be  true  when  the 
premises of theoretical inferences are true and (2) decisions to act in ways that satisfy desires 
when the beliefs about means in the premises of practical inferences are true.
A crucial piece of the puzzle is still missing. Human beliefs and desires are structured 
combinations of meaningful parts. The structures of thoughts are crucial to their participation in 
inferential processes. If the purposes of beliefs and desires are interdependent with the purpose 
of the inferential mechanism in the decision-making system, then beliefs and desires must have 
appropriate structures in order to perform their functions. Additionally, the meanings of thoughts 
depend on their structures and the meanings of their parts. A teleonomic account of the functions 
and contents of thoughts must explain how they are related to the functions and contents of the 
concepts that compose them. Papineau proposes that the function of a concept depends on its 
selective history:
A concept will get selected because in combination with other concepts it forms 
beliefs  which,  in  ‘typical’  circumstances,  lead  to  advantageous  behavior.  At 
bottom it  is  the concepts that get selected...  And so we can think of concepts 
themselves as having purposes – namely, to ‘refer’ to certain objects – which then 
contribute to the purposes of beliefs. (Papineau 1987: 76-77)
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Papineau intends  a  full  account  to  include  desires:  concepts  get  selected  because  they  form 
beliefs and desires which, in concert with each other, lead to advantageous behavior. Like him, I 
will set aside desires for the sake of simplicity. Papineau expects the truth-conditions of beliefs to 
be explained by their structure and the referential values of the concepts they contain: “we need 
to start with the components of beliefs, such as singular concepts, predicate concepts, ways of 
combining concepts  and so on,  and to  focus  on the  referential  values of  such components” 
(Papineau 1993: 82). His account of truth-conditions in terms of what states of affairs beliefs are 
supposed to be co-present with is  reductive:  it  explains truth-conditions non-semantically, in 
terms of  teleonomic links between beliefs  and states  of  affairs.  But  he intends the complete 
explanation to be compositional: what state of affairs a belief is supposed to be co-present with, 
he says, “will depend in turn on the concepts and structure making up the causal role of the 
belief” (Papineau 1987: 76). His basic idea is clear:  what a concept contributes to the truth-
condition of a belief is its referential value, which is reductively explained by its  teleonomic 
links to certain objects.
Papineau insists that a concept can only get selected because it  contributes to beliefs 
performing their functions (Papineau 1987: 77). So the teleonomic links between a concept and 
certain objects are those links that it had when it was selected because the beliefs it was tokened 
in directed advantageous behavior. While Papineau says that the purpose of concepts is to “refer” 
to certain objects, this semantic description is a place-holder for a non-semantic one in terms of 
teleonomic links. But notice that this characterization of the function of concepts is problematic. 
Referring to certain objects—even if this is spelled out in non-semantic terms—is not an effect of 
a concept.  The effects  that concepts could be selected  for producing (if  Papineau’s selective 
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account were right) would rather have to be the effects on behavior they have had when tokened 
in beliefs—effects that may then be explained by links to objects. The content of a concept 
should not be identified with its function, but with the links it is supposed to have in order to 
perform its function of contributing to the production of advantageous behavior.
Suppose that beliefs are mental sentences. According to Papineau’s theory, then, the name 
‘Harry’ (i.e., a singular concept) in my mental lexicon was selected because it was tokened in 
mental sentences that were co-present with states of affairs involving Harry. The link between 
‘Harry’ and Harry was what the word contributed in those occasions to the link between the full 
sentences and the complete states of affairs. Similarly, my mental predicate ‘is talking’ (i.e., a 
predicate concept) was selected when tokened in mental sentences that were co-present with 
talking things. Given their selective history, ‘Harry’ and ‘is talking’ are supposed to be tokened in 
sentences  that  are  co-present  with  states  of  affairs  involving  Harry  and  talking  things, 
respectively. Now suppose that I combine the name and the predicate, forming a mental token of 
‘Harry  is  talking’.  Given its  structure  and the  teleonomic links  of  its  parts,  this  sentence  is 
supposed to be co-present with the state of affairs that Harry is talking. If I made a mistake and 
the one who is talking is instead Harry’s twin brother, my belief is false because ‘Harry’ has a 
teleonomic link to Harry and not to his brother. If I made a mistake and Harry is babbling rather 
than talking, my belief is false because ‘is talking’ has a teleonomic link to talking things and not 
to things that are making meaningless vocal sounds. Reference is not determined by the current 
causal  links  to  reality  of  tokens  of  a  mental  word.  So  the  account  makes  room  for 
misrepresentation, for errors in the deployment of mental words.
As we have seen, Papineau adopts the common characterization of the contents of beliefs 
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and  desires  in  terms  of  truth  and  satisfaction  conditions,  as  well  as  a  compositional 
characterization of  such conditions  in  terms of the structures of  thoughts  and the referential 
values of the concepts that compose them. Additionally, he adopts the standard characterization 
of the roles of beliefs, desires and inference in the production of behavior. But Papineau explains 
each of these elements in terms of etiological functions—specifically, of functions that beliefs, 
desires,  concepts  and  even  inference  patterns  have  been  selected  for  performing.  The  main 
advantage of this etiological twist is that it promises to make room for representational error. I 
have tried to offer a sympathetic summary of Papineau’s views. But the way he articulates his 
teleosemantic account does face some difficulties—the most serious of which stems from his 
bold suggestion that the learning processes responsible for  all acquired mental representations 
are selective processes. These problems are avoided by combining his account with Millikan’s 
alternative one. In the next section, I will explain how Millikan’s account of the functions and 
contents of mental representations differs from Papineau’s, discuss how it avoids some problems 
faced by Papineau’s account and elaborate on how Millikan extends teleosemantics to cover 
linguistic representations. Afterwards, I will discuss the problems shared by both accounts and 
argue that a basic-acceptance teleosemantics can overcome them.
6.4 Millikan on Human Mental Representations
Millikan’s teleosemantic  account  of  the contents  of  human mental  representations  has  many 
features  in  common with  Papineau’s.  Like  Papineau,  she  proposes  that  the  main  etiological 
function  of  desires  is  to  bring  about  certain  conditions  in  the  world,  which  constitute  their 
contents  or  satisfaction  conditions,  and  that  beliefs—given  their  etiological  functions—are 
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supposed to be correlated with certain conditions in the world, which constitute their contents or 
truth  conditions.  Millikan  also  offers  a  teleonomic  account  of  the  inferential  mechanisms 
involved  in  the  decision-making system and a  compositional  explanation  of  the  contents  of 
thoughts  in terms of their  structure and the teleonomic links  to  reality  of the concepts  they 
contain.  So  described,  Millikan’s  proposal  seems  identical  to  Papineau’s.  But  this  general 
description glosses over some differences between the proposals, which I will discuss in this 
section. I will first discuss the similarities and some minor differences between the proposals. 
Afterwards  I  will  focus  on  the  most  significant  difference:  that  Millikan’s  account  of  the 
functions of acquired mental representations does not rely on their own selective history, but on 
the selective history of the innate mechanisms responsible for their acquisition and use: novel 
mental representations have derived rather that direct functions. I shall argue that this feature of 
Millikan’s account is a crucial contribution to the project of extending teleosemantics to cover 
acquired  mental  representations.  While  it  is  indeed  very  plausible  that  some acquired 
representations have selective histories of their own, as Papineau suggests, there are reasonable 
doubts about  all of them having such histories. However, there are good reasons for expecting 
that  the  underlying  innate  mechanisms  that  enable  human  beings  to  coin  and deploy  novel 
representations been selected for doing so. So a combination of both accounts of the source of 
teleonomy for human mental representations is preferable. After discussing Millikan’s account of 
acquired mental representations, I will present her proposal for how to extend teleosemantics to 
cover acquired linguistic representations.
Let us start with desires. Like Papineau, Millikan proposes that the contents of desires are 
individuated by their purposes: “the descriptions that we give of desires are descriptions of their 
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most  obvious  proper  functions”  (Millikan  1993:  67).  The  content  we  ascribe  to  a  desire, 
according to Millikan, is the condition it has the purpose of bringing about if the ascription is 
correct.  Millikan suggests that desires have an additional purpose related to their  role in the 
decision-making system: “desires have as a subsidiary proper function to participate in practical 
inferences along with beliefs” (Millikan 1993: 71). The idea is that desires perform their main 
function—bringing about their satisfaction conditions—by means of performing the function of 
participating in inferences that combine them with relevant beliefs to produce decisions to act. 
Like Papineau, Millikan suggests that the inferential mechanisms themselves have etiological 
functions. One such function is “to produce true beliefs from prior beliefs... by conforming to 
logical principles...  that  move  us  to  true  beliefs  reliably,  or  relatively  reliably  (inductive 
inference), from other  truths” (Millikan 1993: 245-46).81 She also stresses that the inferential 
mechanisms have  the  function  of  combining beliefs  and desires  to  produce  decisions  to  act 
(Millikan 1993: 99).
In contrast with her view on desires, Millikan argues that the contents of beliefs are not  
individuated  by  their  purposes.  One function  of  a  belief,  she  proposes,  is  “to  participate  in 
inferences in such a manner as to help produce fulfillment of desires”, while another function is 
“to participate in inferences to yield other beliefs, true ones” (Millikan 1993: 71). Millikan’s 
account of the functions and contents of beliefs differs in some respects from Papineau’s. She 
does identify, like Papineau, the truth-conditional content of a belief with the state of affairs it is 
supposed to  be  correlated  with—or,  as  she  prefers  to  put  it,  “correspond”  or  “map  onto”. 
However, she does not regard mapping onto a state of affairs as the function of a belief. So why 
81 The inferential mechanisms can also function properly when producing true beliefs from prior false beliefs—as 
it is the case when they perform correct reductio inferences (Millikan 1993: 246n).
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is the belief  supposed to map onto a specific state of affairs? Millikan’s general answer is the 
same as the one she gives in the case of basic representations: mapping onto a specific state of  
affairs is the crucial Normal condition for the performance of the belief’s function (Millikan 
1993:  71-74).  When  I  presented  Millikan’s  account  of  the  content  of  basic  representations 
(Chapter 5, Section 5.4), I pointed out that the notion of a “Normal condition” is a normative and 
historical  notion:  it  is  a  condition  that  must  obtain  for  an  item  to  perform  its  function  in  
accordance with a Normal explanation—which in turn is an explanation of what has historically 
happened during the proper performance of the function. This simple model must be adjusted in 
order  to  apply  to  the  performance  of  the  derived  functions  that  novel  human  beliefs  have 
according to Millikan. I will set this aside to simplify matters, but I will get back to it shortly. For 
the moment, I will simply assume that Millikan has a way to account for the functions of novel 
representations and the Normal conditions for their performance. Another complexity is that the 
mapping in the case of human beliefs is  not  between a simple representation and a state  of 
affairs, but involves instead some sort of compositional principles according to which a belief is 
supposed to map onto a certain portion of reality based on its structure and the referential links to 
reality of the concepts it contains—just like in Papineau’s full account. I will also set these issues 
aside for a moment.
Millikan’s  account  of  the  functions of  beliefs,  as  well  as  her  notion  of  a  “Normal 
condition”,  differs  from Papineau’s account  of  the  functions of  beliefs  and  his  notion  of  a 
“typical circumstance”. As I pointed out above, Papineau’s proposal that the function of a belief 
is “to be present when certain states of affairs obtain” (Papineau 1984: 559) does not fit well with 
the view that functions involve  effects.82 Millikan, in contrast, characterizes the functions of a 
82 Here is another passage where Papineau expresses this view: “the biological purpose of beliefs [is] to occur in 
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belief  clearly  in  terms of  the effects  it  is  supposed to  have:  one function  of  a  belief  is  “to 
participate  in  inferences  in  such a  manner  as  to  help  produce  fulfillment  of  desires”,  while 
another function is “to participate in inferences to yield other beliefs, true ones” (Millikan 1993: 
71).  In  fairness,  Papineau’s  later  proposal—i.e.,  that  the  function  of  a  belief  is  “to  produce 
whichever  results  will  fulfil  the  purposes  of  the  desires  they  are  acting  in  concert  with” 
(Papineau 1998: 8)—is equivalent to Millikan’s and does not have the problem of his initial one, 
as I pointed out in the last section. The views of Millikan and Papineau have converged on this 
matter. Still, there are a couple of other significant differences on which the accounts differ.
Recall that, for Papineau, a belief represents those “typical circumstances” under which it 
has lead to advantageous behavior. For Papineau, the “typical” circumstances under which a 
belief is supposed to be tokened are the average or ecologically normal conditions that obtained 
during the period when it was selected. This allows for beliefs being misrepresentations when 
tokened  in  “untypical”  circumstances  after selection  has  taken  place:  “it  is  only  the  past 
predominance of true belief over false that is required” (Papineau 1984: 558). But this does not 
make  enough  room  for  misrepresentation  happening  during  the  selection  period.  As  Devitt 
objects in his review of Papineau (1987):
The insistence that a belief must have had a history of usually being true runs into 
the  problem  that  was  so  disastrous  for  the...  hybrid  theory  consisting  of 
informationalism  with  a  dash  of  teleology…  This  is  the  problem  of  false 
the presence  of  certain states  of  affairs,  which  states  of  affairs  therefore [count]  as  their  truth conditions” 
(Papineau 1987: xvi). Papineau (1993) still makes a similar claim: “we can pick out the real truth condition of a  
belief as that condition which it is the biological purpose of the belief to be co-present with” (Papineau 1993: 
58). But he clarifies in a footnote: “biological purposes are always a matter of results… the purposes of beliefs 
are to get the organism to  behave in a way appropriate to certain circumstances” (Papineau 1993: 59n). This 
latter claim avoids the mentioned problem.
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positives. Many species have survived only by mostly misrepresenting the world. 
What got selected, from the beginning, were beliefs whose tokens were true when 
it mattered for survival, even though they may have been mostly false. In this 
crucial respect, Papineau’s full-blown teleological theory is no advance over the 
partly teleological hybrid theory. (Devitt 1991: 439)
The hybrid theory that Devitt is alluding to here is the combination of indicator semantics with 
an  etiological  account  of  functions  offered  by  Dretske  (1988).  Papineau’s account  based  on 
“typical conditions” suffers from the same problem with false positives (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.3). Additionally, Papineau characterizes typical circumstances as  guaranteeing the success of 
behaviors: “truth conditions are circumstances which ensure the success of action” (Papineau 
1984: 565). As Devitt remarks, this is simply wrong: “Truth does not guarantee success. The 
satisfaction of many desires depends on things that are quite outside the control of the desirer: on 
the natural order; on the socio-economic situation; on the personal foibles of others; and so on.” 
(Devitt  1991:  439).  Based on my true belief  that  it  is  raining  I  may carry  an umbrella  and 
succeed in staying dry. But there may be no umbrella around. My true belief obviously does not 
guarantee that I will succeed.
Millikan’s characterization of content-fixing circumstances avoids the two problems just 
mentioned:  her  Normal  conditions  are  neither  typical  conditions  nor  success-guaranteeing 
conditions.  Instead,  they  are  the  conditions  that  obtained  on  those  special  historical 
circumstances  under  which  the  representation  successfully  performed  its  function.  Such 
conditions  may  have  rarely obtained when the  representation  was  tokened.  As  I  showed in 
Chapter  5,  Section  5.4,  Millikan’s account  in  terms  of  Normal  conditions  makes  room for 
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frequent false positives. Additionally, the conditions may obtain on plenty of occasions when the 
representation fails to perform its function. That a frog darts its tongue in the presence of a fly 
does not guarantee that the fly will not manage to escape. Millikan’s account has no problem 
with this because her “Normal conditions” are not sufficient conditions for the performance of a 
function.83 An output-oriented teleosemantic theory like Papineau’s, which attempts to explain 
the truth-conditions of beliefs in terms of circumstances that they are supposed to be co-present 
or covary with in order to bring about beneficial effects, is better off relying on a Millikanian 
notion of Normal conditions. I take it that this is a small but helpful amendment for a theory like 
Papineau’s. As I argued in Chapter 5, however, while an output-oriented teleosemantics based on 
Normal conditions makes plenty of room for misrepresentation (including false positives), it also 
faces problems that stem from not assigning any role whatsoever to the causes of representations 
in the determination of their meaning. This is a shared—and in my opinion serious—concern 
about Millikan’s and Papineau’s accounts. I will get back to it in the next section.
It is time to discuss the main difference between the proposals of Millikan and Papineau
—at least as originally articulated—which concerns their accounts of the source of teleology for 
acquired mental representations. While Papineau proposes that learning processes are selective, 
Millikan suggests that acquired representations have functions derived from the functions of the 
innate  mechanisms  that  are  ultimately  responsible  for  their  acquisition  and  deployment.  I 
discussed  Millikan’s  account  of  derived  functions  in  Chapter  4,  Section  4.6.  Recall  that, 
83 As Justine Kingsbury points out, Millikan’s Normal conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions 
for a representation performing its function (Kingsbury 2006). The reason they are not necessary is that the 
token of a representation may perform its function abNormally in situations when the Normal condition does not 
obtain. For example, a beaver may mistakenly token an alarm call, causing all the family to dive for safety, after  
hearing a branch fall from a tree, but by pure accident save the family from an undetected predator that was 
lurking around. It is easy to imagine analogous situations involving human beliefs.
265
according to Millikan, an item A has a derived function to do F if and only if A is the product of a 
device M that has the direct function of producing items like A in order to do F (Millikan 1993: 
13-14). (Strictly speaking, the device M may also have a derived function to produce items like 
A, but then such a function will have to be derived from another device that has the function of 
producing  devices  like  M…  Derived  functions  must  be  ultimately  anchored  on  the  direct 
functions of mechanisms that have been historically built and maintained by a selective process.) 
For example, the color pattern of the skin of a Smith’s dwarf chameleon has the function of 
protecting  the  chameleon  from predators  by  making it  blend  with  its  surroundings.  But  the 
pattern has not itself been selected for doing this. It is not itself a reproduction of earlier patterns 
and, in fact, it may be a pattern that has never occurred before in the evolutionary history Smith’s 
dwarf  chameleons.  However,  the  pattern  is  the  product  of  innate  mechanisms that  have  the 
function of producing such color patterns in order to protect chameleons from predators. The 
mechanisms  have  been  built  and  maintained  by  natural  selection  precisely  for  doing  this. 
Consequently,  the  color  pattern  has  the  derived function  of  protecting  the  chameleon  from 
predators. According to Millikan, the relationship between the functions of novel representations 
and the functions of the innate mechanisms responsible for producing them is of the same kind 
(Millikan 1984: Ch. 2 & 1993: Ch. 4).
Consider the functions ascribed by Millikan’s theory to human desires and beliefs: the 
function  of  desires  being  to  bring  about  their  satisfaction  conditions  by  participating  in 
inferences that combine them with relevant beliefs to produce decisions to act; and the function 
of beliefs being to participate in inferences to produce other beliefs and to help produce the 
fulfillment of desires. As far as acquired beliefs and desires are concerned, these are, according 
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to Millikan, derived functions that these states have because the mechanisms that produce them 
have the function of producing such states as means to perform their ultimate functions—which 
we may characterize, very roughly, as modulating behavior in ways that are appropriate, given 
varying conditions in the world, to  satisfy our varying needs. The machinery involved in the 
deployment of human mental representations is orders of magnitude more complicated than the 
machinery involved in the deployment of the basic internal representations discussed in Chapter 
5—such as the frog’s “bug detector”. It involves a whole system of beliefs and desires composed 
out of concepts and interlinked with each other in inferential processes. This complexity makes 
the system considerably more flexible. But at bottom it works, just like the most basic systems, 
by  mediating  between  inputs  from perception  and  outputs  to  behavior,  according  to  certain 
principles of operation:
The human’s mainframe takes,  roughly, stimulations  of  the  afferent  nerves  as 
input… It  responds,  in  part,  by developing concepts,  by acquiring beliefs  and 
desires  in  accordance  with  these  concepts,  by  engaging  in  practical  inference 
leading ultimately to action… When conditions are optimal, all this aids survival 
and proliferation in accordance with a historically normal explanation, one of high 
generality, of course. (Millikan 1993: 95)
Millikan’s very reasonable contention is that the innate human mechanisms responsible for our 
development  of  concepts  and  our  acquisition  of  beliefs  and  desires  have  been  built  and 
maintained by natural selection—i.e.,  “designed”—precisely for doing this, so that producing 
novel concepts,  beliefs and desires are among their  direct functions.  After all,  the extremely 
complex “design” of the human brain responsible for our acquisition of concepts, beliefs and 
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desires calls for an explanation. And the only viable explanation is the Darwinian one.
As I said above, the account of belief content in terms of Normal conditions needs to be 
adjusted in the case of acquired beliefs. Since an acquired belief has no selective history of its 
own  on  Millikan’s model,  the  crucial  Normal  condition  for  the  performance  of  its  derived 
functions cannot be one that figures in a Normal explanation of how token beliefs of the same 
type historically managed to perform their functions. How can there be Normal conditions for a 
device performing a derived function? Millikan’s answer relies on the Normal explanation of 
how the mechanisms that produce the device are supposed to work. In the case of the chameleon, 
for example, the pigment rearrangement mechanisms are supposed to perform their function—of 
protecting it from predator detection—by means of producing patterns of skin color that bear the 
relation of  having  the  same-pattern-of-color-as  the  surface  the  chameleon  is  sitting  on—
whatever  it  may  be.  The Normal  condition  for  a  particular  and  novel  pattern  of  skin  color 
performing its derived function is, consequently, that is does bear that relation to the surface the 
chameleon is sitting on (Millikan 1984: 42-44). For example, if the chameleon’s skin is currently 
yellow  with  black  dots,  then  its  Normal  condition  for  performing  its  derived  function—of 
protecting the chameleon from predators—is simply that the chameleon is sitting on a surface 
that actually is yellow with black dots.
Even though the chameleon’s skin is not a representation, the situation of acquired beliefs 
is  analogous  in  Millikan’s  account:  the  crucial  Normal  condition  to  perform  their  derived 
functions—of participating in inferences to produce other beliefs and to help in the fulfillment of 
desires—is that they bear a certain general type of relation to the world. Millikan proposes that 
the  relevant  relation  in  the  case  of  beliefs  is  that  of  “corresponding to”  or  “mapping onto” 
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portions of reality—because the Normal explanation of how mechanisms that produce beliefs 
historically  managed  to  perform  their functions  is  that  they  produced  states  that  bore  such 
relations to reality. Millikan’s account of the relation between true beliefs and reality is along the 
same lines as Papineau’s. I will say a bit more about it in a moment.
While Millikan relies on functions derived from innate biological mechanisms to extend 
her  teleosemantics  to  cover  acquired  mental  representations,  she  is  by  no  means  against 
postulating  selective  processes  that  work  outside  the  bounds  of  biological  intergenerational 
natural selection. Actually, Millikan relies on non-biological selection to offer a teleosemantic 
account of the meanings of linguistic representations. Her basic idea is that the elements that 
compose a language, including words and syntactic forms, are themselves reproduced items that 
spread across linguistic communities by being copied from user to user—and from generation to 
generation—forming causal chains of use that constitute lineages or, as Millikan calls  them, 
“reproductively established families” (Millikan 1984: 19):
The  selection  of  language  forms  takes  place  on  the  social  level.  Language 
survives when it serves cooperative functions often enough, functions that reward 
at  once  both  speakers  and  hearers… Language forms  proliferate  when aiding 
speaker and hearer cooperation on common projects—typically, the sharing of 
information… or the coordinating of projects and activities… (Millikan 2005: 85)
Basically, language forms proliferate in this historical process because they are socially selected 
to  serve  “cooperative  functions”  involving  communication.  As  reproduced  items  that  get 
historically  selected in  order  to  serve  certain purposes,  linguistic  representations  have  direct 
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functions. Recall that Millikan’s account of a direct function is formulated in general enough 
terms to cover the functions of any reproduced items that exist because of being favored by one 
or another selective process:  an item A has a direct function to perform F if and only if  A is a 
reproduction of prior items that performed F in the past and A exists because such prior items 
performed F (Millikan 1993: 13).
Millikan  suggests  that  the  main  function  of  “descriptive”  language  forms—i.e.,  the 
utterance of indicative sentences—is to produce true beliefs in hearers, while that of “directive” 
language  forms—i.e.,  the  utterance  of  imperative  sentences—is  to  produce  compliance  by 
hearers (to make them behave in particular ways). I will focus on indicative sentences. Millikan 
relates their function and meaning as follows. Their truth-conditional meaning is determined by 
the crucial  Normal condition  for such sentences  to  perform their  function—of inducing true 
beliefs in hearers—in accordance with a Normal explanation: namely, that they bear a relation of 
correspondence to reality in accordance with certain “mapping rules” (Millikan 2005: 63).
Even though the functions of beliefs and indicative sentences are different, their truth-
conditional meanings are alleged by Millikan to be determined in both cases by the Normal 
conditions that are supposed to obtain for these representations to perform their functions. In 
both cases, the relevant Normal conditions are determined by “mapping rules” that relate the 
complete representation to specific portions of reality based on its structure and the referential 
properties  of  its  parts—referential  properties  that  are  reductively  explained  in  terms  of  the 
teleonomic links between concepts or words and portions of reality such as individuals, stuffs, 
kinds and properties (Millikan 2000: 1 & 2005: 66). One of the features that sets apart mental  
and linguistic human representations, Millikan suggests, is their logico-syntactic structure: they 
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have subject-predicate form and can be negated (Millikan 1984: 308-309 & 1993: 100-101). 
Notice that, while expanded to cover also linguistic representations, this is roughly along the 
same lines as Papineau’s account of the truth-referential contents of thoughts. Both theories can 
be  regarded  as  contributing  to  the  project  of  reductively  explaining  reference  and  truth-
conditions along the lines of a contemporary version of the correspondence theory of truth—
which  combines  a  Tarskian  characterization  of  truth-conditions  based  on  logico-syntactic 
structure and referential properties with a reductive account of reference (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.2).  Surprisingly, however, Millikan often  characterizes  her  theory  of  truth-conditions  more 
ambitiously: as one that involves isomorphisms or picturing relations. I will critically assess such 
characterization  of  her  theory  in  Appendix  1—where  I  will  argue  that,  despite  her  rhetoric, 
Millikan’s theory does not actually rely on picturing relations.
Millikan’s account of the meanings of linguistic representations, based on their  direct 
functions  qua reproduced  devices,  is  intended  to  explain  the  literal  meanings  of  linguistic 
representations.  It  is  worth  comparing  briefly  Millikan’s teleonomic  account  with  what  may 
deserve to  be called  the  “standard” account  of  the source of  literal  meanings.  The standard 
account is that the literal meanings of utterances depend on  conventions that link them to the 
meanings of speakers’ thoughts. There is a lot to say in favor of this view. On one hand, prima 
facie it looks like we use language to communicate what we think: to express our thoughts. On 
the other hand, the arbitrary linguistic signs we use to achieve this goal are obviously a matter of  
social convention. As David Lewis put it: “It is a platitude that language is ruled by convention” 
(Lewis  2002:  1).  In  English,  for  example,  we  use  sentences  containing  the  word  ‘dog’ to 
communicate thoughts about dogs. Other languages use different words with this same purpose. 
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And in English any other arbitrary sign could have been used for this purpose. To explain how 
this comes about, we need explanations of how we can use utterances to communicate thoughts 
and of how linguistic conventions can emerge from our communicative practices. The work of 
Paul Grice (1989) is often regarded as helping to solve at least the first part of the puzzle and the  
work of Lewis (2002) as helping to solve the second part.
Grice proposed an influential account of what  speakers mean by their utterances, based 
on complex communicative intentions. The basic idea is that a speaker  A means  that p by an 
utterance x on if “A uttered x with the intention of inducing [in the hearer/s] a belief [that p] by 
means of the recognition [by the hearer/s] of this intention.” (Grice 1989: 219). Grice proposed 
that the literal meanings of expressions could be explained as regularities that emerge from what 
speakers  mean based on their  communicative  intentions:  “[to]  say what  a  word means  in  a 
language is to say what it is in general optimal for speakers of that language to do with that 
word… what  particular  intentions  on particular  occasions  it  is… optimal  for  them to  have” 
(Grice 1989: 299). But this does not seem like a plausible mechanism for literal meanings to 
emerge from speakers’ meanings: it seems to over-intellectualize linguistic competence (Millikan 
1984: Ch. 3; Horwich 2005: 57-62).
Lewis work on linguistic conventions offers an interesting alternative to Grice. Lewis 
suggests that conventions are arbitrary regularities of behavior that are perpetuated because they 
solve recurring coordination problems among people. For example, the convention of driving on 
the right side of the road arises from the coordination problem faced by drivers wanting to avoid 
colliding with each other, and it  is  arbitrary because driving on the left  would have worked 
equally well. Once a solution to the coordination problem arises, it serves as a  precedent that 
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people continue relying on when the problem recurs, so a behavioral  regularity  emerges. The 
particular coordination problems that language conventions solve are related to communication. 
People want to share thoughts with each other, so certain regularities in the use of words emerge 
to facilitate this task. Lewis idea is that speakers conform to certain regularities in their use of 
words because they have managed to truthfully communicate what they think by conforming to 
those regularities in the past (Lewis 2002: 179). Just like in the case of driving on the right side 
of the road, other regularities would have worked equally well—e.g., the word ‘dog’ could have 
been used in English to share thoughts about cats. But once a solution arises—e.g., using the 
word ‘dog’ to share thoughts about dogs—, it will serve as a precedent that people will continue 
to rely on to solve the same coordination problem when it arises again—e.g., sharing thoughts 
about dogs—; so a linguistic convention will emerge. The crucial advantage of Lewis’ account 
over Grice’s is that it  relies on  precedent—so that speakers and hearers do not need to keep 
relying on complex nested intentions on every communicative interaction. Once a convention 
has emerged, speakers and hearers can simply rely on the available recipe.
Millikan’s account of the linguistic conventions responsible for the literal meanings of 
words is similar in some respects to Lewis’. First, she also proposes that linguistic conventions 
emerge  as  solutions  to  coordination  problems related  to  communication.  Second,  she  also 
regards linguistic conventions as patterns emerging due to the weight of  precedent—e.g., the 
word ‘dog’ is used to share information about dogs because it has been successfully used in the 
past with that purpose. But the crucial difference with Lewis’s account is that Millikan does not 
characterize  linguistic  conventions  as  mere  regularities,  but  as  reproduced  patterns  that 
proliferate because they perform coordinating functions. Lewis initially proposed that a pattern 
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of behavior is conventional if everyone conforms to it (Lewis 2002: 42). This is too strong. He 
later  relaxed this  requirement,  suggesting that  a  behavior  is  conventional  if  almost  everyone 
conforms  to  it  (Lewis  2002:  78).  But  even  this  relaxed  requirement  turns  out  to  be  too 
demanding.  Speakers  may  often fail  to  conform  to  the  conventional  pattern,  because  they 
misspeak, they misuse words due ignorance or error, they commit grammatical mistakes, and so 
forth. Surely the literal meanings of words are a matter of conventions governing their use. But  
an account of such conventions as regularities cannot make enough room for misuses of words.
One  alternative  is  to  treat  linguistic  conventions  as  involving  norms instead  of 
regularities. A clear example is Robert Brandom’s account, according to which meanings are 
engendered by norms governing the use of words. This approach has the advantage of making 
room for misuses of words: the existence of norms, after all, does not require almost everyone to 
conform  to  them.  But  the  approach  also  has  a  serious  drawback:  while  Brandom  offers  a 
“reductive story about norms as instituted by social  practices”, he insists on “the irreducibly 
normative character of the metalanguage in which norm-instituting social practices are specified” 
(Brandom 1994:  626)—which  entails  that  meanings  cannot  be  reduced  to  natural  facts.  As 
Brandom acknowledges, his theory is “opposed to naturalism” (Brandom 2000: 26).
In Millikan’s account, like in Brandom’s, the conventions governing the use of words 
transcend mere regularities and provide a basis for distinguishing correct uses from misuses. But 
Millikan’s account, unlike in Brandom’s, is fully consistent with naturalism. Instead of relying on 
prescriptive  norms  that  are  irreducible  to  natural  facts,  it  relies  on  what  we  might  call 
“teleonomic norms”. As Millikan puts it:
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[The] central norms applying to language are… like those norms of function and 
behavior that account for the survival and proliferation of biological species… 
Specific linguistic forms survive and are reproduced together with cooperative 
hearer responses because often enough these patterns of production and response 
benefit  both  speakers  and  hearers.  Like  conformity  to…  biological  norms, 
conformity to these patterns need not be uniform or even average. In some cases 
conformity may not even be particularly common. Conformity is needed only in a 
critical mass of cases, enough to insure [sic] that the cooperative use constituting 
the norm—the convention—continues to be copied… (Millikan 2005: vi)
If the conventions that govern the use of words are  teleonomic norms, then they establish how 
words are  supposed to be used. This has the advantage of making plenty if room for misuse 
while anchoring the literal meanings of words on natural facts. Notice that Millikan’s account of 
the literal meanings of words in human languages is at its core analogous to her account of the  
meaning  of  simple  animal  languages.  The  main  differences  are  that  in  the  case  of  human 
languages  the  reproduction  is  cultural  rather  than  biological  and  the  teleonomic  links are 
complex: the teleonomic links between sentences and states of affairs are determined by the 
logico-syntactic structure of sentences and the reference-determining teleonomic links between 
their words and the individuals, stuffs, kinds or properties that (allegedly) make up those states of 
affairs.  The  same  compositional  “mapping  rules”  apply  to  her  account  for  the  contents  of 
thoughts. Millikan tends to present her theory as a teleosemantic version of a “picture” theory of 
truth-conditions. This is a problematic aspect of her work that I will leave to discuss in Appendix 
1. Setting that issue aside, the main point is that on Millikan’s account the meanings of concepts 
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and words are basically their referential properties, which Millikan explains in terms of their 
direct teleonomic links to entities in the world.
6.5 Assessing Papineau’s and Millikan’s Teleosemantics
In the previous two sections I  elaborated on the attempts by Papineau and Millikan to offer 
teleosemantic accounts of the meanings of sophisticated human representations. In this section, I 
will briefly assess their proposals regarding how to extend the etiological account of functions to 
human representations and discuss some problems with—and limitations of—their theories of 
meaning.  I  will  argue  that  there  is  good  reason  to  expect  a  teleonomic  account  of  human 
cognition and communication to succeed. But I will argue that the specific accounts of meaning 
that Millikan and Papineau offer are inadequate because (1) they rely on reference-determining 
teleonomic links that abstract away from the causes of representations, (2) they do not offer 
adequate  accounts  of  the  meanings  of  non-primitive  symbols  and  (3)  they  do  not  ascribe 
meanings that could plausibly govern the overall use of symbols in inference. The first problem 
is  related  to  the  concerns  of  Pietroski  (1992)  and  Neander  (1995)  about  output-based 
teleosemantics  that  I  discussed in  Chapter  5.  The second and third problems are specific  to 
human symbols: they are related to the generality and explanatory power considerations that 
favor—as I argued in Chapter 3—a basic-acceptance approach over other approaches.
Papineau and Millikan make interesting proposals regarding the  source of teleonomic 
functions  for  acquired  mental  representations.  Millikan  even suggests  a  bold  account  of  the 
source of teleonomic functions for linguistic representations. Are their proposals plausible?
Let us begin with Papineau’s suggestion that learning processes are selective in nature. As 
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I pointed out in Section 6.3, learning by operant conditioning exhibits striking similarities to 
natural selection. As Skinner observed, it is able to “select” behaviors based on their effects, just 
like  it  happens  in  the  natural  selection  of  hereditary  traits,  but  during  the  life  of  individual 
creatures  (Skinner  1953 & 1966).  But  does  the similarity  between operant  conditioning and 
natural  selection  extend to  other  forms  of  learning  and,  in  particular,  those  involved  in  the 
development of human concepts and the acquisition of human beliefs and desires? It is very 
plausible that processes involved in the acquisition of some mental representations are selective. 
Recall Dretske’s example of a pigeon that learns to get food by pecking on a screen if and only if 
pictures of trucks are displayed (Dretske 1988: 153). If conditioning can achieve such results in a 
humble pigeon, it  is  not hard to imagine that humans could develop perceptual and perhaps 
conceptual skills through conditioning in similar ways. Another form of learning that is shaped 
by effects and can plausibly be seen as a selective process is trial and error learning. Perhaps 
some  acquired  human  beliefs  are  fixed  by  some  form of  trial  and  error.  Nevertheless,  the 
processes  involved  in  the  acquisition  of  some  representations  do  not seem to  be  selective. 
Suppose that someone learns that elephants can swim after a single encounter with a swimming 
elephant. This example illustrates a standard way in which we form many of our beliefs: we 
combine concepts we already possess in novel  ways as a result  of our interactions with the 
world. Yet, there is nothing here that resembles natural selection. The belief does not seem to be 
selected  from  competing  variations  and  no  beneficial  effect  is  responsible  for  its  fixation. 
Acquiring a true belief is, of course, something that is potentially beneficial. But the benefit may 
come after the belief has been fixed or never. Another example of a belief that is not acquired 
through a selective process comes from Papineau himself, who proposes that a function of the 
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inferential  mechanisms  is  to  generate  new  beliefs  about  means  to  satisfy  desires  out  of 
background beliefs. Clearly, such inferential processes are not selective.
Because  some  acquired  representations  are  not  selected  by  a  learning  process,  they 
cannot  have  direct functions.  Papineau’s  proposal  has  the  advantage  of  being  simpler  that 
Millikan’s, but it cannot account for all acquired representations. That is why Millikan’s proposal 
that acquired representations have functions derived from the mechanisms responsible for their 
acquisition is crucial to extend teleosemantics to human mental representations. And there are 
compelling reasons to support Millikan’s proposal. Human beings are only able to develop new 
concepts and acquire new beliefs and desires during their lifetimes because they are born with 
complex brains that come equipped with innate mechanisms that make this  possible.  This is 
beyond  dispute.  But  once  we  acknowledge  this,  it  becomes  clear  that  there  must  be  some 
explanation of why we have such mechanisms. Pure chance is not a good explanation. But even 
if some complex trait happened to be built by pure chance, that would not account for why it was 
maintained. But there is the reasonable concern that what look like complex traits that constitute 
adaptations—that have been selected for—may instead be byproducts of the selection for other 
traits (Gould & Lewontin 1979; Gould & Vrba 1982). To assess this concern, it  is crucial to 
distinguish  between  two  very  different  kinds  of  byproducts:  (1)  those  that  originated  as 
byproducts of other traits but have been subsequently maintained by natural selection because 
they turned out to be adaptive or beneficial for survival, and (2) those that continue to exist 
without  any  selection  for  them—so-called  “spandrels”—because  they  continue  to  be  mere 
byproducts of other beneficial traits. If the complex mechanisms responsible for the acquisition 
of  new  human  representations  were  of  the  former  kind,  then  their  maintenance  by  natural 
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selection would be enough to confer teleonomic functions to them—and derived functions to 
their  products.  If  instead they were of the latter  kind,  then they would not  have teleonomic 
functions.
A point  that  often  goes  unnoticed  is  that  the  claim that  a  complex trait  is  merely  a  
“spandrel” is a very bold hypothesis—as bold and in as much need of evidence as the hypothesis 
that the trait is an adaptation. The mere abstract possibility of some traits being “spandrels” does 
not  seriously  undermine  teleosemantics,  because  it  is  prima  facie implausible  that  having 
acquired concepts, beliefs and desires in our cognitive repertoires does not confer an advantage 
for survival:  “To suspect that the brain has not been preserved for thinking with—… in the 
absence of any alternative hypothesis—would be totally irresponsible” (Millikan 1993: 96). The 
best available hypothesis we have by far—about why our brain comes equipped with the innate 
mechanisms it does—is that such mechanisms have been selected for producing concepts, beliefs 
and desires that help us to meet our needs in varying circumstances.
Analogous considerations apply to  acquired linguistic  representations,  because having 
words  and  ways  of  combining  them into  sentences  to  communicate  with  each  other  surely 
confers as much of an advantage for survival as the simpler innate languages of other animals do. 
Additionally, even if linguistic representations are themselves culturally reproduced items, it is 
important to also take into account that our capacity to learn a language is innate. As much as  
linguistic representations may be said to have direct functions that stem from their own selective 
history, they  can also  be said to  have  derived functions  from our  innate  language faculty. I 
consider  the  view that  there  are  non-biological  selective  processes—such  as  some selective 
learning  processes  (Papineau)  and  the  socio-cultural  reproduction  of  linguistic  symbols 
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(Millikan)—as  largely  compatible  and  complementary  with  the  view  that  acquired 
representations have functions derived from the direct functions of innate mechanisms.
Granting that innate and acquired human representations have teleonomic functions, it 
remains to be seen what is the proper account of their meanings. While Papineau and Millikan 
have made an extremely valuable contribution to semantics, I think that their theories face some 
very serious problems that show that a different kind of teleosemantics for human representations 
is needed. The first problem stems from the purely output-based character of their accounts. In 
Chapter 5, I argued that Millikan’s “consumer-based” teleosemantics for basic representations 
has the problem of ascribing implausible contents that are detached from the cognitive capacities 
of the mechanisms that produce them. As Pietroski (1992) showed, the ascriptions of content 
made by Millikan’s theory can be implausible, because they are unrelated to the capacities of the 
mechanisms that produce them. In his example, the kimus’ state that is caused by red surfaces is  
adaptive because it  led kimus to  snorf-free areas,  so the states mean “snorf-free area”,  even 
though  kimus  are  utterly  unable  to  tell  apart  a  snorf  from anything  else.  I  argued  that  the 
ascriptions  of  Millikan’s  theory—based  exclusively  on  the  “Normal  conditions”  for  the 
performance of the representation’s evolutionary function—are indeed implausible because the 
causes of perceptual representations do not play any role in them. I proposed in its place a hybrid 
input-output theory according to which the content of a basic representation is determined by its 
Normal  cause—namely,  what  causes  tokens  when  they  manage  to  produce  the  effects  the 
representation has the function of producing. These are also teleonomic links, but they are causal. 
As  it  turns  out,  Papineau’s  and  Millikan’s  output-based  teleosemantics  for  human 
representations face the same problem with causes playing no role in meaning determination. 
280
Millikan’s “Normal conditions” link words/concepts to their referents abstracting away from any 
causal connection. Papineau’s theory has the same problem. While discussing what his theory 
and Millikan’s have in common, Papineau (writing with Graham Macdonald) says:
[The]  approach…  dissociates  the  determination  of  content  from  input 
conditions…  content  depends  on  how  consumer  mechanisms  interpret 
representations… on  the  behavioural  output,  not  the  informational  input.  The 
content  is  that  condition  under  which  the  resulting  behaviour  would  be 
appropriate,  whether  or  not  the  actual  circumstances  that  caused  the 
representation are of that type. (Macdonald & Papineau 2006: 6) 84
What Millikan and Papineau tell us is that the teleonomic links that determine meanings are links 
to what concepts are supposed to be correlated to in order to perform their functions, regardless 
of whether those correlations are causally based or not. But this is precisely the kind of view that 
leads  to  the  problem  pointed  out  by  Pietroski  and  Neander:  ascribing  meanings  that  are 
implausible  because  they  are  detached  from  the  cognitive  capacities  of  the  mechanisms 
responsible for producing the representations. In the case of human representations linked to 
inputs from perception, the problem is clear: the theory detaches their meanings from what the 
perceptual mechanisms causally interact with. Consider the concept of darkness. Suppose, as it is 
likely to be the case, that many human infants have an innate tendency to fear being alone in 
84 As far as I can tell, the views of Millikan and Papineau were output-oriented from the beginning—unlike, say, 
the clearly  input-oriented view of  Neander. However,  Millikan seems to have been  the one  that  originally 
rejected most adamantly the idea that causes may play a role in determining content. Interestingly, at the same 
time that Papineau (1987) explained truth-conditional content in terms of co-presence rather than causation, we 
can find remarks where he seems to assign a crucial role to causation. In a passage he remarks, for example, that  
the explanation in terms of natural selection “gives us a substantial distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’  
causes” which are related to circumstances when a belief “had advantageous behavioral  effects” (Papineau 
1987: 65). This is very much in tune with the core idea of my hybrid input-output approach! However, these 
passing remarks did not seem to be articulated into his official doctrine.
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open dark places. Suppose that such tendency is meant to protect us from night predators, by 
making us avoid staying in places where we would be vulnerable to them. Now, such tendency 
will play a role in the development of the concept of a dark place and of thoughts such as the 
belief that I am in a dark place and the desire to leave such a place as soon as possible—which 
combined in inferential processes will on various occasions make us leave dark places. Perhaps 
this sort of effect saved the lives of many of our ancestors. (We may assume that the learned 
concepts  and acquired  beliefs  have  derived  functions  or  direct  ones—following  Millikan  or 
Papineau.) But according to the output-based theory it looks like the concept of darkness, or of a 
dark place, led to beneficial behaviors because it was correlated with night predators. So it looks 
like the meaning-determining  teleonomic link is with night predators. But this is an extremely 
implausible ascription.  Our pre-theoretical ascriptions relate the concept to darkness.  We can 
perfectly explain the behavior in terms of the fear of dark places. Of course, we can also explain 
the evolution of such behavior based on the avoidance of night predators. But what we explain 
then is  not that  the concept  of  darkness  refers  to  predators,  but  rather  that  the  evolutionary 
explanation for our desire to avoid  darkness is that it prompted behaviors that were adaptive 
because  they  helped  us  to  avoid  night  predators.  An  output-based  teleosemantics  cannot 
distinguish cognitively relevant links from other evolutionarily relevant ones. Consider another 
example: the desire for soda, derived from an innate desire for sweetness together with a belief 
that soda is sweet. Surely the contents of the thoughts that make us drink soda are  not about 
nutritiousness—even if the evolutionary explanation of why we have those desires is one where 
the goal of getting nutrients plays a crucial role. Papineau is willing to go along with Millikan 
and bite the bullet in the case of basic representations, but he argues (together with Graham 
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Macdonald)  that  Pietroski’s  objection  does  not  apply  to  representations  that  belong  to 
sophisticated systems of representation: if kimus had a color-perception system serving various 
functions, then their states would mean “red” anyway (Macdonald & Papineau 2006: 9). But this 
reply does not suffice to explain why the kimus’ states do not  also mean “snorf-free area”. If 
there is a history of selection related to the absence of snorfs, the states presumably acquire that 
meaning regardless of also having other contents and functions.
The  problem  I  just  discussed  already  affected  output-based  teleosemantics  for  basic 
representations.  The  following  two  problems  I  will  point  out  are  specifically  about  human 
representations. In Chapter 3, I argued that a theory of meaning articulated in terms of basic 
sentence  acceptance  has  two advantages  over  other  theories.  First,  it  is  able  to  account  for 
different kinds of words/concepts having meanings that relate them either to the external world, 
to other words/concepts or to rules of inference. Second, it is able to explain how the meanings 
of words/concepts govern their overall uses in inferential processes. As it turns, the teleosemantic 
theories of Papineau and Millikan are at a disadvantage: they do not offer plausible accounts of 
non-primitive symbols and the meanings they ascribe even to primitives do not govern their use 
in inference.
The  views  of  Papineau  and  Millikan  are  very  different  regarding  the  issue  of  non-
primitives.  Millikan  seems  to  defend an extreme form of  semantic  externalism according to 
which content is just reference and all referring terms are primitives. (It will become clear below 
why  I  say  “seems”.)  Millikan  (2000),  for  instance,  argues  that  “substance”  concepts—i.e., 
concepts of individuals, stuffs and natural kinds—have the purpose of enabling us to re-identify 
things, and that this purpose is independent of the various ways in which we may achieve it. It is 
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independent of any particular causal links through perception and from any associated beliefs or 
concepts.  She argues that reference is  not determined by any modes of presentation.  All  the 
causal  and conceptual  links  of  a  substance  concept,  she  claims,  are  part  of  a  non-reference 
determining  conception. (See Millikan  2000:  Ch.  11 & 12.)  When  talking  about  the  literal 
meanings  of  words,  she  candidly  claims:  “[The]  public  meaning  of  a  referential  term… is 
essentially just reference. I intend this sweeping assertion to include terms for properties, kinds, 
stuffs, and so forth…” (Millikan 2005: 66). These views seem extremely radical. What about the 
word ‘bachelor’ and the concept it expresses? Is Millikan willing to say that ‘unmarried man’ is 
merely part of a non-reference determining associated conception? And what about the terms of 
logic such as ‘and’? As I argued in Chapter 3, a general theory of meaning must cover  all of 
these  sorts  of  words/concepts.  Surprisingly, Millikan  herself  comments  on  an  endnote:  “We 
should also note that there are some terms—‘bachelor’ is the favorite example—that do seem 
simply to be shorthand for their standard public intensions.” and speculates that “terms of this 
kind are not very common” (Millikan 1984: 340n). Regardless of how common they may be or 
not, we need a theory of meaning to accommodate them. But Millikan does not comment on how 
to do so within her theory. Given her views, there should be a teleosemantic story to be told here. 
After all, the word ‘bachelor’ is a reproduced device presumably with a literal meaning governed 
by a teleonomic norm, while the concept it expresses is tokened by mechanisms with teleonomic 
functions. But the story cannot be the same story that Millikan offers for primitives.
Papineau, in contrast, offers a different theory for “non-observational concepts”, based on 
their inferential links to other concepts (Papineau 1987: 78-80). What he proposes is in fact a 
kind of description theory. Interestingly, he suggests it is a teleosemantic theory. The purpose of 
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non-observational concepts, he suggests, is to “enable us to respond to features of the world to 
which we only have indirect inferential access” (Papineau 1987: 80). This sounds promising, 
surely there is such a thing as the misapplication of concepts covered by a description theory. An 
explanation of their meanings based on what inferential links they are supposed to have would be 
interesting.  But,  unfortunately, the  version  of  the  description  theory  that  Papineau adopts  is 
hopeless. He surprisingly claims that “a non-observational concept refers to that entity whose 
role in the causal structure of the world mirrors the role of the concept itself in the cognitive 
structure”  (Papineau  1987:  93).  Why  not  go  instead  with  something  closer  to  a  classical 
description  theory?  Papineau’s  version  does  not  seem  to  work  for  many  non-observational 
concepts. As Devitt objects, ‘bachelor’ “probably depends for its reference on its causal links to 
‘unmarried’ and yet that causal link is not ‘mirrored’ by one between bachelors and unmarried 
objects” (Devitt 1991: 432). Additionally, Papineau’s version of the description theory is holistic 
(see Papineau 1987: 97-98). As Devitt complains: “Papineau… is committed to an extremely 
individualistic version of holism: if the functional role of a concept in your head, or in my head 
last week, differs in the slightest degree from one in my head now, then the concepts must differ” 
(Devitt 1991: 432). These problems, however, stem from the version of the description theory 
adopted by Papineau, rather than the teleosemantic twist he suggests for it.
Setting aside non-primitives, the final problem with the theories of Papineau and Millikan 
is that the meanings they ascribe are not causally responsible for governing the use of concepts in 
inference. That this is the case is already clear given the fact that Papineau and Millikan regard 
the teleonomic links that determine meaning as causally detached from tokens, as I discussed 
above. But even if their direct links were causally anchored, we would still  have a problem. 
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Imagine, for example, that we modified Millikan’s theory replacing her teleonomic links with the 
teleonomic causal links of my hybrid account. These would still be links between isolated tokens 
of the concept and its perceptual causes—e.g., between tokens of ‘dog’ in the belief-box and 
dogs.  But  the overall  use of  a  word/concept  in  inferential  processes—as I  argued following 
Horwich in Chapter 3—can only be governed or shaped by certain sentences containing it. For 
example, the use of ‘dog’ in inference may be governed by tokens of ‘This is a dog’ in the belief 
box—tokens that may in turn be caused by the perception of dogs.
6.6 Basic-Acceptance Teleosemantics
This has been a long journey, in which I have assessed the virtues and problems of Horwich’s 
use-theory and available versions of teleosemantics. It is time to tie up loose ends. I will start  
with a review of the preliminary conclusions of the previous analyses, articulate the combination 
of basic-acceptance semantics and teleosemantics, and point out some advantages of the view 
over Horwich’s theory and existing teleosemantic theories. I will end with some reflections on 
the roles of reference and truth in the resulting account.
In Chapter 1, I argued that meanings are natural worldly phenomena because they play 
causal roles in the explanation of behavior. In Chapter 2, I argued that the task of semantics is to 
explain the underlying natures of the meanings identified pre-theoretically by the causal roles of 
mental and linguistic representations. As folk semanticists, we identify samples of meanings in 
attitude ascriptions that have the purpose of explaining other people’s behaviors and using their 
thoughts and utterances as guides to reality. I argued that an explanation of the underlying nature 
of these meanings should account for the causal roles used to identify them. In the particular case 
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of words and concepts, I argued that we identify their meanings by the way they are used and as 
what is  causally responsible for their  uses.  This sets  a clear target for an explanation of the 
underlying nature of their meanings: it must account for what non-semantic phenomena explain 
the overall uses of words and concepts and, consequently, constitute their meanings. Notice that 
all of these considerations regarding the identification of meanings and the task of semantics do 
not assume any views about the nature of truth and reference. While the mainstream view in 
semantics  is  truth-referentialism,  which  requires  truth  and  reference  to  play  substantial 
explanatory roles, the identification of the task of semantics should not presuppose any such 
view, which would beg the question against deflationists, who argue that truth and reference are 
not properties that could play such roles and usually advocate for “use” theories of meaning 
where truth and reference allegedly do not play any substantial roles. I argued that we are likely 
to find out about the nature of truth and reference precisely by finding out if we need to appeal to  
them in the explanation of meanings.
In Chapter 3, I argued that Horwich’s version of the “use” theory of meaning has crucial 
advantages over  other  available accounts.  Horwich proposes that the meanings of words are 
constituted by their roles in certain basic or core sentences containing them, which are causally 
responsible for the rest of their uses—or, as Horwich likes to put it, they govern the overall use 
of words. Horwich’s theory is meant to apply to words in natural languages and also to words in 
the language of thought. He largely treats language and thought as a “seamless whole” which is 
appropriate as a simplification for some explanatory purposes, because language and thought are 
indeed  closely  interlinked.  But  I  agree  with  Devitt’s  point  that  in  an  ultimate  analysis  an 
acceptance-based theory should treat thought as more fundamental (Devitt 2002: 109-111). I will 
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set this aside for now.
Horwich’s main reason for suggesting that the meanings of words must be constituted by 
the acceptance of some fundamental sentences containing them is that most uses of words are a 
result of their participation in inferential processes, so that what constitutes their meanings must 
be something capable of shaping such use in inference. The crucial point is that only sentences 
can participate in inferences. Horwich’s insight is that a few sentences containing a word can 
play the role of something like axioms or premises in inferential processes, thereby governing 
the overall use of the word. How this works is rather clear in the case of words traditionally  
regarded as covered by a description theory, such as ‘bachelor’. The sentence ‘The bachelors are 
the unmarried men’ can serve as a premise in inferential processes if it is accepted by the user: 
tokened in his or her belief-box. Other uses of the word ‘bachelor’ can subsequently be explained 
in terms of this fundamental use, together with other factors. But what makes Horwich’s proposal 
interesting is that it can account for a variety of words. As he suggests, the meaning of words can 
be shaped by links to the external world. For example, the acceptance of ‘This is red’ when 
perceiving a red surface is plausibly what explains the overall use of ‘red’. A connection between 
‘red’ and red surfaces, by itself, cannot play a role in inference. So it cannot govern the use of the 
word. Finally, Horwich suggests that the overall use of logical words can also be explained in 
terms of basic acceptance. For example, the use of ‘and’ may be governed by the acceptance of 
the two-way schema “p, q // p and q”.
What  I  just  described  is  the  core  insight  underlying  Horwich’s  use-theory:  that  the 
acceptance of some basic or fundamental sentences containing a word constitutes its meaning. I 
call this view “basic-acceptance semantics”. The view is recommended by its promise to account 
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for  the  overall  uses  of  words—to  explain  how  meanings  govern  use—and  because  of  its 
generality—it can account for meanings of words that depend variously on their links to other 
words, to the external world and to rules of inference.
Horwich’s use-theory has extra commitments.  First,  it  is proposed as a companion to 
Horwich’s deflationism about truth and reference. So Horwich expects the acceptance of basic 
sentences containing a word not to determine its reference. Second, it is articulated in terms of 
dispositions and regularities of use. Horwich claims that our disposition to accept basic sentences 
containing a word is the fundamental law-like regularity governing its use. In Chapter 3, I argued 
that these two commitments are problematic. Regarding deflationism, Devitt points out that the 
theory  seems to provide  the  same links  that  a  moderate  truth-referentialism would  count  as 
reference-determining.  So  the  theory  risks  collapsing  into  truth-referentialism.  I  happen  to 
believe  that  a  collapse  is  likely,  but  I  argued  that  it  does  not  undermine  basic-acceptance 
semantics.  I  also  argued that  Horwich’s articulation  of  the  theory  is  undermined by serious 
problems  of  ignorance  and  error  that  stem  from  its  dispositionalism.  People  often  have 
dispositions to make mistakes (error) or lack the relevant dispositions to use a word (ignorance), 
so  a  theory  that  reduces  meanings  to  use-dispositions  cannot  make  enough  room  for 
misrepresentation. For instance, if someone confuses wolfs and coyotes with dogs, the law-like 
regularity underlying his use of ‘dog’ will  be his  disposition to accept ‘This is a dog’ when 
perceiving  dogs,  wolfs  or  coyotes—with  the  unwelcome  consequence  that  he  is  not 
misrepresenting when he applies ‘dog’ to a coyote. Horwich proposes a version of the division of 
linguistic labor that may be thought to help with this problem. But his account is dispositionalist 
as well: a speaker’s use of a word can be characterized as a misuse provided that he or she is 
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disposed to defer to experts. But as Devitt replies, people may make mistakes about when or 
whom to defer to, and may not be disposed to defer at all.
I  suggested  in  Chapter  3  that  a  combination  of  basic-acceptance  semantics  with 
explanatory frameworks other than “dispositionalism/regularism” could avoid the problems of 
ignorance  and  error.  One  option  would  be  to  adopt  a  “normativism”  according  to  which 
meanings do not depend on regularities, but on prescriptive norms governing the uses of words. 
If the meaning of ‘dog’ is constituted by the norm that we ought to accept ‘This is a dog’ in the 
presence of dogs, then basic-acceptance semantics could draw the line between correct uses and 
misuses.  But  this  alternative  is  unattractive  because  it  involves  abandoning  the  project  of 
naturalized  meanings—and  meanings  play  causal  roles  in  the  world,  so  they  cannot  be 
irreducibly  normative.  Another  alternative  that  promises  to  overcome  the  problem  of 
misrepresentation,  but  within  the  confines  of  naturalism,  I  suggested,  is  to  combine  basic-
acceptance semantics with a teleonomic or teleological account of the functions of symbols.
The suggestion to combine these views led me to explore the teleonomic account  of 
functions and available theories that rely on it to explain meanings. The teleonomic notion of 
function discussed in Chapter 4 has its home in biology, where it is explained in terms of what 
traits have been naturally selected for doing. Hearts have the function of pumping blood because 
that is what the hearts of ancestors did that explains why there are creatures with hearts today. 
What  is  of interest  to semantics is  that  this  notion of function allows for “quasi-normative” 
ascriptions of failure to perform a function. If a heart does not pump blood, it is not doing what it  
is supposed to, given its evolutionary history. Applying this notion to offer a theory of meaning 
promises  to  makes room for  misrepresentation.  The simplest  cases are  those of  basic  innate 
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representations in animals.
There are two main kinds of teleosemantic approaches that I explored in Chapter 5. On 
one  end  of  the  spectrum,  there  is  Millikan’s  account,  according  to  which  meanings  are 
determined by the conditions in the world that must obtain for the consumers of a representation 
to perform their function. For example, the frog’s so-called “bug detectors” represent frog food 
because it was when frogs captured nutritious bugs by darting their tongue that the consumers 
performed the function for which the trait was selected. While very attractive at first sight, it 
turns out that causal links to reality through perception play no role in this account, which can 
lead to implausible content ascriptions and, more fundamentally, the account fails to achieve a 
fundamental  goal  of  semantics,  which  is  to  account  for  the  causes  of  representations  being 
tokened. On the other end of the spectrum, there is Neander’s producer-based teleosemantics, 
which has the advantage of tying meanings to the causal links responsible for the tokening of 
representations,  but  which  does  not  make  enough  room  for  misrepresentation  because  it 
disregards the consumption of representations as irrelevant to their meanings. So the frog’s state, 
according  to  Neander,  means  “small,  black,  moving  thing”,  since  the  frog’s  perceptual 
mechanisms cannot tell apart a flying bug from any other small black thing—even though what 
the consumers need is to catch bugs. To overcome this dilemma, I proposed a hybrid account 
according to which basic representations represent what I called their “Normal causes”: namely, 
what is supposed to cause their tokens in order for their consumers to perform their functions. 
The hybrid account makes plenty of room for misrepresentation, like a consumer-based one, but 
ascribes meanings that do play a causal role in the tokening of representations.
The remaining challenge  was  to  explore  how teleosemantics  can  be  extended to  the 
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sophisticated mental and linguistic representations of human beings. In this chapter, I presented 
the proposals of Papineau and Millikan, who agree that desires have the function of producing 
behaviors that satisfy them and that beliefs have the function of collaborating with desires to 
produce such behaviors—and are supposed to covary with conditions in the world. But they both 
ultimately offer compositional accounts according to which the truth-conditions of beliefs (and 
the  satisfaction  conditions  of  desires)  are  determined  by  their  structure  and  the  referential 
properties of their parts. At bottom, their theories are about  teleonomic links between concepts 
and their referents. The main difference is that Papineau proposes that the source of teleonomic 
functions for acquired representations is  that  learning processes are  selective,  while  Millikan 
proposes that the functions of acquired representations are  derived from the functions of the 
mechanisms responsible for their acquisition and deployment—like the varying colors of the skin 
of  a  chameleon,  which  have  not  been  selected  themselves,  but  are  the  product  of  innate 
mechanisms that have been selected to protect the chameleon by producing patterns of color that 
make it less visible to predators. Millikan also offers a teleonomic account of the functions of 
words,  based  on  the  fact  that  they  are  culturally  reproduced  items  with  a  history  of  social 
selection. Millikan plausibly argues that the conventions that determine the literal meanings of 
words are teleonomic norms. I argued that some but not all learning processes are selective, so 
we need to rely on Millikan’s account of derived functions, although it can be combined with 
Papineau’s account. There is very good reason to expect the innate mechanisms responsible for 
the acquisition of concepts, beliefs and desires have the function of producing such states, since 
human  cognition  is  obviously  adaptive.  So  the  most  plausible  hypothesis  is  that  there  are 
function-conferring  selective  processes  underlying  the  maintenance  of  such  mechanisms. 
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Similarly, reproduced patterns of linguistic behavior are at least as adaptive as simpler innate 
systems of animal communication. So the most plausible hypothesis is that they have teleonomic 
functions.
On a critical  assessment  of  Papineau’s and Millikan’s accounts  of  concept  and word 
meanings, I pointed out three serious problems. First, that the reference-determining teleonomic 
links they rely on are not causal in nature, so their theories have the same problem as Millikan’s 
consumer-based theory of basic representations. Indeed, those links are not causally responsible 
for the tokening of concepts/words, and they are detached from the cognitive capacities of the 
mechanisms that produce them. So, based on the methodological considerations proposed in 
Chapter  2  and  deployed  against  Millikan’s  consumer-based  teleosemantics  in  Chapter  5,  I 
objected that such links cannot plausibly be regarded as meanings. Second, relying on one of the 
arguments in support of basic-acceptance semantics deployed in Chapter 3, I objected that the 
theories of Millikan and Papineau fail to be general enough because they do not offer plausible 
accounts  of non-primitives.  In  Millikan’s case,  the theory does not  even attempt to offer an 
account of anything other that primitives. Papineau’s case is different. To his credit, he tries to 
offer an account for non-observational concepts that is a teleosemantic version of the description 
theory. Unfortunately, the version of the description theory he adopts fails because it relies on 
implausible mirroring relations and it is hopelessly holistic. Neither Papineau nor Millikan offer 
accounts of logical terms. Finally, the theories of Millikan and Papineau do not ascribe meanings 
that can govern the use of concepts in inferential processes. Most of the uses of concepts are in 
inference,  so direct  links to  reality—even setting aside the issues mentioned above—are not 
enough to explain what governs stimulus independent uses.
293
In summary, the situation is the following. On one hand, a basic-acceptance semantics 
promises to explain meanings in terms of underlying properties that are causally responsible for 
the overall  uses  of words/concepts,  which can explain how the meanings  of  words/concepts 
govern  their  overall  uses  in  inference  and  in  a  way  which  is  general  enough,  allowing  for 
meanings to involve links to the world, to other words/concepts or to rules of inference. But the 
regularist version articulated by Horwich cannot make room for misuses or misrepresentation. 
On the  other  hand,  teleosemantics  promises  to  offer  a  naturalist  solution  to  the  problem of 
misrepresentation, but available proposals for human words/concepts are implausible because the 
links they regard as meaning constitutive are causally detached from the production/tokening of 
words/concepts, they cannot govern use in inferential processes, and they do not account for the 
variety of links that a general theory of word/concept meaning should account for.
The  solution,  I  suggest,  is  to  articulate  a  teleosemantic  theory  in  terms  of  basic 
acceptance  or—what  is  equivalent—to  articulate  a  basic-acceptance  semantics  in  terms  of 
teleonomic functions. It is worth mentioning that the idea that a “use” theory of meaning can be 
coupled with a teleonomic account of the functions of symbols has been suggested before by 
teleosemanticists, although not by use-theorists. For example, Neander suggests:
[Teleosemantic] theories tend to be versions of causal or informational theories, 
but teleonomy could also be used to add normativity to a conceptual role theory of 
mental content. (Neander 1999: 3)
The “normativity” that Neander refers to is, of course, not of the prescriptive kind that normative 
versions of the “use” theory rely on. It is rather the teleonomic normativity involved in there 
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being, as a matter of fact, a distinction between correct and incorrect deployments of concepts. 
Similarly, Millikan suggests that a functional-role theory of mental content can be coupled with 
teleology to make room for misrepresentation:
Suppose, for example, that you think of mental representations as items defined in 
a  classical  functionalist  way, in  accordance  with  patterns  of  causal/inferential 
dispositions… Then the teleological theorist, call her Tilly, will come along and 
point out that surely some of the causal roles of actual representations in actual 
people’s heads correspond to bad inferences. What you must say, says Tilly, is that 
what the representation represents is determined by what its causal role would be 
if  the  head  were operating  correctly, that  is,  in  the  way  it  was  designed,  by 
evolution or learning, to operate. (Millikan 2000: 229)
Neither Neander nor Millikan are interested in developing themselves a teleonomic version of 
functional-role semantics: what we may call a “functional-role teleosemantics”. But they realize 
that dispositionalist versions of functional-role semantics have problems of misrepresentation. In 
contrast, theorists that defend naturalistic versions of the “use” theory tend to ignore the problem
—or even to dismiss it as a pseudo-problem, like Horwich (see Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2). The 
only “use” theorists that take this problem seriously seem to be those that defend non-naturalist 
versions that rely on prescriptive normativity, like Brandom (1994 & 2000). It is surprising that 
“use”  theorists  themselves  have  not  seriously  contemplated  the  possibility  of  articulating 
teleonomic  versions  of  their  theories.  Some of  them even  explicitly  claim that  teleology  is 
incompatible  with  functional-role  semantics.  Greenberg  and  Harman  (2006),  for  example, 
propose what they consider a broad and inclusive understanding of functional- or conceptual-role 
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semantics  (CRS),  which  encompasses  any  theory  that  regards  the  content  of  concepts  as 
determined “by any part of their role or use in thought”, rather than being restricted to those 
theories according to which content is determined merely by “the role of the mental states or 
symbols in inference or in other purely internal mental processes” (Greenberg & Harman 2006: 
295-296). Under their broad understanding, they point out, indicator or informational theories 
“count as special versions of CRS” (Greenberg & Harman 2006: 296). However, they go through 
the trouble of specifically excluding teleological theories from even their broad understanding of 
functional- or conceptual-role semantics:
Just how inclusive our broad understanding of CRS is depends on how broadly 
conceptual role or use is understood. For example, teleological theories of content 
give an important role to the evolutionarily determined “function” of symbols or 
symbol structures, where some such theories understand the notion of the function 
of a symbol or structure in a way that goes beyond the symbol’s use or role as 
ordinarily  understood…  We do  not  count  such  theories  as  versions  of  CRS. 
(Greenberg & Harman 2006: 296.)
Greenberg  and  Harman  display  a  notorious  resistance  to  regard  the  teleological  notion  of 
function as compatible with the kind of naturalist “use” theory they favor. I suspect that their 
resistance stems from the close relationship between their naturalist “use” theory and classical 
functionalism, since teleological functions are not merely uses or roles as understood by classical 
functionalism.  According  to  classical  functionalism,  mental  states  are  characterized  by  their 
functional roles, which consist in their patterns of actual and potential causal relations with other 
mental states, perception and behavior. Naturalist use theories that regard meaning as determined 
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by  functional  roles  constitute  an  application  of  the  general  functionalist  framework  to  the 
explanation of meaning, and they draw much of their plausibility from functionalism. Moreover, 
“use” theories have traditionally regarded the meanings of expressions as closely related to their 
inferential roles, and functionalism promises to naturalize inferential roles by reducing them to 
causal  roles.  By  characterizing  functional  roles  as  patterns  of  actual  and  potential  casual 
relations, however, classical functionalism and the “use” theories based on it are committed to 
dispositionalism. It is true that the teleological notion of function goes beyond the one deployed 
by traditional functional-role theories: the one that has its origin in classical functionalism. But 
going beyond the dispositionalist notion of function may be a changed that is needed—and not 
only for the purposes of semantics. As Elliott Sober points out, functionalism about the mind 
would also benefit from a teleological twist (Sober 1985).
In principle any dispositionalist version of functional-role semantics could benefit from a 
teleological  twist.  But  as  I  pointed  out  in  Chapter  3,  most  of  these  theories  are  hopelessly 
holistic. A teleological twist can only help with problems of misuse and misrepresentation. Any 
other  problems  faced  by  a  functional-role  theory  will  presumably  be  inherited  by  its 
teleosemantic counterpart. As I argued in Chapter 3, the best available theory is the non-holistic 
one offered by Horwich, which relies on the acceptance of basic sentences. It is this version of  
the “use” theory that I propose to combine with a teleonomic account of functions. Of the many 
possible forms of “functional-role teleosemantics”, a “basic-acceptance teleosemantics” seems to 
be the most promising one.
The  core  feature  of  a  basic-acceptance  teleosemantics  is  that  it  regards  the  basic 
sentences involved in the meanings of words not as what  regularly governs their uses, but as 
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what is supposed to govern their uses. A general statement of the main idea is the following:
The meaning of a word, w, is constituted by the fact that the acceptance of certain 
basic sentences containing w is supposed to govern w’s overall use.
The sense in which some core sentences are supposed to govern the overall use of a word is the 
same sense in which the heart is supposed to pump blood or the blink reflex is supposed to be 
triggered by foreign objects touching the cornea. It is a sense in which an item may be supposed 
do  something  even  if  it  fails  to  do  it.  This  is  the  feature  that  allows  basic-acceptance 
teleosemantics to make room for misuses of words. Instead of claiming that the meaning of 
‘bachelor’ is constituted by the fact that its use is regularly governed by the acceptance of ‘The 
bachelors are the unmarried men’, basic-acceptance teleosemantics claims that the meaning of 
‘bachelor’ is constituted by the fact that its use is supposed to be governed by the acceptance of 
‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’. Similarly, basic-acceptance teleosemantics claims that 
the meaning of ‘horse’ is engendered by the fact that its use is supposed to be governed by the 
acceptance of ‘This is a horse’ in response to the perception of horses. If someone tends to apply 
the word also to muddy zebras and odd cows, such uses can be characterized as misuses, because 
they are not governed by the acceptance property that is supposed to govern them. This account 
of word meaning promises to maintain the advantages of Horwich’s theory, regarding generality 
and explanatory power, while overcoming its problems of ignorance and error.
The general statement of the main idea of basic-acceptance teleosemantics I provided 
above has the advantage of being simple. It provides a convenient way to introduce the idea. But 
it ignores crucial details, since it does not even use the word ‘function’. As I argued above, there 
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is very good reason to believe that words do have teleonomic functions based on one or another 
of the sources of teleonomy for acquired representations proposed by Papineau and Millikan—
or, even better, a combination of them. Even our most basic conceptual and linguistic abilities  
exhibit all the signs of “design” and the only plausible explanation is one that ultimately relies on 
natural  selection  and/or  other  selective  processes.  But  even if  we grant  that  words  do  have 
teleonomic functions,  this  leaves  open the question of  how such functions are  related to  the 
acceptance of some basic sentences containing them. The answer to this question I favor regards 
the acceptance of basic sentences as the  Normal cause of uses of words: as what causes such 
uses when words perform their functions in accordance with a Normal explanation. Notice that 
this idea of a “Normal cause” is the same one I deployed in my hybrid account of the meanings 
of basic representations. The difference is that the Normal causes of basic representations are 
perceptual causes, while the Normal causes of words deployed in inference are certain sentences 
in  the  “belief-box”  (although  for  some  words  the  basic  sentences  themselves  have  Normal 
perceptual causes). I think that reliance on Normal causes provides a good basis to articulate a 
teleonomic version of basic-acceptance semantics, since basic-acceptance semantics is a theory 
that is tailored to explain meanings in terms of what causes tokens of words/concepts. Notice that 
if the acceptance of a basic sentence constitutes the Normal cause of the use of a word, then such 
sentence indeed is supposed to govern the use of the word. So the general statement I provided 
above is indeed an accurate, while simplified, representation of the view.
How does a basic-acceptance teleosemantics articulated in terms of Normal causes look 
like? To simplify exposition, I will first follow Horwich assuming that language and thought 
form a seamless whole. The appearance that language and thought form a seamless whole may 
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come from the fact that, on one hand, we use language to express what we think but, on the other 
hand,  we  have  acquired  many  of  our  concepts—or  “mental  words”— from  their  linguistic 
counterparts. But this is not an explanatory circle. It is a “spiral”, since the ultimate origin of 
newly coined words must be on some thinker that coined the correlated concept and a word to 
express it (Devitt 1996: 157-158). But the fact that our language and thought are so intimately 
interconnected means that for certain explanatory purposes we can more or less safely take them 
as  a  seamless  whole.  So  in  order  to  articulate  a  simple  version  of  “basic-acceptance 
teleosemantics” I will simply talk of sentences, words, and assume that we use the same words to 
communicate and think with. I will also simply assume that there is a teleonomic story to tell 
about acquired representations. Let me start with a statement of the account:
The meaning of a word w is constituted by its use in certain core sentences (that 
link it to the world, other words or rules of inference), because this use is the 
Normal  cause underlying  the  overall  use  of  the  word  in  virtue  of  which  it 
performs  the  functions  determined  by  the  history  of  its  use  and/or  of  the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms responsible for it.
The idea is that certain core sentences are supposed to govern the use of the word because those 
are the sentences that govern the use of the word when it successfully performs its function in 
accordance with a Normal explanation. So the quasi-normative teleonomic sense of “supposed” 
in my previous general statement is explained by how words Normally manage to perform their 
functions. Notice the difference between the following three statements:
(R) The  acceptance  of  certain  basic  sentences  containing  the  word  w is  the 
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regularity governing the use of w.
(P) The  acceptance  of  certain  basic  sentences  containing  the  word  w is  the 
prescriptive norm governing the use of w.
(T)  The  acceptance  of  certain  basic  sentences  containing  the  word  w is  the 
teleonomic norm governing the use of w.
(R) states the view adopted by Horwich. But a basic-acceptance semantics can be articulated 
instead in terms of prescriptive norms, such as (P) or in terms of teleonomic norms, such as (T). 
A basic-acceptance semantics articulated as (R) is naturalist, but does not make enough room for 
misrepresentation.  A  basic-acceptance  semantics  articulated  as  (P)  makes  room  for 
misrepresentation, but abandons naturalism. While a basic-acceptance semantics articulated as 
(T) is simultaneously naturalist and makes enough room for misrepresentation.
Let us consider the treatment of a likely primitive, such as the word ‘dog’ by different 
semantic theories. For a word like this, an indicator theory based on reliable causes would say:
The word ‘dog’ means what it does because its tokens are regularly caused by the 
perception of dogs.
This theory has, on one hand, a serious problem of error. If someone has a tendency to token 
‘dog’ as a result of the perception of dogs, coyotes and wolfs, the result is that, according to the  
theory, the word means “dog, coyote or wolf”. Additionally, the theory cannot explain stimulus 
independent uses of the word. Now, this indicator theory can be modified initially in one of two 
ways. On one hand, we can follow Horwich’s dispositionalist use-theory and articulate the link 
as one between a basic sentence containing the word and reality:
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The word ‘dog’ means what it does because its use is governed by a disposition to 
token ‘This is a dog’ in the presence of dogs.
This  version  can  explain  the  stimulus-independent  uses  of  the  word,  because  the  meaning 
ascribed is a property that can causally explain the uses of the word in inferential processes—i.e., 
in  thinking. This is an important advantage of the theory. But Horwich’s articulation does not 
make room for misrepresentation. Just like with the original indicator theory, if the speaker is 
unable to distinguish dogs from coyotes and wolves, then the application of the word to coyotes 
or wolves turns out, implausibly, not to be a misapplication. This is a serious drawback of the 
theory. On the other hand, we can modify instead the original indicator theory using a version of 
my hybrid account. I proposed it merely as an account for basic representations. But we could 
apply it to words assuming, for example, that they have a history of social selection:
The word ‘dog’ means what it does because its tokens are Normally caused by the 
perception of dogs—i.e., this is the cause of tokens that perform the function that 
accounts for the proliferation of the word.
This sort of theory promises to make room for misrepresentation, since it states what is supposed 
to cause tokens of the word. But it has nothing to say about stimulus-independent uses, which is 
a very serious drawback that makes the theory a non-starter as it is—which is a problem shared 
with  the  original  indicator  theory.  Finally,  according  to  basic-acceptance  teleosemantics  we 
would get the following:
The word ‘dog’ means what it does because its uses are supposed to be governed 
by the acceptance of ‘This is a dog’ in response to the presence of dogs—i.e., the 
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acceptance of ‘This is a dog’ caused by the perception of dogs is the  Normal  
cause governing the use of ‘dog’ in thinking.
This view combines the advantages of Horwich’s account and the hybrid teleosemantic account 
over  the  simple  indicator  theory. Like  Horwich’s account,  it  can  explain  how the  stimulus-
dependent use governs the stimulus-independent uses in thinking. Like the hybrid teleosemantic 
account, it makes room for misrepresentation. Surely this articulation of the theory is sketchy. 
But it is a first attempt in a promising and entirely new direction. When we recount the serious  
problems faced by available  theories,  it  really  looks like exploring further  the possibility  of 
combining a basic-acceptance account of meaning with a teleosemantic one is worth it.
Let us assume that words are reproduced items that are culturally transmitted from user to 
user—and from generation to generation—and that they proliferate because of the benefits they 
confer to their users as tools for thinking and as tools for communicating with each other. We 
may then offer the following accounts of the meanings of different kinds of words:
The word ‘dog’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the 
functions  that  account  for  its  proliferation  are  Normally  governed by  the 
acceptance of ‘This is a dog’ in response to the perception of dogs.
The word ‘elm’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the 
functions  that  account  for  its  proliferation  are  Normally  governed by  the 
acceptance of ‘This is an elm’ in response to the perception of elms.
The word ‘bachelor’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the 
functions  that  account  for  its  proliferation  are  Normally  governed by  the 
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acceptance of ‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’.
The word ‘arthritis’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the 
functions  that  account  for  its  proliferation  are  Normally  governed by  the 
acceptance of ‘Arthritis is an inflammation of the joints’.
The word ‘and’ means what it does because the uses in which it performs the 
functions  that  account  for  its  proliferation  are  Normally  governed by  the 
acceptance of the two-way inference schema “p, q // p and q”.
This articulation is in some regards overly simplistic. It treats the words used for communication 
and the words used for thinking as the same. And it treats them as reproduced items with their 
own socio-cultural selective history. The real story is very likely much more complicated than 
this. However, this simplified story serves the purpose of illustrating how a basic-acceptance 
teleosemantics promises to  explain the uses of words in  thinking processes,  and the uses of 
words  for  communication,  all  while  making  plenty  of  room for  misuses  of  the  words  and, 
furthermore, while accounting for a variety of words with meanings involving either links to the 
world, links to other words or links to rules of inference.
Consider the meaning ascribed to ‘elm’ above. If speakers/thinkers are too ignorant to 
distinguish elms from beeches—like in Hilary Putnam’s (1975) example—then their application 
of the word to beeches counts as a misuse because the word has proliferated due to uses that 
were caused by the perception of elms. Now consider the meaning ascribed to ‘arthritis’ above. 
Suppose ‘arthritis’ is a term covered by a description theory. This does not prevent users from 
making mistakes. Yet versions of the description theory that make room for error are difficult to 
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find.85 Remember Papineau’s failed attempt at a teleosemantic version of a description theory. 
While it had problems, the idea of offering a teleosemantic description theory was not itself bad. 
So, if Bert uses ‘arthritis’ to say something like ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’—like in Tyler 
Burge’s  (1979)  example—then  he  is  misusing  the  word,  since  the  uses  that  explain  the 
proliferation  of  the  word  are  Normally  governed  by  the  acceptance  of  ‘Arthritis  is  an 
inflammation of the joints’. And it is indeed plausible, I venture to say, that the English word 
‘and’ has proliferated because of uses were it was governed by the acceptance of the inferential 
rule for conjunction. A speaker that mistakenly uses it in some other way—say, as governed by 
the acceptance of the inferential rule for disjunction—surely is misusing the word.
I  have assumed for the sake of simplicity that language and though form a seamless 
whole and that words simply proliferate as reproduced items. But a better account will have to 
explain public  words as tools for communication and mental  words or concepts as tools for 
thinking.  Additionally,  while  public  words  are  indeed  likely  candidates  for  having  direct 
functions, this is not the case for all concepts. These are difficult matters. But I will give an idea 
of how this may be managed by basic-acceptance teleosemantics.
In the case of acquired concepts, I suggest that basic-acceptance semantics should follow 
mainly  Millikan,  proposing  that  they  have  particular  functions  that  derive  from the  general 
functions  of  the  innate  mechanisms  responsible  for  concept  acquisition  when  coupled  with 
experience. Additionally, some concepts may be acquired through selective learning processes, as 
Papineau  suggests—in  which  case  they  will  have  direct functions  resulting  from their  own 
selective history. But  this  does  not  prevent  these  same concepts  from also  having functions 
85 Devitt and Sterelny point out that the traditional description theory may have problems of ignorance and error  
even in the case of terms that seem to properly fall under it (Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 94-96).
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derived from the very same selective learning mechanisms.
In the case of the arbitrary symbols of natural languages, I suggest that their meanings 
depend on public conventions that establish them as shared means or tools to express certain 
concepts, where the linguistic conventions are characterized in terms of the history of the use of 
words  instead  of  regarded as  current  regularities  in  their  use—following  roughly  Millikan’s 
teleonomic account of linguistic conventions.  Words spread across linguistic communities by 
being copied from user to user, thus forming lineages or reproduced items. Words proliferate in 
this  historical  process  because  they  are  socially  selected  to  facilitate  communication—the 
expression of thoughts. Consequently, the process through which a certain use gets standardized 
as a conventional or public use for a word—e.g., the use to express certain concept—is a process 
in which the word acquires a historically selected function. Just like with the “learning selection” 
of  some concepts,  it  is  plausible  that  the  “social  selection”  of  words  is  ultimately  possible 
because people have certain innate mechanisms; in this case, mechanisms that allow people to 
acquire  languages  and expand their  lexicon,  so that  words  may also plausibly have  derived 
functions from these mechanisms.
The  resulting  view  is,  then,  that  the  meanings  of  words  in  public  languages  are 
determined by historical conventions that link them to words in the language of thought—i.e.,  
concepts—and that the later, in turn, have meanings determined mainly by derived teleonomic 
functions performed when their deployment in thinking—i.e., inferential—processes is governed 
by  their  use  in  some  core  sentences  that  serve  as  the  most  fundamental  premises  in  these 
processes: core sentences that constitute the Normal causes of the overall uses of concepts. These 
core sentences are not themselves the result of inferential processes—in this sense they are non-
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inferential aspects of the uses of words—but they are anyway part of the “inferential roles” of 
words, because they serve as premises in the inferential machinery of thought.
The functions of different  words  in  the language of  thought  varies  considerably. The 
common function to all words is, I suggest, a very general function—namely, to play certain 
roles in inference in order to ultimately contribute to the modulation of intentional behavior; 
since the ultimate effects of inferential processes are decisions to act that lead to the external 
outputs of the cognitive system: actual behavior. After all, functions are “effects” according to 
the teleonomic model of functions adopted by basic-acceptance teleosemantics. But my proposal 
is  not  to  identify  the  meaning  of  a  word  with  its  function.  Nor  is  it  to  identify  it  with  a 
Millikanian “Normal condition” that is detached from the causal-roles of symbols. Instead, I 
follow roughly the idea I developed in my hybrid account for basic representations, identifying 
meaning with the Normal causes responsible for words performing their functions—when they 
do.  Borrowing  from  Horwich’s  use-theory  of  meaning,  I  propose  that  the  Normal  causes  
responsible  for  words  performing  their  functions—when  they  do—involve  core  sentences 
governing their use. A word can play a causal role in intentional behavior—and thereby perform 
its  ultimate  function—because  it  is  deployed in  certain  characteristic  ways  in  inference  that 
follow from its use in certain basic sentences that are not themselves the result of any inferences.
I  conclude  with  a  provisional  consideration  about  the  roles  of  reference  and  truth-
conditions in basic-acceptance teleosemantics. I pointed out, following Devitt, that Horwich’s 
version  of  basic-acceptance  semantics  risks  collapsing  into  truth-referentialism.  I  have  not 
articulated  basic-acceptance  teleosemantics  explicitly  in  truth-referential  terms.  I  am  of  the 
opinion that we can continue making plenty of progress in semantics before settling the issue of 
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deflationism. I very strongly suspect that the direct and indirect links to reality postulated by 
basic-acceptance teleosemantics will turn out to be reference-determining ones. But I suggest 
that use-theorists who favor deflationism should explore teleosemantic versions of the use-theory 
(i.e., versions of “functional-role teleosemantics”), since they promise to overcome the problems 
of  ignorance  and error  that  plague  all  naturalistic  use-theories.  I  suggest  also  exploring  the 
possibility  of  non-reference-determining meanings  within  the  framework of  basic-acceptance 
teleosemantics. But as far as I can see, however, the most reasonable hypotheses about meaning 
constitutive  links  seem  to  be  the  ones  we  would  expect  if  truth-conditions  and  referential 
relations played substantial explanatory roles in semantics.
A  proper  truth-referentialist  version  of  basic-acceptance  teleosemantics  should  be 
moderately truth-referentialist,  in order to accommodate words with meanings that link them 
either to reality, to other words or to rules of inference. It will have the following general shape:
i. The meanings of  primitive words are constituted by the acceptance of basic sentences 
containing  them with  links  to  reality  that  are  supposed  to  govern  their  use  and that 
determine their references.
ii. The meanings of non-primitives are constituted by the acceptance of basic sentences with 
links  to  other  words  that  are  supposed  to  govern  their  use  and  that  determine  their 
references.
iii. The meanings of logical words are constituted by the acceptance of basic sentences with 
links to  inference rules that are supposed to govern their use and that determine their 
contribution to the truth-conditions of the sentences they are used in.
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Not surprisingly, this is very similar to the shape of a truth-referential basic-acceptance semantics 
that I offered as an illustration in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.3, but now with a teleonomic twist. The 
idea is that the very same properties that are responsible for governing the use of a word are what 
determine its reference. I want to suggest that in a truth-referentialist version of basic-acceptance 
teleosemantics,  the  basic  sentences  that  constitute  meanings  (because  they  function  as  the 
Normal causes of the overall uses of words) should be seen as playing the role of  modes of  
reference.  Consider  the  meaning ascribed to  ‘bachelor’ above.  The teleonomic  link  between 
‘bachelor’ and the acceptance of ‘The bachelors are the unmarried men’ can be regarded as a 
descriptive  mode  of  presentation  in  Fregean style.  More  interestingly, consider  the  meaning 
ascribed to ‘elm’. In this case, the teleonomic link between ‘elm’ and the acceptance of ‘This is  
an elm’ in response to the perception of elms provides what Devitt (2001b) calls a “causal” mode 
of reference. Frege regarded the associated description that determines the reference of a word as 
part of the word’s meaning. So he could explain how co-referential words can differ in meaning: 
different associated descriptions can determine the same reference. But this only works for non-
primitives. Devitt’s idea is that the direct causal link to reality that determines the reference of a 
primitive  can  also  be  regarded as  part  of  the  word’s meaning.  So we can  explain  how co-
referential  primitives  can  differ  in  meaning:  different  causal  links  can  determine  the  same 
reference. What I am suggesting is that a truth-referential basic-acceptance teleosemantics as a 
matter of fact treats the meanings of both primitives and non-primitives as modes of reference.
Basic-acceptance teleosemantics treats words with different basic sentences playing the 
role of  Normal causes as having different meanings, even if they happen to be co-referential. 
Suppose that the  Normal cause of uses of ‘renate’ is the acceptance of ‘A renate is a creature 
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with a kidney’, while the Normal cause of uses of ‘cordate’ is the acceptance of ‘A cordate is a 
creature with a heart’. The two words have different meanings but, as it turns out, they have the 
same reference, since all renates are cordates and vice versa. The old description theory already 
was able to treat terms such as these as having different meanings or senses, and consequently to 
explain  why the  identity  statement  ‘All  renates  are  cordates  and vice  versa’ has  a  different 
meaning than the trivial  statement  ‘All  renates  are  renates’.  Basic-acceptance teleosemantics 
offers roughly the same explanation as the description theory in these cases. But now let us focus 
on primitives: words with meanings involving direct links to reality, which are not covered by a 
description theory. Suppose the Normal cause of uses of ‘Hesperus’ is the acceptance of ‘This is 
Hesperus’ in response to the perception of the shiniest  star-looking celestial body during the 
evening,  while  the  Normal  cause of  uses  of  ‘Phosphorus’  is  the  acceptance  of  ‘This  is 
Phosphorus’ in response to the perception of the shiniest star-looking celestial body during the 
morning. Since these two words have different  Normal causes, they have different meanings 
according to  basic-acceptance teleosemantics,  even if  it  turns out that they both refer to the 
planet Venus. So basic-acceptance teleosemantics explains why ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ has a 
different meaning than the trivial ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’. A problem faced by “direct reference” 
theories is that they cannot explain why ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ has a different meaning than 
‘Hesperus is Hesperus’, since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ have the same reference and such 
theories claim that meaning is exhausted by reference.86 But even a truth-referentialist version of 
basic-acceptance  teleosemantics  identifies  meanings  with  the  Normal  causes of  the  uses  of 
words, which it takes to be certain basic sentences containing them. If these meanings turn out to 
86 Theorists  that  defend  “direct  reference”  views  usually  propose  that  the  difference  between  ‘Hesperus  is 
Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is not  semantic, but merely pragmatic (e.g., Salmon 1986 & Soames 
2002). Devitt (2012: Sec. 3.4 & 3.5) offers compelling arguments against this “pragmatic defense” of the direct  
reference view.
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strongly determine the referential properties of words, they will constitute modes of reference.
6.7 Conclusion
In  this  chapter,  I  have  discussed  how  teleosemantics  can  be  extended  from  the  basic 
representations discussed in Chapter 5 to the sophisticated mental and linguistic representations 
of  human  beings.  I  assessed  the  valuable  attempts  by  Papineau  and  Millikan  to  extend 
teleosemantics  to  human  representations.  While  I  defended  and  borrowed  their  proposals 
regarding the sources of teleonomic functions in human cognition—as well as the functions of 
beliefs and desires—I found serious problems with their accounts of concept and word meanings. 
In their place, I offered a new version of teleosemantics for concept and word meanings that is 
articulated  in  terms  of  basic  sentence  acceptance.  I  argued  that  the  resulting  view,  “basic-
acceptance teleosemantics”, overcomes problems of Horwich’s basic-acceptance theory and of 




The canonical version of the correspondence theory of truth has been largely abandoned for good 
reasons. This version relied on alleged relations of resemblance between truth-bearers and facts. 
One of the boldest attempts to clarify what such relations involved was perhaps Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus (1922)—were  the  correspondence  relation  was  portrayed  as 
involving (1) a relation of structural resemblance between as true sentence and a fact, and (2) 
referential  relations  between the  words  of  the  sentences  and the  components  of  the  fact.  In 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2, I discussed the serious difficulties faced by this view—which account for 
why it has been largely abandoned. However, Tractarian themes have resurfaced in the literature. 
Wilfrid Sellars, for example, endorsed a picture theory according to which “the manner in which 
the names occur in the picture is a projection, in accordance with a fantastically complex system 
of rules of projection, of the manner in which the objects occur in the world” (Sellars 1963: 215). 
More  recently,  Ruth  Millikan  has  pursued,  as  she  puts  it,  “the  picturing  themes  from  the 
Tractatus that were carried through in Sellars’ discussions” (Millikan 2005: 77). According to 
Millikan, “what makes a sentence true is that there is something in the world onto which it maps 
in accordance with certain mapping functions” (Millikan 1984: 9). She clarifies that what she 
means by ‘mapping’ is, basically, “as Wittgenstein put it, ‘picturing’.” (Millikan 2005: 63). “The 
value  of  a  system of  representation”,  she  claims,  “depends...  on  there  being  some  kind  of 
isomorphism... between the domain of the signs and the domain of their signifieds” (Millikan 
2004a: 84). Given the insurmountable problems faced by the pictorial account of truth, these 
confident claims are puzzling. I will argue in this appendix that Millikan wrongly presents her 
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view as  a  pictorial  one in  the tradition of  the  Tractatus and that  the  relations  between true 
representations and reality that her “mapping functions” actually require are better understood 
within the  framework of  a  contemporary  correlation-based account  of  truth,  of  the  sort  that 
follows from a Tarski-based characterization of the truth of a sentence in terms of its syntactic 
structure  and  the  referential  properties  of  its  words,  combined  with  a  reductive  account  of 
reference in terms of substantive relations between words and parts of reality. In this appendix I 
will abstract away from the other objections I raised against Millikan’s theory in Chapters 5 and 
6. The topic of this appendix is merely her claim that her theory involves picturing relations.
Millikan combines what she claims to be a pictorial account of truth with a teleological 
account of the functions performed by representations, which includes a teleological account of 
the referential properties of their parts. Her naturalist account of reference is among the main 
contemporary candidates for reducing referential properties to substantial non-semantic relations. 
So her “pictorial” view does not suffer from lacking such an account. Millikan’s view is complex 
and the role of picturing in her account is often overlooked, because most of the interest has been 
on her theory of reference. Notable exceptions are Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) and Nicholas 
Shea (2013), who are sympathetic to some aspects of Millikan’s program but skeptical about the 
role of isomorphism in her account. Godfrey-Smith and Shea see the teleological part as doing 
all the explanatory work in Millikan’s theory, in such a way that truth-conditions are determined 
merely  by  the  selective  history  underlying  the  mechanisms  responsible  for  producing 
representations. While their assessments are different, they agree that isomorphism does not play 
a genuine explanatory role in Millikan’s theory (Godfrey-Smith 1996: 184-187; Shea 2013: 63-
80). Their main concern is about the interplay between the teleological and the allegedly pictorial 
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aspects  of  her  theory. But  in  this  appendix  I  am mainly  concerned with  the  allegedly  non-
teleological part of Millikan’s theory.
Millikan regards mapping relations or isomorphisms between representations and reality 
as the core features that make representations true, and she intends her teleological account to 
explain merely why representations are supposed but may fail to map or be isomorphic to reality: 
the teleological part of her theory is only intended to explain misrepresentation (Godfrey-Smith 
1996: 184-185; Shea 2013: 63). While Godfrey-Smith and Shea are skeptical about this, I will 
here simply grant for the sake of argument that Millikan’s theory does contain a non-teleological 
account of truth in terms of the relation that she calls “mapping” or “isomorphism”. My question 
is  what  is  precisely  this  relation.  If  it  really  is  the  Tractarian  relation  of  picturing,  as  she 
explicitly claims, then this part of her theory is undermined by the problems discussed in Chapter 
2, Section 2.2. Millikan intends her theory to apply to all sorts of representations, from human 
representations  to  the  most  basic  cases  of  non-human  representation.  I  will  focus  here  on 
sentences of natural human languages.
According to  Millikan,  sentences  “correspond to  states  of  affairs  in  accordance  with 
semantic-mapping  functions”  (Millikan  2005:  63).  The  notion  of  “function”  here  is  the 
mathematical one (Millikan 2005: 53), rather than the teleological notion that she deploys in 
other parts of her theory. Semantic-mapping functions, she argues, are rules that determine the 
truth-conditions of sentences:
The semantic-mapping function is given by rules according to which significant 
transformations of the sentence that conserve its  syntactic form yield different 
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truth- or satisfaction-conditions... ‘It’s raining’ contrasts with ‘It’s snowing’, ‘It’s 
hailing’,  ‘It’s sleeting’,  and so forth.  All  display  the  same syntactic  form, the 
transformations that substitute  ‘snow’,  ‘hail’,  and ‘sleet’ for ‘rain’ determining 
different satisfaction-conditions in a systematic way. (Millikan 2005: 63-64)
Substitutions of component parts of a sentence of a specific syntactic form, she claims, change 
its truth-conditions in a systematic way. So, for example, ‘Fa’, can be transformed into ‘Fb’, 
‘Ga’, ‘Gb’, etc., which have the same syntactic structure but represent different states of affairs. 
The  difference regarding  what  portions  of  reality  each  of  these  sentences  “maps”  onto  is 
determined exclusively by the different referential properties of their components. To the extent 
that  mapping  rules  determine  what  states  of  affairs  are  represented  by  transformations of 
sentences  of  the  same form—which  is  what  Millikan  suggests  in  the  quoted  passage—the 
“mapping” determined by these rules has nothing to do with the traditional notion of structural 
resemblance between sentences and facts. Of course the mapping rules that determine the truth 
conditions of ‘Rab’ and its transformations—‘Rba’,  ‘Scd’,  ‘Sdc’,  etc.—will be different.  It is 
clear that Millikan thinks that mapping functions relate each sentence to a state of affairs that 
would make it true, and that this relation depends on (1) the syntactic structure of the sentence 
and (2) the referential properties of its words. These two features are part of pictorial theories, 
but also of the contemporary non-pictorial account of correspondence that I discussed in Chapter 
2 (although this theory does not explicitly posit fact or states of affairs, a variant of it may do so  
without relying on picturing relations). The questions are whether Millikan’s “mapping” rules are 
intended to  relate  sentences  to  states  of  affairs  which  have  the  very  same structures  as  the 
sentences and whether this is actually  required  by her account of truth-conditions in terms of 
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“mapping” rules.
Consider the following rule for the simplest form of subject-predicate sentence. SP: The 
sentence ⌜Φx  ⌝ is true if and only the state of affairs in which the object referred to by ⌜x⌝ has 
the property referred to by ⌜Φ⌝ obtains. The rule SP is compatible with Millikan’s claim that the 
relata of sentences are states of affairs and her professed Aristotelian realism about properties 
(Millikan 1984: Ch. 15 & 16). Also, SP covers all the substitution instances of ⌜Φx —i.e., ‘⌝ Fa’, 
‘Fb’,  ‘Ga’,  etc.—assigning a specific state of affairs  as the truth-maker for each instance. It 
yields in a systematic way the truth-conditions for of all the transformations of ‘Fa’. Assuming 
that these corresponding states of affairs have the same ontological structure—that of an object 
having a  monadic  property—SP pairs or  correlates sentences  that  have  a  specific  syntactic 
structure  with  states  of  affairs  that  have  a  specific  ontological  structure.  SP delivers  what 
Millikan calls “a correspondence by a given rule or function between form and some structure in  
the  world”  (Millikan  2005:  98).  Everything  that  Millikan  seems  to  require  of  a  “semantic-
mapping rule” is met by SP. The crucial point is that SP does not require the combination of a 
name with a monadic predicate to  structurally resemble the combination of an object with a 
monadic property. If SP is the kind of “semantic-mapping rule” that Millikan has in mind, then 
hers is a correlation-based rather than a resemblance-based form correspondence view. What is 
puzzling is Millikan’s talk of “mapping” as a form of “picturing” involving an “isomorphism” 
between representations and reality. A correlation account should only talk of “representing”.
Millikan’s favorite example of representation is the figure-eight waggle dance made by 
honey bees to communicate to each other the location of nectar—which she often compares to 
human sentences. The ethologist Karl von Frisch discovered that waggle dances communicate 
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the location of nectar and that they do this by representing its direction and distance from the 
hive: the angle of the waggle dance with respect to the vertical axis of the hive represents the 
angle from the line between the hive and the Sun where nectar is located, while the duration of  
the  dance  represents  how far  away  from the  hive  the  nectar  is  (von Frisch  1953:  Ch.  11).  
According to Millikan, the bee dance “is a tiny map” that “maps the location of nectar by a 
certain rule of projection” (Millikan 2005: 83). “Variations in possible bee dances”, she points 
out,  “correspond one-to-one to  variations  in  possible  locations  of  nectar” and “the  principle 
involved”,  she  claims,  “is  mathematical  isomorphism”  (Millikan  2005:  97).  The  way  she 
describes how the “bee language”—as von Frisch called it—represents the location of nectar has 
a distinctly Tractarian flavor. It is striking that bee dances do represent the location of nectar by 
means of mathematical rules of projection. A waggle dance x represents the presence of nectar in 
direction  y at distance  z  from the hive. There is a direct mathematical projection between the 
angle of  x and the direction  y, and another one between the duration of  x and the distance  z. 
Mathematical rules of projection determine the values of y and z. Whether this makes the whole 
dance “isomorphic” to the location of nectar is not so clear and I will not discuss it. But what is 
this supposed to tell us about representations in general and about human sentences in particular?
Bee dances are Millikan’s favorite example because she thinks that they illustrate basic 
features of representations in general. Here is how she explains what “mapping functions” do in 
any system of representation: “Semantic mapping functions define isomorphisms between the set 
of possible signs in a certain sign domain and the set of their possible signifieds.” (Millikan 
2004a: 49). This is meant to apply also to the linguistic and mental representations of human 
beings, although she warns that we should “expect the... mapping functions to be much more 
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abstract” in the case of human representations (Millikan 2005: 102). Furthermore, she insists that 
she uses the term ‘isomorphism’ in “the abstract mathematical sense” (Millikan 2004a: 84). In 
their pictorial period, Wittgenstein and Russell also intended true sentences to be isomorphic to 
facts only in an abstract sense. They intended only the underlying logical form of a true sentence 
to resemble the structure of what it represents, independently of its superficial structure which 
may be different. If this were the kind of abstract isomorphism that Millikan expects to obtain 
between true sentences and what  they “map” onto,  her  theory would be undermined by the 
problem discovered by Russell:  that  a  sentence ‘Rab’ would represent  a fact  containing two 
objects united by a dyadic relation, while the sentence contains three words united by a triadic 
logico-syntactic relation (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). However, despite her talk of “picturing”, 
“mapping”, “rules of projection” and “isomorphisms”, she  never claims explicitly that a true 
representation has the same structure as what it represents.
Recall  Millikan’s  claim  that,  in  human  languages,  the  mapping  rules  systematically 
determine for different sentences different states of affairs as truth-makers (Millikan 2005: 63-
64). This is compatible with a correlation-based view of correspondence. Recall her claim that 
mapping  rules  determine  a  correspondence  between  the  form of  a  true  sentence  and  some 
structure in  the  world  (Millikan  2005:  98).  This  claim  also  falls  short  of  being  genuinely 
pictorial. As I argued above, the rule SP would determine a correspondence between a sentence 
of the  form ⌜Φx  and a state of affairs with a specific  ⌝ structure—that of an object having a 
monadic  property—regardless  of  whether  the  sentence’s form  matches that  structure  or  not 
(which is good because it does not, as Russell showed). Now consider the following passage:
We can think of beliefs as... mental sentences... and think of... their truth makers... 
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as  determined  by  some  sort  of  Tarskian  mapping...  Certain  substitutions  of 
sentence parts correspond to substitutions in aspects of world affairs mapped... 
That  is,  there  is  a  functional  isomorphism between  the  whole  set of  possible 
mental sentences... and the  set of world affairs to which these sentences would 
correspond... (Millikan 2004b: 231-232)
This passage is very revealing of what kind of “mapping” Millikan expects to obtain between 
true sentences and reality. The rule SP I proposed is precisely the “sort of Tarskian mapping” for 
simple predicative sentences that a realist about properties and structured states of affairs (or 
facts) like Millikan would need. Analogous “sort of Tarskian” rules would be required to cover 
other syntactic structures. What those rules would determine is a systematic one-to-one pairing 
of all possible sentences with all of their possible truth-makers, which is what Millikan in the  
passage calls—rather confusingly, in my opinion—a “functional isomorphism”. This pairing is 
clearly what a fact-based view of correspondence as correlation requires, which is less than what 
a  genuinely  pictorial  theory  requires.  Incidentally, notice  that  the  set  of  all  instances  of  the 
equivalence schema also seems to provide a systematic pairing between sentences and what they 
represent (‘p’ is true ↔  p,  ‘q’ is true ↔  q, ‘r’ is true ↔  r,  etc.).  But this “pairing” is  not a 
relation.  A  correlation-based  correspondence theory  requires  the  systematic  pairing  to  be 
determined by substantial relations between sentences and truth-makers.
All  of  this,  however,  leaves  open  the  possibility  that  Millikan’s talk  of  relations  of 
“picturing” between sentences and their truth-makers may additionally require actual structural 
resemblance. The fact that she does not explicitly require structural resemblance is not enough to 
sort  this  out,  since her  pictorial  talk and her  comparison between sentences  and bee dances 
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suggests  otherwise.  However,  Millikan  has  recently  made  a  distinction  between  “projected 
correspondence”  and  “substitutional  correspondence”  (Millikan  2013b:  84-86)  that  helps  to 
clarify this issue. This distinction is intended as a response to an objection by Shea. So I will 
provide some context before explaining the distinction and discussing how it settles the issue of 
whether Millikan requires true sentences to structurally resemble states of affairs.
In  his  objection  to  Millikan’s isomorphism requirement,  Shea  suggests  an  interesting 
hypothetical scenario. Suppose that the bee rules for representing distance were as follows:  1 
waggle = 75 m, 2 waggles = 300 m, 3 waggles = 60 m, 4 waggles = 150 m, etc. (Shea 2013: 74). 
Of course, these are very different from the actual rules, discovered by von Frisch, relating bee 
dances  to  the  distance  of  nectar.  But  in  principle—while  very  unlikely—some  species  or 
subspecies of bee could have evolved to have dances which represent by Shea’s rules, provided 
their foraging range was limited, so that a finite list of rules could be used to represent all the 
required distances. I will call these creatures “bees*”. One of the features of Shea’s bee* rules is 
that they are list-like: there is a different rule for each distance represented. Another feature is 
that the list is arbitrary: there is no general principle involved, such as more waggles representing 
more distance. The only principle is that each number of waggles represents a particular distance. 
Bee* dances are not “isomorphic” in any minimally strict sense of the word to the distance of 
nectar they represent. Yet, as Shea points out, his arbitrary rules seem to determine what qualifies 
as a “functional  isomorphism” in Millikan’s sense (Shea 2013:  75).  As I  indicated above,  a 
systematic one-to-one pairing of representations with states of affairs seems indeed to be what 
she calls a “functional isomorphism”. Shea’s hypothetical bee* rules deliver such a pairing. The 
example echoes and supports Godfrey-Smith’s objection that Millikan’s notion of isomorphism 
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is  too  liberal—that  “nearly  any relation  can  constitute  a  «mapping» in  Millikan’s  theory” 
(Godfrey-Smith  1996:  185).  Shea  and  Godfrey-Smith  make  these  points  in  the  context  of 
discussing the relation between Millikan’s isomorphism requirement and her teleological theory 
of content. As far as Shea is concerned, Millikan’s teleosemantic theory has the resources to 
explain his hypothetical bee* rules in terms of evolutionary grounded substantive relations.87 He 
is not objecting to Millikan’s teleosemantics. What Shea intends the example to show is that the 
isomorphism requirement does not play a genuine role in the theory.
Millikan draws the distinction between projected and substitutional correspondence in her 
response to Shea. The language of actual bees, she suggests, is a clear example of mapping by 
means of projected correspondence. There are mathematical functions or projection rules relating 
features  of  different  bee  dances  to  different  locations  of  nectar.  She  offers  the  following 
illustration of what the rule for representing distance may look like: “For example:  add one 
waggle to the dance = add 1,000 yards to the distance of nectar. If this equation applies to every 
possible  bee  dance,  it  describes  a  projected  correspondence  between  dances  and  distances” 
(Millikan 2013b: 84). While also imaginary, this rule does capture the basic principle involved in 
actual bee dances: a longer dance represents a longer distance of nectar from the hive. About 
Shea’s  bee*  rules  Millikan  says:  “Shea  suggests  for  bee  dances  a  list  giving  arbitrary 
correspondences between numbers of waggles and distances. This would be a list of correlated 
substitution transformations...” (Millikan 2013b: 84). Her point is that there is no mathematical 
equation or projection rule relating the number of waggles to the distance of nectar. Instead, she 
87 The list-like nature of bee* rules may raise concerns about whether they determine substantive correspondences, 
since deflationists offer precisely list-like characterizations which, they claim, involve no substantive relation. 
Presumably the reply to this concern is that the bee* dances are substantially related to locations of nectar by 
evolutionary history.
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claims, there are substitutional rules that arbitrarily relate changes in the number of waggles to 
changes in the distance of nectar from the hive represented—e.g., replacing a 2 waggles dance 
with a 3  waggles  dance transforms the distance represented from 300 m to 60 m (Millikan 
2013b: 84-85). Even though they are arbitrary, she acknowledges, bee* rules do determine a 
systematic one-to-one pairing of representations and what they represent (Millikan 2013b: 85). 
Setting aside the representation of direction, her claim is that a bee dance is true when it has a 
projected correspondence to the distance of nectar, while a bee* dance is true when it has a 
substitutional correspondence to the distance of nectar.88
Millikan further illustrates the distinction with another example where, she says, both 
kinds of correspondence are at play: a human-made map of a county where lines represent “the 
shape and placement of roads” and “different colors... represent different road surfaces, such as 
dirt, gravel, paved, and so forth” (Millikan 2013b: 86). This is basically a hybrid case where, if  
the map is accurate, the shape and placement of the lines has a projected correspondence to the 
actual  shape and placement  of  the roads,  while  the colors  of  the lines  have a  substitutional 
correspondence to the actual surfaces of the roads.
A way of clarifying Millikan’s point is that what she calls a “projected correspondence” 
involves a relation of isomorphism between representation and reality, while what she calls a 
“substitutional correspondence” involves merely a correlation determined by some substantial 
relation other than isomorphism. Millikan does not make the point explicitly in these terms. 
Perhaps she  still  wants  to  regard  substitutional  correspondences  as  involving some form of 
“abstract isomorphism”. While this is a terminological issue, I see no point in applying the term 
88 Millikan now claims that the teleological part of her theory is what grounds any such correspondences on real 
relations (Millikan 2013b: 82-83).
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‘isomorphism’ to  non-projective  correspondences.  This  would  be  misleading,  since  it  would 
obscure  the  standard  distinction  made  in  the  literature  on  the  nature  of  truth  between 
correspondence  as  congruence,  structural  resemblance  or  isomorphism,  on  one  hand,  and 
correspondence as mere correlation, on the other. Once a theory admits both non-projective and 
projective correspondences, it is better characterized as a correlation theory, since what it claims 
to be the common feature of all true representations is that they are paired to their truth makers 
by  one  or  another  substantive  relation—projective  relations  being  merely  one  such  kind  of 
relation that some representational systems (e.g., bee dances) may rely on.
Now  we  can  address  Millikan’s  position  regarding  sentences  in  human  languages. 
Drawing on her distinction between projective and substitutional correspondence, she says that 
“almost all of the correspondences found in natural language are substitutional” (Millikan 2013b: 
84)  and  claims  that  “this  is  the  main  difference  between  simpler  representations  and  the 
representations of human language” (Millikan 2013b: 86). I am skeptical about the second claim. 
But let me start by commenting on the first one. Millikan has always argued that what sets apart 
sentences from other representations is their syntactic structure: they have subject-predicate form 
and can be negated (Millikan 1984: 308-309). She has pointed out, for example, that “bee dances 
are not sentences, for they have no subject terms, and a rabbit’s danger thumps are not sentences, 
for they never predicate of a time and place anything other than danger... [while] the alarm calls  
of vervet monkeys are not sentences because... [they] are never negated” (Millikan 1993: 118). 
Also, she has always characterized the “mapping” rules of sentences as mainly substitutional, as 
shown by some passages I  have already quoted.  Here is  an earlier  example: “In the case of 
sentences that map, the significant transformations... are mostly substitution transformations...” 
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(Millikan 1984: 108). However, only now she has made the explicit claim that substitutional 
rules are  not  projective rules.  This makes it  clear that  she does not regard now the kind of 
“substitutional” correspondence of true sentences to be like the “projective” correspondence of 
accurate bee dances. In the clearer terms I prefer to use, her conception of sentential truth is one 
of correspondence as correlation, rather than one of correspondence as congruence, structural 
resemblance or isomorphism. I argued before that Millikan’s theory does not really require true 
sentences to structurally resemble states of affairs. Whatever she intended in her previous work
—which is not entirely clear—she now clearly does not think that true sentences structurally 
resemble what they represent.
I close this appendix with couple of critical remarks. The first one is substantive and the 
second  one  terminological.  My  first  remark  is  against  Millikan’s  claim  that  the  distinction 
between substitutional and projective truth-conditions is what sets apart human sentences from 
simpler representations. (I think that her syntax-based distinction is more appropriate, although 
we may find syntax also in non-human languages of thought: whether syntax is uniquely human 
is an empirical question.) Notice that  some very sophisticated representations (e.g.,  computer 
generated models) may rely at least partly on projective rules. More importantly, many simple 
non-human representations seem to have “substitutional” truth-conditions. Vervet monkey alarm 
calls  are  an obvious  example:  they  are merely correlated to  the  presence  of  the appropriate 
predators  when  accurate.  Indeed,  plenty  of  extremely  simple  “detection”  systems  represent 
reality without relying on any projective rules or mathematical isomorphisms. The hair detectors 
used by the Venus flytrap to detect that an insect has landed are a clear example. (By the way, the 
triggers  only represent—when  successful—that  an  insect  has  landed,  so  there  are  neither 
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projective nor substitutional “transformations” involved. The distinction does not apply across 
the board.) It is likely that the perceptual representations of more sophisticated creatures do rely 
on some forms of isomorphism (Millikan 2005: 102). But correspondence as correlation seems to 
be ubiquitous and not merely a sophisticated human phenomenon.
My second point is that once correspondence by means of mathematical isomorphism has 
been discarded as a necessary condition for representational truth,  there is no motivation for 
regarding true representations in general as either picturing or mapping what they represent. It is 
obvious that any further talk of picturing would be merely metaphorical. Perhaps bee dances and 
many other representations literally are maps of what they represent. But consider simple human 
sentences like ‘Socrates is wise’ or ‘Snow is white’. Saying that these sentences map something 
seems  clearly  metaphoric.  What  could  that  possibly  mean  other  than  that  they  represent 
something? Talk of mapping does not convey anything that cannot be as easily conveyed by 
explicit talk of representing.
In  Chapter  2,  Section  2.2,  I  argued  that  the  pictorial  account  of  sentential  truth  as 
structural resemblance to facts is hopeless. In this Appendix I have argued that the “pictorial” 
account promoted by Millikan, despite her claims, does not require genuinely pictorial relations. 
If she originally intended correspondence relations in general to involve structural resemblances, 
that  feature  of  her  theory  should  be  replaced  by  a  correlation-based  account.  It  seems  that 
Millikan herself has now reached this conclusion, at least for the case of sentential truth. The 
only viable alternative for a correspondence theory of sentential truth is to offer a correlation 
account based on substantial relations between sentences and reality.
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Appendix 2:
More on Attitude Ascriptions
In Chapter 1, I argued against the view that attitude ascriptions of the form ‘S believes that p’ or 
‘S  said  that  p’  assert  relations  between  people  and  abstract  objects  called  “propositions”.  I 
defended a  non-propositionalist  alternative, proposed by Devitt (1996), according to which the 
‘that’-clauses  in  attitude ascriptions  function as  indefinite  singular  terms. I  showed how this 
account has crucial advantages over the propositionalist analysis. In this appendix, I will discuss 
yet  another  analysis  of  attitude  ascriptions  that  constitutes  an  important  non-propositionalist 
alternative  to  the  one  I  defended  in  Chapter  1:  the  multiple-relation  analysis  offered  by 
Friederike  Moltmann  (2003  &  2013).  Moltmann’s  analysis  is  based  on  Russell’s  multiple-
relation theory of beliefs.  Russell  himself  abandoned this  view due to  a  serious problem he 
encountered  while  trying  to  develop  it—and  the  view  was  not  taken  seriously  afterwards. 
Moltmann,  however,  has  resurrected  the  view  an  attempted  to  articulate  it  in  a  way  that 
overcomes  the  difficulties  faced  by  Russell’s  version.  In  what  follows,  I  will  first  present 
Russell’s original  proposal  and the problems it  faces.  Afterwards,  I  will  present  Moltmann’s 
contemporary version and argue that it also faces serious difficulties. Finally, I will argue that the 
analysis  I  proposed following Devitt  has  crucial  advantages  that  favor  it  over  any multiple-
relation analysis of belief ascriptions.
To understand Russell’s multiple-relations theory, it will be convenient to briefly review 
the view he was trying to avoid: his earlier view that the primary truth-bearers are what today are 
called “Russellian propositions”. (I discussed this in Chapter 1. Here I provide a brief summary.) 
Let me use a simple example: the proposition that Rab—i.e., that the object a has the relation R 
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with the object b. The early Russell (1903) held that the constituents of propositions were entities 
in the world. The constituents of the proposition that Rab would be the objects a and b, as well as 
the relation R. But what glues these parts into a unity? Russell suggested that in the proposition 
that  Rab, the fact that  R actually relates  a and  b is what provides the unity of the proposition 
(Russell 1903: 48-53). As I pointed out in Chapter 1, on this view true propositions collapse into 
the facts that make them true. Russell embraced this, proposing that a proposition is true if and 
only if it is  identical to a fact (Russell 1904). But a serious problem is that on Russell’s view 
there cannot be false propositions (King 2007: 23). If it is not a fact that  Rab—if  R does not 
relate a and b— there is no unity that we can call the “false proposition” that Rab.
Eventually Russell attempted to avoid the problem of falsehood by rejecting propositions 
and replacing them with beliefs as the primary truth-bearers. Treating a belief as a relation to a 
“Russellian” proposition would  defeat  the purpose.  Russell  proposed instead that  a  belief  is 
complex unity involving  multiple relations between entities in the world and the believer: that 
S’s act of believing that  Rab contains  R,  a and b bound to S by the believing relation (Russell 
1912: 124-29). Notice that there was an important continuity with Russell’s earlier account: the 
constituents of his truth-bearers still were mind- and language-independent entities, rather than 
representations standing for them. But on Russell’s new account the unity of the truth-bearer was 
provided by the believing relation: “The relation [R... when S believes that Rab]... occurs in the 
act of believing...  [as] one of the objects—it is a brick in the structure, not the cement. The 
cement is the relation ‘believing’.” (Russell 1912: 128). Russell’s analysis of the structure of S’s 
act  of  believing that  Rab can be logically  symbolized by ‘BsRab’—where ‘B’ is  a  polyadic 
predicate standing for the believing relation but ‘R’ is a name for a relation rather than a dyadic 
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predicate. Similarly, the analysis of S’s act of believing that Fa can be symbolized by ‘BsFa’—
where ‘F’ is a name for a property instead of a predicate. The constituents united by the believing 
relation are all treated as objects.
The multiple relation account allowed Russell to make some room for falsehood and led 
him to define truth as correspondence. On this account, whether BSRab is independent of whether 
it is a fact that Rab—the believing relation can bind R, a and b one by one with S even if R does 
not bind  a and  b: “it is easier to account for falsehood if we take judgment to be a relation in 
which the mind and the various objects concerned all occur severally” (Russell 1912: 125). This 
independence  of  truth-bearers  from facts  is  what  originally  led  Russell  to  regard  truth  as  a 
correspondence rather than an identity relation. He proposed that S’s belief that Rab is true if and 
only if there is a corresponding fact where R binds a and b in the “same order” as R, a and b are 
bound to S by the believing relation (Russell 1912: 128-29). As Kirkham points out, this is “the 
(original modern) correspondence-as-congruence theory of truth” (Kirkham 1992: 132).89
Russell’s multiple relation theory was an ingenious attempt to avoid propositions, but it is 
undermined by two insurmountable problems which show that the theory ascribes the wrong 
constituents and the wrong structures to truth-bearers. The solution to these problems requires a 
shift to structured representations as truth-bearers.
One problem faced by Russell’s theory is that it does not truly make room for all kinds of 
falsehood: it fails to achieve its main goal. Suppose that S falsely believes that Rab, not merely 
89 The account relies on a supposed resemblance or congruence between the structures facts and true beliefs. But it 
also relies on an alleged identity of the constituents of facts and true beliefs. While this is the first contemporary 
attempt to explain truth as resemblance-to-facts, the truly influential one is the second attempt by Wittgenstein 
and Russell himself, which treats representations as truth-bearers and relies on  referential rather than  identity 
relations between their constituents and reality.
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because  R does not relate  a and  b,  but because  b does not exist.  As Kirkham points out, on 
Russell’s analysis S cannot have such a false belief: one of the constituents is missing, since the 
theory requires R, a and b—rather than ideas or concepts purporting to stand for them—to be the 
constituents of the belief (Kirkham 1992: 122-123). I will call this the “missing constituents” 
problem. The upshot of this problem is that the constituents of a truth-bearer must be symbols or 
representations that purport—but may fail—to refer to entities in the world.  In fact, the early 
Russell’s account of propositions is also undermined by the problem: if  a does not exist, there 
cannot  be  a  false  proposition  that  Fa,  not  because  it  lacks  unity,  but  because  it  lacks  a 
constituent. The early Russell had a reply: ‘a’ is not a genuine name, but an abbreviation for a 
uniquely identifying description (Russell: 1905), so the proposition expressed by ‘Fa’ does not 
contain a to begin with: there is no missing constituent. An analogous attempt may be made to 
rescue his multiple relation theory: the belief  expressed by ‘Fa’ does not contain a, so it is not 
missing  a  constituent  (see Kirkham 1992:  123).  But  Saul  Kripke  has  shown  that  Russell’s 
treatment of ordinary names as disguised descriptions utterly fails (Kripke 1980). Additionally, 
Russell acknowledged that there are  genuine names. The missing constituents problem would 
anyway arise for Russellian propositions or beliefs expressed by sentences containing empty 
genuine names. While Russell assumed that genuine names cannot be empty, Kripke has also 
debunked this assumption (Kripke 2011).
The  missing  constituents  problem may be avoided by a  modification of  the multiple 
relation theory that replaces the relevant entities with concepts purporting to stand for them. The 
truth of a belief would then depend on whether there is a corresponding fact where the referents 
of the concepts are bound together in the same order as the concepts are bound to the believer by 
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the believing relation—which would make room for beliefs that are false due to reference failure. 
If we use underlining to symbolize concepts, so that the concepts purporting to stand for R, a and 
b are  R,  a and  b, we can symbolize the resulting analysis of  S’s act of believing that  Rab by 
‘BsR  ab’—where ‘R  ’ is a name for a predicational concept, rather than a dyadic predication. This 
is still a multiple relation account: the concepts are related one by one to the believer by the 
believing relation. If the missing constituents problem were the only problem faced by Russell’s 
multiple  relation theory, this  variant may work. In any case,  Russell  did not realize that  his 
theory was undermined by this problem (perhaps he thought that he could deploy his theory of 
disguised descriptions to avoid it). What led him to abandon the multiple relation theory was 
another problem, which happens to affect any variant.
The other problem faced by the multiple relation theory was discovered by Wittgenstein. 
In a letter from June 1913, Wittgenstein pointed out to Russell that ‘Rab  ∨ ~Rab’ must “follow 
directly”  from the  correct  analysis  of  ‘S believes  that  Rab’ and  that  this  “condition  is  not 
fulfilled” by his theory (Wittgenstein 2008: 40). Notice that ‘Rab  ∨ ~Rab’ is a tautology and that 
any arbitrary tautology can be validly deduced from  any statement. So what is the problem? 
Wittgenstein was hinting that there must be a non-arbitrary connection between  S’s belief that 
Rab and  specifically  ‘Rab   ∨ ~Rab’  which—unlike  other  tautologies—expresses  that  this 
particular belief is either true or false. On his Notes on Logic from September 1913, Wittgenstein 
elaborated on why the multiple relation theory fails to establish this connection:
When we say A judges that, etc., then we have to mention a whole proposition 
which A judges. It will not do... to mention only its constituents... [A] right theory 
of judgment must make it impossible for me to judge that “this table penholders 
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the book”... (Wittgenstein 1969: 96)
In the ordinary ascription ‘S believes that Rab’, S’s belief is specified by ‘Rab’, which by itself 
constitutes  meaningful  unit  that  can  be true or  false—‘Rab  ∨ ~Rab’—because the  syntactic 
arrangement of ‘R’, ‘a’ and ‘b’ forms a sentence. Such a sentence is the “whole proposition” that, 
according  to  Wittgenstein,  must  be  mentioned  to  specify  S’s  belief.  (I  discuss  below 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of sentences as propositions). The belief ascriptions made by Russell’s 
theory were very different, since they replaced ‘S believes that  Rab’ with ‘BsRab’, which does 
not contain ‘Rab’. This was an intended feature of Russell’s analysis. But Wittgenstein objected 
that in ‘BsRab’, the string ‘Rab’ is not by itself a meaningful unit that can be true of false, so it 
cannot specify S’s belief. The concatenation of ‘R’, ‘a’ and ‘b’ does not form a sentence because 
‘R’ does not play the role of a dyadic predicate: ‘Rab’ is merely a string of names analogous to 
the nonsensical string of ‘table’, ‘penholder’ and ‘book’ mentioned by Wittgenstein. As Russell 
explained the problem some years later, he was “putting the subordinate verb on a level with its 
terms as an object term in the belief” (Russell 1918: 59). Russell’s account of S’s act of believing 
that Rab did not have the right form: it did not relate S to a structured unity that can be true or 
false. I will call this the “structure problem” of the multiple relation theory.90
Notice that the structure problem also affects the concept-based variant of the  multiple 
relation theory that may overcome the missing constituents problem. In ‘BsR  ab’ the string ‘R  ab’ 
is merely a concatenation of names for concepts, rather than a meaningful unit that can be true or 
90 Nicholas  Griffin (1985) argues that Wittgenstein’s main concern was that the multiple relation theory did not  
provide the necessary  type restrictions on the constituents of the belief: it did not treat  R as a relation in  S’s 
belief that Rab. Peter Hanks (2007) argues that Russell could have provided the required type restrictions, but 
Wittgenstein’s main concern was the unity of the truth-bearer: even if R were specified to be a relation, it would 
not relate a and b, since R, a and b would still be severally related to the believer. Of course, if R is not treated 
as a relation to begin with, its unity with  a and  b is also broken. On either interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
objection, Russell’s truth-bearer does not have the right structure.
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false such as the mental sentence symbolized by ‘Rab’. Regarding beliefs as structured mental  
representations containing concepts or ideas purporting to refer to entities in the world avoids 
both the structure and the missing constituents problems.
Russell unsuccessfully tried to amend his theory by adding a form as yet another object of 
the multiple relation—instead of ‘BsRab’, the ascription would be ‘BsRabδ’, were ‘δ’ names the 
form  Φxy—but it  was  unclear  how this  separate  form could structure  the  other  constituents 
(Griffin 1985: 242; Hanks 2007: 127). Russell eventually abandoned the theory and accepted 
Wittgenstein’s proposal that truth-bearers are linguistic and mental representations. The shift to 
representations was exclusively motivated by the structure problem. The missing constituents 
problem played no role. Even in Russell (1918) and Wittgenstein (1922) empty genuine names 
are wrongly assumed to be an impossibility (Kripke 2011: 60-61).
After Russell himself abandoned it, the multiple relation theory was relegated during the 
remainder of the twentieth century to a “historical curiosity, rather than a serious philosophical 
position” (Griffin 1985: 213). But Michael Jubien (2001) and Friederike Moltmann (2003) have 
recently resurrected it in an attempt to avoid treating beliefs and other attitudes as relations to 
mind- and language-independent propositions. Peter Hanks argues that these attempts face the 
very  same problem that  led  Russell  to  abandon  the  theory  (Hanks  2009:  471-72  & 484n). 
Moltmann (2013), however, maintains that her analysis of attitude ascriptions overcomes the 
problem. Her version of the multiple relation theory is the most developed one and provides an 
alternative to the non-propositionalist analysis of attitude ascriptions I proposed in Chapter 1. 
But I will argue that it is unclear whether her ingenious proposal succeeds and that my proposal 
avoids altogether the problems faced by any multiple relational analysis of attitude ascriptions.
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Moltmann (2013) treats attitude verbs as multigrade predicates, following a proposal by 
Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley (2004). A multigrade predicate is alleged to be one that can take 
a variable number of arguments. Consider (1) ‘Tom cooked dinner’ and (2) ‘Tom, Dick and 
Harry  cooked  dinner’.  The logical  form of  (1)  is  ‘Ct’,  but  Oliver  and Smiley  contend that 
‘cooked dinner’ is multigrade, so the form (2) is ‘Ctdh’ rather than ‘Ct & Cd & Ch’ (Oliver and 
Smiley 2004: 609-612). Oliver and Smiley also draw a distinction between argument places and 
positions. Consider (3) ‘Adam fought with Yuri’ and (4) ‘Adam and Bill fought with Yuri and 
Zero’. Each of the two places of ‘x fought with y’, they propose, can take a variable number of 
internal positions; so the form of (3) is ‘Fa;y’ and the form of (4) is ‘Fab;yz’—where the non-
standard ‘;’ is used to separate places (Oliver and Smiley 2004: 615-618).
Moltmann suggests that ‘believes’ and other attitude verbs are multigrade predicates with 
a  first  place reserved for the agent  and a second place with a  variable  number of  positions 
reserved for the constituents of the “attitudinal object” (which she claims is not a proposition); so 
that the logical form of ‘John thinks that Mary likes Bill’ is: ‘THINK(John; LIKE, Mary, Bill)’  
(Moltmann  2013:  132-149).  Like  Russell,  she  regards  the  constituents  as  severally  related 
arguments of the attitude verb. Unlike Russell,  she treats the attitude verb as dyadic: ‘LIKE, 
Mary, Bill’ occupies a  single place, within which ‘LIKE’, ‘Mary’ and ‘Bill’ occupy  different 
positions. The attitude verb, she proposes, establishes relations of “intentional predication”: the 
attitudes  are  “ways of  predicating  a  property  of  its  arguments”  (Moltmann 2013:  147).  Her 
suggestion is that the attitude verb assigns “different roles” to the “different positions” within its 
second place: “one distinguished argument position for a property, meant to be predicated of the 
other arguments, as well as further argument positions matching the argument positions of the 
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property”  (Moltmann  2013:  149).  What  ‘S believes  that  Rab’  states,  she  argues,  is  that  S 
predicates the property R of a and b (Moltmann 2013: 146). This analysis, she claims, overcomes 
the problem that undermined Russell’s account: “the fact that the constituents are arguments of a 
multigrade attitudinal relation will ensure that the sequence forms the content of an attitudinal 
object that... has the right truth conditions.” (Moltmann 2013: 153).
Does Moltmann’s theory overcome the problems of Russell’s theory? Let us start with the 
missing  constituents  problem—which  she  does  not  discuss.  Moltmann  says:  “An  agent  is 
successful in predicating an n-place property of n objects just in case the property holds of the 
objects”  (Moltmann  2013:  146).  If  it  is  not  the  case  that  Rab,  then  S is  not  successful  in 
predicating R of a and b. This makes room for some falsehoods. But Moltmann’s analysis, like 
Russell’s, relates S to R, a and b themselves. If b does not exist, then it seems that S is not only 
unsuccessful in predicating R of a and b, but the predication cannot take place. In fact, if ‘b’ is an 
empty term, ‘S believes that Rab’ seems to be a false ascription under her analysis instead of the 
ascription of a false belief. Moltmann makes a tentative suggestion that may provide a solution to 
this problem: “[the] constituents may be concepts, occupying a position in the multigrade place 
of the attitude verb specifically marked for such concepts” (Moltmann 2013: 159). Moltmann 
here is  not  committing herself  to  this  suggestion,  and she is  focusing only on the  predicate 
embedded in the ‘that’-clause (which is why she mentions only a single  position that may be 
occupied by concepts). But by adopting this suggestion and extending it to cover the arguments 
of the embedded predicate, her theory may overcome the  missing  constituents problem. This 
would be a concept-based modification of her analysis.
Moltmann’s analysis also faces a dilemma regarding the structure of the ascription. The 
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quasi-unity  provided by treating  the  attitude  verb  as  dyadic  is  not  enough to  overcome the 
structure problem: what unifies the different positions in its second place into a structure that can 
be true or false? Moltmann claims that the attitude verb assigns “different roles” to the different 
positions. This could either mean that in ‘S believes that Rab’ the ascription contains a name ‘R’ 
referring to a property  R—which  S is “meant” to predicate of  a and  b—or that the ascription 
itself contains a relational predicate ‘R’. The dilemma is that both options are problematic: the 
first one is undermined by the structure problem, while the second one seems to collapse into  
propositionalism.  According to  the first  option,  the form of  the ascription is  ‘Bs;Rab’.91 The 
string ‘Rab’, just like in Russell’s version, is a concatenation of names. Even if one of these 
names has the specially assigned role of referring to a relational property, this does not turn the 
string into a unity that can be true or false. Clearly this is not what Moltmann has in mind: recall  
her analysis of ‘John thinks that Mary likes Bill’ as ‘THINK(John; LIKE, Mary, Bill)’. What she 
has in mind is the second option, according to which the form of the ascription is ‘Bs;Rab’.92 In 
the string ‘Rab’, the predicate ‘R’ does appear to take ‘a’ and ‘b’ as its arguments: we do seem to 
have a structure with “the right truth conditions” (setting aside the missing constituents problem: 
can S have this belief if b does not exist?). But this analysis seems to collapse into the very kind 
of propositionalism she wants to avoid. In the traditional propositionalist view, the ascription ‘S 
91 Oliver and Smiley suggest this option. They argue that this solves the problem of the multiple relation theory 
using “predicates with variably many arguments”, but they do not claim that it solves the problem—which they 
do notice—of “the conversion of verbs into nouns (‘loves’ into ‘loving’) which the multiple relation theory 
demands” (Oliver and Smiley 2004: 628). Moltmann departs from Oliver and Smiley on this matter.
92 This is not a well-formed formula of first-order logic, even when extended to include multigrade predicates. But  
suppose that ‘B’ is treated instead as a multigrade higher-order predicate that takes both names and predicates as  
arguments.  In  this  case,  the  ontological  commitments  of  the  ascription  may  seem  as  problematic  as  the  
commitment  to propositions that  Moltmann wants  to avoid.  However, Moltmann (2013) interprets ordinary 
language  expressions—including  second-order  predications—as  having  less ontological  commitments  than 
usually  supposed.  Roughly,  she  interprets  expressions  usually  understood  as  referring  to  a  property  qua 
universal  or  abstract  object  as  merely  plurally  referring to  the various particular  instances  of  the property 
(Moltmann 2013: Ch. 1-3). I will grant that Moltmann can account for ‘Bs;Rab’ being well-formed and not 
having problematic ontological commitments related to the seemingly higher-order predication it contains.
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believes that Rab’ is analyzed as having the form as ‘Bs<Rab>’—where ‘<Rab>’ functions as a 
name for  the  proposition  expressed  by the  sentence  ‘Rab’.  How different  is  ‘Bs;Rab’ from 
‘Bs<Rab>’? Instead of angled brackets, Moltmann uses multigrade positions. Nonetheless, her 
analysis seems to plug the same unity—by other means—into the second argument place of the 
attitude verb. She actually acknowledges that in her analysis “the structure of the multigrade 
position matches a structured proposition”, but she insists that there is a difference: that there is  
no  propositional  object  in  her  analysis,  but  merely  “an  ordered  plurality  of  propositional 
constituents” (Moltmann 2013: 150). Moltmann wants the constituents to be separated enough so 
that there is no unity left that may be regarded as a “propositional object”, but she also wants 
them to be united enough so that the “attitudinal object” they compose can be true or false. It is 
unclear whether she succeeds balancing these two conflicting desiderata.
Things get even less clear when we consider ascriptions containing logically complex 
embedded sentences. Moltmann tentatively suggests that ‘John believes that either Mary or Bill 
will  win’ may  have  the  form ‘believe(John;  OR,  f[WIN,  Mary],  f[WIN,  Bill])’—where  the 
connective ‘OR’ works as a multigrade  predicate “taking attitudinal objects of entertaining as 
arguments  in  any  of  their  places”  (Moltmann  2013:  152).  This  suggestion  seems  outright 
implausible.  Are  quantifiers and  negations embedded  within  ‘that’-clauses  also  multigrade 
predicates? Consider ‘John believes that God does not exist’. Its multiple relation analysis will 
have to be some variant of ‘BELIEVE(John; NOT, EXIST, God)’. Placing logical operators and 
quantifiers in predicate argument positions is not only logically problematic, but ontologically 
opens Pandora’s box. Of course, the Russellian view of propositions has difficulties handling 
complex truth-bearers as well: what are the constituents of, and what provides the structure for, 
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propositions like <Mary or Bill will win> and <God does not exist>? Moltmann acknowledges 
that  her  theory  “shares  a  number  of  issues  concerning  complex  sentences  with  structured 
propositions approaches” (Moltmann 2013: 152). What she has in mind is mainly Russellian 
approaches. But these shared issues are serious enough to undermine both kinds of approach.
The analysis  I  propose in  Chapter  1,  drawing on Devitt’s (1996) suggestion  that  the 
‘that’-clauses  in  attitude  ascriptions  function  as  indefinite  singular  terms,  completely  avoids 
commitment to mind- and language-independent propositions, while also avoiding the problems 
faced by multiple relation analyses. According to this analysis, ‘S believes that  p’ states that  S 
has a belief and specifies that the  content of this belief is the  same as that of the embedded 
sentence ‘p’. The form of the attribution in the analysis is ‘ x(Bxs & Sx∃ ‘p’)’: some belief of S has 
the same content as ‘p’. In Chapter 1, I showed that this analysis has crucial advantages over the 
propositionalist  analysis.  First,  it  avoids  the  Substitution  Problem that,  as  Moltmann  (2003) 
shows, undermines the propositionalist analysis.93 Second, it does not treat the attributed content 
as a mind- and language-independent entity, which could not possibly play a causal role in the 
explanation of people’s behavior. Additionally, I showed that the analysis is able to account for 
the validity of inferences like ‘S believes that  p, so  S believes  something’ without quantifying 
over propositional objects.
93 The issue is that the clause ‘that p’ cannot be replaced with ‘the proposition that p’ for all attitude verbs without 
changing the meaning of the ascription. ‘Mary believes that it will rain’ can be rephrased as ‘Mary believes the  
proposition that it will rain’, but ‘Mary fears that it will rain’ cannot be rephrased as ‘Mary fears the proposition 
that  it  will  rain’.  Strictly  speaking, the substitution problem only undermines the traditional  version of  the 
propositional analysis, where ‘S believes that  p’ is analyzed as having the form ‘Bs<p>’. As I pointed out in 
Chapter  1,  a  propositionalist  can go along with Devitt’s proposal  to treat  the ‘that’-clause as an indefinite 
singular term, but give a propositionalist twist to the analysis. On this sophisticated propositionalism, ‘S believes 
that  p’ is analyzed as having the form ‘ x(Bxs & Cx<p>)∃ ’: Some belief of  S has the proposition that  p as its 
content. As I showed in Chapter 1, this analysis avoids the substitution problem. However, the resulting view is  
undermined by the main problem with propositionalism: the ascribed contents cannot play causal roles in the 
explanation of behavior.
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Now I want to point out that this analysis also does better than multiple relation analyses. 
Consider (1) ‘S believes that Fa’, (2) ‘S believes that Rab’ and (3) ‘S believes that Fa or Gb’. On 
the analysis I propose, the forms of these attributions are simply (1') ‘ x(Bxs & Sx∃ ‘Fa’)’, (2') 
‘ x(Bxs  &  Sx∃ ‘Rab’)’  and  (3')  ‘ x(Bxs  &  Sx∃ ‘Fa  or  Gb’)’—where  names for  the  sentences 
embedded in the ‘that’-clauses (formed by enclosing them within quotation marks) are placed in 
the second argument  place  of  the relational  predicate  ‘Sxy’ (‘x has  the  same content  as  y’). 
Suppose that ‘Gb’ is true—so ‘Fa or Gb’ is true—but ‘Fa’ and ‘Rab’ are false because a does not 
exist. Then the beliefs attributed to S in (1') and (2') are false, while the belief attributed in (3') is 
true. The analysis avoids the missing constituents problem: if the embedded sentence is false due 
to reference failure, the ascribed belief will be also false. Since any two representations (whether 
mental of linguistic) have the same truth-value if they have the same content, the analysis entails 
that the belief has the same truth-value as the sentence embedded in the ascription’s ‘that’-clause. 
Consequently,  the  analysis  also  avoids  the  structure  problem:  by  mentioning the  complete 
embedded sentences, it specifies the right truth-conditions for the ascribed beliefs. (Notice that 
this is precisely what Wittgenstein recommended in his criticism of Russell’s theory, although he 
did not articulate an analysis of ascriptions.) For example, the analysis of (1) as (1') entails that  
S’s belief is true if and only if Fa. The full inference is the following:
(P1) Some belief of S has the same content as ‘Fa’. (P2) ‘Fa’ is true if and only if 
Fa. (P3) Any two representations have the same truth-value if they have the same 
content. (C) Therefore, some belief of S is true if and only if Fa.
Here (P1) is the analysis’ paraphrase of ‘S believes that Fa’, (P2) is an uncontroversial instance 
of the equivalence schema and (P3) is an equally uncontroversial principle. The conclusion (C) 
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shows that the analysis ascribes a belief with the right truth-conditions. The logical form of this 
inference is as follows:
x(Bxs & Sx∃ ‘Fa’)
T ‘Fa’ ↔ Fa
x y[Sxy → (Tx ↔ Ty)]∀ ∀
 x[Bxs & (Tx ↔ Fa)]∴ ∃
Where ‘Tx’ = ‘x is true’. (Recall that ‘Bxs’ = ‘x is a belief of  S’ and ‘Sxy’ = ‘x has the same 
content  as  y’).  This  is  a  valid  argument  form and  it  remains  valid  when  replacing  the  all 
mentioned and used instances of ‘Fa’ with instances of any other sentence. This shows that any 
belief ascription under the proposed analysis has the right truth-conditions.
Finally, the analysis  I  propose can handle attitude ascriptions with logically  complex 
embedded sentences as easily as it can handle simpler ones, just with the resources of standard 
first-order logic. This is already shown by the analysis of (3) as (3'). But consider (4) ‘S believes 
that  ~ y(Fy)∃ ’. The analysis of (4) as (4') ‘ x(Bxs & Sx∃ ‘~ y(Fy)∃ ’)’ does not use ‘~’ or ‘ y∃ ’ in a 
predicate argument position: they are merely parts of the name for the sentence that specifies the 
content of S’s belief. (3') and (4') are well-formed and ontologically unproblematic. They are as 
plausible and harmless as the statement that the Spanish sentence ‘Dios no existe’ has the same 
meaning as the English sentence ‘God does not exist’.
Even if a sophisticated multiple relation analysis like Moltmann’s were able to avoid the 
problems of Russell’s version without collapsing into propositionalism—which is unclear—its 
treatment of logically complex ‘that’-clauses would nevertheless be implausible. Consequently, I 
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doubt  that  the  multiple  relation  theory  can  be  successfully  resurrected.  Russell  did  well  to 
abandon it following Wittgenstein’s advice.
Neither the early Russell’s account of propositions nor his subsequent account of beliefs 
solved the problem of the unity or structure of the truth-bearer. On his Notes on Logic from 1913, 
Wittgenstein proposed a simple solution: “Propositions... are symbols” (Wittgenstein 1969: 98). 
The  sentential symbol ‘Rab’, for example, has the symbols ‘Rxy’, ‘a’ and ‘b’ as constituents 
(Wittgenstein 1969: 98). There is no problem accounting for the unity of the sentence, which is 
provided by its syntactic structure. As Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebooks on 1914: “Does the 
subject-predicate form exist? Does the relational form exist? ...everything that needs to be shewn 
is  shewn  by  the  existence  of  subject-predicate  SENTENCES”  (Wittgenstein  1969:  2-3).  Of 
course, the structure of sentential symbols was never a problem for Russell.  In fact, he used 
symbolic logic to uncover the hidden structures of sentences that traditional logic mistakenly 
analyzed as having simple subject-predicate forms—such as ‘The present King of France is bald’ 
which, Russell (1905) showed, has the complex form ‘ x{[Kx & ∃ ∀y(Ky → x=y)] & Bx}’: i.e., 
‘there is unique thing which is King of France and this thing is bald’). But Russell was convinced 
that the primary truth-bearers themselves contained no symbols—whether in his early account of 
propositions or in his multiple relation theory of beliefs—and regarded the symbols used in logic 
as a “theoretically irrelevant convenience”. This conviction made syntactic structures unavailable 
as candidates for the structure of truth-bearers. Wittgenstein’s suggestion that “propositions” are 
symbols places not only symbols, but also syntactic structures, in the truth-bearers themselves.
By 1918, Russell finally accepted sentences as truth-bearers: a “proposition is just a...  
complex  symbol...  that...  has  parts  which  are  also  symbols:  ...a  sentence  containing  several 
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words... is therefore a complex symbol” (Russell 1918: 10). By 1919, he extends the view to 
cover mental representations, whether they are made out of mental words and mental images 
(Russell  1919:  29).  Russell’s  truth-bearers  are  finally  concrete  linguistic  and  mental 
representations. Similarly, Wittgenstein (1922) uses the word ‘proposition’, as Horwich points 
out, to refer to “a  sentence with its meaning, and not, as is more common these days, to refer 
merely to the  meaning itself that a sentence might have” (Horwich 2012: 76n). Wittgenstein’s 
“propositions”  are  structured  combinations  of  meaningful  symbols  or  representations.  Like 
Russell,  he  intends  the  view  to  cover  mental  representations:  “The  applied,  thought, 
propositional  sign  is  the  thought.”  (Wittgenstein  1922:  3.5).  While  Russell  (1919)  and 
Wittgenstein  (1922)  do  not  offer  an  account  of  attitude  ascriptions,  notice  that  neither  the 
analysis  of  ascriptions  as  stating  single relations  between  agents  and  mind-  and  language-
independent propositions, nor Russell’s multiple relation analysis, is compatible with their view 
that beliefs are concrete structured representations that are truth-bearers in their own right—i.e., 
primary truth-bearers.  But  the  analysis  of  ascriptions  as  proposed  by  Devitt,  which  I  have 
defended in Chapter 1 and in this appendix, does offer a compatible alternative.
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